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Summary of Work
This thesis examines methods of appraising and financing capital projects in the shipping 
industry. Detailed interviews were held with 52 companies/individuals and 19 banks, with a view to 
identifying behaviour patterns in the area of investment and financing decisions. It was found that 
approaches to investment and financing decisions varied according to the size and nature of companies, 
and their activities. Three broad categories of company were thus identified, covering large public 
companies, smaller public companies and large private companies, and small or "entrepreneurial" 
companies. Further stftdivisions were made according to the nature of activities, namely liner or bulk 
operations. Detailed analyses of behaviour in these three categories were then made, and similarities 
and differences identified. An analysis was also carried out of the approach used by banks in 
considering their lending decisions for the shipping industry, and the implications of this behaviour for 
company decision making. The results of these analyses suggested a more complex approach to 
investment and financing decisions than is implied by finance theory, and identified a number of points of 
overlap and linkage between the areas of finance and strategy. These analyses enabled an empirical 
assessment to be made of the practical relevance of the theory of finance as it relates to investment 
and financing decisions in the shipping industry, and also permitted the identification of a number of 
areas of overlap and linkage between finance and strategy. A descriptive model was developed of 
investment and financing decisions in the shipping industry, which seems likely to provide insights into 
behaviour in other industries.
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Chapter 1
Objectives and Content of the Study
_L Alms and Areas of Investigation
The purpose of this thesis was to examine methods of appraising and financing capital projects in 
the shipping industry. The approach used, which is summarised below, enabled a number of important 
things to be done.
(i) It enabled a detailed analysis to be made of the way in which capital projects are analysed and 
financed within a specific industry, namely shipping.
(ii) It enabled an empirical assessment to be made of the practical relevance of the theory of finance, 
as it relates to investment and financing decisions, albeit in one particular industry. The initial thrust 
was on the more generally accepted aspects of the theory of finance, but a number of criticisms of. and 
extensions to this theory were also assessed in relation to the findings.
(iii) As the thesis developed it became dear that considerable links existed between the area of 
finance and that of corporate strategy. It thus proved possible to examine the relationship between the 
two areas and to identify certain areas of overlap and linkage which enabled finance theory to be set 
more firm ly in a corporate strategy context.
(iv) in fact, after these assessments had been made it proved possible to set out a descriptive model 
(albeit in general terms) of investment and financing decisions in the shipping industry. Given the 
diversified nature of a significant number of the companies in the sample, it is quite likely that such a 
model would also provide useful insights into investment and financing decisions in companies in other 
industries. The findings thus provide a detailed framework for further research.
Nevertheless, it must be recognised that this thesis is essentially concerned with the financial and 
economic aspects of investment decision making. It is not intended to be seen as an attempt to devise an
2all embracing theory of decision making, but rather as an attempt to identify the nature of. and the 
weighting given to. the various aspects of economic and financial analysis within the decision making 
process, as it relates to investment and financing, in a specific industry.
Interest in this area was prompted by a number of factors.
(i) Shipping is an extremely capital intensive industry, with the cost of new vessels running into 
many millions of pounds. Host decisions, therefore, require careful consideration, and appraisal could 
reasonably be expected to cover strategic issues, individual project analysis and alternative financing 
methods. An examination of the decision making process should thus provide useful insights into the 
relative importance of these aspects, and inter relationships between them.
(ii) The industry is one which is international and extremely competitive, with overcapacity existing 
at world level, and likely to persist for some years. It is. or has been, a cyclical industry, with long 
periods of recession typically being followed by short periods of boom. The risks are high, and 
forecasting is difficult. Therefore one might expect that methods of dealing with risk would be fairly 
well developed. As a minimum the study should provide considerable insight into ways in which 
decisions are made in extremely volatile and uncertain environments.
(iii) Concessionary interest rates and other subsidies are frequently available for capital acquisitions. 
Loans of approximately 80% of the capital cost of an asset are typically available. The effects of 
easily available subsidised financing packages has put more emphasis on alternative financing methods 
than one would expect to find in. say. a manufacturing concern. It also means that debt/equity ratios 
can be much higher than for companies in many other industries. One might, therefore, expect that 
views on capital structure would be clearly defined. The opportunity clearly exists for a wide range of 
alternative capital structures. A study of the industry would thus afford the opportunity to assess the 
perceived Importance of capital structure In Investment decisions. If no optimal capital structure were 
found to exist, serious questions would need to be raised about the discount rate to be used in the 
application of dcf techniques.
(iv) Prior to commencement of this study, a number of investment appraisals drawn up for ship 
acquisitions had been examined. These suggested that a certain confusion existed in the industry 
between the investment and financing decisions. Cash flows used for discounting purposes typically 
showed both operating and financing flows (i.e. included capital repayments, plus interest charges). Dcf
3returns calculated were thus returns on the equity interest in projects, and not total project returns. 
Such an approach, when coupled with a difficult forecasting exercise for operating flows (and often with 
considerable optimism on the part of decision makers) made possible the calculation of reasonable 
returns on equity for projects which were really quite poor -  provided that large sums were borrowed 
at subsidised rates. This in turn reduces the incentive for using equity, and makes the estimating of 
individual project risk quite difficult. Several questions arose from this. First, did shipping companies 
typically make dcf calculations which combined both financing and operating aspects of a decision? 
Second, if they did. what kind of discount rate did they use? Third, did such calculations usually have 
the effect of increasing the reliance on borrowed funds as compared with the use of equity? Indeed, 
could the generally acknowledged shortage of equity (at least in the UK) be partly attributable to the use 
of faulty appraisal techniques? Fourth, how was operating risk and financing risk separated and 
assessed in relation to individual projects?
Questions such as these suggested that an important atm of this study ought to be the assessment 
of the relevance of certain parts of the theory of finance, relating to investment and financing 
decisions, found in the majority of standard finance texts. Specifically the study ought to provide an 
assessment of the practical relevance of finance theory in the shipping industry in the following areas: 
(I) The extent to which share price or wealth maximisation was seen by decision makers as an
objective, whether explicit or implicit. Other corporate objectives could be identified in the study, and 
an assessment made or their Importance.
(ii) The extent to which discounting techniques, and other appraisal techniques were used in making 
investment decisions, and their relative importance. The basis of the various calculations used would 
be identified.
Oil) The extent to which investment and financing decisions could be separated.
(iv) The extent to which perceived optimal capital structures existed.
(v) Linked to these last two was consideration of the choice of discount rate used when discounting
techniques are used.
Questions such as these, however, represent only part of the process. Given the wide ranging 
criticisms which have been made of finance theory, and the existence of an important area of literature 
covering corporate planning and strategy, it was decided to broaden the questioning to include wider
4issues covering strategic, economic and industry Issues. Clearly such questioning needed to be fairly 
specific, given that the aim was the identification of potential links between finance and corporate 
strategy, and the emphasis was thus placed on questions relating to economic and financial analysis. 
The following areas were thus specifically addressed:
(i) The strategic issues which were considered in recent or planned vessel acquisition, or other 
major investment decisions within the company, and their relative importance in the final decision.
(ii) The commitment of the various companies to the industry, or sections thereof - this was linked 
to questions about diversification/specialisation, etc.
(iii) The extent to which "macro' variables were considered in decision making and the type of 
variables considered important. Questions in this area developed as the linkage with corporate planning 
and strategy became more apparent.
(iv) Whether different types of vessel were appraised in different ways, and the reasons for any 
such differences.
(v) Methods of forecasting for different types of investment, and the nature of the number crunching 
exercises gone through.
(vi) Methods of financing investment in shipping, and views taken on different forms.
(vii) Attitudes towards exchange risk.
When taken together, answers to these questions enabled a fairly clear picture, or series of 
pictures, to be drawn, as to how companies actually approach Investment and financing decisions in 
shipping. In fact behaviour patterns were found to differ across the companies included in the analysis, 
depending in general upon the type of company and the activities in which they engaged. Three principal 
categories of company were identified, and detailed analyses of behaviour for these categories follow 
in later chapters. These analyses provide an opportunity to relate actual behaviour to the traditional 
theories of finance (together with various extensions and criticisms), and to identify potential or 
actual links with corporate strategy. They also provide the framework for the development of a 
descriptive model of investment and financing, based upon observed behaviour in the companies included 
in the survey. This model is clearly based upon an analysis of the factors identified above. No 
systematic attempt was made to address issues relating to the impact of such things as organisational 
structures, internal politics, or inter-personal behaviour on the decision making process. The weakness
5of such a model is apparent, but similar weaknesses can be seen to exist in most theories or models of 
rational economic behaviour, and certainly in the theory of finance. The model developed can 
nevertheless be seen as a positive theory based upon actual behaviour.
In identifying behaviour patterns, and establishing alternative theories, it is necessary to 
ascertain the extent of any constraints on decision making imposed or influenced by the suppliers of 
finance, and to assess their impact on corporate decision making. For this reason a study was also 
included of bank attitudes and approaches in the following areas:
(i) Any distinguishing features of shipping as an industry, as compared with other industries.
(ii) Information required (or expected) by the bank from the applicant.
(ill) The Information available within the bank Itself, and its use In the decision making process.
(iv) Criteria used in making a lending decision.
(v) Types of finance typically available, and the terms on which it is offered.
(vi) Attitudes towards lease finance and credit worthiness: specifically leasing and debt capacity, and 
leasing and the period of finance.
(vli) Views on capital structure/gearing considerations.
(viii) Covenants or accounting ratios required.
(ix) Future trends in the provision of finance for the industry.
Some of these areas are clearly linked to the tests of finance theory referred to earlier, particularly 
those relating to capital structure, accounting ratios, and accounting information generally. For 
example. If the banks consider debt/equity ratios to be an important lending consideration, they udll be 
an important consideration to the investing company, because of the amount of debt finance typically 
taken up. Other areas referred to above are specific to the industry. Answers to these questions help 
to establish the particular context in which decisions are being made, and the importance of that 
context.
Z  Structure of the Thesis
The structure of this thesis follows the above ideas, and consists of the chapters identified
6below.
Chapter 2 provides an outline of the Industry. In order to provide an understanding of Its size and 
peculiarities. Nowhere in this study was any attempt made to generalise results into non-shipping 
areas. This may well be possible, particularly for large quoted public companies, but evidence was 
collected in the context of this particular industry, and the limitations of the study must be recognised.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on finance, and identifies key concepts and theories, together 
with major criticisms levelled at the theories. It aims to provide an overview of the theory of finance, 
as It relates to investment and financing decisions, against which subsequent findings can be measured.
Chapter A reviews the literature on corporate planning and strategy, together with related 
approaches. However, It must be recognised that the aim of this chapter Is rather different to that of 
chapter 3. Among other things, this thesis aims to to identify areas of overlap and linkage between 
ideas from finance theory and those relating to corporate strategy. It does ool aim to analyse 
systematically the practical relevance of the various theories and supporting techniques relating to 
corporate strategy. Its principal thrust is financial. This chapter should be seen in this light, as 
providing an overview of the literature on the area, so as to provide a basis for the identification of the 
areas of overlap and linkage between Ideas from finance theory and those relating to corporate 
strategy.
Chapter 5 sets out the methodology to be used In this study, covering the overall approach, the 
basts of the interviews and sample selection.
Chapter 6 sets out the results of a survey on bank practice as regards lending on ships. The 
behaviour of banks can be seen as an important contextual influence on behaviour within shipping 
companies.
Chapter 7 outlines the approach used in the Shipping Company pilot study, together with some 
tentative models of behaviour for the companies to be analysed.
Chapter 8 analyses investment and financing behaviour in category 1 companies, namely large 
public companies with considerable shipping Interests. Various Interesting differences according to the 
type of activity or nationality are also identified.
Chapter 9 analyses behaviour in category 2 companies, namely smaller public companies and 
medium to large private companies, with considerable shipping interests.
Chapter 10 analyses behaviour in small or "entrepreneurial* companies including a number of
Greek companies.
Chapter 11 summarises the results of the previous three chapters, and Identifies the major 
areas of similarity and difference between the three categories, so as to provide a framework for both 
an assessment of finance theory, and the development of a descriptive model, in the area of investment 
and financing decisions in the shipping Industry.
Chapter 12 relates the results of the previous four chapters to chapters 3 and A, so as to 
provide an assessment of the practical relevance of the theory of finance in this area, and to identify 
areas and ways in which the theory can be improved, together with an identification of areas of 
overlap and linkage with corporate strategy. A descriptive model of Investment and financing decisions 
in shipping is then set out. based upon observed behaviour. The thesis concludes with an indication of 




_L Introduction to and Structure of the Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the industry, so as to set subsequent 
discussion and analysis in context. The chapter specifically aims to describe the nature of the industry, 
to identify any features of the industry which require particular attention, and to identify the more 
important commercial aspects and problems facing the industry at the time of the analysis (1982-4). It 
perhaps needs to be noted that the commercial problems facing the industry in 1987 seem to be 
relatively unchanged from those facing the industry in 1982-4. Particular emphasis will be given to 
those aspects and problems which relate most closely to the investment and financing decisions.
Given the complexity of the industry the chapter is subdivided into the following sections.
(i) The nature of the Industry. This section will cover shipping as a service industry; the 
relationship between the demand for shipping services with 6NP (including reference to possible 
distortion effects); types of shipping services, together with their organisation; the international 
nature of the industry and its geographical spread; and a variety of political influences, specifically 
relating to national flags and flags of convenience, the UNCTAD Code and less developed countries, the 
impact of Soviet policy, shipbuilding, and shipping subsidies.
(ii) Capital intensity, costs and financing. This section will cover such things as the absolute size of 
the industry; an indication of typical costs involved; typical approaches to financing; and current levels 
of equity in the industry.
(iii) The current commercial setting in the industry. This section will examine the current situation 
with regard to supply/demand relationships; the volatility/cyclicality of the industry; and a variety of
9other factors of potential significance for shipping companies. These will include reference to political, 
commercial and technological factors.
(iv) Particular features of the industry In the UK and USA. This is considered necessary given the
preponderance of such companies In the analysis.
Z  The Nature of the Shipping Industry
2J. Shipping as a Servine industry
It is important to recognise that shipping is a service industry, with the aim of providing 
transport for goods and materials from one part of the world to another. The demand for shipping 
services is thus a 'derived4 demand, being dependent on the demand for goods and materials. While 
certain forms of transport, such as pleasure cruises and holiday travel, may be regarded as 'consumer 
services', the demand for the vast majority of shipping services will depend upon the level of economic 
activity and the desire to transport goods and materials from one place to another. Clearly social and
political factors can influence the demand for shipping services as well as economic factors. For
example, subsidies can be used to encourage trade on certain routes considered to be socially and/or 
politically desirable. Military cargoes or cargoes to support political initiatives (e.g. the exportation of
aid in the form of grain cargoes from the USA to Egypt) also clearly influence the overall level of
demand for shipping services. Overall the demand for shipping services will thus depend upon the level 
of economic activity, together with a number of other social and political factors.
In fact the relationship between the demand for shipping services and GNP has traditionally been 
fairly stable. Just as GNP has followed a somewhat cyclical pattern, so has the demand for shipping 
services. Various estimates have been made of the relationship between the two. and a 1% change in 
GNP has typically been associated with a 2% change in the demand for shipping services. In the USA a 
I % rise in US GNP was estimated to produce a 1.336X increase in total US waterborne commerce, 
over the period 1958-1978. (Simat 1979)
The implication of the above is that it would be relatively easy to predict total waterborne 
cargoes if  GNP could be predicted reasonably accurately. However, the above relationship relates to a
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period of much greater political and economic stability than is now found, and far less confidence exists 
with regard to the continuation of the same relationship into the future. In more recent years GNP has 
been affected by such things as foreign economic activity, particularly that relating to OPEC, and the 
greater development of government social and regulatory programmes. The oil crisis undoubtedly left 
Its mark in terms of the Western nations, with growth rates of 6NP in the 1970's being much lower 
than those of the I960's. Uncertainties remain about the underlying strength of the economies of 
various countries, and the efficiency of governmental economic policies. In short, there are now 
considerably more uncertain variables, or distortion effects, involved in projections of GNP and 
associated growth rates than there were in previous years. Such things as changes In the demand for, 
and cost of. energy, particularly oil; crop failures; politics (e.g. USA/Russian grain embargo, the Gulf 
conflict, etc.); all impact on GNP and associated growth rates. The prediction of GNP. and hence the 
demand for shipping services. Is thus now a much more difficult exercise.
Some indication of these problems can be seen from Figure 1. showing total OECD production 
from 1970 to 1903. Of particular interest in this context Is the difference in forecast figures over a 
six month period, indicating the difficulties experienced even by the most sophisticated analysts. The 
volatility of the figures over recent years is also evident.
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Figure 1. Total OECD Industrial Production (1970 -  1983)
Source : Lloyds Shipping Economist -  December 1983.
The position with regard to disaggregation of GNP figures into industries, commodities and 
related trade routes is even more difficult. Disaggregation of this type requires a much more
sophisticated set of data, covering historical data for commodities and trade routes, together with 
estimates of GNP for trading partners and predictions of trade flows between nations. In making 
estimates of this type the aspirations and political attitudes of trading partners need to be considered, 
together with the likelihood of delays/strikes, crop failures, developmental or other aid. changes in the 
industrial infrastructure of the trading partners, and political developments such as protectionism, 
cargo sharing, etc. Exchange rate fluctuations can pose particular problems, as is evidenced by the 
serious imbalance in the North Atlantic trades in recent years, caused by the relative strength of the 
dollar in relation to European currencies.
The overall conclusion of this section is that the total demand for shipping services is a function 
of GNP and GNP growth, plus a variety of other complicating variables, and is unlikely to be influenced 
much by anything done by the shipping companies themselves (other than at the margin, for such things 
as cruising, ferries, etc.). Forecasting the overall level of demand for shipping services is thus an 
Increasingly difficult exercise. Forecasting levels of demand for individual trade routes requires even 
more variables to be included, with a corresponding increase in the difficulty. This difficulty of 
forecasting Is an important factor in subsequent sections of this study, since traditional appraisal 
methods place great emphasis on forecasting cash flows relating to new projects. Difficulties of the 
type outlined above are likely to have an impact on the importance attached to these methods.
2 2  Shinning Services -  Type and Organisation
The purpose of this section is to provide background information on the shipping industry, in 
terms of market segmentation, ship types, and related areas of activity.
In considering the shipping industry it  needs to be recognised that ocean shipping is a highly 
diversified industry, which covers numerous separate markets, each with its own, unique economic 
characteristics. The days when most ships could carry all sorts of different cargoes are long gone, and 
the market is now effectively segmented into a number of distinct areas. Brief details of the major 
ship types are given in Table 1, while an indication of the relative importance of ship types in terms of 
tonnage is provided by Table 2.
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Ship Type
1 i i i  ^
Description
Container Ship Vessel designed to carry containers (usually in twenty or 
forty feet units). May be fully cellular (i.e. completely 
containerised) or partial. Some containers may be 
refrigerated. Containerships in most trades are volume 
and not weight limited.
Roll on/roll off Ship Vessel designed to carry highway trailers (e.g. wheeled 
containers) with a clear intermodal capability, able to 
interface directly with land transportation.
Barge Carrier A vessel designed to transport barges instead of 
containers. Barges can typically be loaded/unloaded 
away from docks
Dry Bulk Carrier Vessels designed to carry large quantities of bulk cargoes. 
May be sub-divided into ore., coal and grain.
Combination Carrier Vessel designed to be able to carry more than one 
specialised cargo, e.g. oil and bulk carrier (080).
General Cargo Ship Vessel designed to carry a variety of dry cargo.
Other Dry Cargo Ships Variety of specialised vessels to carry such things as 
forestry products, cement, livestock, vehicles, fru it etc.
Oil Tanker Vessel designed to transport oil products in bulk quantities. 
Of a variety of sizes, including very large crude carriers  
(VLCC's) and ultra large crude carriers (ULCC’s).
Chemical Tanker Vessel designed to carry chemical products.
Liquified Gas Carrier Specialist carrier for gas products -  Liquified Natural Gas 
(LNG) and Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG).
Parcel Tanker Vessel designed to carry small parcels of different liquid 
and chemical products.
Other Tankers May include tankers designed for special purposes 
e.g. asphalt, bitumen, molasses, wine and vegetable oil.
Passenger Liner Vessel designed to carry passengers -  used for specified 
routes and/or cruises
Ferry Vessel designed to transport goods/passengers/vehicles 
on a prescribed route.
>
Table 1. Major Ship Types
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Types '0 00  tons gross
Oil tankers 175,004
Liquified gas carriers 7,393
Chemical tankers 2,249
Bulk/oil carriers 26,241
Ore & bulk carriers 83,355
General cargo 82,610
Container ships 1 1 ,274
Other vessels 3,121
Total 391,247
Non trading types 28,663
World total 419,91 1
v. --------y
Table 2. Types of Ships in the World's Merchant Fleet 
Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping Statistical Tables, 1980
The majority of ships in the world operate either as liner vessels or as tramps. The distinction 
between them basically relates to their method of operating and the emphasis of their marketing 
efforts. For a detailed analysis of these differences see Sletmo and Williams (1981) and Frankel 
(1982). A summary is given below. Table 2 indicates clearly the importance of the liner and bulk 
trades, particularly the latter, in relation to the overall world supply of tonnage. In passing it  is worth 
noting that the passenger trade does not account for a very large proportion of the total, although 
clearly it  may be significant for individual countries or companies.
Unec-Qpfiralions
The Liner services follow published, relatively fixed schedules, on pre-determined routes. This
*
in bum has a profound effect on the type of cargo carried, and thus on the method of carriage. As 
Sletmo and Williams (1981) have pointed out. the importance of the availability of scheduled services 
varies with the type of products shipped. Raw materials, such as ores and oil. tend to be carried in 
quantities which can justify the use of a complete ship, often, but not necessarily, on a regular basis. 
Use of such vessels can thus be arranged by the shipper (through charters) as and when convenient. On 
the other hand, manufactured goods, which are likely to be sold in many different markets, are 
typically shipped in relatively small lots, and certainly usually take up only a small part of the capacity 
of a liner vessel. Given the competitive pressures which exist in the various markets for manufactured 
goods, it  is important for businesses to know that they can ship their goods quickly and efficiently, at a
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predetermined time and cost, and this is the function of the liner trades. Since manufactured goods are 
typically high value goods It is not surprising to find that the liner trades account for a greater 
proportion of total shipping income than one might expect from the tonnage committed to this particular 
sector of the market. Sletmo and Williams (1961) estimate that in 1970 the liner trade accounted for 
some 20% of total tonnage but 43% of total shipping revenues.
Clearly the emphasis of the liner trades is the carrying of relatively small consignments of goods 
for many shippers, fhe development of the container vessel and what is referred to as intermodal 
transport’ reflects this market. A Tull load' for a shipper may be a container, rather than a ship, and 
the container can be transported from manufacturer to retail outlet, using trucks, rail, and ships. The 
development of the container fleets reflects the needs of the industralised nations. Hence liner vessels 
on routes between less industrialised nations are likely to be less specialised in terms of the amount of 
space given over to containers.
Liner operations are typically significantly more expensive than other forms of shipping 
operations. The vessels themselves are costly to build and operate. Perhaps more important is the 
need for a sophisticated Infrastructure of support services, notably expensive terminal operations and 
agency networks. For this reason liner companies are often large companies, sometimes being part of a 
larger, diversified conglomerate. In recent years the search for economies of operation has led to 
substantial increases in the size of liner vessels. (e.g. the ordering of 12 container ships, each with a 
container capacity in excess of 4000 twenty foot equivalent units (TEtTs) by United States Lines.)
The size and productivity of modem liner vessels Is such that they typically w ill represent a 
significant proportion of cargo carrying potential on a particular route. Hence if  liner companies are to 
make adequate returns it  Is Important that liner routes do not suffer from excess capacity, and that 
some degree of coordination exists on each route. Sletmo and Williams have estimated that even on the 
North Atlantic run. which carries some of the largest volumes of trade, no more than 30 vessels are 
needed. They point out that this trade volume is likely to support no more than six to eight competitive 
and efficient liner companies operating on this particular route. Very few services offer the kind of 
volume that exists on the North Atlantic run. and the implication is clear that other routes are unlikely 
to support as many operators.
Sletmo and Williams (1981) point out that cargo volumes cannot typically be increased 
significantly by reductions in rate levels. Shippers are thus in a strong bargaining position in relation to
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shipowners, unless some kind of countervailing bargaining power can be introduced by the latter. 
Typically this Is achieved by the use of liner conferences or consortia, covering specified routes. 
These organisations set tariffs and schedules for the routes coming within their agreement. All 
conference members typically have to follow laid down and agreed policies, which may include such 
things as the allocation of trade shares, restrictions on discounts and rebates, and pooling of earnings 
and sailings. Sletmo and Williams (1981) consider that liner conferences are the main way in which 
owners of liner companies can enhance their bargaining power, in what are inherently unstable 
markets. They point to the problem of developing rate structures which will ensure that the liner 
companies achieve reasonable utilization levels, so that fixed costs, which are substantial, can be 
covered, and reasonable levels of profitability can be achieved.
The Tramn Trades
The tramp ship, by comparison with liner ships, has no fixed itinerary. It picks up cargo where 
needed, and typically looks for new business for each voyage, dost tramp ship voyages are made on 
behalf of a single shipper, and most carry a full load of a bulk commodity such as coal or grain. The bulk 
trades include both dry bulk, covering Iron ore. grain, coal, alumina, phosphates and a number or special 
and minor commodities, and also liquid bulk, typically referred to as the tanker trade. The tramp 
trades also include general cargo ships and other specialist ships such as forestry products carriers. 
While there is a wide range of commodities which are carried on tramp ships the principal cargoes are 
oil. iron ore. grain and coal, which account for the bulk of the ton-mileage and therefore determine the 
volume of shipping requirements.
The tramp ship satisfies specific transient needs, as they arise. Basically the tramp shipowner 
offers an operating ship. This vessel can then be ‘chartered* on a Voyage' basis or a time' basis. No 
published information exists specifying shipping charges or schedules for particular movements of 
cargo, although considerable information is available on recently agreed fixtures' (i.e. prices for 
specified cargoes on specified routes for specified periods of charter). A person who wants to charter 
a vessel (or part of it) w ill ask a broker to examine the market and find the tramp shipping companies 
which w ill offer the lowest price or hire. Strictly, rates are negotiated for each individual charter, but 
rates reflect market conditions, and considerable guidance can be obtained from current rates being 
obtained by shipowners. Rates will vary according to such things as the risks involved, the nature of
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the cargo, and the time of the charter. Long-term charters are generally likely to be slightly cheaper 
than short-term charters, since they provide regular employment In an otherwise volatile industry. 
Charters generally take one of four forms.
(i) Voyage charter -  where a vessel is hired to transport a specified cargo from one port/s to 
another port/s.
(ii) Time charter -  where the charterer gets the use of a vessel for a particular period of time.
(iii) Bareboat charter -  where the charterer hires a vessel, without crew, for a given period of time. 
The charterers thus take responsibility for all operations of the ship and for all operating costs.
(iv) A contract of affreightment -  which is a long term agreement with a shipowner to ship a certain 
amount of cargo between two ports, on vessels and at times of the shipowner's choice.
It should be dear from the above points that the characteristics of the tramp shipping markets 
are quite different to those of the liner markets. For example, it is quite possible to enter the tramp 
shipping market with a single ship, so no large corporate infrastructure is needed. Inevitably, the 
conference system is virtually non-existent in the tramp trades, since companies can enter and leave 
the market easily, quickly and relatively cheaply (at least in relation to the liner trades). The fairly 
fundamental differences between the liner and tramp trades account for significant differences in 
behaviour, as will be seen in later chapters.
2 J l Size and Spread nf the Industry
Shipping is one of the few truly international industries in the world. The Fairplay Shipping Year 
Book for 1981 listed 43 nations with merchant fleets. The largest fleet listed was in fact that of 
Liberia, about which more w ill be said in the next section, since Liberia is a Tlag of convenience” 
registry. The other major flags were (in decreasing size order): Japan. Greece, United Kingdom. 
Panama. USSR, Norway and the USA, with gross tonnage for each country in this leading group of 
between 18 and 80 millions. A further nine nations had registered gross tonnage of between 5 and 12 
millions. This group included nations such as China. Spain and India. The remaining nations listed had 
registered tonnage of between 1 and 5 millions. This group contained a variety of different nations, 
from developed nations such as Canada and Australia, through Communist block nations such as Poland 
and Romania, middle eastern nations such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and others such as Argentina.
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Cyprus and Indonesia.
Obviously, a large number of nations have an active interest in shipping. However, the 
dominance of the fleets of the firs t two groups referred to above needs to be recognised. In terms of 
the volume of world tonnage the firs t nine national flags (or flags of convenience) listed above, account 
for approximately 2/3 of the total, with the next group of nine accounting for approximately 18X. 
fhis dominance by certain nations, particularly the developed nations, has led to certain pressures for 
change, which are dealt with below.
Shipping is not only a large industry In terms of geographical spread. It is an enormous consumer 
of capital. Costs of acquiring ships are very high. For example Table 3 includes a selection of actual 
new building prices reported by Fairplay in 1980.





2 Multi-purpose dry cargo 15,000 UK mid 1981 £ 10 5 m total
2 Refrigerated cargo liners 10,000 UK mid/end 1981 £25 m total
3 Bulk / container (1466TEU) 70,000 S. Korea Sept-Dee 1982 US$99 m total
3 Container (1700 TEU) - Netherlands mid 1981/2 US$114 m total
2 Coal bulk carriers 138,000 S.Korea Feb/Apr 1982 US$80 m total
Geared bulk 38,500 Japan May 1982 Y 6,000 m
2 OBO carriers 76,000 Japan 1982 US$86 m total
2 Crude oil tankers 120,000 UK late 1982 £50 m total
Products carrier 19,500 S.Korea 1981 US$16 m
6 LNG carriers 125,300 USA 1982/3 US$1,000 m total
Table 3. Examples of recent newbuilding prices 
Source: Fairplay Shipping Year Book 1981
Clearly the size of the investment decision for a shipping company is considerable. The cost of 
individual vessels may run into many millions of US dollars, particularly for specialist ships such as 
LN6 ships or cruise ships. Costs of in excess of 1150M per ship would not be unusual in these areas. 
For companies planning investment on a fleet basis the costs are massive. For example, the order by 
United States Lines, of twelve 4.000 ton TEU container ships is estimated to have cost between 600M 
and 700M US dollars. The cost of building these ships in the United States, (they were built in S. Korea)
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would probably have been at least twice this figure. Oceanic Finance Services Ltd. in a 1979 Datapaper 
analysed the amount of capital that the shipping industry had used between 1970 and 1978 on 
newbuildings. They estimated the delivered cost of newbuildings for the world commercial fleet for the 
period to be approximately $120.00011. Certain assumptions were made which might result in slight 
inaccuracies in this figure, but the basic message remains. If one considers that these figures excluded 
the Russian and Eastern bloc countries, and the Liquified Gas Carrier Fleet, it is clear that the above 
figure represents a conservative estimate of expenditure for the period. In the same paper it was 
pointed out that, given the need to replace tonnage delivered in the early seventies, it was unlikely that 
the expenditure in the early eighties w ill fall below US $ 15.000 million per annum. These figures make 
it clear that shipping investments are likely to be major decisions for the companies concerned, 
justifying detailed analysis at both a strategic and a project level.
2A Political factors affecting the Industry
Given the international nature of the industry, with large numbers of suppliers and customers,
one might expect the shipping markets to act in a way which is close to that associated with the
economic analysis relating to conditions of perfect competition. Such an idea is reinforced by the 
extremely efficient flows of information relating to the industry, with close to perfect knowledge (of 
the current situation) being possible. In practice a high degree of efficiency does exist within the 
shipping market. However, there are a number of influences which might be described as politically 
based, which de-stabilise the industry. These influences, which are dealt with in more detail below, 
tend to lead to decisions being made in some sectors of the industry, where the profit motive is not 
necessarily paramount. This in turn may lead to profits being less than one might expect in conditions 
of perfect competition. It is therefore not always possible to earn even an adequate (i.e. normal) level 
of profit. The major influences considered are:
(i) The position and importance of the flags of convenience
(ii) The aspirations of the less developed countries, particularly through the UNCTAD Code
(iii) The impact of the communist bloc countries, and the difficulUes western companies have in
compeUng with fleets of such countries, operating under difficult political and economic systems
(iv) Maritime aids and subsidies
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(v) The importance of the shipbuilding industry in political terms 
(vt) Issues of national security
In practice it is frequently difficult to determine precisely which influences are most important 
at any one time. Political pressures change dramatically over short periods of time. However, in 
making assessments of future trading conditions, shipping companies have to consider these factors, 
and make judgements accordingly. As an example of the difficulties involved, and the reasons behind 
certain political decisions, it is worth considering the position of the United States with regard to cargo 
preferences and cargo reservation. Horison (1984a) has estimated that in 1980 more than one third 
of the cargoes, by volume, of US flag vessels, were hauled because of the cargo preference rules. 
Whether such a governmental response is due to concerns of security, unfair competition, shipbuilding 
capacity, or any other political pressure, is far from clear.
The potential importance of political influences of the type Identified above, and analysed in more 
detail In succeeding sections, is enormous. The problems, however, of incorporating such variables into 
forecasUng and appraisal for individual companies, are considerable. Frequently these factors seem 
likely to form part of a background against which strategic decisions are set. with broad Judgements 
being made of the likely Impact of the various influences at a parUcular time. However factors such as 
these are handled, they are likely to have a considerable impact on the decisions of most shipping 
companies, either ImpliciUy or explicitly, at some stage or another.
Flags of Convenience (FQCS)
A vessel registered in a parUcular naUon is said to be operaUng under that naUon's flag*. The 
significance of this is that a vessel Is subject to the law of the country whose flag It Is flying, and the 
rules and regulaUons of the naUonal ship agencies. Income and profits taxes also depend upon the state 
in which shipping companies are domiciled. The so-called Flags of Convenience* have developed to 
encourage the registraUon. in parUcular countries, of vessels whose beneficial owners reside 
elsewhere. In general Flags of Convenience are associated with more liberal regimes in terms of tax 
and operaUng regulaUons. A particular feature which frequently arises is that FOC ships, even if 
beneficially owned by companies from the developed naUons. are manned by low cost crews from the 
less developed countries. Significant cost differenUals thus exist for FOC registered ships as compared 
with those of other National flags, with perhaps the greatest differences being found with American
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ships.
FOCs have Incurred the displeasure or UNCTAD, because of the fact that the neets or the 
developing countries increased only slightly in the seventies, as a proportion or the world fleet. The 
employment or seamen rrom less developed countries, on FOC ships, Is held to be partly accountable for 
this Fact (see for example Branch (1982) P219-222). Generally, therefore, the less developed 
countries are pressing for the removal or Flags of convenience.
In the developed nations much of the opposition to FOCs comes From two Fronts. Firstly the 
trade union movement is clearly concerned with the loss oF Jobs to national members oF their unions. 
The second cause For opposition comes From strategists and politicians concerned with the maintenance 
oF a merchant marine capable oF being used by a national government In a Ume oF urgency. Vessels 
registered under the national flag can clearly be requisitioned in such circumstances. (e.g. the 
requisitions made by the British Government at the time of the Falklands). FOC ships, even beneficially 
owned by developed nations, are not so easily obtained and controlled.
It perhaps needs to be pointed out that FOCs are not seen as bad by all parties. Indeed, from the 
viewpoint of many shipowners in the developed world (particularly the USA) FOCs represent a 
■solution' to the problem of being able to participate in markets In which they could not compete. IF they 
were Forced to operate at their own domestic costs. There is no doubt that without FOCs there would 
not be much of an American presence internationally in the bulk trades. US ships are simply not 
competitive in these markets, and the business typically goes to owners who can ofFer efficient 
operations at the lowest cost. Companies in other developed countries are moving In the same direction 
(e.g. consider the recent decision by BP to flag out Its remaining ships). As it is, FOCs have enabled the 
American controlled Fleet under the Liberian and Panamanian flags to be built up to the stage where It 
accounts For more than 10X of the total bulk tonnage in the worlds merchant fleets. 6iven that it costs 
two to three times more to build and maintain a ship in the USA than in many other countries, with 
crew costs two to eight times more, it is clear that without FOCs the United States would not be in the 
international bulk trades at all.
Other developed nations have used FOCs For similar reasons to the USA. Some countries have 
used them For political reasons. For example. Israel. South Africa, Taiwan, to head off difficulties 
which might arise in trading with particular countries. Several Hong Kong owners appear to have used 
FOCs in preference to the British flag. Several Greek companies used FOCs during the period of
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political instability in Greece, but most of these have now changed back.
The growth of the FOC fleets is confined to the bulk trades, as distinguished from the liner 
trades. In fact the growth of these fleets roughly parallels growth in the international bulk trades. 
Given the various pressures which exist in the system, both political and economic, it is not clear that 
this relationship will continue indefinitely into the future.
The UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences
The UNCTAD Code is a proposed procedure governing the operation of liner conferences, which 
may have a significant impact on certain companies operating in the liner trades. The origins of the 
code can be traced back to the dissatisfaction of the less developed countries with their share of trades, 
and in particular their ability to join ‘closed* conferences to Europe and Japan.
The principal points of substance in the code are that conferences w ill be 'open* to the national 
lines of the countries they serve, but membership for carriers of other countries (so called third flag 
countries) may be limited. Cargoes carried by a conference between two countries shall be shared 
equally by the ships of those countries, except for a portion made available to third flag cross traders. 
The proportion generally suggested for cross traders is 20%, hence the so-called 40/40/20 rule. The 
code also proposes that decisions regarding trade between two countries cannot be taken without the 
consent of the national flag lines of both.
In fact considerable reservations exist with regard to this code, principally from the developed 
nations. Various reactions have reduced the impact of the code on cross traders. For example, the 
European countries developed the Brussels Package* in 1979, which limits cargo sharing provisions to 
their trades with emerging nations, considerably reducing the potential impact on trade between 
developed nations. The 40% allocation to the fleet of an EEC state and the 20% set aside for 
cross-traders will be left open to the fleets of all EEC states and to those of any other OECD states 
which agrees to apply the same formula to their own trades with developing nations.
The Code received sufficient ratification to be implemented in 1983. It remains as a political 
factor of potential significance in years to come. The United States has been a particularly strong 
opposer of the Code, as is evidenced by the following comments taken from the Journal of Commerce -  
Morison and Dunlop (September 23 1983).
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<Maritime Administrator Harold £. Shear warned ... that i f  forthcoming talks 
fa il to Wont' the impact on the US flag carriers o f the UNCTAD Code o f Conduct fo r 
Liner Conferences, this country is  prepared to ac t."
"... i f  the discussions with the CS6 (Consolidated Shipping 6roup) are 
unproductive and US flag carriers are shut out o f their cross trades, the United 
States is prepared to take firm  action to counter such discrimination ... (such steps) 
could be in the form o f restricted access o f cross-traders to our trades".
Statements such as this simply reflect the long held opposition of the USA to cargo allocation of 
this type. In 1979 President Carter, in a speech deploring the general trend towards such allocation 
measures, and the UNCTAD Code in particular, said.
"We shall continue to resist the imposition o f cargo-sharing regimes whether 
bilaterally or m uitiiateraiiy.
"At the same time we should not allow our interests to be compromised by the 
actions o f other nations which may impede the ab ility  o f our ships to participate in 
world trades. Cargo sharing policies adopted by other nations cannot be allowed to 
force our ships from any trade in which they should be entitled to compete. While it  
is  our poiicy to refra in  from cargo sharing agreements as a generaI matter, we w ill 
be prepared as in the past to protect the competitive righ t o f US carriers . '  (See 
Nemirow 1979: P12)
The US has thus negotiated a number of cargo sharing agreements where considered necessary to 
protect US interests, with countries such as Argentina. Brazil and Russia. Further developments in this 
area must be seen as likely.
Clearly the UNCTAD Code, together with the cargo sharing response which might be developed in 
response to it. w ill introduce a further degree of uncertainty into the liner trades. At least one banker, 
Mr. Jim Davis, has pointed out that the liner code does nothing to enhance the creditworthiness of liner 
companies.
"The Liner code, through weakening the hold o f the established operators in 
some o f the ir tradftionat trades and probabfy encouraging the placing o f further 
orders fo r new tonnage by developing country lines, does nothing but deepen my 
pessimism concerning the general prospects o f liner shipping as a suitable sector fo r 
commercial financing. ’  (See Buckingham 1983)
The code must therefore be seen as a force for change which introduces greater insecurity to the 
liner industry in terms of both trade shares and financing ability.
The impact of the Soviet and Eastern Bloc Countries
By the end of 1983 the Soviet merchant fleet was estimated to number some 7.500 ships, 
making it  the worlds largest in numbers. This of itself might not be significant if the fleet operated
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along strictly commercial lines. However, this appears not to happen. The Soviets have been accused 
of cutting rates to levels well below cost, with a view to capturing a large share of the trade. It has 
been estimated that Soviet ships move about 5-6X of all world cargoes although the Soviet economy 
generates only 2.5X of world trade (Tagliabue 1984). In certain parts of the world the imbalance is 
much greater. For example, Russian ships are estimated to carry about 20 times as much cargo as 
German ships in West German/Soviet trade. Particular concern has been expressed by leaders of both 
Government and business in Europe at the Soviet inroads. Accusations have been made that the Soviets 
operate without paying attention to costs, making competition virtually impossible. Undoubtedly Soviet 
lines have achieved considerable inroads into certain trade routes previously dominated by the 
Europeans e.g. coffee and cotton, by undercutting prices by substantial amounts (see Tagliabue).
There is little  doubt that the attitude to costs and profits is very different between Soviet bloc 
countries and Western countries. Costs themselves are considerably lower for the Soviets, with fuel 
generally being available at pre-1973 prices, crew costs being much lower, and depreciation and 
financing costs being low or non-existent (see for example Stryker 1979). The two systems are 
simply not comparable. Soviet crew members regularly undergo military training, and can be used for 
a variety of military purposes. Soviet vessels are generally much more heavily built than Western 
merchant ships, which are designed with economy in mind. They thus have greater military potential 
than Western ships. This in turn has led a number of western observers to express considerable 
concerns about the impact of Soviet merchant marine policy on the security of the West. Concerns have 
been expressed most strongly in the United States, where the strength of the Soviet merchant marine is 
In stark contrast to the weakness of the American merchant marine (or at least that part registered 
under the American flag). It has been argued that naUonal security has an economic dimension which is 
being threatened by the growth and policies of the Soviet block fleet (Van Her 1979). Precisely how 
such threats w ill be perceived by western governments, and the effect that ft w ill have on policies that 
affect shipping. Is unclear. This point w ill be returned to in a later secUon.
Oaritime Aids and Subsidies
Given the large number of suppliers of. and customers for. shipping services, one would expect 
the market to operate freely and efficienUy. In practice this is not so. Government assistance in one 
form or another is common, and it has been argued that the level of a nations involvement in shipping is
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a function of the assistance level (Stryker 1979). Indeed, a Maritime Administration publication. 
Maritime Subsidies 1978. published In December 1978, detailed the maritime assistance programme or 
58 different nations. The principal forms of direct aid offered to the merchant fleets of these nations 
were identified as:
Operating subsidies for ships 
Subsidies applied to ship construction 
Trade In allowances for ships 
Low interest loans
Subsidies on payments of interest on loans 
Government guarantees of loans to shipowners 
Accelerated depreciation of assets for purposes of taxation 
Tax free reserve funds
Duty free imports of materials needed for ship construction 
Cargo preference schemes
Restrictions on foreigh-flag shipping in domestic trade (cabotage protection)
Maritime research programs.
Not all of the above were used by any Individual nation and no standardised pattern seemed to exist. 
Each nation appeared to adopt whatever methods seemed most likely to ensure the survival of their 
merchant neets.
Assistance is not confined to countries of a particular type, but covers the developed nations, the 
less developed nations, and the communist nations. For example, a further Maritime Administration 
Study -  The Maritime Aids of the Six Major Maritime Nations (1977). showed that the quantifiable 
direct assistance provided by these six countries, for the maritime industry, including grants, credit 
and financing help, and tax allowances (but excluding cargo reservation), averaged about $ 1 £8 per 
year for the period 1971-75. Subsidised loans for the acquisition of new vessels are generally 
available in the OECD countries at 8 1/2X over 8 1/2 years. This position certainly applies in the UK. 
and the rules on capital allowances have until recently provided further substantial assistance to the 
industry in Britain. Japanese shipping companies have typically been able to obtain 65-75X of the cost 
of vessels in the form of loan finance, with interest differential subsidies being available. Export 
credits for vessels constructed in Japanese yards are usually available. For developing countries very
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heavily subsidised finance appears to be available to finance orders for ships to be built in Japan. e.g. in 
1979 Pakistan was granted a Y 15B loan In return for a six ship order. The terms included a 10 year 
grace period and repayment In 30 years at an annual rate of 3.5%. In Norway, a reduction of 
approximately 26% In construction cost was Introduced from 1979, together with 80% loans over 12 
years, at 8% and with a grace period of three years. In the United States a subsidy has been available 
to assist with the construction of vessels in US yards. This subsidy, known as Construction Differential 
Subsidy (CDS), was paid on US flag ships for use in foreign commerce, and reflected the difference 
between the domestic cost of a proposed vessel and the estimated foreign cost of the same vessel, up to 
a lim it of 50% of the total cost. Detween 1970 and 1978 CDS contracts were made to aid In the 
construction of 94 new vessels. Subsidised Shipping orders totalled approximately $55 with subsidy 
being $ 1.95. A further 49 vessels were reconstructed or reconditioned. (Source Marine Engineering 
log -  June 1983). No funds are currently being made available for CDS. so it may be a thing of the 
past. However. Charles Hiltzheimer, when Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Sea-Land 
Industries, estimated that CDS would have to be raised from 50% to at least 67% and then on to as 
much as 75% in the near future. If the cost of vessels built in US yards were to be equivalent to that of 
vessels built in foreign yards (see Deargie 1983). Such a statement implies that the political 
pressures for further CDS funding will be considerable, since without such funding the future for 
American Shipyards looks bleak. Evidence of this can be seen from various press reports (e.g. Morison 
1984b). Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS) Is also obtainable in the United States. This Is a form of 
direct financial assistance to help US flag operators compete effectively with foreign shipping lines. It 
is designed to offset the competitive advantages enjoyed by lower cost foreign companies. A third form 
of support provided in the United States Is that of TiUe XI financing guarantees. Under this system the 
Maritime Administration can guarantee debt financing up to 87 1/2% of the total actual cost of 
construction of a vessel. Shipowners are thus able to obtain long term debt finance (over periods of up 
to 25 years) at rates which are slightly above US Treasury issues.
Assistance is also available in the less developed countries, even though relaUvely low labour 
costs give such countries a significant competitive advantage. In many cases assistance is given with 
the cost of building vessels, a point which w ill be returned to in the next section.
As was made dear in the previous section considerable support also exists for the industry in
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the Communist nations. Such aid is difficult to quantify, given the nature of the communist economic 
system, but certainly includes effective subsidies on labour, fuel, insurance, depreciation and interest.
A system with large elements of aid and subsidy clearly distorts market prices somewhat. 
Whether this is sensible or not is not an issue which will be addressed here. The fact remains that such 
aids exist. Companies thus need to be fully aware of all the subsidies and other assistance available, 
and to take advantage of them, if they are to compete with other efficient (i.e. low cost) operators. 
Even then, they may not be able to compete with efficient companies operating under different flags. 
Shipping companies performance, and hence their investment, has the potential to be significantly 
affected by governmental policy on aids and subsidies. To most shipping companies such a statement is 
self evident. This is unfortunately not true of most Governments.
The Shipbuilding Industry
Shipping and Shipbuilding are different, but related Industries. Shipping Is to do with the 
provision of waterborne transport services. Shipbuilding is about the provision of ships for these 
services. Shipping profitability is clearly influenced by the relative supply of vessels and the demand 
for services and in an efficient market the demand for ships would depend on this balance. By 
comparison, the shipbuilding industry would supply ships as long as "normal* profits could be earned 
from building them.
In practice a number of distortions exist, which prevent an efficient balance being achieved. The 
reasons for these are broadly as follows:
(i) Shipbuilders are not concerned with the profitability of the shipping markets per se. but with the 
sales of ships. They are not directly concerned with the use to which the ships they build are put. or 
with the overall number of ships.
(ii) A shipyard represents a substantial source of employment, since shipbuilding is a labour 
intensive industry. In many areas a long tradition of shipbuilding has led to the shipyard being one of. If 
not the most, important sources of employment in the area. In many of these areas other employment 
has typically been based on the heavy industries, many of which are now in decline. In the UK such 
areas include Tyneside. Clydeside and Belfast. Inevitably in such areas the social and political 
pressures to maintain employment wherever possible are enormous. Given the nature of shipbuilding it 
has thus become a politically sensitive industry. Shipbuilding is thus often actively supported and
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assisted by Governments, even where no such support is forthcoming for the shipping industry.
(iii) A further political aspect is that some governments consider It necessary to ensure that 
domestic shipbuilding capacity does not fall below a certain level, usually for reasons of long term 
security and Independence.
Examples of the above can be found in numbers of areas in the world. For example, the Journal 
of Commerce (Porter 1903) reported that between 1979 and 1903 British Shipbuilders received 
nearly £750 million of government support, but was still unable to compete with the hugely subsidized 
shipbuilding industries of Third World Countries. The report went on to say that Korean yards were 
currently quoting prices for ships that would cover only the material costs in European yards. A week 
after this original report (0arnard 1903) the paper quoted Sir Robert Atkinson, then Chairman of 
British Shipbuilders, who had coupled a scathing attack on price-cutting by Japanese and South Korean 
yards with a stark warning that without State aid the UK Shipbuilding industry will wither away. He 
stated that some fundamental decisions would have to be taken by the UK Government if merchant 
shipbuilding and marine engineering were to be sustained in the UK. The net effect of pressures of this 
type in the system is a shipbuilding capacity which is greater than is really needed to satisfy the needs 
of the shipping industry. The effect of this on demand/supply relationships can be considerable. This 
w ill be reconsidered in a later section.
Issues of National Security
Underlying many of the actions of governments are broad concerns related to national security, 
in both military and economic terms. Even where such concerns have not been translated into effective 
action, poliUca! lobbies of potential significance remain. For example. William Neuhauser (1900). 
Executive Secretary of the National Maritime Council, has argued that a strong U.S. Merchant Marine is 
essential to US national Security. He saw this as a critical component of deterrence. The Soviet Union 
must know that the U.S. is both willing and able to send men and material to a potential war zone in 
quantities sufficient to deprive it  of gains through military aggression. He went on to point out the 
deficiencies of the US Merchant Marine in terms of its supportive capabilities, and to argue for a new 
comprehensive maritime policy for the United States.
Other observers have expressed concerns in relation to economic security, pointing out that a 
certain size merchant marine Is essential If a nation Is not to have the potential of being held hostage
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over essential imports. For example Van Her (1979) pointed out that only 4% of US import and export 
tonnage was carried by American flag vessels. He compared this with figures of 50X for Russia. 40X 
for Japan, and 30-40X for most West European nations. He further pointed out that the US was self 
sufficient in only 3 of 71 basic materials essential to US national defence, and that the US had become 
virtually 100X dependent upon foreign flag ships for delivery of these goods. Neuhauser himself had 
raised similar points in 1979. stating that,
I f  new trade and maritime policies are not promptly forthcoming we w ill see 
more US Liner company bankruptcies -  and we w ill see more American ship yards go 
under. The end result could well be the Russians and others completely dominating 
our commercial sea ianes, perhaps to the point where trade terms are dictated to us, 
much as the o il rich  OPEC nations are doing righ t now. '
In Britain the security issues were probably at their most apparent in recent years, at the time 
of the Falklands crisis, when a number of British flag ships were requisitioned. Whether such an 
exercise could be mounted even only a few years later is now debatable, and must surely be a concern 
for government.
Security issues arise periodically, and w ill be treated dlfferenUy according to the political views 
of governments In power, and to the political conditions existing at the time. There is seldom any real 
consistency of policy. Nonetheless. Issues of this type can have a bearing on the support for. and hence 
the nature of the shipbuilding and the shipping industries of a nation.
i  Costs and Financing
3.1 The nature of shipping costs
It has already been pointed out that shipping is a highly capital intensive industry, with current 
costs of new vessels and related facilities being extremely high. Frankel (1982) has estimated that the 
replacement cost of the world's shipping fleet is estimated to be well in excess of $2806 (in 1980 
terms), and that total annual investment in newbuildings would grow to $258 per year by 1990. 
Interestingly, he goes on to point out the increased importance of financing costs, which together with 
fuel expenditures often make up approximately 60 per cent of total costs. This puts considerable 
emphasis on the identification of an appropriate investment financing strategy, making this aspect of the
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decision fairly crucial in terms of the success of the investment. Financing costs may well be 
considerably influenced by the choice of flag and country of ownership, since these influence such things 
as the eligibility for subsidies, credit terms, tax benefits, etc. Operating costs will also be heavily 
dependent upon the choice of flag. For example US flag ships are governed by various rules and 
agreements which effectively result in manning costs being very high in relation to those of other flags. 
The cost of manning a flag of convenience ship is thus very much lower. Indeed, the cost of manning a 
flag of convenience ship is also considerably lower than that of a UK ship. A United Nations study on 
comparative labour costs, published in 1979. indicated that annual manning costs in 1975 for a typical 
32 man tanker crew varied from $320,000 for a developing country, $300,000 for a Greek crew. 
$402,000 for a British crew. $050,000 for a Norwegian crew, to $ 1.750,000 for a US crew.
Costs of running a shipping company can be broken down into four areas.




The costs relating to the firs t of these represent by far the largest proportion or total cost, 
although the cost of terminal facilities may be significant for a liner company. Principal costs 
associated with the ship Include:




(v) repair and maintenance
(vi) supplies
(vii) cargo handling costs
(viii) brokerage
The firs t three are very largely fixed, representing a significant proportion of total costs. This 
poses problems in Ught market conditions since variable costs can be covered at rates which pose 
serious problems of long term profitability and survival. In the short term it is clearly beneficial to 
keep operations going as long as variable costs are covered and a contribution to fixed costs is being
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made. In the long run fixed costs must be covered and profits made if further equity capital is to be 
attracted into the industry.
One considerable advantage of the above cost structure, which was found to be of significance in 
this study, was that shipping companies were found to have considerable confidence in their estimates 
of the costs of operating ships. The two most critical variables appear to be interest rates and oil 
prices.
One further point worth noting is that in shipping economies of scale can be very significant. 
Manning costs certainly do not increase in proportion to increases in ship capacity. Larger ships 
therefore offer significant potential reductions in costs per ton mile, or cost per TEU mile, provided 
that the larger vessels can be fairly fully utilised. Larger ships, running on more fuel efficient engines, 
with smaller crews, could change the cost structure of the Industry significantly.
3*2 Methods of acquiring and financing vassals
Placing an order with a shipyard is probably the most usual form of acquiring a new ship. Such 
an acquisition can be financed in one of or a combination of the following ways.
(i) The owner's own funds. This has become far less significant in recent years, given the enormous 
cost of acquiring new ships. Even so it  has been estimated that between 1970 and 1978 the 
international shipping community found some US$ 24.000M from its own equity sources. (Oceanic 
Finance Corporation 1979) The use of the owners own funds ensures that control remains with the 
owners, and that the risks associated with debt finance are avoided.
(ii) Shipyard finance. Typically some 70-80X of the cost of a vessel can be financed by a loan from 
the shipyard building the vessel, often at a subsidised rate, for periods of between 7 and 15 years. 
Standard OECD terms, which are thus available for most western world companies, provide for 80X 
finance, at 8 1/2X per annum interest, over 8 1/2 years. It is sometimes possible to obtain higher 
proportions, over longer periods, with various concessions being granted with regard to grace periods 
before repayment commences. Examples have been found of loans for 100X of cost, over 12 years, at 
7X p.a. interest, with grace periods of two years. Other loans covering 90X of the cost have been 
available over 15 years. The typical loan period however, is probably of the order of 8-10 years.
(iii) Leasing. This method increased in importance in the 1970's, but still represents a relatively
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small proportion of total financing. It appears to be only available for blue chip companies. Typically it 
provides 100% finance over 12-15 years. Leasing is seen by many owners as reducing flexibility, and 
its advantages depend upon the tax position of the company concerned.
(iv) Commercial bank credit. Given the general availability of relatively cheap yard credit, it is 
unusual to find commercial banks being asked to finance new ships in total. However, many companies 
find themselves unable to finance even the 20-30% needed if they use shipyard credit. Commercial 
banks are thus used to 'top-up*' such loans. Interest on the 'top-up’ portion is at commercial rates, and 
is dependent on the calibre of the borrower and the collateral provided.
(v) In the USA Title XI finance can be used for ship acquisition. Title XI financing takes the form of a 
government guaranteed corporate bond, usually for a period of 20-25 years. The bond will usually 
cover up to 87 1/2% of the cost of acquisition, and the rate of interest will typically be marginally 
higher than on government bonds. The bonds are tied to specific vessels. In assessing applications for 
Title XI support, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) go through a number of steps to assess the 
economic feasibility of the proposal, and will only lend if  it  is satisfied. It thus acts in a similar way to 
a commercial bank.
Second hand vessels are almost entirely financed from owners equity and commercial bank 
credit. An efficient sale and purchase market operates through sale and purchase brokers. Banks will 
typically require a range or collateral to back up a ship loan, covering such things as a firs t or second 
mortgage, assignments of earnings, guarantees or covenants, etc.
Over the next decade it Is likely that yard credit, commercial bank loans, and Title XI finance
(USA only) w ill be the major sources of funds for new vessels. New equity is likely to be limited, for
the following reasons:
(i) Only good Corporations are likely to be able to raise capital on the stock markets, and they are 
unlikely to put much of their own money Into a depressed market such as shipping.
(ii) Serious limits exist to the wealth of owners of private companies.
(iii) Retained earnings are unlikely to be high given the current market sltuaUon.
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±  The Current Commercial Environment in Shipping
± 1 Supply/Demand- Relationships
Section 2.1 indicated that a close relationship can be expected between the demand for shipping 
services, and GNP. As GNP changes so does the demand for shipping services. The last few years 
(1980 on) have seen a fairly serious recession in much of the developed world, with a consequent 
reduction in the demand for shipping services. Some improvements have occurred since 1983, 
particularly in the United States, but a certain pessimism remains about the world economy generally. 
By comparison the supply of vessels has not changed as dramatically. A large ship of the type used in 
international commerce is likely to take some time to design and build. Once built there is no technical 
reason why a vessel should not operate for a period in excess of 15 years. Some increase in the rate of 
scrapping has occurred, and ships are being scrapped at much younger ages than was once the case 
(e.g. supertankers have been scrapped only seven years after completion). Nevertheless, the reduction 
in the supply of ships which would be needed to achieve equilibrium with demand has simply not 
occurred. The pressures from the shipbuilding industry remain, and new buildings continue. In some 
cases, for example, the massive order for container ships placed by United States Lines, new orders 
w ill have a significant effect on the supply side figures for certain types of ships. A supply/demand 
imbalance currenUy exists, and seems likely to continue for some time In the future.
Figure 2 illustrates the state of the overall shipping market since the beginning of the 1970’s. 
The catastrophic effect of the 1973/4 oil crisis can be seen, as can the effects of the recession of 
1980. Major changes in policy with regard to building and scrapping are clearly needed if  a significant 
move towards equilibrium of supply and demand is to be achieved. It is likely to be several years 
before such an equilibrium is achieved, even if. such policies were to be implemented.
Figure 2 relates to the overall market. Similar concerns exist when the market is 
disaggregated by type and size. In fact the problem is slightly different in the various sectors with 
different relaUonships existing. Table 4 summarises the position in various markets. These figures 
indicate overcapacity in all areas, of varying degrees, ranging in 1983 from 8X in general cargo ships 
of 15000 dwt + to 115% for supertankers. Clearly the opportunity for making reasonable profits in the 
supertanker market is virtually zero, given this kind of relaUonship.
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Figure 2. World Merchant Shipping (1970-1984) 
Source: Lloyds Shipping Economist -  December 1983
The information provided in the original source (Lloyds Shipping Economist -  December 1983) 
includes projections which incorporate known orders, together with assumptions about scrapping. The 
expected supply figures for the end of 1986 are thus shown in the final column. These figures are based 
on actual supply in November 1983, plus orders known in September 1983. less scrapping assumed to 
continue at the same rate as before. Not surprisingly, the expected figures show a substantial 
reduction in supply for the two larger categories of tanker, presumably through continued scrapping. 
Even so the figure for supertankers still suggests a major imbalance continuing. Rather more 
surprisingly, the figures for expected supply for the dry bulk sector show increases, in two cases 
fairly dramatic increases. Given the already high overcapacity such a move appears surprising, and 
would suggest that freight rate levels for the bulk sector would continue to be low for some time. The 
actual figures for November 1985 are included in Table 4, to enable judgements to be made about 
current supply/demand relationships. Given that interviews were carried out in the period 1982-84, 
the figures for November 1983sfiould be seen as providing a context for the decisions discussed.
Similar concerns exist in the liner trades. A number of liner companies have invested in larger, 
more efficient tonnage. In some cases existing tonnage has been maintained by the companies thus 
increasing their overall capacity. In other cases some existing tonnage has been sold off. a policy which 
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'Fears among finer operators that vessels sold on the second-hand market 
would go to independent or nationally backed companies that could undercut rates on 
directly competitive trades through lower capita! and operating costs appear fu lly  
ju s tifie d ." (Slots for Sale, Lloyds Shipping Economist. December J983)
There is little doubt that the increase in container carrying capacity achieved by recent newbuildings 
have not been compensated for by equivalent scrappings.
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Table 4. Supply demand relationships for different sectors/sizes of ship 
Source: Lloyds Shipping Economist -  December 1983/5.
Overcapacity is clearly a major problem in shipping. Indeed, it  has been held to be at the root of 
the shipping industry's problems (see for example Daily Commercial News -  January 27 1984). The 
various political influences referred to earlier have played a major role in reaching this situation. 
Nevertheless, there are large elements of "fashion following" in the industry, which undoubtedly 
contribute towards the problem. For example, consider the substantial increases which have occurred 
in the number of 40,000 dwt bulk carriers since 1980, in spite of the overall supply/demand figures.
The implications for freight rates and corporate profitability of a situation of considerable 
overcapacity are serious. Douglas (1984) pointed out that most ocean transportation was being 
provided at freight rates which were well below full cost, often covering little  more than fuel and 
labour expenses. This has serious long term implications for the Industry in terms of the incentive to
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re-invwt, or even to remain in the industry. Douglas argues that in a time of considerable surplus 
capacity, even cost reduction schemes are unlikely to lead to increased profits, since the free market 
will drive rates down to close to running cost level. Without such schemes, however, shipowners will 
not be able to compete.
±2  Forecasting Problems and Industry Volatility
it has already been pointed out that forecasting the demand for shipping is difficult, particularly 
when overall demand is disaggregated by type and route. Yet freight rates will largely depend upon the 
relationship between supply and demand. 6iven that supply is relatively fixed in the short run. and 
demand is difficult to forecast, it is not surprising that freight rates are extremely volatile. Given also 
the overcapacity which exists it is also not surprising to find that they are very low. In many cases 
covering variable costs but not fixed costs. The price of ships is in turn largely influenced by expected 
profitability, either through use or subsequent disposal. 6iven that profitability is dependent on freight 
rates and disposal values the price of second hand ships fluctuates somewhat, with scrap value likely to 
set a floor to the price.
The industry is thus in a fairly volatile state, and is subject to considerable short term 
fluctuations. At present (1987) rates are not high. Forecasting future returns is thus difficult. 
Figures 3 and A provide an indication of the kind of changes in freight rates that have occurred in recent 
years.
Figures 5 and 6 provide equivalent figures for second hand price trends over the same period. 
The same broad trends are apparent in both figures. Even the newbuilding price trends (see figure 7) 
indicate a response to the freight market.
Variations in rates are not uncommon. However, until recently the variations followed a 
reasonably cyclical pattern. Rather more doubts now exist as to whether this cyclicality will continue, 
certainly with the same regularity. More recent observers (for example, Hargreaves 1983), have 
been predicting longer periods of recession between short upturns In the market. Whether such 
predictions will be correct remains to be seen.
Other variables causing considerable problems with regard to forecasting are interest rates and 
exchange rates. Interest rates, as well as being volatile, have also been very high, giving higher than
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Figure 7. Newbuilding Price Trends -  Japan 1 9 7 9 - 1983 
Source Lloyds Shipping Economist -  December 1983
usual real rates of return to lenders, but posing problems for an industry with large borrowings. 
Exchange rate fluctuations have caused headaches for shipping companies because of their effect on 
trade flows, frequently causing substantial trade imbalances (e.g. Europe/USA). Such imbalances, 
apart from being difficult to forecast, pose serious problems in terms of operating efficiency. In some 
cases in recent years containers have been filled with scrap metal for the Eastbound Atlantic run. 
simply to get containers back where they are needed for traditional liner cargo. Fluctuating exchange 
rates have also introduced other problems for shipping companies. Changes in rates of exchange 
between the domestic currency and the US dollar (the generally accepted currency for shipping 
transactions) may cause considerable differences in effective costs, and therefore profitability. Loans 
taken out in other than the domestic currency carry with them the risk of potential exchange rate gains
or losses as exchange rates change.
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4.3 Other factors of potential impact on shipping companies
The political factors outlined in section 2 of this chapter all have the potential to affect company 
profitability. Perhaps of most significance are
(i) impacts on potential cargo of such things as cargo preference agreements, and increases in the
fleets of the eastern bloc countries and those of the less developed countries,
(ii) the potential impact on costs of various forms of subsidy and of registering under a flag of
convenience.
Commercial trends or developments not already identified include the use of speculative funds to 
acquire vessels, particularly tankers, in the hope of achieving capital profits in the event of a rise in 
the value of the vessel. Pressures for tighter cost control and cost reductions are also increasing. In 
certain cases, particularly the liner trades, these pressures are likely to lead to larger ships, leading 
to economies of scale, greater use of fuel efficient engines (typically slow speed diesels), and greater 
parity of manning costs (see for example Hiltzheimer 1982). The search for parity of manning costs 
may lead to increased "flagging out" from certain national flags (e.g. USA and UK) . or to reduced 
crews, often with more technologically advanced and automated equipment.
Technological issues of significance centre on three main areas, energy conservation, ship 
design, and modem communications methods. Energy conservation relates to the use of energy efficient 
hulls, effective maintenance, and efficient energy conversion levels. Changes in ship design are of two 
types, one concerning the efficiency of the vessels, the other concerning the efficiency and/or 
flexibility of cargo handling and transportation. Changes in communication methods are likely to lead to 
significant changes in decision making, and in the commercial responsibilities of masters.
The poliUcal influences referred to in section 2 make it  likely that yard credit w ill remain at 
similar levels to those currenUy available, with subsidised interest being common. TiUe XI finance 
clearly represents an efficient means of financing American vessels, and is likely to be used by 
American companies for as long as possible. Commercial bank credit w ill probably remain a significant 
source of financing for purchasers of second hand vessels, and/or top-ups for companies in certain 
nations. Leasing is likely to be confined to the best companies, parUy because of availability, partly
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because of borrowers preferences.
5. The Shipping Industry in the UK and the USA
5.1 The United Kingdom
The UK has a long tradition in shipping, and has historically been a major maritime nation. UK 
shipping has traditionally been a significant contributor to UK invisible earnings. In 1980 net earnings 
from UK owned ships were in excess of £1.000 millions, a figure which was approximately half of the 
net invisible earnings of the City of London. In recent years however, the shipping industry in the UK 
has suffered a decline, from a high point (in terms of gross registered tonnage) in 1976, of just over 
30 millions grt. to just above 20 millions grt by 1981. Capital expenditure on ships for the UK fleet has 
slowly declined in money terms over the same period, with a more significant decline being evident 
when the figures are calculated in real terms, in spite of this, investment in 1980 still amounted to 
more than £400 millions, and in 1981 to more than £250 millions. (Source British Shipping StatisUcs 
1981 Tables 2.8. 55)
Perhaps the main reason for the decline in the UK industry in recent years is the relative cost 
advantage of flags of convenience and certain national flag fleets. It is difficult to know whether there 
has been a significant decline in UK beneficially owned shipping, but many British companies now operate 
under the Liberian flag, or other flags of convenience.
British companies can obtain finance for new ships under standard OECD terms. Taxation rules 
have, until recently, been particularly favourable in the UK, with free depreciation effectively being 
allowed on new ships. The recent changes from this position w ill pose further problems for the 
industry. Shipbuilding costs in the UK are relatively high, but there are no restrictions on registering 
foreign built ships under the British flag.
The situation facing British shipowners is not untypical of that facing shipowners in most 
developed nations. The concerns are probably greater than in some countries, because of the relative 
importance in the past of the merchant marine, in terms of invisible earnings, and the very clear 
decline over the last ten years. Nevertheless an analysis of behaviour in British shipping companies is
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likely to give similar results to those that would be achieved in most developed nations.
5.2 The United States. aL America
The shipping environment and associated markets for shipping companies in the USA is 
effectively split into two quite different sectors. The Merchant Marine Act 1920, the Jones Act. 
states that cargo can be transported from one place to another in the United States only on vessels built 
and registered in the United States. US domesUc trades are thus effectively limited to US flag ships, 
built in the United States. Protection of this sector of the industry means that low cost foreign 
operators cannot undercut domestic companies. The significant cost differentials which exist in both 
building and operating US vessels, as compared with foreign vessels, are of no importance for Jones 
Act trades. All parUcipants in domestic trades compete on the basis of domestic costs. Given the very 
high costs of new buildings it is not surprising that a significant part of the domesUc fleet is extremely 
old, since the competitive forces are not as great as in other markets.
The foreign, or international market, has no such restrictions. US shipowners competing in the 
international markets are subject to most of the rigours of international competition, subject to the 
reservations given below. US companies involved in international trade may operate under the US flag, 
or under a flag of convenience. US flag ships have to follow certain rules and regulations, not least that 
ships normally have to be built in the USA and be manned by US crews. (In recent years the rule about 
ships needing to be built in US yards has been temporarily relaxed, provided that such ships are only 
used on foreign trade, and not Jones Act trades.) American flag ships involved in foreign trade may 
obtain certain advantages, through such things as:
(i) construction subsidies (construction differential subsidy -  CDS) -  though funds have not been 
available for this in recent years.
(ii) operating subsidies (operating differenUal subsidy -  ODS), which may be available on certain 
routes.
(iii) availability of TiUe XI finance.
(iv) cargo preference contracts.
Details of the firs t three can be found on pages 24/25 of this chapter. Cargo preference contracts 
relate to the carrying of government (or government sponsored) cargoes. In spite of these advantages
41
US Dag rules typically put most companies at a serious cost disadvantage in relation to foreign 
competition, particularly with regard to building costs and manning costs.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the US flag share of US oceanborne foreign trade has declined 
significantly in post war years, from 42.5% of total tonnage in 1950, 20.7% in 1956 to 4.5% in 1901. 
In value terms the corresponding figures for 1956 and 1981 were 33.8% and 15.5% respectively. 
(Source Shear 1983). The liner trades have held up best (26% of total US oceanborne liner tonnage in 
1981). partly because of the sudsidies, partly because certain US liner companies are in the forefront 
with regard to efficient and advanced container vessels. Indeed the US flag ’ foreign’ fleet can be seen 
to consist principally of two types of vessels:
(i) highly efficient/high technology/expensive vessels which can compete internationally in spite of 
labour cost disadvantages.
(ii) other ships which operate at significant cost disadvantages, but which survive through subsidies 
and cargo preference deals.
In practice, the US flag fleet represents a relatively small part of the US beneficially owned 
fleet. Many US companies operate vessels under other flags (parUcularly Liberia and Panama). While 
forfeiting the advantages identified above, such companies avoid the cost disadvantages of the US flag. 
To all intents and purposes such a company faces the same problems as any other company in the world 
operating under the same flag of convenience (with the possible exception of tax if  domiciled in the 
USA). Such a company is thus highly unlikely to have its ships built in the USA. or to employ American 
crews.
In any analysis of ’American’  shipping, the above differences need to be clearly recognised.
Chapter 5
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Review of the Literature on Finance
JL Introduction
The purpose of this chapter and the next is to review the literature relating to this particular 
study, and to identify the approaches to investment and financing decisions which are to be found 
therein. Given that one of the major aims of this thesis was an empirical assessment of the theory of 
finance, this theory, and its associated criticisms, are reviewed first, and this review provides the 
basis of this current chapter. As the thesis developed it became clear that in practice links existed 
between the theory of finance and other theories, particularly those relating to corporate strategy and 
planning. A review of this area is thus provided in chapter A. In fact the areas outlined in chapters 3 
and A have tended to develop relatively independently, almost as separate and unrelated areas of study, 
with rather different underlying disciplines or themes. For example, finance theory is well grounded in 
economic theory. By comparison the theories relating to corporate strategy, while including financial 
dimensions, tend to have their roots more in behavioural theories and management studies. In recent 
years a limited amount of overlapping of ideas has started to take place. In practice decision makers in 
business have to balance the various theories and practices found. Chapters 3 and A. by setting out a 
review of the available approaches, provides a framework for achieving the aims of the thesis.
on Finance
2J_ The Concept of Net Present Yalue and the choice of the discount rate
A considerable volume of literature exists in the finance area, built up principally over the last 
thirty years. Some agreement has been reached on theoretical ideas. In some areas conflict remains. In
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order to keep this review down to manageable proportions, the essential theories set out below will be 
based on one of the better modern text books, namely “Principles of Corporate Finance", by Richard 
Brealey and Stewart Myers (1981). Where it Is necessary to supplement this with more specific 
references, this will be done.
Fundamental to the theory of investment decisions is the concept of net present value (NPV). 
The use of NPV is based upon an implicit objective of shareholder wealth maximisation. In practice it 
might be argued that a variety of other objectives could or should be appropriate. For example, as long 
ago as 1963 Cyert and March raised questions about organisational goals, and emphasised goals in 
relation to production, inventory, sales and market share, as well as profits. The idea of organisation 
slack was also introduced, as was Williamson’s Managerial Discretion Model. Baumol (1961) has 
developed a model assuming sales maximisation as an objective, with a profit constraint if required. 
Simon (1955:1957) has argued that in many cases managers are satisfied to achieve certain limited 
objectives, rather than to maximise them. Such firms are said to "satisfice". Marris (1964) 
specifically argued that the difference between "management" and "stockholders" needs to be 
recognised, since the existence of a harmony of interests cannot be taken for granted. In short, a large 
number of alternative objectives and assumptions about behaviour could be set up. based upon perceived 
wider responsibilities or opportunities. However, finance theory typically argues (albeit often 
implicitly) that even if  management does perceive these wider responsibilities the concept of NPV is 
s till valid, since management must strike a balance between shareholders* interests and those of other 
parties. NPV is seen as the measure that best describes the profit potential of a proposed investment.
Alternatives to NPV Include payback (and discounted payback), average return on investment, 
internal rate of return and a profitability index. However, little  support is found in the literature for 
these, other than the internal rate of return (IRR). This is principally because IRR is a discounting 
method, which w ill, in most cases, lead to exactly the same decision as the use of NPV. However, in 
certain situations differences might arise, namely mutually exclusive projects, projects with 
non-conventional cash flows and situations of capital rationing. In all three situations IRR is seen as 
theoretically inferior. However, whether such situations are of much practical importance is a 
different issue, and one which can be addressed in this study, at least with regard to shipping.
Certainly the majority of writers appear to favour the use of the NPV rule over all others. For 
example. Brealey and Myers summarised their view as follows:
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7f  we ere gofng to the expense o f collecting forecasts, we might as well use 
them properly. Ad hoc c rite ria  should therefore have no role in our firm 's decisions, 
and the net present value rule should be employed in preference to other techniques 
using discounted cash flow s.'  (P78)
A smaller number of writers have argued the merits of the IRR rule in fairly strong terms. 
Probably the most well known of these are Merrett and Sykes (1963). While recognising that the IRR 
method can be associated with certain technical difficulties, they nevertheless consider that for most 
simple capital budgeting decisions the yield method is both technically and practically superior to net 
present value. They give three main reasons for this conclusion.
The firs t is  that yie ld  is  a more useful measure o f p ro fita b ility  when we are 
endeavouring to assess the return offered fo r risk  bearing. ’
'Second, the yiefd method, despite its  being in some respects the more 
complicated is. in our experience. more easily understood and accepted by 
businessmen than the method o f net present value "
'Finally, the y ie ld  method has the advantage o f obviating needless dispute about 
a firm 's cost o f capita/. ‘  (PI23/4)
In the final analysis the weight of theoretical opinion remains firm ly behind the NPV rule, but 
significant problems with the IRR only remain for projects with non-conventional cash flows and in 
situations of capital rationing. If neither of these two problems exist the arguments in favour of the 
FPVrule, as compared with the IRR rule, are far less convincing.
The use of the NPV rule requires the identification of an appropriate discount rate, known 
variously as the hurdle rate, the opportunity cost of capital, or the cost of capital. (The identification 
of a hurdle rate is also clearly needed if  the yield method is to be followed.) Various theories have been 
put forward for estimating this particular rate, and two schools of thought currently exist, namely the 
cost of capital concept, and modifications of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) for use in capital 
budgeting.
Cost of Capital may be defined as the rate that must be earned in order to achieve the rate of 
return required by the firm’s investors. In determining this rate each type of capital. i.e. both debt and 
equity, should be weighted (using market weights) and incorporated into the calculation. It perhaps 
needs to be emphasised that the aim is to calculate the expectad required rate of the firm’s investors. 
Current required rates, when set in efficient markets, represent probably the best guide possible to 
those rates, provided that new investments are of essentially the same risk as existing investments.
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The calculation of a weighted average cost of capital based on current rates (and therefore on current 
market values) thus provides an extremely good estimate of expected required rates for new 
investments in the same risk category. It will, however, only be appropriate if:
(i) The corporation's financial structure (i.e. relationship between debt and equity) is relatively 
stable, and future financing patterns will follow this same pattern, at least in broad terms, and
(ii) The riskiness of a project being evaluated is similar to that of the corporation's existing assets. 
The weighted average cost of capital will nfll represent an appropriate discount rate if any of the above 
conditions do not exist. Problems typically arise where corporations finance new projects in very 
different ways to those currently being used, or where the risk associated with new projects is 
different to that currently relating to the corporation's activities as a whole. In practice different 
types of projects carry with them different types of risk, and the use of a weighted average cost would 
not differentiate adequately between projects of fundamentally different risk categories. Under such 
circumstances the basic model needs to be modified. (See for example the model developed by Martin. 
Petty, Keown and Scott (1979 : P406).
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) The opportunity cost of capital or required rate of 
return is seen as having two constituted parts, namely a risk-free rate, and a risk premium. The 
risk-free rate is generally considered to be the rate paid on government securities. The risk premium 
w ill depend on the level of risk associated with a particular project or investment. The risk premium 
which is associated with an individual security can be (theoretically) derived by reference to the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Broadly the CAPM states that in well-functioning capital markets 
the expected risk premium on each investment is proportional to its beta. Investments with high betas 
are more risky than those with low betas.
The CAPM can be applied to capital budgeting, to provide a basis for adjusting for the risk 
associated with different capital projects. If the beta of a corporation is known, an approximate 
expected rate of return can be calculated, and used as a discount rate. Such a calculation, even if  it  Is 
only approximate, w ill s till enable broad differentiation between companies in different risk categories. 
However, as with the weighted average cost of capital, the resulting figure would not be appropriate if 
new projects are more or less risky than a company's existing business. Each project should be 
discounted at a rate reflecting the risk associated with that particular project. For example, the beta 
of a firm specialising in projects of the type being proposed by another firm could provide a guide to an
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appropriate project beta.
in essence the CAPM Implies that projects should be accepted which offer a rate of return which 
compensates for the project's beta. Such a view Is strikingly different to the weighted average cost of 
capital rule, when not adjusted for differing risk associated with new projects. It implies that projects 
in a certain risk category should be discounted at a particular rate, irrespective of the company 
undertaking the project. An investment in Treasury Bills ought not to be considered more risky when 
entered into by a small company than a large company, since the ’project' risk is the same for either. 
Similarly, a high risk project ought not to be accepted by a large firm, as opposed to a small firm, 
simply because it has a lower current average cost of capital. The problem is therefore the calculation 
of the project beta.
The use of borrowed funds w ill have a considerable effect on betas. The shareholders of a 
levered firm will have additional financial risk, as compared with those of an unlevered firm. The net 
effect is that financial leverage will increase the beta of the equity. Using similar logic, it should be 
dear that operating leverage -  the commitment to fixed production charges -  should also increase the 
beta of a project. Both financial and operating leverage are of considerable importance in the shipping 
industry.
In practice beta is difficult to measure for individual firms, but greater accuracy can be obtained 
by looking at an average of similar companies. However, betas vary according to borrowing policy, and 
they change over time. In arriving at an estimate therefore a financial manager w ill need to combine a 
sound understanding of the theory with good judgement. Guidance can be obtained from recent behaviour 
of share price in relation to market movements, and past trends in company and related industry betas.
In recent years a number of organisations have started to provide beta forecasts for a large 
number of company shares. However, these forecasts are not without problems of their own. 
Harrington (1983) found that the betas forecast varied considerably; that the larger the horizon and the 
larger the portfolio, the better the forecast accuracy of any beta; and that ail the methods tested left 
the possibility for over- and under-estimations of troubling magnitudes. Levy (1984) also highlighted 
the differences in betas caused by the use of different time horizons, and noted significant differences 
in the behaviour of betas for aggressive and defensive stocks as the time horizon was lengthened. A 
further problem with CAPM is that recent empirical evidence has shown that most of the commonly 
used market indexes are not optimised portfolios. Under such conditions CAPM does not provide a
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reliable indicator of expected return (see Roll and Ross 1984). Other writers (e.g. Reinganum 1981. 
Levis 1985) have identified the fact that abnormal returns can be obtained from portfolios of small 
firms. Reinganum concluded from his study that:
“the simple one-period CAPtl is  en inadequate representation o r capita! m arket 
equilibrium . A lternative models o f capita! market equilibrium  should be seriously 
considered and tested. ’  (P56)
Perhaps the best developed “alternative" to CAPM Is Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), developed 
by Ross (1976), which asserts that an assets riskiness, and hence it's average long-term return, is 
directly related to its sensitivities to unanticipated changes in four economic variables, namely, 
inflation, industrial production, risk premiums, and the slope of the term structure of interest rates. 
(See Roll and Ross (1984) for an overview of APT.) The essential difference between APT and CAPM Is 
that the former reflects the possibility that there may be more than one systematic risk factor. 
Indeed. It has been argued (Shanken 1985) that In many discussions of the APT. scholars may have been 
thinking of a multi-beta interpretation of CAPT1. The result is that the two models can lead to different 
choices with regard to optimal portfolios. It has been suggested (8ower. Dower and Logue 1984) that 
while the case for APT is certainly not decisive, it better explains variations in returns over time and 
across assets than does CAPM. Certainly It provides a framework for a more flexible approach to 
portfolio management which enables managers to better structure the risk exposure of a portfolio. 
Nevertheless doubts exist about the empirical testability of the model. (Shanken 1982:1985) 
Conclusion on the choice of discount rate A number of theoretical solutions to the problem or an 
appropriate discount rate appear to be reasonably well developed. In general, however, the models 
relate to portfolios of securities rather than to real assets, and to investors rather than individual 
corporations. There Is little  doubt that the models outlined above can provide useful insights into 
various aspects of risk and return, but their conversion into practical guidance is difficult. Questions 
remain as to which methods are used in practice to arrive at an appropriate figure, and how such 
figures are derived.
22  Theoretical arguments concerning Capital Structure
in section 2.1 reference was made to the use of a weighted average cost of capital as a discount 
rate. It was pointed out that such an approach would only be appropriate if  (inter alia) the financial
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structure of the corporation were relatively stable, and future financing patterns followed this same 
structure, at least in broad terms. The use of CAPM in discount rate setting was also dependent upon 
financing methods. Clearly therefore, the rate of discount chosen will be influenced by capital 
structure/financing methods, and the literature on the capital structure debate Is thus reviewed below.
In considering its capital structure, a firm should attempt to find that particular capital structure 
or financing mix which maximises its overall market value; if such a structure exists. Modigliani and 
Miller (MM) (1958) have proved that financing decisions cannot change overall market value, in 
perfect markets, if the investment decisions are taken as given. The total value of a firm is determined 
by its cflfli assets, not by the type of securities it issues, and their overall mix. The essence of the MM 
argument is as follows. Leverage increases the expected stream of earnings per share but not the 
share price. This occurs because the required rate of return is increased as leverage (and hence 
financial risk) increases, by an amount sufficient to ofTset the increase In expected earnings. The 
expected rate of return on the ordinary shares of a levered firm increases in proportion to the 
debt/equity raUo (expressed in market values). The rate of increase depends on the spread between 
the return on assets and that on debt.
The MM argument is based upon assumptions of a perfect capital market with information freely 
and immediately available, no transactions costs, no taxes, and a world where individuals can borrow 
at the same rate as corporations. These assumptions clearly are not all realistic in practice, and 
modification to the theory is necessary. The most critical assumption concerning the MM theory is 
probably that of no taxes. Indeed. MM (1963) subsequently adapted their stance to include taxes. 
This, they contended, had the effect of reducing the average cost of capital as debt increases, implying 
an optimal capital structure of 100* debt. Such an approach brings with it further problems. 
Increases in debt increase the risk of ruin or complete loss through liquidation. The higher the financial 
leverage the greater the risk of bankruptcy. Hence, in practice, it  seems likely that the financial 
structure chosen w ill represent a balance between the advantages associated with the tax savings on 
debt interest, and the potential risk of ruin associated with higher levels of debt.
Once personal taxes are incorporated in the argument, the position becomes even less clear, 
since the objective ought to be to minimise the present value of all taxes, rather then simply the 
present value of corporate taxes. Whether such a position is practically achievable is highly dubious, 
since investors have a whole range of different tax rates. Miller (1977) has developed a model which
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attempts to deal with the problem of differences between corporate and personal taxes. In effect he 
suggests that corporations can bribe investors (by offering higher rates of interest) to acquire more 
bonds, rather than equity, with equilibrium being reached when the corporate tax saving equals the 
personal tax loss. Miller's model has several important implications. The firs t is that there Is an 
optimal debt-equity ratio for corporations as a whole, dependent on tax rates and the funds available to 
Individual investors in the various tax brackets. The second is that there is no such thing as an optimal 
debt-equity ratio for any single firm. The market is only interested in the total amount of debt and no 
single firm can influence that. Miller's model was based on the assumption that debt interest would be 
taxed at a progressive rate, with government debt being tax exempt. Gordon (1982) examined a 
one-period world with perfectly competitive capital markets, a corporate tax. and a progressive 
personal tax on debt income. His conclusion was that optimal capital structures could exist for 
individual firms, with the value of the firm being a convex function of its leverage rate, and the optimal 
policy for each firm being to maximise leverage. Tax exempt government debt was not found to change 
either of these two conclusions. Miller's theory was found to hold only where marginal personal tax 
rates for all persons were both the same and equal to the corporate tax rate. Ross (1985) incorporated 
uncertainty into the analysis, and also concluded that optimal capital structures could exist for 
individual firms. De Angelo and Masulis (1980) showed that Miller's theory did not hold if corporate 
tax shelters existed which were not the result of debts, or if  bankruptcy costs were non-trlvial. 
Knoeber and Flath (1980) have demonstrated empirically that the gains from leverage are positive and 
that costs of bankruptcy are significantly large.
The points made above make it dear that the capital structure issue is further complicated by 
considerations of financial distress or bankruptcy. Following the earlier logic, the optimal capital 
structure should be at 100X debt, if  the PV of tax savings is considered. However, higher debt 
increases the level of risk of bankruptcy (or at least of some kind of financial problem), and the PV of 
these costs also needs to be incorporated. The costs of financial distress can be broken down into a 
number of areas, covering both direct and indirect costs of actual bankruptcy, and the costs associated 
with a financial crisis which nevertheless stops short of bankruptcy. Scott (1976) has presented a 
multiperiod model of firm valuation with assumptions of possible bankruptcy. If it  is assumed that the 
probability of bankruptcy is zero, his model was formally identical to that proposed by Modigliani and 
Miller. However once the detrimental effects increased debt can have on a firm  were considered, it
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became clear that a unique optimal capital structure could exist, below the 100% debt implied by MM. 
The conclusion reached by Scott was that:
7 he optima/  level o f debt ... was an increasing function o f the liquidation value 
o f the firm 's  assets, the corporate tax rate, and the size o f the firm .'  (P.50)
The position outlined above is not dissimilar to that taken up in the so called "traditional” 
approach to capital structure. The arguments for this concentrated on the idea that value was 
maximised when cost of capital was minimised. Hence the capital structure which minimised the 
average cost of capital would also maximise company value.
In essence the traditional view is that financial risk is not perceived as increasing significantly 
until a certain level of debt is reached. Beyond this point, however, increased returns are required by 
lenders to compensate for the perceived extra risk. Similarly, the cost of equity is not likely to rise as 
soon as debt is introduced, but will only do so after a certain level of debt is reached. If debt reaches 
very high proportions, the cost of both equity and debt are expected to rise sharply, such that any 
advantages of debt are likely to be cancelled out. Given the assumptions of the traditional model, the 
average cost curve will be U-shaped (some might say saucer shaped). This implies that at the lowest 
point on this curve the market valuation of the company will be at a maximum, since returns are 
discounted at the lowest rate. Since maximisation of shareholder wealth is taken to be the 
organisation’s overall objective, the capital structure at this lowest point of cost represents the 
optimal debt/equity ratio.
Myers (1984b) pointed out that we do not know how firms choose the various securities they 
issue (and hence their capital structure). He contrasted two ways of thinking about capital structure, 
as follows:
V. A s ta tic  tra d e -o ff framework, in  which the firm  is  viewed as setting a 
target debt-to-vaiue ra tio  and gradually moving towards it ,  in  much the same way 
that a firm  adjusts dividends to move towards a target payout ra tio .
2. An old-fashioned pecking order framework, in  which the firm  prefers 
Internal to externaI financing, and debt to equity i f  i t  Issues securities. In the pure 
pecking order theory, the firm  has no well-defined debt-to-vafue ra tio ." (P2)
The firs t of these is consistent with many of the views set out above. However. Myers goes on to
argue that in fact the pecking order framework performs at least as well in explaining financing choices.
He suggests (while recognising that the "story" is oversimplified and underqualified) a "modified
pecking order" story broadly as follows. Firms have good reasons to avoid issuing common stock to
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finance real Investment. However they do not wish to pass up positive NPV projects or to Issue stock 
at too low a price. Target dividend payout ratios are thus set which enable normal levels of new equity 
to be generated internally. Some of the normal investment outlays may be covered by new borrowings, 
but the firm tries to keep the debt safe, thus avoiding any material costs associated with financial 
distress, and maintaining reserve borrowing power. Since target payout ratios are 'sticky', but 
investment opportunities fluctuate relative to internal cash flow, the firm will need to raise more funds 
on occasions. Risky debt will normally be used before common stock. Observed debt-equity ratios w ill 
thus reflect the cumulative need for external financing, which in turn w ill depend on the profitability 
and growth of the firm.
The overall conclusion on this area is tenuous. The 'm ajority' view appears to suggest that an
optimal capital structure exists. Miller s theory does not appear to have been universally accepted, but
is disturbing. Brealey and Myers included the question "How can we explain capita l
structure?" in their ten unsolved problems in finance. They concluded:
"The upshot oT the m atter is  that we s t ill don't have an accepted coherent 
theory o f capita/ structure. I t  is  not fo r went o f argument on the subject * . (P739)
Nor do we know whether managers or companies themselves actually work towards a capital structure.
and if so, what their rationale is.
2Jl Interaction of Investment and Financing Decisions
Under the MM assumptions set out in the last section, and. indeed, in a number of real world 
situations, the investment and financing decisions can be treated as independent. However, In some 
cases these two aspects interact, and adjustments need to be made. The approach usually 
recommended is to arrive at an adjusted NPV as follows:
Adjusted NPV * base-caseNPV + NPV of financing decisions
(APV) (ie . all equity financed caused by project acceptance
project)
In the case of a project financed by a subsidised loan, such as is typically found in shipping, the PV of 
the interest saving would need to be calculated and added to the base-case NPV. Any tax savings which 
arise due to increased debt capacity associated with a project should also be incorporated. An 
alternative to the calculation of an adjusted NPV is to calculate an adjusted cost of capital.
Adjusted present value ideas can be further developed in the context of international projects.
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Lessard (1981) has suggested a “divide and conquer*1 approach to capital budgeting, suggesting that 
financial contributions to a project's value are recognised separately and explicitly. The model 
suggested by Lessard involves the separation or the various cash flows, including such things as capital 
outlay, operating cash flows, contractual cash flows, depreciation tax shields, tax shields due to 
normal borrowing, financial subsidies etc. The use of such a model, through the separation of the 
various contributory factors, enables a more effective analysis of projects to be carried out. since the 
areas subject to the greatest risk can be analysed most rigorously. Adjusted present value represents 
a useful extension of the basic theory, particularly where the different cash flows identified above are 
found.
In practice the ideas outlined above appear to be less than generally accepted. For example. 
Pinches (1982) has questioned the viability of the assumption that the investment and financing 
decisions can be separated, describing the assumption as “troublesome*, and has observed that there is 
little  If any acceptance of the concept of adjusted present value in practice.
2A Risk and Uncertainty In Capital Riirigftting
Diversification is seen as a means of reducing or eliminating specific risk. However, the 
advantages of such a process relate to the holding of a portfolio of securities. The arguments for 
diversification of activities within a corporation are considerably less compelling. Indeed, Breeley end 
Myers point out that if  investors cm diversify on their own account they will not pay any extra for the 
shares of firms which are diversified. Since individuals £AQ often diversify more easily than firms, the 
implication must be that diversification within a firm will not change the value of that firm, which is the 
sum of the various component parts. The theory would therefore appear to suggest that diversification 
is best left to the investors.
However, risk reduction through diversification represents one particular aspect of risk 
analysis. A further aspect arises in the area of project analysis, and a variety of techniques have been 
devised to assist with the handling of risk in such cases. The more commonly proposed methods include 
the following:
(i) The use of risk adjusted discount rates. (s.g. Fame 1977)
(ii) The use of certainty-equivalents. (e.g. Brealey & Myers : P I76)
53
(iii) The use of probabilities and expected values. (e.g. Hertz & Thomas (1983))
(iv) The use of decision trees (sometimes incorporating probabilities). (e.g. Moore and Thomas 1976. 
Rafrfa 1968)
(v) Simulation. (e.g. Hertz 1968)
(vi) Scenario Analysis.
(vll) Break-even analysis. (e.g. Reinhardt 1973)
These methods are typically seen as ways of Identifying the major uncertainties surrounding a 
project, or of identifying the principal threats to its success. They do not act as alternatives to the 
calculation of net present values. Many of the methods used are derived from operational research or 
statistics. Most can be used independently or jointly to supplement or confirm the decision making 
process.
JL Criticisms and Weaknesses of Finance Theory
3.1 Introduction
In recent years the orientation of much of the finance literature has been on modelling, with 
emphasis on the development of formal models of economic choice and the subsequent rigorous testing of 
these models by the use of statistics and econometrics. There has been little  place for what has been 
described as "descriptive reality" although criticisms of its lack of attention were made many years 
ago by writers such as Donaldson (1963:1969). However, recently there have been rather more 
suggestions that such an approach is misguided. For example. Derkinderen and Crum (1981) pointed out 
that:
'’Adherents to th is growing school o f thought boiievo that since observed 
behavior in  the market piece is  the aggregation o f the behavior o f individuals, more 
attention to the a ttributes o f the process o f ris k y  decision making by individuals and 
groups w ill give useful insight to economic modellers. That is, they believe that 
better models can be bu i/t that should tead to substantially more meaningful and 
higher qua lity predictions about observed phenomenon i f  the models are grounded 
more firm ly  in  the underlying precepts o f behavior.'  (P2)
Criticisms cover a number of areas, including objectives, environmental complexitity. the realism of
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the assumptions of the traditional models, the relationship between capital budgeting techniques and 
strategic decisions, and criticisms related to perceived organisational or empirical behaviour. 
Inevitably any sub-division of these criticisms tends to be somewhat artificial. Nevertheless, these 
areas are examined in more detail below in order to provide a framework for analysis. Their 
inter-relationships are readily apparent.
3.2 Criticisms of Objectives
As has already been pointed out. a considerable amount of literature exists on organisational 
goals. The purpose of this section is to specifically consider literature setting out to criticise finance 
theory. Criticisms cover a number of areas. Gordon (1981) has considered the objective of share 
price maximisation more fully. He considered that the primary interest of management is in 
profitability, not in their corporations' current market values. While profitability and market value are 
related, they are by no means identical. Gordon further pointed out that corporate executives also 
emphasize such things as growth, security, and personnel. The importance of security is reflected in 
concern about capital structure and diversification. The lower the proportion of debt in the capital 
structure the greater the stability of net income. Diversification, typically through conglomerate 
mergers or takeovers, can reduce the instability of business income. Since diversification is of little  
benefit to shareholders its continued existence may be considered evidence of management's desire for 
security.
Carter (1981) criticised (albeit implicitly) the allegiance of finance-cum-economic theorists to 
"pure” economics, and not to management. He has considered the apparent conflict between the 
traditional approach and behaviouralists in some detail, and identified a number of ideas from the latter, 
which are relevant to this study. Probably the most important of these are ideas firs t introduced by 
Cyert and March (1963) and Simon (1957:1955). The former stressed that in the search for 
alternatives, the search is typically localised and simple minded. Simon offered the idea of "bounded 
re tio n e lity ’ . which implies that not all information available can be rationalised and assimilated, so 
not all alternatives can be evaluated. He also introduced the idea of satisficing, reference to which has 
already been made. Other relevant behavioural ideas relate to memory and learning experiences, 
diffusion of ideas, differences between individual and organisational decision making, and tastes and
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changes therein. The recognition of these factors is likely to lead to the development of a better model 
of capital budgeting.
Zeleny (1981) has followed up some of these ideas, in particular those relating to satisficing, as 
compared with the more traditional ideas of optimisation. He criticised the conventional ideas of 
optimisation but suggests that satisficing is not necessarily all it  appears to be. On conventional views 
on optimisation he said:
”... re a l decisions are based on a progressive comparison o f the preference 
systems o f m uitipie actors, in  a generally fuzzy environment, evolving through 
interactions w ithin the sphere o f d iffe ren t po litica l, value, and power frameworks. 
The preferences themselves are fuzzy, incompletely formulated, non transitive, and 
often inconsistent and conflicting. They d iffe r from  one actor to another, and they 
change throughout the decision-making process based on new circumstances and new 
inform ation. fo  Quantify and aggregate such a varie ty o f factors into a single 
objective function, that is, one and only one crite rion  o f choice, is  an undesirable 
reduction o f re a lity .......
‘Complex decision-making issues are essentially marked by m uitipie c rite ria , 
and decision makers are more concerned w ith resolving the ir conflict, reducing risk , 
and managing cognitive stra in  than w ith optim izing solutions ... The m ultiple c rite ria  
decision making modeI becomes a methodology supporting the problem-solving process 
o f the decision maker: the ro le  o f the analyst Is  not to make prescriptions o r
specific recommendations -  there is  no solution independent o f the decision makers 
judgem ent." (P203/4)
In spite of these arguments Zeleny did not consider satisficing to be an appropriate objective, 
considering it  to be the result of an incomplete or unsuccesful attempt at optimization. It was not seen 
as a guiding principle of human decision-making behaviour. Zeleny. while accepting the principle of 
limited or bounded rationality, argued that it  is compatible with optimisation. Even given all the 
constraints and limitations it is still possible to pursue a given maximising objective, subject to these 
constraints. This approach is referred to as "bounded op tim a lity". Nevertheless. Zeleny 
recognised that:
"optim ization is  a technical concept, inapplicable in  situations where conflict, 
ambiguity, m ulti-dim ensionality, and qualitative judgement are dominant. There can 
be no absolute defin ition o f optim ality, any such conception is  contingent on the type 
o f problem involved, the decision maker's purpose, a b ility , and needs: end the 
context o f the problem. The dilemma faced is  substantial. On the one hand, the 
best' solution is  that solution which is  judged best' by the decision maker(s) 
involved. f t  is  the one that is  preferred, understood, accepted, supported and 
implemented w ith confidence. On the other hand, the decision maker could, because 
o f personal bounded ra tiona lity , lavish confidence on solutions that are fa lse ly  
perceived as superior. The ro le  o f the analyst is  to help but Id  up decision maker 
confidence o r to  gather arguments to weaken i t . " (P207/8 )
Other writers. e.g. Spronk (1981). have recognised the existence of multiple goals, and argued
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Tor the use of interactive muitipie goal programming. Such an approach deals with all goal variables 
simultaneously, and permits the investigation of trade-offs between them in a systematic way. Spronk 
argued that the use of goal programming corresponds with the decision makers reality. He quoted 
Ashton and Atkins (1977) who pointed out that the use of various targets and goals, and other 
Indicators of company performance, is frequently found In practice. Nevertheless. Spronk recognised 
the practical difficulties of the goal programming approach, since the number of goal variables can 
easily grow to an unmanageable number.
Schmidt (1981) has drawn attention to the dynamic and evolving nature of the objective-setting 
process within firms. Strategy is concerned with adapting a firm to a changing environment, so 
formalised planning systems need to be able to match changing objectives and changing environments. In 
fulfilling such a requirement a flexible approach Is needed. Schmidt listed seven “fle x ib ility  
types “ of use in a formalised planning system. A flexible approach of this type permits model 
changes, use of alternative data, and interactive decision making. If the concept of multiple criteria 
decision making is accepted, the use of such a flexible approach becomes inevitable. It is worth noting 
that Schmidt, in dealing with the flexibility of corporate planning models, also emphasised the flexible 
use of feedback. Donaldson (1985) in a more recent study of the formation of corporate goals, found 
that companies did not put maximum profit as the firs t goal. Nor did they work towards some absolute 
financial target. Multiple financial goals were found to be set. with priorities changing as the 
competitive and corporate environment changed. Managing a company's financial goals system was thus 
found to be "en unending process in  which competing end conflicting p rio ritie s  must be 
be is need'.
3.3 Criticisms concerning Environmental Complexity
Most of the criticisms of the last section were based upon arguments about diversity and 
complexity of objectives and led to a desire for a broadened perspective for making financial decisions. 
Other writers have emphasised the complexity of rather broader environmental factors, pointing out 
that recent years have seen dramatic changes in environmental turbulence. For example Derkinderen 
and Crum (1981) have called for greater consideration of environmental factors in the resource 
allocation process. They suggested that the firm should be treated as an organic open system that
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continually Interacts with its environment, both influencing and being influenced by it. They pointed out 
that:
“in  managing the corporate resource allocation process, today's manager faces 
increased situational flu id ity  and a m ultitude o f complexities, most o f which were 
unknown, and some even unimagined, a decade ago ...
“Although these situations are pervasive in  the ir impact on companies, a t the
inform ation is  avaiiahie fo r form alizing budgets and plans -  i f  indeed it  is  nossihla. In  
derive anv meaningful cash How projections jit which Lha decision, maker, has adequate 
confidence. Decisions s ti/ i have to be made and resources allocated, but dynamics 
and increasing com plexity render such decisions fa r more d iffic u lt, and the 
consequences o f a bad' choice much more severe fo r the continued p ro fita b ility  -  
perhaps even the survival -  o f the firm .'  (P39XEmphasis added)
In such circumstances careful definition and specification of the boundaries of the environment relevant 
to the firm is advisable. Clearly changes in relevant factors and/or objectives will in turn lead to 
changes in the specification, while the interests of other stakeholders (including employees, customers, 
suppliers, management, the local community, and society as a whole) need to be included. Interestingly, 
in considering possible reactions to the environment Derkfnderen and Crum also introduced the 
presumption that the firm would have infinite life, so Its managers are expected to take whatever steps 
they believe necessary to preserve the corporation in the long term -  even if  these are contrary to the 
short-run wishes of the owner.
Bertoneche (1981) Identified the following areas In which the business environment has become 
much more complex: slower and more erratic economic growth; increased worldwide competition; 
increased regulatory constraints; reduced availability of capital and raw materials; and decreased 
predictability of several parameters such as inflation rates, exchange rates, commodity prices, and so 
on. In a small study of six companies Bertoneche found that these complexities were causing companies 
to look at their investment decision-making process in a different perspective. In general he found that 
discounted cash flow and other refined techniques did not help the decision-making process. Problems 
seemed to be centred on the assumptions behind projects, and on the realistic investigation of 
alternatives. Interestingly, the study also Identified the use of DCF methods and the refined techniques 
as a source of confusion and frustration among operating managers, unless they had a comprehensive 
understanding of the corporate strategy.
Gandemo (1981) has also made a number of observations on the influence of increased 
environmental turbulence on corporate investment and financial planning. He reminded us that with
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rising fixed costs, which usually consist of labour, depreciation and interest, returns on total capital 
become very sensitive to even relatively small changes in the sales volume. If such a situation is 
combined with general increases In debt/equity ratios, the fluctuations In returns on equity for 
individual companies could be considerable. The choice of an optimal capital structure was thus seen as 
a much more difficult exercise when conditions are changing. Existing theories relating to capital 
structure do not include all the variables which are relevant under such conditions. Factors such as the 
risk of being taken over, the risk of being unable to cover fixed financial obligations, and the potential 
impact of a long period of recession could all be significant in periods of increased environmental 
turbulence.
Gandemo referred to the work of Donaldson (1969) who found little  evidence that management 
searched for optimal debt-equity ratios. This should not be taken to mean that management did not have 
any views on the area. They did. particularly where extremes might adversely affect market value. 
Donaldson saw the approach to capital structure as being:
"an evolutionary process o f feeling out new positions in  e constantly changing 
world, positions which, i t  is  hoped, w ill be both safe and successful by whatever 
yardstick the company sets fo r Its e lf.m (P249)
Gandemo pointed to a number of changes in the financial environment in recent years. Reduced rates of 
return on total capital, and effective tax discrimination against share issues as compared with bond 
issues. There has thus been a move towards the use of external debt to finance growth, a move which 
Is satisfactory if  the leverage effect is positive. Risk preferences and criteria for evaluating 
debt/equity ratios have shifted. Financial Institutions have changed in character, particularly those 
with state backing or Influence. Indeed public sector Involvement in the allocation of capital in the 
community has also caused considerable changes. Policy has tended to move from general measures 
towards selective measures, from economic policy to Industrial policy. Such a change brings with It the 
real risk that companies may become more interested In getting the most out of the various 
economic-political measures than in improving their operating and commercial efficiency.
Gandemo identified a number of areas which appeared to justify further research. These include: 
companies not quoted on stock markets; the effect of measures used by governments of different 
countries to attract new industries; the effect of governmental measures on real planning and decision 
making at the corporate level; differences in planning and decision making between growing and 
profitable companies, and unprofitable companies or companies in crisis; and the effect of mergers and
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takeovers, or decentralised decision making, on decision making, particularly In Imperfect markets. All 
represent areas not covered adequately by the literature and research.
3.4 Criticisms of the Underlying Assumptions of Finance Theory
A number of writers have criticised the underlying assumptions of finance theory, and its 
practical applicability. Franke (1981) has criticised assumptions about information costs and 
availability. Many models in finance theory are based upon assumptions of perfect, costless 
information, yet information is seldom, if  ever, of this type. If such an assumption is dropped a number 
of important consequences follow. Franke put forward a number of tentative arguments, including the 
following:
(i) In practice managers have more freedom in their actions than is assumed in finance theory, since 
the owners of the firm exercise only loose1 control. When linked with the ideas on potential conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and managers, which are dealt with later, the importance of such 
freedom of action is considerable.
(ii) Knowledge about feasible strategies, cash flow patterns associated with different strategies, and 
market valuation of cash flows is diffuse.
(iii) Franke suggested that market value is a composite measure of many different factors and quoted 
Hertz (1964) who analysed nine factors (or subgoals), namely market volume, sales price, market 
growth rate, market share, investment outiay, lifetime of the investment, salvage value of the 
investment, variable cost, and overhead cost. Under such a model projects would be accepted if  their 
estimated market value is positive and a certain number of subgoals reached their minimum acceptance 
standards. Such an approach could be interpreted as a diversification in objectives.
Carter (1981) has given four reasons why managers do not use the more comprehensive financial 
theory models for corporate planning and long run capital budgeting decisions.
(i) Data requirements are large and costly
(ii) Accuracy is suspect
(iii) The models never seem to work right, and need constant alteration and adjustment of data inputs.
(iv) The marginal returns to management from time spent worrying about detailed cash flows are 
probably much less than from seeking new project ideas and from carefully implementing or revising old
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projects that have been approved.
Oericinderen and Crum (198!) have raised a number of doubts with regard to project value 
additivity, which was seen as a 'fundamental p rincip le * necessary for the use of current 
analytical methods. The characteristics of a securities portfolio may not be isomorphic with those of a 
firm, a fact which:
"either hes not been considered edequeteiy in  the lite ra tu re  or has been 
assumed away. Hypothesizing the existence o f isomorphism is  convenient fo r 
analytical theories since strong and re la tive ly  simple generalized linkages can then 
be formed to describe the allocation o f scarce resources via the price system  
mechanism. However, without isomorphism, the apparent s im ila rities between 
securities portfo lios and corporations can lead to  carrying the generalizations a b it 
too fa r, thus d istorting the nature o f the decision-making context. As long as 
conventional finance theory does not claim practica l app licability fo r corporate 
investment decisions, there are no problems. But often there are pretentions in th is  
respect w ith an inherent danger fo r misguided d irection .m (P42)
Particular concerns of Derkinderen and Crum in this area were:
(i) projects in a portfolio are not economically independent in the way that securities in a portfolio 
are.
(ii) it  is not true that all markets are completely efficient and that all Investors' can achieve 
diversification, so that only systematic risk is relevant.
(iii) with effective multiperiod capital rationing the optimum capital budget is no longer the simple 
linear sum of the net present value of the most profitable projects. Other project characteristics must 
also be considered together with project interdependence. In addition, when there is a great deal of 
uncertainty in the environment, especially when resources are scarce, the problems of identifying new 
market opportunities, new technologies and other such factors become intimately interwoven with the 
selection process for new investment projects.
The essence of the arguments of Derkinderen and Crum is that certain characteristics of business 
do not exist for securities portfolios, and these seriously compromise the assumption of isomorphism. 
This in turn makes some of the ideas found in finance theory less than completely valid for corporate 
resource allocation decisions.
2*5 Criticisms relating to Corporate Strategy
Criticisms and comments in this area are of two main types.
(I) if  capital investment is to be effective, it  needs to be put into a broader perspective.
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(ii) traditional capital budgeting tends to Ignore the major strategic issues facing the company, or to 
assume that the major strategic decisions have actually been made.
In fact these two are closely related, as will be seen below.
Derkinderen and Crum (1981) have suggested that a systems approach should be adopted, and 
that capital budgeting activities should be conducted explicitly within the context of the overall strategy 
of the firm. The definition of the interactions between the company and its environment, and the 
continuous maintenance and regulation of information flows between the company and its environment, 
are essential parts of the process. However, merely collecting data is not sufficient. Some kind of 
filtering device In the scanning system Is needed, so as to sort out relevant Information from 
background noise. Derkinderen and Crum suggested that a fusion of certain concepts from the field of 
strategic management with characteristics generally employed in finance would provide a useful 
approach. They pointed out that a systems approach is not necessarily a contradiction of. or substitute 
for. analytical Ideas typically found In the finance literature. Systems thinking was seen as 
supplementing the latter by concentrating attention on interrelationships. The systems approach should 
help to ensure an effective distribution of scarce resources to meet environmental challenges and 
opportunities, whereas analytical procedures should help to ensure an efficient allocation. A 
combination of the two approaches should provide considerable benefit.
Coda and Dematte (1981) have considered the adequacy of traditional financial concepts and 
techniques In relation to their handling of strategic decisions. They argued that:
"There is  e m ultilevel decision system, end e t the higher leve l -  the streteg/c 
one -  e finenciel epproech d iffe ren t from  the tred itione l one is  epptied: usue!
methods fo r p ro ject evsluetlon, such es peybeck period o r net present vetue, ere 
eventuelly epplied. es complementery instruments, e fte r the higher-level resource 
ellocotion decision Is  teken. The economic end finencie l eve/uetion fo r such resource 
ollocetion emerges from  en ite re tive  process more complex then is  usuelly essumed. " 
(P98/9)
Various debates on objectives were considered, demonstrating that many finance scholars consider 
that In the real world, the decision-making process takes a form quite different from that usually 
assumed. Particular problems were associated with higher-level decisions. Yet these decisions, 
relating to strategy, are nevertheless Investment decisions. Indeed. Coda and Dematte regarded a 
decision of this type as a metainvestment choice, pointing out that it  effectively commits a company to 
a certain strategic approach which will require a further sequence of investments to be made 
subsequently. They further argued that decisions of this type, to stay in business for strategic
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reasons, are also Influenced by Ideas on a portfolio strategy. Coda and Dematte summarised their
views on the nature of the business strategy decision as follows:
“Basically, the business strategy is  a long term  game in which one strives to  
gain a dominance through excellence in a specific business area, through a sequence 
o f actions and Investments consistently organized around a business formula, w ith
the aim to recover the investments plus a premium. As the economic theory would
suggest, and as experience shows, the level o f the premium depends on the 'richness' 
o f the 'so il’ and on its  level o f dominance o r the degree o f protection o f the 
te rrito ry '.
“ ... the decision to p lay a certain strategy in  a business area must be 
implemented by a number o f investments and specific resource commitments. But the 
strategy form ulation is  a more aggregated decision that encompasses a period o f time 
longer than that o f the single investment. Furthermore, once th is strategic decision 
has been taken, it  stands as a framework against which single projects must be 
measured.'  (P102)
Given this approach, the question of financial evaluation needs to be considered. Coda and 
Dematte broke their analysis down into three areas:
1. Time horizon -  In conventional capital budgeting analysis projects are considered over the period 
of the investment. If the same concept were used with a business strategy approach, the time scale 
would need to be to the time that the company goes out of business. However in most cases, the 
forecasting of cash flows for such a long period is virtually impossible. This has a number of important 
implications. Coda and Dematte pointed out that in practice the time scale used in business strategy 
decisions goes from the early stages of a business life cycle to the flex point of that cycle. They argued 
that the reason for this is linked with a theory of the evolution of the competition during the various 
life-cyde stages. It is assumed that if  a company reaches the maturity stage in a dominant position, 
then a good return on the later related investments will follow. Hence the crucial periods for an 
investment are the firs t life-cyde stages, when even the cash flows may be negative. Under such 
circumstances companies pay considerable attention to these early stages, especially the penetration 
stage, where the financial traps are usually hidden. Coda and Dematte argued that once a company has 
reached the conviction that it  can dominate a business area, it  is likely to proceed with subsequent 
investments without computing the global rata of return on them. In terms of financial evaluation the 
focus is thus on the cash flow sequence up to the maturity stage.
2. Decision Criteria -  If the rate of return is not calculated, other decision criteria need to be 
identified. The essence of the arguments of Coda and Dematte is that decisions are strongly influenced 
by the probability of reaching a good degree of control over the business area. and. thou^i to a lesser
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extent, the es time ted richness of the market segment. The financial aspects which are seen as being of 
most Importance relate to the capacity of the company to raise the desired mix of funds. The financial 
feasibility of various strategic alternatives is seen as an important influence on decisions. Coda and 
Dematte pointed out that the metainvestment decision is heavily influenced by the funding possibility, 
irrespective of the rate of return. This is somewhat different to what is assumed in finance theory.
3. Role of Financial Reserves in the Business Strategy Decision -  Coda and Dematte pointed out that 
strategy appears to be heavily influenced by the company's present and future financial reserves. 
Managers appear to be particularly concerned with ensuring that the company w ill be financially viable 
through the life cycle and especially in periods of potential recession.
Coda and Dematte summed up by suggesting that the financial evaluation of a business should 
answer the following questions:
7. What are the approximate level and the variance o f the re tu rn  on Investments
(instead o f the in terna l ra te  o f re tu rn ) required fo r the creation o r maintenance o f 
the dominance system in  a given te rrito ry '?  Are they reciproca lly adequate? And 
do they sa tis fy  the expectations o f those who invest in  the business the ir 
entrepreneurial, managerial, and financial resources?
"2. W ill the business strategy be feasible w ith regard to  the company's liq u id ity
structure? Or w ill i t  endanger the liq u id ity  reserves and the unused debt capacity,
making completion o f the business strategy problem atic?
"J. W ill the capitat structure and especially the debt-equity changes induced by the
business strategy im pair the so lid ity  o f the company to  the leve l o f provoking a 
confidence c ris is  in  the financial community as fa r as the sa leab ility is  concerned?" 
(P lO d)
Question I is concerned with assessing the economic viability of a specific strategy. Questions 
2 and 3 are concerned with financial feasibility of the strategy. These two kinds of evaluation were 
seen as being distinct but interrelated. They are not supported by the traditional capital-budgeting 
approach. However, they can be used in conjunction with financial simulation to evaluate the effect of 
changes in the decision variable, or external variables, on such things as the profitability, liquidity, and 
solidity of the company. The use of such models is seen as enabling managers to evaluate the risk 
connected with a given business strategy and to modify the strategic posture if  required, so as to obtain 
a satisfactory trade-off between the basic financial strategic variables, regarded by Coda and Dematte 
as growth rate, self-financing rate, leverage, and liquidity reserves.
Coda and Dematta viewed the decision system of a company as a box within a box structure, where
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the single investments are the smallest boxes, dependent on the business strategy choice. The business 
strategy provides the framework against which single investment proposals can be measured. Each 
individual investment project must therefore be consistent with the overall strategy, in practice, many 
investment alternatives may be consistent with the strategy, it is in choosing between such 
alternatives that the traditional capital-budgeting techniques can play a relevant role. They enable the 
comparison of investment alternatives which are consistent with the overall strategy, but different as 
to timing and amount of cash flow. Where investments are large In relation to the total size of the 
company, the single investment decision is likely to have a strong impact on the overall strategy, 
possibly leading to its modification. Under such circumstances it is necessary to evaluate the impact of 
individual projects on the corporate financial structure.
Bertoneche (1901) made similar comments, pointing out that:
In  essence, the common underlying essumpt/on o f e ll ffnencieiiy besed 
epproeches to  the resource ellocetion process is  thet the fundementei stretegic 
decisions, ... heve been mede ... in  the iite re tu re  o f finence, very little  ettenUon 
hes been peid to stretegic consideretions fo r the esset pfenning end ellocetion 
process ... This s/tutet/on mey seem surprising end dengerous since U feeds to e 
pro ject-by-p ro ject epproech. * (P107)
Bertoneche quoted Hes tie. (1974) who listed nine steps in the investment decision making process, 
which are broadly as follows:
1. Determine the alternative investments available.
2. Weigh the strategic aspects of the alternatives.
3. Collect data and information on the viable alternatives.
4. Develop the assumptions and calculate incremental cash flows.
5. Measure the net benefits.
6. Assess the effect of different assumptions on the measured results.
7. Analyse the risk of the project.
8. Weigh the benefits and strategic purpose of the project against its risk and the constraints of the
corporation.
9. Communicate the relevant information to top management in a way which facilitates effective 
decision making.
Bertoneche argued that too much attention has been concentrated on steps 4 and 5. with little  
emphasis being put on the other steps, particularly 2. 8 and 9. He placed considerable importance on an
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analysis of projects, to see whether they f it with the overall strategy of the corporation. He 
suggested the use of some kind of existing general framework, citing that of the Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG), as one example. This approach describes the business portfolio according to two main 
criteria, namely relative market share and rate of growth, and w ill be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter. Such an approach would help the business to define areas in which the corporation wants 
to expand, maintain the status quo. or to contract or leave. Capital budgeting decisions must then be 
made in the context of the long run strategic plan. It is this which ultimately determines the allocation 
of capital resources. Bertoneche pointed to the difficulty of making certain decisions on a purely 
financial basis, giving as an example the purchase of a patent to prevent competition. Yet such an 
acquisition might be a very worthwhile thing to do from a strategic viewpoint. Existing financial 
techniques were considered to still have a role to play, but some adaptation is necessary.
The preliminary conclusions of Bertoneche^ study led him to identify certain important 
consequences.
In  corporate practice, the generei strategy o f the firm  must be made dear a t 
the various levels o f management so that pro jects may receive a more complete and 
precise review  o f th e ir stra tegic ram ifications. The capita! expenditure analyses 
should not only be pages o f figures and computations, but they should also clearly  
state the basic assumptions and raise the rig h t strategic questions. A t the research 
level, the models presently available have not captured the essence o f the managerial 
decision process, and try in g  to  re fine  techniques o f financial measurement and 
ra ising theoretical questions is  ju s t a sm all p a rt o f the overall investment decision 
making process. Research should...he. directed., towards the integration of the 
trad ition a l caoitalrhudget fram ework into the overeii resource allocation _process, o f 
the company bv stressing the strategic aspects and adapting the current techniques 
to  the increasing environm ental complexity. " (PI 15) (emphasis added)
Bertoneche quoted Bower (1972):
7/ would be extrem ely useful i f  we could discover a wav to integrate the 
pow erful logic o f the financia l modeI in to  a tru /v  descriptive modef o f the resource 
allocation process in  large organizations. " (p23) (emphasis added)
Crum and Derkinderen (1981) have attempted to devise a set of realistic assumptions for the 
development of decision models or theories. These assumptions are based on realistic assessments of 
the environment of decision making, and the analytical ability of decision makers. Solutions achieved 
are the best only in the sense that given the limitations which exist, no better alternatives can be 
identified. It also needs to be recognised that while decisions may appear to be made at a particular 
point in time, the process leading up to a decision is frequently a long one. involving a number of 
different people. The behavioural implications of this are important. Other fundamental realities also
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need to be recognised:
In  a world o f uncertainty w ith incomplete inform ation available, strategic 
management dictates that good current decisions be defined not only in term s o f 
effective u tiliza tion o f available inform ation (the classical conception) but a/so in  
term s o f th e ir b u ilt in  fle x ib ility  to enable the firm  to react appropriately when new 
inform ation is  obtained in  the fu tu re  -  that is. the future consequences o f current 
decisions must he considered e xp lic itly  as part of  the in itia l decision process..." 
(P159) (emphasis added)
The implications of a different set of starting assumptions are considerable. If the firm does not 
possess all the needed information, or cannot process It completely effectively, optimisation becomes 
difficult, if  not impossible. If the firm consists of a set of individuals with differing motives and value 
systems, managers are likely to become more concerned with resolving conflict between Individuals and 
power groups. Some kind of decision criteria need to be established, however, and targets set for each. 
Under such circumstances managers are then likely to concern themselves with achieving an acceptable 
balance between the various criteria, so as to satisfy the various power groups, including shareholders, 
fhe single minded pursuit of shareholder wealth maximisation is thus unlikely.
Crum and Derkinderen suggested five distinct classes of decision criteria.
(i) Prescreening or filte r variables -  these act as a means of eliminating alternatives without the 
need for further analysis. For example. Crum and Derkinderen suggested that projects that have 
serious implications of bankruptcy w ill often be eliminated, regardless of the potential high returns that 
go with this risk.
(ii) Measures of aggregate performance over time -  including measures such as net present value, 
internal rate of return, and profitability index. Crum and Derkinderen regarded most of the measures 
suggested in the finance literature as falling within this class. They were particularly critical of the 
fact that these measures eliminate intertemporal information and assume that the purpose of the 
decision model Is to establish an allocation plan for the entire planning horizon. In other words, the 
focus of the model is not on making an initial decision that may be updated in the future, but on the 
specification of all decisions to be taken during the period without updating at a later point in time. Such 
an assumption is seen as being of questionable merit.
(iii) Criteria that ensure corporate stability and harmony -  Crum and Derkinderen included in this 
class such things as the maintenance of earnings per share, the achievment of an adequate return on 
equity each period, the balancing of various growth rates, and the preservation of satisfactory liquidity 
and financial ratio relationships. They pointed out that criteria such as these are generally seen as
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constraints on decisions ratter tten as separate goals or objectives. Whichever way they are viewed. 
Crum and Derkinderen argued that as managers seem to consider them to be quite important, they 
should be evaluated explicitly by decision models.
Crum and Derkinderen considered that the above criteria are inadequate for making effective 
decisions in a world of uncertainty. They called for a shifting in the emphasis of the resource allocation 
process from long range planning to one of making the best possible current decisions, given the amount 
of information available. An Important aspect or such decisions is that they should have adequate 
flexibility so that as events unfold the firm can react appropriately.
Crum and Derkinderen thus developed two further classes of criteria.
(iv) Criteria concerned with strategically positioning the firm, in the sense of maximising the number 
or feasible options that lead to favourable outcomes In the future as a result of current decisions.
(v) Criteria concerned with strategic positioning in the sense of minimizing the number of feasible 
paths that lead to unfavourable outcomes in the future as a result of current decisions.
Crum and Derkinderen considered the contribution of the last two to be potentially very significant. 
However, they pointed out that It Is difficult to set out specific criteria that can be used for these 
classes, since strategic positioning concepts are "Very situation dependent'. Hence the 
Importance of the decision context in settling such criteria.
Crum and Derkinderen then considered various ways in which an analysis can be structured so as 
to enable a decision to be made based upon multiple criteria. They identified five broad categories, but 
finally pointed to the system of 7nteractive M ultiple Objective D iscrete programming'  
(HOD programming), which they consider to be superior to other methodologies.
Before leaving this section on criticisms of finance theory in relation to corporate strategy, it is 
perhaps appropriate to make reference to the work of Hayes and Garvin (1982). who appeared to blame 
discounted cash flow for many of the industrial difficulties facing the USA. A particular criticism was 
that DCF techniques have Inherent weaknesses that make them inappropriate for evaluating long term 
projects. It has been argued (Myers 1984: Hodder and Riggs 1985) that such criticisms are invalid, 
and are due to the misapplication or misinterpretation of the techniques. Potential dangers in DCF 
analysis can relate to biased or inappropriate assumptions, improper treatment of inflation effects, 
excessive risk adjustments (particularly where risk declines as a project takes off), and ranking on the 
basis of internal rate of return. Such dangers, while real, should not be seen as valid criticisms of
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finance theory, but as a problem of application. Myers went on to offer three explanations for the gap 
between finance theory and strategic planning: they may be kept apart by differences in language and 
culture; DCF analysis may fail in certain strategic applications; and. as mentioned above. DCF analysis 
may be misused in strategic applications. He argued that strategic planning needs finance, and that both 
sides should make a conscious effort to reconcile financial and strategic analysis.
i i i  Organisational/Behavioural Criticisms
This section deals with various criticisms and studies which cast doubt on the validity of the 
finance theory approach to capital budgeting, principally for reasons to do with organisational or 
behavioural issues. Criticisms generally fall into the following categories: criticisms relating to the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers; criticisms relating to the nature of the decision 
making process, and criticisms relating to the complex nature of organisations. A considerable degree 
of overlap exists between these categories, and the criticisms identified in earlier sections.
One of the earliest critics of finance theory was Donaldson (1963), who outlined the different 
financial goals which shareholders and managers might have. These differences were seen as being 
sufficiently great to provide serious problems for the practical application of finance theory. Donaldson 
pointed out that in spite of this fact most academic writers had been on the side of stockholder interest 
in discussions on how business ought to be run. He expressed the view that it would be finance theory 
and not management practice that would have to change if  the two were to continue to have a valid 
relationship with each other.
Hull (1982) also reviewed some of the conflicts of interest which can arise between shareholders 
and managers, and attempted to update some of Donaldson's work. He concluded that there had been 
little  sign of financial theory changing in the way suggested by Donaldson. Specific areas of potential 
conflict which were identified included the following. A manager is likely to have a far greater stake in 
one company than is a well diversified shareholder. Future job prospects, salary etc. are likely to 
depend upon survival of the particular firm in which he works. He is thus likely to be concerned with 
the company's total risk, whereas the shareholder is likely to be concerned primarily with systematic 
risk. This will in turn impact on rates of return required from capital projects, with higher returns 
being required by managers. A further complication is that middle managers are likely to avoid backing
69
projects with high risk, since their future Job prospects are largely conditioned by the success of the 
projects they back. Middle managers interested in promotion also have a vested interest in projects 
which show improvements in the relatively short term. Acquisitions represent another area of 
potential conflict of interest, with substantial benefits accruing to management. Benefits to 
shareholders may be minimal or even negative, unless genuine synergistic benefits are likely to result.
Potentially important conflicts of interest arise in the areas of capital structure and dividends. 
Hull suggested that the costs associated with financial distress or bankruptcy are high for managers, so 
the resulting trade-off between the tax advantages of debt and the costs of liquidation will tend to lead 
the manager towards relatively low gearing levels. Similar views were expressed with regard to 
dividends, with the result that
"The dividend decision cen therefore be viewed as a tra d e -o ff which 
management must make between the benefits o f avoiding increases in ris k  and the 
benefits o f not alienating shareholders, it  is  arguable that th is trade o ff leads to the 
philosophy o f Vet's pay as little  as we can get away w ith ' . '  (Hull 1981: P7)
In 1969 Donaldson again called for a broader based approach to decision making, pointing out that 
finance theory was strongly normative, and little concern had been paid to descriptive or empirical 
work.
'T raditionally, financial theorists have been more interested in  the logical 
superstructure than In the underlying assumptions and the evidence as to the ir 
descriptive v a lid ity ." (P34)
While the effort to develop normative financial theory was seen as highly desirable. Donaldson 
nonetheless considered it  equally desirable that there should be a vigorous and concurrent effort to 
understand and describe real world behaviour in financial management.
“The improvement o f practice necessarily begins w ith business as i t  is  and 
moves by steps that continually balance what is  desirable against what is  possible 
and practicable. Only by examining the re a l w orld w ith a minimum o i normative 
preconceptions can we hope to re late the optim a! to the operational." (P34)
Donaldson then went on to take an Internal view of financial decisions. His analysis suggested 
limits to the range of Investment opportunities, typically to ventures enlarging on or extrapolating from 
existing product or market bases. The time taken to invest and disinvest in real assets was also seen 
as substantially reducing the opportunity to apply diversification concepts. Returns of most relevance 
to managers were seen as residual flows after dividends. Managers were likely to have particular 
views of risk, which would be influenced by the desire to preserve and expand the corporate entity on 
which their future depends. Donaldson used these ideas to develop the concept of financial mobility. He
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argued that the challenge to management Is provided by unexpected changes of substantial proportions 
affecting an important aspect of operations. Satisfactory handling of such events requires an 
understanding of what is happening and how to adapt, time to act. and capacity to act. Donaldson's 1969 
study was concerned principally with the latter, namely the preservation of the economic and financial 
resources, which he regarded as the key to managements capacity to act in the face of change. The aim 
of financial mobility is the achievement of a state of equilibrium in funds flow which is consistent with 
the corporate objectives. The basic elements of a developed strategy of mobility were seen as 
including:
(I) a plan for the preservation or achievement of funds flow equilibrium under known existing and 
expected conditions;
(ii) the identification of key financial policies for debt and dividends;
(iii) a search process designed to identify hitherto unexpected events as soon as possible;
(iv) the identification of the resources which might be needed if  an unexpected event arises;
(v) the development of strategies for dealing with unexpected events.
The resources of mobility include balance sheet Items and future inflows, with aspects to do with 
amounts, timing and probability. These are influenced by such things as the competitive position, since 
the quality and staying power of earnings is of considerable importance in the management of financial 
mobility.
More recent work by Donaldson (1965) is consistent with his earlier work. The complexity of 
financial objectives has already been noted. In addition Donaldson also commented on the trade-offs 
which need to be made between growth and risk. He pointed to the perceived random nature of access to 
capital market funds, and the resulting instillation of a spirit of self sufficiency in many managers. This 
is seen as a rationale for the commonly found reliance on internal funds to fund growth coupled with 
conservative debt levels. Donaldson's research found that most of the companies Included in his sample 
preferred to scale down growth rather than raise further equity in the financial markets. 
Diversification is seen as being consistent with this desire for financial self-sufficiency, since it 
provides managers with a kind of internal capital market, stabilises corporate income, ensures more 
use of human and financial resources, and allows an organisation to survive the demise of particular 
product lines. Donaldson pointed out that objectives and approaches of the type identified above are 
both rational and justifiable. They are nonetheless rather diferent to those assumed in finance theory.
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and their implications for investment and financing decisions are considerable.
Other writers (e.g. King 1975, Pinches 1982) have also criticised various aspects of finance 
theory, as an inadequate guide to behaviour. King argued that capital budgeting theory is principally 
concerned with the optimal choice of capital projects, and that by adopting a scientific model of decision 
making it  implicitly accepts that evaluation is central to the process. He pointed out that this required 
two tacit assumptions to be made, namely that projects exist ready for evaluation, and that choosing 
between articulated projects is sufficient to obtain an optimal capital allocation. Neither is considered 
valid. Projects need to be created and this requires a process of search, which pervades the entire 
organisation. This search process is seen as having a number of crucial stages, including triggering, 
screening and definition. However
“cap ita l budgeting theory and the sc ie n tific  mode/ o ffe rs  no he/p to  those who 
struggle to  a rticu la te  a p ro je c t and to  gather relevant inform ation ... Capital 
budgeting theory therefore makes no contribution to  how screening and defin ition  
should be conducted, how the search process should be directed, except by holding 
up an idea! towards which those involved are impugned to  aim". (King 1975: P78)
In short, the formal processes derived from the theory represent only a relatively small part of the
decision making process. The second problem referred to above relates to the way in which central
management often has to make decisions on proposals from more junior levels of management. Under
such circumstances they can make judgements on the proposals as put forward. However, they do not
necessarily know the range of alternatives which are available, or if  any information is either biased or
lacking from the descriptions given to them. Decisions In such circumstances can clearly be
sub-optimal.
King concluded that the majority of the areas of decision making remained unexplored, and 
suggested further research to develop an understanding of the relationships between organisational 
structure, decision making procedures, creativity, commitment and bias.
Pinches (1982) identified a body of literature dealing with how decisions are made in 
organisations, and related this to the capital budgeting process. Some of the main points coming out of 
the Pinches paper are as follows:
V. Coai/tions, interpersonal factors, bargaining and p o litic s  often p iay an
im portant ro te  in  the selection o r re jection  o f capita/  budgeting projects.
2. The cap ita i budgeting process is  ia rge iy ite ra tive  w ith screening taking
pface in  a somewhat sequential fashion.
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J. Hu/tipie c rite ria  are employed to r decision making.
4. inform ation problems and data uncertainties abound.
5. rhe proper treatment o f ris k  is  s t iii a m ajor source o f concern.
6. The re w a rd  and punishment system  employed has an im portant im pact on 
ca p ita l budgeting decisions. " (P 8/9)
Pinches concluded that the approach to capital budgeting found in finance theory was “myopic", and 
could easily lead executives to view the problem as one of generating the “right numbers” to get a 
project accepted. He recommended that greater considerations should be given to determining how 
strategic and capital budgeting decisions are actually made, to broadening the perception of the capital 
budgeting process, and to researching a variety of capital budgeting related topics, notably Information 
needs, political processes and risk measurement.
Particularly interesting studies referred to by Pinches were those of Bower (1972), Carter 
(1971) and Mintzberg et al (1976). These studies took a rather different approach to the problem. For 
example. Bower was able to construct an explanation of capital investment as a function of structure 
and process at the level of the organisation. Carter observed that a decision to go ahead with a project 
was seen as a way of putting aside ambiguity so as to take on a positive thinking approach, implying that 
decisions ought to be perceived as part of a continuing process. Mintzberg et al identified capital 
budgeting as a "somewhat d is to rte d  p o litic a l process fa r  less a n a ly tic a l than the 
norm ative lite ra tu re  s u g g e s ts (P260) A more recent study (Berry 1984) also approached the 
capital budgeting process from this kind of standpoint. Berry found evidence that goals were differently 
perceived and acknowledged by managers, and that this perception was related to the closeness of the 
managers to the environment to which the goal referred. He also found that managers saw the capital 
budgeting process as integrative, both in terms of goals and control. Nevertheless his findings did 
suggest that managers had a rather limited appreciation of the impact of activity in other divisions on 
their own capital budgets. Some evidence of “game' playing was found, with top management reducing 
subordinates submissions, while junior managers occasionally put In projects to draw fire, or put them 
in ahead of time.
The implications of this particular section are fairly clear. The financial theory relating to 
capital budgeting does not adequately explain actual behaviour. The decision making process is more 
complex than is assumed by this theory. Rational alternative theories may be derived which have little
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to do with rationality in an analytical or economic sense, at least with regard to shareholder interests. 
The impact of organisational structure, behaviour and politics on the capital budgeting process may be 
considerable.
4. Empirical research on the use of capital budgeting 
techniques
4 1 Intrnriuntinn
A number of studies have been made in both the UK and the USA in recent years as to the 
practical usefulness of capital budgeting techniques. In the UK the most recent study is that of Richard 
Pike (1982). though an earlier study was made in 1976 by Westwick & Shohet. In the USA a whole 
string of research studies have attempted to ask questions on capital budgeting methods in practice. 
These are well summarised by Petty and Scott (1981) in one of a series of essays set out in "Readings 
in Strategy for Corporate Investment" (Derkinderen and Crum: 1981). and this essay will form the 
basis of the comments made here, at least as far as the USA is concerned.
The research conducted was categorisd by Petty and Scott into four headings: goals, organisation 
and stages in the investment analysis process; evaluation methods; required rates of return; and 
recognition of risk. Pike followed similar logic, splitting his project into the following areas: planning 
and evaluation procedures; control procedures; evaluation techniques; risk appraisal techniques; and 
sophistication in Capital Budgeting. Considerable overlap exists, and where possible the UK and USA 
surveys will be reviewed concurrently.
The results of these studies have a number of disconcerting implications for theorists, as can be 
seen from the following sections, in broad terms, the findings suggest inconsistencies between theory 
and practice in the areas of goals, the weighting given to various techniques, and the importance of the 
various techniques in the overall process.
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±2  Goals, objectives and Capital budgeting systems
On objectives the various American studies referred to tend to support the notion that managers 
have multiple goals. Share price maximisation was frequently considered to be less important than 
other goals, such as maximising return on investment, achieving desired growth rates, etc. 
Management was found to be operationally oriented, and favoured goals that could be translated into 
measurable targets. By comparison, the maximisation of share price was seen as an elusive goal.
One particularly interesting part of the Petty and Scott review concerned the perceived 
difficulties associated with the stages of the capital budgeting process. The evidence suggests that 
management perceives project definition and cash flow estimation to be the most difficult stage of the 
whole process, with project implementation and review second, and financial analysis and project 
selection being a poor third. This implies that academics spend a disproportionate amount of time on 
appraisal methods, the stage in the evaluation process regarded by managers as among the least 
difficult.
The Pike study included questions on administrative and planning procedures. The result 
indicated that a high proportion of respondents had capital budgets looking beyond two years, an up to 
date budgeting manual, and a formal body responsible for screening and reviewing investment proposals. 
It should be noted that this survey concentrated on large organisations, and the evidence clearly 
suggested that the larger the firm, the more likely it was to adopt the above procedures.
4*3 Evaluation methods and Techniques
Petty and Scott analysed the various surveys completed in the USA. Pikes study covered the UK.
The results are somewhat disconcerting for theorists. While there is no doubt that the use of
discounting techniques had increased considerably over the years, overall their use was somewhat
patchy, and other methods which are theoreUcally less valid still seemed to be given considerable
weight. Indeed the Pike survey clearly showed that more firms use payback or accounting rate of
return than use NPV. There was little  evidence of the use of discounted payback or bail out payback.
Petty and Scott quote a 1978 survey, the results of which were considered "provocative" . The
results of this survey showed that:
"whereas 86S o r the firm s used e ither the in terna l ra te  o f re turn  o r net 
present value models in the ir procedures, only 16X used such discounting techniques
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without also using the payback period or average rate o f return metrics, fh is same 
tendency to use theoretically incorrect models as supplementary or backup tools has 
been reported elsewhere. It seems that we know litt le  o f the reasoning behind 
management's reluctance to abandon the cruder methods o f estimating project 
worth.'  (P.13) (emphasis added)
A further interesting feature of the surveys is the apparent relative support for IRR as compared 
with NPV. This Is particularly noticeable in the Pike study in a table on primary evaluation methods. 
Even for firms with the largest capital budgets (i.e. greater than E50m), IRR was by far the most 
common primary method. Petty and Scott concluded, on the basis of the surveys made, that 
management prefers the internal rate of return technique to any of the alternatives.
While the Pike study is essentially quantitative (a subject which will be considered further later) 
some insights into the reasons for the above were obtained. Payback was justified by management on 
the grounds of Its simplicity in calculation and comprehension. It was thus seen as a valuable tool for an 
initial screening of alternatives and for smaller, highly profitable projects with quick returns. In many 
cases payback was seen as being a secondary method complementing other more sophisticated methods. 
In Pike’s main survey it was established that over 90X of the firms using multiple criteria included 
payback as a method. Payback was seen as providing a useful contrast to other methods, as well as 
shedding some additional light on marginal or risky projects. In particular, payback was seen as being 
of some value in risk assessment where risk is predominantly time related. Whether such a view is 
Justified is a different issue.
Support for the Accounting Rate of Return seemed to be based upon the fact that it provided a 
link between a project's return and the return on the business as a whole.
Reasons given for the non-use of discounting methods generally suggested a lack of understanding 
by respondents of discounting methods. IRR was generally supported for three reasons. Firstly, it was 
thought to make ranking or comparison easier. Secondly, it was easy to understand. Thirdly, though 
this was of less practical significance, the method did not require the input of a hurdle rate. The firs t 
of these reasons has already been discussed and round to be Invalid. The other reasons are more 
difficult to dispute.
Support for NPV generally derived from the theoretical Justifications given earlier. 
Interestingly, only two respondents thought that it was easier for non-financial personnel to 
understand. A small number of respondents thought that both IRR and NPV were necessary.
Pike includes a number of quotations in this section which begin to get to grips with the rationale
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for multiple criteria (P58). For example.
"... both (IRR and NPV) throw light on a project 's financial profile. Payback 
completes a three-prong approach. '
"It is  fe lt that the more evaluation methods to support a programme the 
better. "
"We use both IRR and NPV but only as supplementary sign posts because they do 
not show the impact on the company's p ro fitab ility  or balance sheet in conventional 
(and public) term s." (P58)
The above results pose something of a problem for the theorist. In spite of the clear theoretical 
advantages of NPV other methods are found to be more important in practice. One problem of course, 
might be that decision making in practice is unlike anything in the traditional finance literature. It has 
already been pointed out that managers see project definition and cash flow estimation as the most 
difficult stage or the whole process, with project implementation and review second, and financial 
analysis and project selection being a poor third. In such a situation it may be that the surveys on 
evolution methods and techniques are concentrating on the wrong area. The calculation of a payback 
period, in IRR or FPV. may well be made, but the question then needs to be asked as to exactly how 
important such figures are in the final decision making process. It may well be the case that decisions 
are made on the basis of some overall strategic goal, of necessity, or even by whim. If cash flows 
cannot be estimated with any degree of precision, the relevance of the methods may diminish. The Pike 
study, while undoubtedly Interesting and useful, stops short. It asks which evaluation methods are 
used, and why. The relevant questions are: How are investment decisions actually made, and how 
significant are the component parts of the process, one of which concerns evaluation methods, in 
reaching a final decision? The majority of the studies in this area have been quantitative. There is 
considerable scope for research of a much more qualitative nature, which attempts to identify the 
various nuances of decision making, to put evaluation methods more firm ly in their place.
4*4 Required Rates of Return
The evidence brought together by Petty and Scott suggests fairly strongly that large firms d& 
employ required rates of return in their capital budgeting procedures. However, a variety of different 
methods appear to be used to determine the discount rate. Interestingly, most of the surveys referred 
to by Petty and Scott do not include questions aimed at understanding how the firm arrives at its
77
required rate of return. Further empirical work would appear to be necessary.
4.5 Risk
The Petty and Scott summary is supportive of the view that throughout the 1970s the number of 
firms explicitly considering project risk has been increasing. In many cases the consideration remains 
subjective. Risk adjustment methods found generally covered changes in the discount rate, changes in 
the required payback period, the use of probabilities, sensitivity analysis, and simulation. Considerable 
variability was found in the use of these techniques in the various surveys. Pike found the following 
risk appraisal methods in use: sensitivity analysis (38%): higher required rate of return (36%); a 
shortened payback period (31 %); and the use of probability analysis (12%). The figures in brackets are 
percentages of those firms which were actually using assessment methods. However, only 37% of the 
total number of firms surveyed by formally analysed risk. Pike concluded from this that many firms 
use a combination of methods for assessing project risk, while others appraise risk on a more informal 
basis. Of particular interest in this area was the breakdown by risk appraisal method and size of 
company. Of firms with a capital budget in excess of £50m in 1980/81. 77% used sensitivity analysis. 
Only 15% of companies with a capital budget below £5m used this technique, while 38% represented an 
average figure (an increase from 24% in 1975). 68% of the larger category of company used 
sensitivity analysis as the primary risk appraisal method. As is clear from the above figures, very 
little use was made of probability analysis.
The reasons given for nan use of formal risk assessment were interesting. These generally fell 
into three categories.
(i) Unnecessary -  where projects were in familiar or well known fields. Some respondents 
suggested that informal methods were adequate.
(ii) impossible to quantify, since risk assessment is a subjective judgement, and projects vary from 
one to the next.
(iii) Complexity -  risk assessment was seen as a complex and time consuming business, which the 
ordinary manager was unable to understand.
It is interesting to note that even where formal risk assessment was conducted, a significant number of 
respondents nevertheless had reservations with respect to its value.
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±h. Sophistication in. Capital. Budgeting
Pike was concerned with assessing whether there had been any discernable trend towards 
greater sophistication since 1975. He found increased sophistication in the following procedural areas:
(i) Current manual
(ii) Review of hurdle rate
(iii) Formal analysis of risk
(iv) Monitoring performance
(v) Post completion audits
However, greater sophistication in investment techniques seemed harder to find. The main techniques 
to have been adopted over this period were the internal rate of return method, and sensitivity analysis. 
Pike also found that firms were tending to use more evaluation methods. A significant increase was 
also identified in the number of firms considering inflation in their investment evaluations.
Pike also asked for an assessment of the importance of highly developed capital budgeting 
systems in the making of sound investment decisions. 54X of the respondents felt that such systems 
were either Important1 or Very important*. Interestingly, the response varied significantly with size, 
with 38X of the smallest firms, and 71X of the largest firms making this response.
5. The Shipping Oriented Literature
A relatively small amount of literature exists which relates finance theory to shipping. Even the 
book by Cheng (1979), undoubtedly one of the most comprehensive books on the area, s till has only one 
chapter devoted specifically to capital expenditure decisions, and this follows the traditional approach 
very closely. Hampton (1979) has also applied specifically to shipping some of the theories concerning 
investment appraisal. He provides considerable case material, most of which was developed from his 
experiences at Marine Transport Lines and in subsequent consulting, which indicates that many of the 
appraisal techniques clearly can be applied to shipping activities. However little  examination was made 
of the usefulness of these techniques in relation to alternative techniques or to decision making in
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general. Frankel (1982) in considering the “Management and Operations of American Shipping9, has a 
chapter on ship finance. Included in this is a section on capital budgeting and evaluation techniques. 
While much of this work is very similar, at least in effect, to that described earlier. Frankel does 
identify five further evaluation criteria used in shipping, besides the methods already referred to in 
earlier sessions. The extra methods are as follows:
(i) Capital Recovery Factory Method (CRF)
(ii) Minimum average Annual Cost Method (ACC)
(iii) Present Worth Method (PW)
(iv) Equated Interest Rate of Return Method (IRR)
(v) Minimum Required Freight Rate (RFR),
Holt (1982a) has considered some of these techniques in more detail, in particular, the minimum 
average annual cost method, though he refers to it as the annual capital charges or annuity method. 
This method, when used to select between independent projects, should give the same results as NPV 
and IRR. For a project to be considered acceptable, annual net returns must exceed the combined annual 
interest and depreciation charges. Known as the Annual Capital Charge, the appropriate amount needed 
to cover depreciation and Interest is calculated. The appropriate figure is estimated by finding the 
relevant annuity factor (usually from tables), also sometimes called the "Capital Recovery Factor", and 
multiplying it by the project capital cost. If net annual returns (i.e. revenue less operating expenses) 
exceed the annual capital charge, the project should be accepted. In the event of the net annual revenue 
stream not being constant, it could be made constant for analytical purposes by calculating its present 
value and then multiplying this same by an appropriate annuity rate to convert it  into a series of equal 
amounts each year. Capital recovery factors can also be used to make comparison between projects of 
unequal lives, by converting NPVs to equivalent annual cash flows (See Moon: 1982). The Present 
Worth method is very closely related to NPV, but is related only to expenditures; while the equated 
interest rate of return is virtually identical to the yield method. The minimum required freight rate 
(RFR) is the calculated freight income needed per unit of cargo and time to cover all operating costs and 
to provide a required rate of return on the capital invested in the ship. The RFR could be regarded as a 
calculated long term average freight cost that can then be compared with actual freight rates currently 
prevailing.
The majority of the above techniques generally represent variations of the major techniques
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given earlier. However, the minimum average annual cost method and required freight rates seem to 
provide useful additional insights. Their practical usefulness will thus be evaluated along with the 
other techniques given earlier.
In considering risk and uncertainty in shipping investment decisions, probably the best source of 
literature Is the Seatrade Academy. This institution runs a course entitled "Understanding Investments 
in Shipping" regularly, at various places around the world. Both the theory and practice of investment 
are dealt with. A range of lectures have been given. In the main these discuss applications to the 
shipping industry of traditional methods, such as payback, conservative adjustments to cash flow 
values, sensitivity analysis, risk adjustment of the discount rate, running multiple scenarios, etc. (e.g. 
Gustafson: 1982)
However, a number of more sophisticated attempts have been made to incorporate risk analysis, 
by the estimation of value ranges and probabilities, and the use of decision trees (e.g. Holt: 1982b). 
Cumulative probability distributions have been proposed. In many cases the papers delivered were 
theoretical, and gave no indication of the actual usage of the techniques in the industry itself, in solving 
real problems (e.g. Jessop: 198lab: 1982) However, in a small number of cases models had been 
developed with the clear aim of being commercially used. (e.g. Sychrava & Ingham: 1979ab. Sychrava 
1982). One such case was the adaptation by Lambert Brothers of a risk analysis computer programme 
for use in shipping, to assist management with the analysis and assessment of uncertainty in ship 
investment appraisal, market analysis and forecasting, corporate planning, budgetary/cost control and 
other areas. The use of risk analysis was seen as enabling the organisation to take quantitative data 
evaluation and decision making techniques a stage further than had previously been the case. In essence 
it involved the inputting of a range of possible values, and their associated probability, for any one or 
all of the uncertain variables. This permitted the quantification, simultaneously, of the effect on the 
final outcome of any number of uncertain variables. Some such variables were known to be important 
from past experience. Others were identified through the use of sensitivity analysis.
Having said this, the literature on risk analysis in shipping tends to follow closely that which 
relates to investment appraisal in general. With the exception of the small number of applications 
referred to above, the literature concentrates very much on potential applications of theoretical 
models. Very little  literature exists which describes practical approaches used in individual companies.
daddams (1982) has considered diversification as a means of risk reduction In shipping. He
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points to a number of reasons why shipping has become steadily more risky over the last twenty years. 
He also points to the trend towards Insitutiona! ownership, with a corresponding need for steady 
earnings. However, fluctuations in shipping earnings are not seen as making the industry a prime 
candidate for attracting funds. If this is coupled with higher gearing, it becomes clear that a more 
stable flow of earnings is needed. Since such earnings are unlikely to come from shipping activities 
they must come from elsewhere, fladdams does not see this problem affecting private shipowners in 
the same way. He regards it as quite acceptable for such companies to average their earnings as long 
as overall the good years balance the bad ones. This kind of thinking leads to diversification to protect 
shipping interests from the worst vaguaries of excessive competition. Maddams points out that most 
European shipping companies have developed new shipping activities apart from their basic trades. 
Further diversification has extended interests into cargo related business, but also to other unrelated 
business. e.g. construction, brewing, property etc. The examples given by Maddams tend to support his 
ideas that diversification Is an important part of risk reduction strategy for shipping companies. No 
empirical evidence however, currently exists.
Norman (1981) has considered a rather different aspect of risk reduction, possibly peculiar to 
shipping (or at least to transportation). This concerns risk reduction through an optimal chartering and 
sale and purchase policy. While this particular work is still tentative. Norman clearly considers that 
there are gains to be made from good timing for both chartering and sale and purchase. He also suggests 
that the market price of risk (at least in tankers) is fairy high, with the premium earned by spot market 
owners being quite large:
"This suggests that aggressive chartering policies (policies involving a 
substantial fraction o f spot charters). combined with conservative financial policies 
(a low debt/equity ra tio ) are better than the converse. "
The above ideas are interesting, and worthy of further consideration, but it is not the intention to 
examine this area specifically in this thesis. Having said this, the extent to which companies see these 
aspects as being of importance can be ascertained, which should help in deciding on the appropriate 
direction of future research.
JL Conclusions
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This chapter has attempted to review the present state of finance theory as it  relates to 
investment and financing decisions, and to establish the range and type of empirical evidence and 
criticisms relating to this theory. The main theoretical points can be summarised as follows:
(i) The use of NPV as a means of project evaluation should yield optimal decisions in terms of the 
perceived objective of maximisation of shareholders wealth. IRR has problems for projects with 
non-conventional cash flows and in situations of capital rationing.
(ii) Various methods have been proposed for the choice of the discount rate, based upon weighted 
average cost of capital, modifications to CAPM. and adjusted present value. Care needs to be taken to 
ensure that the discount rate chosen is appropriate for new projects, particularly where different risk 
categories are involved.
(iii) The arguments regarding capital structure are many and various. The majority view appears to 
suggest that an optimal capital structure exists, but the problem has not been conclusively solved.
(iv) The theory suggests that the investment and financing decisions are broadly separable, with 
adjusted present value being proposed where necessary.
(v) A variety of techniques for dealing with risk have been devised.
A number of practical difficulties have been identified with regard to certain of these, notably with 
regard to the use of CAPM as a basis for calculating an appropriate discount rate, and the separation of 
the investment and financing decisions. Further questioning on methods used and the practical problems 
of implementation could usefully take place.
Such empirical studies as have been undertaken generally suggest increased use of the methods 
recommended by finance theory, but they also include a number of disturbing findings. Methods other 
than NPV were found to be used fa irly widely, and IRR was generally preferred to NPV. Overall the 
empirical evidence tends to be quantitative, with relatively little  qualitative research having been 
conducted. There is scope for more detailed questioning of this type, and on the relative significance of 
the various component parts of the process so as to put evaluation methods more firm ly in perspective.
Finance theory has been subject to a number of criticisms, the most serious of which relate to 
objectives, the nature of the decision making process, the relationship between capital budgeting and
83
strategic decisions, and the impact of increases in environmental turbulance and complexity on the 
practical application of the theory. The objective of maximisation of shareholder wealth Is the subject 
of much criticism. Consideration of the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders 
Indicates an opportunity for the development of alternative sets of objectives, with a consequent effect 
on decisions, so as to more closely achieve managerial objectives. This has implications for such things 
as diversification policy, capital structure and dividend policy. Different levels of managers might well 
have differing objectives, making the resolution of differing objectives more difficult. A managerial 
approach to capital budgeting, even when subject to broad constraints imposed by shareholders, may 
well result in rather different decisions to those implied by finance theory. Criticisms of the nature of 
decision making suggest a much more complex approach than implied by finance theory. The process of 
search, evaluation and implementation appears to be an iterative one. with a variety of inputs, of an 
economic, environmental, behavioural and political nature. More research appears to be needed into the 
overall decision making framework, and the role that finance theory has to play in it. particularly 
where strategic decisions are involved. Finally, increases in environmental turbulence and complexity 
pose practical problems for the application of finance theory. Further work is needed on decision 
making in turbulent and uncertain environments, and on the application of the various methods of risk 
analysis which exist.
Little empirical work has been carried out on capital budgeting in the shipping industry. The 
industry provides a rid ) source of material, since the shipping markets are volatile and complex, 
financing opportunities are considerable and risks are high. This thesis aims to assess the practical 
relevance of finance theory to the shipping industry, and to consider some of the broader criticisms 
outlined above, at least in the context of this particular industry.
Chapter 4
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Review of the literature on Corporate Planning and 
Strategy
I Introduction
in considering the review of the literature on this area it is important to recognise the limited 
aim of this thesis with regard to corporate planning and strategy. The thesis aims to identify points of 
overlap and linkage between finance and corporate planning and strategy, with regard to investment 
and financing decisions in the shipping industry. Questioning on planning and strategy was thus geared to 
this aim. with emphasis being placed on such things as :
(i) objectives.
(ii) the nature of the corporate planning process, and the period for which plans are made.
(iii) the nature and importance of the background environmental/economic analysis supporting
strategic decisions.
(iv) the strategic issues seen as being most important to investment decisions.
(v) the process of search, evaluation and choice of capital projects.
Discussion of these areas should provide useful insights into the process of corporate planning and 
strategy development in the shipping industry, and should facilitate the achievement of the aims of the 
thesis in this area. Nonetheless, it must be recognised that this thesis does not aim to analyse 
systematically the practical relevance of the various theories and supporting techniques relating to 
corporate strategy.
Such an approach poses something of a dilemma with regard to the literature review on corporate 
planning and strategy. This chapter could be confined to consideration of the literature relating to the 
questions identified above, or it could provide a broader context for the study, by setting out a general
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overview of the literature in the area. On balance the latter approach seemed both more realistic and 
more appropriate, given the fairly integrated nature of much of the writing in this area. This chapter 
thus aims to provide a broad review of the literature in the area of corporate planning and strategy. It 
is nonetheless clear from the above comments that not all of this review is equally relevant to this 
study. The final section of this chapter thus provides an indication of the main areas of investigation on 
which the study concentrates, and the identification of those parts of the literature which seem likely to 
be of most relevance to it. A more detailed specification of the areas of investigation is provided in the 
next chapter, on research methodology, and in chapter 7. on the shipping company pilot study and its 
results.
In general, it is fair to say that the writing on corporate planning and strategy does not have the 
same degree of consistency as that covering finance. Some measure of consensus appears to exist with 
regard to the development of rational planning systems, but even here a variety of approaches can be 
found. Section 2 of this chapter therefore describes the way in which corporate planning systems 
evolved, summarises the most important aspects of these systems, and identifies the range of 
approaches which have been developed. Section 3 Identifies and reviews the techniques commonly found 
to support planning systems. This is followed by a brief review of the criticisms which have been made 
of corporate planning systems, particularly those relating to rational systems. Details of the more 
important empirical studies in this area are then given. The sixth section of this chapter reviews an 
approach known as PARE analysis, which is an attempt to link the areas of strategic management and 
finance more closely together. This is followed by a review of the shipping oriented literature in the 
area. The chapter concludes with a summary of the literature relating to corporate planning and 
strategy, and the identification of those parts which are of most significance to this particular work.
2-Corporate Planning and Strategy
Vanciland Lorange, writing in 1975. said that:
"The widely accepted theory oT corporate strategic planning is simple: using a 
time horizon o f several years, top management reassesses its  current strategy by 
looking fo r opportunities and threats in the environment and by analyzing the 
company's resources to identify its  strengths and weaknesses. Management may
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draw up several alternative strategic scenarios and appraise them against the long 
term objectives o f the organisation. To begin implementing the selected strategy (or 
continue a revalidated one), management fleshes it  out in terms o f the actions to be 
taken in the near fu tu re ." (P81)
Vancil and Lorange went on lo indicate that they believed that the planning process varied 
considerably from firm to firm. Specifically they argued that in smaller companies, strategic planning 
was a rather less formal, almost continuous process, whereas for large diversified companies, 
informal planning was virtually impossible, given the large number of managers likely to be involved in 
decision making. In a later article (Lorange & Vancil 1976) they set out a number of issues on which 
choices or decisions must be made in designing a planning system, including such things as the 
communication of goals, limitations of the goal setting process, the role of the planner in relation to 
managers, and links between planning and budgeting. Different choices or decisions would clearly give 
somewhat different planning systems. However, Vancil and Lorange considered that the thought 
processes in undertaking planning were essentially the same for different organizations. They 
therefore attempted to formalize the steps in the process and to explain the purpose of each step.
Strategy formulation was seen as occurring at three different levels, headquarters, division and 
department, and the associated strategy and planning processes were thus labelled as corporate 
strategy and planning, business strategy and planning, and functional strategy and planning.
"Corporate planning, leading to the formulation o f corporate strategy, is  the 
process o f (a) deciding on the company's objectives and goals, including the 
determination o f which and how many lines o f business to engage in. (b) acquiring the 
resources needed to attain those objectives, and (c) allocating resources among the 
different businesses so that the objectives are achieved."
"Business planning, leading to the formulation o f business strategy, is  the 
process o f determining the scope o f a division 's activities that w ill sa tisfy a broad 
consumer need, o f deciding on the division's objectives in its  defined area o f
operations, and o f establishing the policies adopted to attain those objectives. 
Strategy formulation involves selecting division objectives and goals and
establishing the charter o f the business, a fte r delineating the scope o f its  operations 
vis a vis markets, geographical areas, and/or technology."
"In functional planning, the departments develop a set o f feasible action
programs to Implement division strategy, while the division selects -  in the light o f
its  objectives -  the subset o f programs to be executed and coordinates the action 
programs o f the functional departments. Strategy formulation Involves selecting 
objectives and goals fo r each functional area (marketing, production, finance, 
research, and so on) and determining the nature and sequence o f actions to be taken 
by each area to achieve its  objectives and goals. Programs are the building blocks o f 
the strategic functional plans." (P82)
Not all writers on this area agree with the above definitions. However, there does appear to be 
a fair measure of agreement that strategy can be characterised according to organisational level.
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namely corporate, business and functional (see for example Wheelwright 1984).
The Vancil and Lorange description of strategic planning given above represents a reasonably 
concise summary of the state of play in the 1970s, for the better organised firm. Since that time 
further ideas have developed, and the world has become rather more complex and turbulent. Some 
firms have made further improvements, while many are not yet at the stage implied by the above 
description.
Gluck. Kaufman and Walleck in a more recent article (1980) found evidence of certain large 
organisations performing extremely well in relation to their more traditionally managed competitors. 
In an attempt to ascertain why this occurred they embarked on a systematic examination of the relation 
between formal planning and strategic performance across a broad spectrum of companies, looked for 
common patterns in the development of planning systems over time, and specifically examined their 
evolution in large successful companies. They found evidence that evolution did take place along similar 
lines, although at different paces. A four-phase evolution model was described.
(i) The firs t phase was described as basic financial planning, and was closely related to the annual 
budgeting process. Business strategies were rarely formalised, and emphasis was on forecasts of 
revenue, costs, and capital needs, and the identification of limits for expense budgets, all on an annual 
basis.
(ii) The second phase was perceived to be forecast-based planning. Typically this planning is initially 
an extension of annual budgeting in terms of time. However, forecasts often prove to be inaccurate and 
more advanced forecasting tools are thus sought, including trend analysis, regression models and 
simulation. Phase II was seen as improving the effectiveness of strategic decision making. The 
principal reason for this was that It forces management to face up to the long-term implications of 
decisions and to consider the potential impact on the business of identifiable current trends. Criticisms 
of Phase II concern the predictive ability of the models. Sooner or later plans based on predictive 
models fail. Gluck et al pointed out that such plans often fail to signal major environmental changes, 
which often have a considerable impact on corporate fortunes. Other criticisms generally relate to the 
dangers of Phase II planning becoming a "mechanical routine" . with consequent adverse affects on 
motivation, or of key issues being buried under masses of routine data. Gluck. Kaufmann and Walleck 
considered most long range or strategic planning systems to be in Phase II. which implies that the Vancil 
and Lorange description may have been premature.
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(Hi) The third phase . referred to as externally oriented planning, occurs when rapid environmental 
change makes market forecasts obsolete. Repeated errors in forecasts cause planners to look more 
carefully at the basic market place phenomena which are likely to lead to change. This is seen as making 
resource allocation "both dynamic and creative’ . The Phase III planners now look for 
opportunities to:
‘sh ift the dot o r a business on a portfo lio m atrix into a more attractive sector, 
either by developing new capabilities or by redefining the market to better f it their 
companies' strengths. " (P156)
It is this search for alternative strategies which distinguishes Phase III from Phase II. While it is a 
source of considerable strength it also is seen as causing a notable weakness. Gluck et al point to the 
danger of explicit choices being made by planners and managers, often without top-level participation. 
Such a danger is likely to push management into the next phase.
(iv) Phase IV, referred to as strategic management, is seen as drawing strategic planning and 
management together into a single process. Strategic management, according to Gluck et al. is largely 
accomplished by three mechanisms.
7. A planning framework that cuts across organizational boundaries and facilitates  
strategic decision making about customer groups and resources.
2. A planning process that stimulates entrepreneurial thinking.
J. A corporate values system that reinforces manager's commitment to the
company's strategy." (PI50)
The planning process in strategic management emphasises flexibility and creativity, as well as the 
comprehensiveness and thoroughness implicit in earlier phases. The process must avoid becoming 
bureaucratic or ritualised, frequently a feature of Phase II systems. A further feature of strategic 
management, emphasised by Gluck et al. is the importance of the "corporate values system" 
shared by top and middle management. Considerable diversity exists in practice, but common themes 
typically found include such things as: the value of teamwork, leading to task oriented organizational 
flexibility; entrepreneurial drive; open communication; a belief in the future of the enterprise; and 
confidence in its ability to influence the environment within which it is operating. Gluck et al concluded 
that:
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as the economic system becomes more complex and the integration of single 
business units into multinational, diverse organisations, continues, ways must be 
found to restore the entrepreneurial vigor o f a simpler, more individually oriented 
company structure. Strategic management, linking the rigor o f formal planning to 
vigorous operational execution, may prove to be the answer.' (P161)
Similar arguments have been put forward by Ansoff (1977), who used the term long range 
planning to describe systems very similar to those of Glucks Phase II. He also pointed out that 
increased turbulence and environmental complexity make reliance on extrapolations of the past 
somewhat unwise, and necessitate the development of a new type of planning system, capable of coping 
with discontinuities. Ansoff described this new approach as 'entrepreneurial planning", which is a 
decision making logic common to the modern systems developed in recent years, including strategic 
planning, new venture planning, PPBS, strategic management, strategic portfolio management, 
strategic issue analysis, and real time strategic planning. According to Ansoff, entrepreneurial 
planning makes two fundamental departures from the earlier extrapolative planning techniques:
"I1 treats the environment in a much broader perspective. The forecasts o f the 
future seek to discern likely significant discontinuities and changes in direction, fhe 
field o f search for these discontinuities and changes goes beyond the traditional 
boundaries o f the firm s environment to encompass technological, political, 
sociological, and economic trends which are relevant to the firm's future."
I t  differs in the manner by which information is processed. I f  the evaluation 
o f the firm's prospects makes it evident that the future o f the firm's current 
business is unattractive .... a search for new alternatives is instituted, their 
conseguences are analyzed, and the best orientation is selected. fhis enlarged 
environmental awareness necessitates enlarged internal awareness. I f  the firm  is to 
consider alternatives to its past activities, it needs to know its capabilities and 
capacities, ("strengths and weaknesses") for undertaking new departures." (P I5 /1 6 )
Clearly such an approach raises questions about potential changes in both goals and objectives of a firm.
The similarity of the above arguments with those given earlier is apparent, in spite of 
differences in terminology. Because of the differences in terminology it is somewhat difficult to set out 
the generally accepted view of corporate planning, but the trends in planning are clear. Gluck et al 
commented on the problems of terminology and pointed out somewhat sarcastically that "mere 
planning has lost its glamor; the planners have a ll turned into strategists" . While some 
of this may have caused a certain amount of confusion it was nonetheless seen as helping to shift the 
attention of mangers away from the technicalities of the planning process to much more serious 
consideration of the substantive issues affecting the long term well being of their enterprises.
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More recent writings have focussed much more clearly on the newer approaches identified above, 
fo r example, Hax and Majluf (1984) presented a methodology suggesting the tasks that have to be 
performed in the formulation of strategies, programmes and budgets. They defined the corporate 
strategic planning process as "a disciplined and well-defined organizational e ffo rt aimed to 
completely specify corporate s tra te g y '. (P 40) The same three conceptual levels of strategy 
(namely, corporate, business and functional) were used as the essential layers of any corporate 
planning process. A series of steps were identified which were seen as providing the content of the 
strategic planning process.
(i) The identification of the vision of the firm. This was seen as including an expression of the 
mission of the firm  in terms of products, markets, and geographical scope, together with ways of 
achieving competitive leadership, (e.g. achieving the lowest delivered cost position, product 
differentiation, etc.). Strategic business units and their interactions needed to be identified, and 
corporate philosophies articulated.
(ii) The development of strategic posture and planning guidelines, distilled from the vision of the firm  
and an analysis of the external and Internal environments. Potential strategic thrusts and broad 
corporate performance objectives can be identified.
(iii) The definition of a more detailed mission at the business level, in terms of products, markets, 
geographical scope and competitive uniqueness.
(Iv) The formulation of business strategy and broad action plans -  aimed at securing a long term  
sustainable competitive advantage. The business strategy should be arrived at after consideration of 
the non-control table forces associated with the external environment, and the internal competences of 
the firm . Business portfolio matrices could be of use in this area.
(v) The formulation or functional strategies and broad action plans.
(vi) Consolidation of business and functional strategies at the corporate level. As a minimum this was 
seen as addressing four issues: resolution of conflicts; balancing the business portfolio, with several 
dimensions of concern; defining the availability of strategic funds, debt policy, growth etc.; and 
evaluation of priorities for resource allocation to each business unit.
(vii) The definition and evaluation of specific action programmes at business and functional level. This 
should include description; priority; estimates of costs and benefits; manpower requirements; time
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schedule; individual responsible for Implementation, and the procedure for controlling its 
Implementation. Cash flow projections are frequently based on different scenarios.
(viii) The allocation of resources and the definition of performance measures for management control.
(ix) The development of strategic and operational budgets.
This methodology is not seen as being prescriptive, and Hax and Majluf recognise that there is no 
one way to plan, and more than one way to plan effectively. The actual planning system is likely to 
depend upon the type of business, managerial competence, competition, and environmental turbulence, 
and should be tailored to fit the corporate culture, organisation and administration.
Many more examples of books and articles can be found covering the area of strategy and related 
techniques (e.g. Ansoff 1965; 1969: 1979, Ansoff et al 1976, Hamermesh 1983. Andrews 1980). In 
general they have been helpful In focusing management attention on the development of processes which 
will enable strategic issues to be identified and appropriately handled. Some measure of agreement 
exists on the kind of steps and elements typically found In corporate planning systems. Figure 8
C o rp o r a te  A p p ra is a l
Finance, personnel management, facilities technology , purchasing, markets, products
Company
Appraisal
Corporatel------ 1 Operating 1__ I Annual
Strategy i-------i Plan i---- i Plan Review
E n v iro n m e n t
Economic social/political, technological, competitive
Figure 8. Basic steps In corporate planning
Source: Managing the Process of Corporate Development. Taylor 1982b P i l l .
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represents one view of the typical steps, while the main elements of the process were identified as:
(i) specific objectives - by company, division and function
(II) environmental analysis
(iiiJ company appraisal






(Source: Taylor 1982b: PHD
Considerable similarity can be seen to exist between these elements and the tasks of Hax and Majluf, 
suggesting a broad measure of agreement.
To say this however, still leaves the problem of differing approaches to planning, and differing 
styles of implementation. Taylor (1984) has pointed out that over the last decade new pressures in the 
system have resulted in a maturing and development of corporate planning practice. He argued that the 
result has been the evolution of a broad range of philosophies and techniques which aim to help 
organisations adapt to rapidly changing environments. He outlined five styles or modes of planning 
which have emerged.
(I) Planning as a central control system for acquiring and allocating resources. This is seen as a 
rational decision making and control process, supported by techniques or analysis such as SWOT 
analysis, business portfolio analysis, gap analysis, extrapolative forecasting, and extended budgeting.
(ii) Planning as a framework for innovation. I.e. generating new products, processes, markets and 
businesses. This is supported by programmes Tor such things as divestment, diversification, 
acquisition, new product development, and market penetration and development.
(iii) Strategic management -  the Idea of planning as a means of developing both strategies and the 
commitment, skills and talents needed to implement them. Emphasis is placed on elements such as 
organisation and staff development, organisation structure, and management systems. Supporting 
techniques include stakeholder analysis. SWOT analysis, business portfolio analysis, etc.
(iv) Planning as a political process, for resolving conflicts between interest groups and organisations
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competing for resources, both inside and outside the business. This requires the monitoring and 
forecasting of social and political trends, assessing their impact on the firm, and organising and 
implementing appropriate action programmes. Supportive techniques may include such things as 
employee communication, social issue analysis, country risk analysis, etc.
(v) Planning as a means of exploring and creating the future. This involves the development of 
alternative futures, the assessment of the social and economic impacts of such futures and the 
definition of key decisions. Supporting techniques include such things as scenario analysis, delphi 
studies, trend analysis, simulation, and contingency planning.
Taylor saw these approaches as being compatible and complementary. The subdivision into the 
various approaches however, is useful in identifying the range of ideas which can now be found under 
the general heading of corporate planning and strategy. Nevertheless. Taylor emphasised that the 
techniques and approaches referred to must be seen as part of a coherent programme of change. He 
concluded that:
7/7 determining the ir approach to planning, the chief executive and his planning 
s ta ff need to examine the different methodologies which are available to discover 
which system best meets the ir needs. They should then adapt the approach to suit 
the ir own organisation. For corporate planning systems do not come ready-made. 
They have to be tailor-made to f i t  each enterprise." (Taylor 1984: P52)
The arguments outlined above provide a broad indication of the way ideas on corporate strategy 
have developed over the last decade, with a measure of agreement being achieved with regard to the 
basic steps in the corporate planning process. Considerable differences in approach nonetheless exist. 
For example, an interesting discussion of the differences between an analytical approach to strategy, as 
compared with an incremental value-based approach, can be found in Wheelwright (1984).
Before leaving this section it is worth pointing out that strategic planning need not be confined to 
large organisations. Clearly, many small companies cannot afford the time or resources needed for a 
sophisticated system, and a simplified process needs to be devised. Nevertheless, the same underlying 
principles remain. For example. Linneman and Kennell (1977) have put forward a simplified ten-step 
approach which could be used by smaller organisations. They are particularly concerned with the 
problems caused when the assumed values of key variables are wrong and the chosen strategy is 
inappropriate. The aim of their approach is thus to develop flexible strategies by the use of multiple 
scenario analysis.
Thomas (1978) has considered strategy particularly in the context of service businesses, and
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has identified a number of significant differences between strategic management of such businesses and 
of manufacturing businesses. Management should thus ensure that these differences are understood, 
and that the economics of the business have been analysed. Questions need to be asked about 
competitiveness, the cost effectiveness of operations, and pricing policy. Particular attention needs to 
be given to establishing the processes used to develop and test new strategies, and to questions 
concerning acquisitions of other companies.
i  Supporting Techniques used in the Strategic Planning 
Process
2 J . Intmriurtinn
In the last section a variety of techniques were identified which might be of assistance in the 
development of strategy. The purpose of this section is to provide a brief overview of the more 
commonly found techniques.
Greater attention is given to those techniques generally held to support planning as a central 
control system or as a system of strategic management, since the potential for links with finance 
theory appear greater.
i 2  SWOT Analysis
This technique involves the analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
relevant to a company. It builds upon the analyses of individual business units, managerial skills, and 
issues such as flexibility. Care must be taken to identify reasons why particular facets of the business 
are regarded as strengths or weaknesses, since circumstances may change the view on these facets. 
The relative importance of the various facets also need to be identified, particularly in terms of a 
comparison with competitors. The aim should be the identification of the "distinctive competence" 
of the business, (i.e. the identification of the particular strengths which give the company an edge over 
its competitors and the weaknesses which are to be avoided or rectified). Some kind of equivalent 
analysis of the resources of competitors is frequently appropriate.
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The concept of distinctive competence is seen as linking strategic analysis and strategic choice.
"... traditional approaches to strategic choice have tended to focus on
identifying product/market opportunities and then viewing the company's resources
as a constraint by assessing strengths and weaknesses in relation to these
opportunities. The idea o f distinctive competence provides a different focus for 
identifying and assessing future strategies since strategic choice can also be 
concerned with seeking out product/market areas which allow the company to
capitalise on its distinctive competence." (Johnson andScholes 1984: P112)
Some problems and difficulties exist with the analysis of strengths and weaknesses. Stevenson (1976),
in a study aimed at providing insights into the process, was able to make several broad generalisations.
(i) managers tended to treat strengths differently from weaknesses.
(it) the underlying steps in the process or defining strengths and weaknesses were found to be 
similar, though few members of management agreed precisely on their company's particular strengths 
and weaknesses.
(iii) The cognitive perceptions of an individual with regard to the strengths and weaknesses of his 
organisation were strongly Influenced by factors associated with that Individual, such as position, 
perceived role, and responsibility. No single type of measurement or criteria was found to be relevant 
to the measurement of all attributes.
Stevenson concluded that the traditional notions about strengths and weaknesses required further 
examination, particularly in terms of dealing with procedural difficulties, and of making the analysis 
situation dependent.
5 5 Strategies fnr Qrnwth
Much of the early literature in this area was concerned with helping companies plan their way 
into new businesses. For example Ansoff (1965) analysed alternative directions for growth, and 
emphasised the importance of expansion and diversification through market penetration, market 
development, product development and diversification. Similar ideas were found in the approach known 
as ’Gap Analysis’ , developed by the Stanford Research Institute. In this approach management set an 
objective, forecast the level of achievement which is expected if no new initiatives are made (referred 
to as the momentum line), and then plan to fill the gap between the two. Solutions might include 
increases in efficiency, new products, new markets and new businesses. In many cases one of the 
constraints on growth is the availability of funds. Modifications to the model can be made to focus
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attention on narrowing and eliminating the negative cash gap in such cases.
More recently the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) has emphasised the importance of growth and 
cost reduction, in the form of an experience curve. The argument is based upon the idea that as output 
increases economies of scale result, with a corresponding reduction in unit costs. BCG. in a survey of a 
large number of products in a wide range of industries, found that as output doubled so the costs of 
value added (adjusted for inflation) declined by a constant amount, typically 20-308 (see Henderson 
1984). The strategic implication of the experience curve is that the business with the largest market 
share will tend to be the lowest cost producer. The market leader can thus price aggressively in 
relation to competitors. This approach is not without its critics (see Taylor 1982b: P116-118 for a 
review). Criticisms include the following. The potential for overcapacity is considerable, and other 
companies can learn from the experience of one particular company. The major economies of scale may 
accrue principally in the early years of a product's life cycle (Hall and Howell 1985). Indeed, the 
evidence that expanding volume can produce dramatic reductions in cost is limited. The importance of 
understanding likely reactions from competitors is high. Flexibility may be lost as a result of a 
commitment to long production runs and standard products with a consequent increase in the risk of the 
business should the market or the associated technology change. The theory says little  about markets 
which are not competitive, but oligopolistic, monopolistic, or subject to government or regulatory 
intervention or control.
2A Business Portfolio Matrices
Portfolio matrix analysis is basically an attempt to devise some kind of systematic procedure for 
generating and choosing strategic alternatives. A number of different approaches have been developed. 
All require an understanding of ideas on product or business life cycles, which generally suggest four 
stages of evolution, namely embryonic, growth, maturity and aging or decline. Five matrices are 
outlined in this section, in terms of components and strategic recommendations. Useful reviews of 
these can be found in Marshall (1985). Macmillan (1986). and Taylor and Hussey (1982).
The BCG share-growih matrix The BCG basically related differences in unit cost to differences in 
market share. This enabled a linkage to be made between cash generation and relative market share. 
When market share is placed on a matrix with cash use. seen to be dependent on the market growth
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rate, the share-growth matrix results, as shown in Figure 9.
M arket Share
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Figure 9. The BC6 share-growth matrix
When such a model is used the businesses within a company are placed in their appropriate box, which 
can then be used to indicate an appropriate strategy. “Stars* are seen as both high share and high 
growth. “Cash Cows“ (frequently former stars) generate substantial funds but have limited 
reinvestment or growth prospects. “Question marks” represent low shares of high growth industries. 
Typically they require substantial funds for reinvestment to maintain market share, yet generate 
relatively poor cash flows. The end result is thus likely to be a negative cash flow, with the result that 
relatively few such businesses can be supported. “Dogs” have low market share and low growth. Many 
such businesses are likely to become cash traps, and consideration ought to be given to their 
divestment. The goal, according to BC6. is the achievement of a balance of businesses, with the cash 
being generated from cash cows and the liquidation of dogs being used to support the stars and selected 
question marks.
Certain dangers exist in the use of a technique such as that outlined above (see Marshall 1985). 
The matrix and its associated labels may be used in an unduly simplistic way. In particular the matrix 
ignores the impact of competition. The experience curve and the relative market share-profitability 
relationship may not represent a useful description of competitive advantage. For example a firm 
cannot benefit from the experience curve if  little  value is added by production. Exogonous cost 
advantages, which can include things such as shared experience, low cost inputs (or subsidies), product
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differentiation, etc. may also provide further problems for the curve. Any such advantage may well 
allow a low share business to earn very high profits. New products may also eliminate experience 
curve competitive advantages. Other more general criticisms of portfolio matrices will be made later.
Hax and Majluf (19 83 ) have shown that most of the dangers and criticisms have been recognised, 
and that BCG have developed a further matrix based upon two different dimensions; the size of the 
competitive advantage and the number of unique ways in which that advantage can be achieved. Four 
categories of business are recognised, namely "volume" , "stalemate" , "fragmented" and 
"specialisation" . The most appropriate strategy is different in each category, and is dependent upon 
the relationship between return on investment and market share.
Business Strength - industry attractiveness Matrix
This matrix, developed by dcKinsey (1978) from early work at General Electric, works by 
positioning strategic business units on a three by three matrix measuring business strength and 
industry attractiveness, with rankings of high, medium and low. The matrix recognises that more 
factors than market share and growth are important in strategy development. It is shown 
diagrammatically in figure 10.
In d u s try  A t t r a c t iv e n e s s
High M edium Low
High
R e la t iv e
MediumBusiness
^  M a in t a i n .S tre n g th
Low M i l k / d i v e s t
Figure 10. The business strength -  industry attractiveness matrix
This matrix is highly qualitative, since business strength and industry attractiveness need to be 
established. Business strength is generally held to be dependent on market share, relative share and 
rate of growth, technological skill, product and process sophistication, profitability, brand loyalty and
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managerial capabilities. Industry attractiveness depends on such things as the size and growth of the 
market. Industry profitability, ease of entry, degree of competition, investment Intensity, and the 
availablity of labour and materials. As with the share-growth matrix the position in the matrix is 
associated with a particular strategy, although only three major strategies result, as can be seen from 
the figure.
Strong criticisms of this matrix have been made on the grounds that it is vague, since the axes 
can mean whatever any user wants them to mean (e.g. Channon and Jailand 1979). Hence the 
positioning of a business is much less precise than with the BCG approach, where both axes are 
quantifiable. Nevertheless McKinsey's approach can be seen as a useful tool for debating strategic 
resource allocation, even if  It Is not precisely quantifiable.
Directional Policy Matrix
This matrix, developed by Royal Dutch Shell (1976). is a three by three matrix with axes 
measuring competitive capability and prospects for sector profitability. Each variable was assigned a 
score giving an effective range of poor to excellent. Shell defined competitive capability in terms of 
market position, production capability and product research and development. Prospects for sector 
profitability were defined in terms of market growth rate, market quality, industry feedstock position 
and environmental aspects. Different industries would require more meaningful factors to be used, but 
the principle remains. As with the other matrices, the relative positions of the strategic business units 
can be plotted on the matrix, the framework for which is shown in figure f 1. Resultant strategies can 
be seen from the diagram.
Prospects fo r  secto r p ro fita b ility
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Figure 11. The Directional Policy Matrix
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The major criticisms are based upon the difficulties of associating scores to variables.
Other Matrix approaches
Sutton (1980) developed a strategic planning matrix based upon the Directional Policy matrix. It
was a three by three matrix with the axes measuring competitive capability and general performance
prospects. General performance prospects depend upon the structure of the market. Competitive
capability depends upon competitive strengths.
Rothschild (1976) has developed a financial ratio matrix based upon PIMS results (described in
the later section on empirical studies). The axes measured return on sales and return on investment.
General criticisms of Portfolio Matrices
Portfolio matrices have been the subject of considerable criticism in recent years. For example.
Marshall (1985) concluded that:
“... a ll portfolio matrix schemes are little  help in selecting which businesses 
the firm  should Invest in. They are flawed in that they measure the attractiveness 
o f a particular business to the firm  and not necessarily the value o f additional 
investments." (P77)
Coates (1983) in discussing both the theoretical and operational problems of portfolio matrices 
identified a number of particular problems including:
(i) The strategies proposed by the various models can be different.
(ii) All of the models require the firm to be divisible into separate business units, which is 
frequently not practicable. Products sharing similar technology, or with synergistic advantages, do not 
fit easily into the models.
(iii) The portfolio models assume that the dominant firm earns the highest profit, an assumption on 
which there appears to be relatively little evidence. A particular problem Is that it is possible that 
market characteristics may have a significant influence on profitability, in that unprofitable industries 
w ill offer low returns even to dominant firms, while profitable Industries w ill offer substantial returns 
even to the mediocre. Product differentiation and market segmentation may also pose problems for the 
assumption of a link between market demand and profitability.
(iv) Industry attractiveness can be seen as depending upon rather more than life cycle. Capital 
intensity may well be important. Also it has been noted that some firms have reaped high returns from 
strategies involving heavy investment in declining industries. (Porter 1980)
(v) A further basic assumption of the portfolio matrix approach is that there is a lim it to the funds
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available from the market for investment. Whether this is Justifiable Is unclear.
(vi) Theoretically, investment funds should be used so as to equate marginal returns on each unit. 
Hence consideration of the marginal return of each investment is needed if an optimal allocation of 
investment is to be achieved.
(vii) Collusion could lead to the maintenance of relatively unattractive business units where monopoly 
profits could accrue.
(viii) Liquidation values may well have a considerable impact on the maintenance/divestment decision.
(ix) Little quantitative attention Is paid to risk, particularly the CAPM type of approach.
(x) The definition of a business unit Is difficult, but crucial to the usefulness of a portfolio model. A 
narrow definition would artificially enhance the position of a business, whereas a broad definition would 
bias the position downwards.
(xi) The implementation of a portfolio model requires detailed business unit information to ensure 
correct positioning on the matrix.
(xii) The portfolio models do not help in choosing actual projects to accomplish a particular strategic 
objective.
(xiii) Some problems can arise which make individual strategies suggested by the models either 
difficult or invalid. For example, in oligopolistic industries attempts to increase market share may well 
destroy pricing coordination. Anti-trust legislation or governmental influence may be Important.
Hamermesh (1986) has argued that the most serious drawbacks of portfolio planning arise in the 
area of mature industries, and Identified problems of low employee morale and motivation. He also saw 
it as sometimes limiting the strategic thinking of managers, leading to conservative strategies. Earlier 
research (Hamermesh and White 1984) had established a strong relationship between the organizational 
and administrative structures of a business unit and its performance. Portfolio techniques focus on 
industry and competitive conditions, and Ignore those other Important relationships. Nevertheless, 
despite its drawbacks, Hamermesh saw portfolio planning as an important tool in most large, diversified 
companies. However, if  the approach is to be used effectively its limitations need to be fully 
recognised.
Derkinderen and Crum (1984) have raised particular problems and limitations of the 
share/growth technique from a financial strategic perspective. They have expressed concern as to the 
extent to which the technique helps to establish a viable link between the company and its environment
102
which is both financially and strategically sound. An alternative matrix, known as Potential and 
Resiliance evaluation, is discussed, which provides a supplement emphasising the financial-strategic 
aspects. Given the importance of the ideas to this thesis PARE analysis is discussed in more detail in a 
later section.
The Stakeholder approach to strategy
While first mentioned in the 1960's in the work of the Stanford Research Institute, the 
stakeholder concept did not become an important part of the literature on strategic planning until the 
1970's. In 1971 Taylor argued that the importance of stockholders would reduce, with businesses 
being run for the benefit of other stakeholders too. Various other writers explored the implications of 
the approach during the 1970's and 1980's (e.g. Haselhoff (1976). King and Cleland (1978). Hussey and 
Langham (1978)). Recently more fully worked out approaches to strategic management using a 
stakeholder approach have been developed (e.g. Freeman 1984). In essence the stakeholder theory 
suggests that a business has obligations to all the individuals and organisations with which it has 
transactions and relationships. Management cannot simply aim to satisfy the needs of shareholders and 
customers and ignore other interest groups.
An important implication of stakeholder theory is that
*Corporate strategy is  concerned not simply with producing a return on the 
shareholders' capita! and delivering satisfactory products to customers, hut also 
achieving social acceptance in the community. ensuring a continuing and 
uninterrupted supply o f key raw  materials and components, influencing government 
policies, and o f course ensuring that the work force and the whole management team 
are motivated and committed to the company and its  policies."
' The 'stakeholder approach' suggests that management should be searching fo r a 
set o f policies fo r research, production, marketing, finance, personnel and 'public 
a ffa irs ' which are compatible with each other and which manage to satis fy  the 
minimum requirements o f the stakeholder groups, giving p rio rity  to those interests 
which, fo r various reasons, seem to m erit more attention than the rest. “ (Taylor 
1982b: P126)
A second important implication of the stakeholders theory is that corporate strategy cannot be 
expressed solely in berms of products and markets.
ZJt Techniques for Political Planning
The ideas developed in the last section, together with the general increase in the activities of
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governments and pressure groups, have ted to the development of corporate planning as an
inter-organlzational process Involving relationships with those other organisations and interest groups 
(both inside and outside the business) whose decisions and actions seem likely to have a significant 
impact on the firm.
It has been argued that:
7/7 the 1970's there has been a dramatic decline in managerial power and
authority, and many planning failures have been caused because management are
over-estimating their power to carry through their decisions. A manager can only 
plan manageriaiiy to take decisions which are under his own control. For decisions 
which are made by other groups or individuals outside his control he must plan
politica lly to influence the ir decisions." (Taylor 1982a: P69)
Taylor went on to argue that "Corporate A ffa irs " or "External Relations ’  should be the subject 
of plans in the same way as any other functional area. Particular attention should be paid to 
government and unions. While the form that political planning takes is likely to vary from business to 
business, components might include:
(i) political mapping
(ii) analysis of political networks
(iii) identification of the political agenda
(iv) the assessment of likely political response
(v) organised lobbying
(vi) communications programmes
(vii) economic impact studies
(viii) futures forecasts
U  EuI uecl research
Increasing use is now being made of scenario analysts and other future research techniques to 
cope with the changes which now seem to occur fairly regularly. A scenario is basically a hypothetical 
set of events which has been constructed so as to focus attention on causal processes and critical 
decision points.
“Scenarios are not supposed to provide an accurate picture o f the future, but to 
challenge the imagination: to encourage managers to plan, not ju s t fo r the most like ly  
future but also fo r other alternative futures which are less lik e ly ." (Taylor 1982c: 
P217)
104
A particularly useful review or scenario analysis is to be found in Taylor (1982c)
Scenario planning is seen as a way of helping managers become more flexible by the use of such 
approaches as:
(i) environmental scanning, so as to identify any signals, however weak, which might Indicate 
problems to come
(ii) sensitivity analysis, so as to ensure the development of plans which are reasonably robust under 
differing conditions
(iii) contingency planning, so as to be prepared for crises
(iv) risk analysis, so as to make managers more aware of the threats to their business
(v) more flexible investments, so as to build more flexibility into operations.
Scenario analysis is seen as being particularly Important in times of social and political change.
A number of techniques have been identified as being useful in writing scenarios and in developing 





(v) delphi studies 
(vf) impact analysis
The philosophy of scenario planning is well summarised in Taylor (1982c). as follows:
The futurology or futures research movement fs one o f the most significant 
developments to affect planning in the last decade. Futures research o ffe rs a 
perspective complementary to that o f the 'control system' school. The controller 
starts from  where the system is  now and he tries to develop a guidance system 
which w ilt take i t  in a certain direction. He uses techniques such as budgetary 
control and forecasting approaches based on extrapolation.
"Futures research or scenario planning starts with a vision o f the future and 
asks What different futures are feasible?' . What w ill happen to our enterprise In 
these new conditions?' The futures researcher envisages not one future but a 
number o f alternative futures. And he aims to produce strategies and plans which 
w ill be robust enough to enable the organisation to survive and prosper under a wide 
range o f conditions. He uses qualitative techniques which explore the future; taking 
the opinions o f specialists, examining the possible impacts o f certain events and 
constructing scenarios describing futures which could happen given certain 
assumptions." (P225)
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4. Criticisms and limitations of Rational Planning Systems
As has already been made clear, a number of alternative approaches to planning and strategy 
have been developed. Many of the alternative approaches identified were based upon general 
dissatisfaction with the idea of planning as a central control system, an approach which has tended to 
dominate management thinking about corporate planning. A number of more general criticisms and 
concerns remain, generally relating to problems associated with the use of rational planning systems. 
An outline, albeit brief, of these criticisms is given below. Given the nature of this thesis a detailed 
discussion was considered unnecessary. This is not to deny the undoubted importance of such 
criticisms, but reflects a recognition that the links between finance and corporate strategy are more 
likely to be found in approaches based on rationality.
Bryman (1984) has provided an Interesting review of the arguments concerning rationality. The
rational system model of organisational analysis, seen as being exemplified by the writings of Weber
(1964) and the Classical Management School, basically identified the organisation as an instrument 
designed to achieve a specific goal or set of goals. A more modem approach to rationality was seen in 
the development of contingency theory. As has already been pointed out, recent years have seen 
dramatic changes in the environment within which most companies operate, and in the size and 
complexity of organisations. This in turn has led to differences in strategic management practices. 
Contingency theory is based upon the idea :
'that there are many differing organizational and environmental factors which 
influence strategy and seeks to determine a relationship in which organizational 
strategy is  dependent upon specified environmental conditions. ... The contingency 
approach to strategy suggests that, fo r a certain set o f organizational and 
environmental conditions, an optimal strategy exists. Contingency approaches are 
based on the idea o f contingent relationships between an independent variable: 
environmental conditions; and a dependent variable: the organization's strategic 
response.'  (Harvey (1982: P8D)
Steiner and Miner (1977) argued that:
"The appeal o f contingency theory is  that i t  appears to provide a middle ground 
between the extreme situationist view that every situation is  unique and that 
therefore generalisation is  well nigh impossible, and the view that organizational 
functioning can be fu lly  explained in terms o f broad generai truths and principles."
(P 774)
A number of studies have provided useful insights into this kind of approach. Lawrence and
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Lorsch (1967) concluded that organisational design must reflect the particular tasks the company is 
trying to perform. High performers in each industry are those which achieve the best fit with their 
environment. Lawrence and Lorsch also showed that high performing firms in an uncertain environment 
were associated with greater decentralisation than low performing firms. In predictable industries the 
high performers were more centralised. Cable and Steer (1977). in a British survey, found that 
organisation structure was a significant predictor of return on assets, broadly confirming the results of 
an earlier study by Poensgen (1974). Clifford (1973) studied rapidly growing companies and concluded 
that the right' structure for each company at any point of time is a function of: corporate objectives 
and plans: the number of distinct businesses making up the company: the key factors for success in 
each major line of business; company organisational principles; and management capability, style and 
personality. Most of the work to date relates to questions of structure, though several have attempted 
to identify those variables of most importance to levels of performance (for example Glueck (1972)). 
The PIMS study has also identified a number of the apparently important variables in profitability 
determination. This study is dealt with in more detail in the next section.
Contingency theory is still in its infancy, and it is likely to be some time before a comprehensive 
contingency theory is developed which proposes specific strategies, structures and systems for each 
situation. Steiner and Miner (1977) have put forward a limited domain theory which should assist in 
the development of such a theory. It is suggested that key variables can be established for each domain, 
with a comprehensive theory eventually emerging as the number of domains increases. An industry 
based study would dearly be consistent with this approach.
Having said this, it must be recognised that contingency theory has been fairly severely 
criticised. For example. Miller (1981) has pointed to problems with many of its underlying 
assumptions. His criticisms were summarised as follows:
'The assumptions about the adaptive process entail a very much sim plified 
characterization. There are specification errors, unwarranted assumptions o f 
linearity in relationships, the search fo r one best method o f adaptation, and a
deterministic perspective o f causality. The results are often conflicting end 
fragmented findings. “ (P8)
Miller nevertheless went on to argue for a new “6estalt" approach, in an attempt to find more richly 
described natural clusters among a broad variety of variables covering the environment, the 
organisation and its strategies. Other writers (e.g. Bryman 1984) have seen contingency theory as 
being essentially underpinned by ideas on rationality, albeit using a systems approach, so all the
107
problems which are associated with rationality remain.
Bryman saw criticisms or rationality as having four perspectives, although he emphasised that 
his list should not be seen as exhaustive or mutually exclusive. The four perspectives were identified 
as "garbage can", Institu tiona l' , "politica l' and 'Marxist '  .
The garbage can approach has been outlined by Cohen et al (1972) and March and Olsen (1976). 
Cohen et al argued that it may be useful to move away from the concept of the organisation as a static 
structure to the examination of organisations in which goals are hazy and participation is fluid. As 
Bryman pointed out, the departure of this model from the rational model is "quite extreme". The 
ideas of Weick (1976) on the loose “coupling" of various aspects of organisations are largely in line 
with the garbage can approach. Both Cohen et al and Weick sugest that an excessive concentration on 
such things as unity, integration, co-ordination and consensus, may be inappropriate, and may blind 
decision makers to many important aspects of the organisation. As pointed out by Bryman,
"The view with which the reader is  le ft a fte r an introduction to the views o f 
these w riters is  a world in which organizational elements are much less tidy  and 
co-ordinated, yet more fluid, than the rational mode! can embrace. The image o f the 
rational actor which underpins its  world-view begins to disappear from sight. ’  
(Bryman 1984: P3)
The institutional approach (see for example Meyer and Rowan 1977) basically argues that 
apparent rationality can be explained by the desire to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the world at 
large. Rational structures and practices serve ceremonial and symbolic functions, and signal to the 
external environment that the organisation is legitimate and thus worth support and resources. Some 
measure of empirical support exists (e.g. Meyer et al 1981). The Institutional approach rejects the 
rational approach since it dismisses the suggestion that formal organizational structures are 
necessarily designed with the achievement of specific goals in mind.
The political approach basically puts internal politics at the centre of organizational life. (See 
e.g. Pettigrew 1973; PrefTer 1977, 1978. 1981; Mlntzberg 1985). This approach emphasises such 
things as influence, coalitions, and techniques useful for enhancing one's position in the frequent 
scramble for resources (Pfeffer). It moves away from the view of organisation structures as 
externally imposed to a focus on structures in a more or less continuous state of flux. The relationship 
between conflict in organisations and internal politics is clearly important, with executives playing a 
variety of "games", depending upon circumstances (Mintzberg 1985). The main reasons for the use of 
games appear to be related to such things as: the resistance to authority; the building of a power base;
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the defeat of a rival; and the changing of the organisation. The impact of conflict on an organisation may 
be considerable, and may endure for some considerable time. Mintzberg (1985) has argued that there 
are three basic dimensions of conflict In organisations -  Intensity, pervasiveness, and duration. He 
further suggested that this implies four basic forms of political arena, namely confrontation, shaky 
alliance, politicised organisation and the complete political arena, with these being dependent on the 
three basic dimensions referred to above. The relationship between these four types of political arena 
can then be put in context by considering the way in which conflict arises, develops, and is eventually 
resolved, and a process model set up. The implications of such a model for decision making may well be 
considerable, and the model may predict courses of action quite different to those implied by the 
supposedly more "rational" approach.
The Marxist approach represents the fourth perspective in terms of criticisms of the "rational" 
model. Criticisms of traditional organisational analysis generally relate to the way in which existing 
organisational arrangements have been accepted; the way it has adapted to the interest or 
administrative elites; the fact that social class is not included; and to the fact that it is ahistorical (see 
for example Goldman 1978; Benson 1977; Salaman 1979). The Marxist approach has little in common 
with either the rational approach or the other three approaches identified above. Basically the emphasis 
appears to be on the part that organisational arrangements play in societal structures, and not on their 
implications for efficiency.
Bryman (1984) has pointed out that each or these four perspectives Is antithetical to the rational 
model. He has also argued that in other areas, such as economics, there have been slight shifts away 
from the rational choice approaches. The postulate of economic man is seen as the source of some 
disillusionment. Meredith (1984) has argued that the "decision oriented" viewpoint of management 
science rests upon false assumptions, and embodies a philosophy which may be detrimental. Attention 
should be focussed rather more on "mess analysis", including problem identification, data 
interpretation, and transient problem behaviour analysis. Model design and analysis should be 
de-emphasised and situational.
In the area of corporate strategy similar examples of changes In emphasis can be found. One 
particularly interesting approach has been developed by Quinn (1977. 1978. 1980). In a series of 
articles Quinn cast some doubts on the merits of the formalised textbook type of approach to planning 
and strategy formulation of the type discussed in earlier sections, arguing that it tends to focus too
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much attention on quantitative factors, and too little on the qualitative, organisational and behavioural 
factors which often determine success. Quinn has argued that executives should not. and do not, follow 
such an approach. He suggested that they blend formal analysis, behavioural techniques, and power 
politics into a cohesive, step by step movement towards the achievement of broadly conceived ends, 
with further refinement occurring as new information appears. This process is referred to as logical 
incrementa/ism" . Quinn's research suggested that such a process is in accord with reality, in that 
managers consciously and proactively move forward Incrementally, with strategy evolving as events 
unfold. It should not be seen as "muddling through". Nor should it be seen as being inconsistent with 
formal planning systems. These are seen as serving a number of essential process functions, and as. in 
a sense, institutionalising incrementalism. However. Quinn argued that the planning process is rarely 
the source of key issues.
Similar pleas for a more broadly based approach to strategy can be found elsewhere. For 
example Walker Lewis (1984) emphasised the importance of the creation of an organisation and culture 
capable of systematically integrating a wide range of different areas of expertise. Drucker (198S) 
pointed to the need for a commitment to the systematic practice of innovation. Lenz and Lyles (1985) 
conducted a study in which it became clear that the strategic planning process could easily become 
Inflexible, formalised and excessively quantitative" . They pointed out that such systems 
could develop a degree of inertia which was capable of stifling creativity and frustrating managers. 
Undue formality and rationality were seen as the problems, and it was suggested that this could be 
avoided by the cultivation of organisational values, the incorporation of assumption-testing procedures, 
and periodic audits of the planning process. 8hide (1986) has argued that in many cases high profits 
come from superior execution or forceful opportunism, not from structural competitive barriers. He 
emphasised the importance of vision, but pointed out that it is only as good as the energy, 
resourcefulness, and professionalism of the organisation. Gluck (1984) has argued that strategic plans 
frequently fall to affect the lower level decisions which determine success or failure. Again the 
importance of vision and leadership was emphasised. The vision of good companies was generally seen 
as being based not only on a clear notion of competitive markets but also on an understanding of how 
economically strong and sustainable positions can be maintained in these markets. Gluck saw vision as 
being grounded in an understanding of the industry, the competitive dynamics, and company capabilities 
and potential. In building capability experience, judgement and commitment were seen as being more
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important than standard analytical or methodological approaches.
Hayes (1985) has identified an increasing number of complaints about the harmful aspects of 
strategic planning systems, even when it is functioning properly. Hayes argued that:
"... under certain circumstances, the methodology o f formal stategic planning 
and. even worse, the organizational attitudes and relationships that i t  often 
cultivates can impair a company's ab ility  to compete." (P112)
The traditional strategic planning process was seen as being based on an 'ends-ways-means" model, 
with the establishment of objectives (the ends) being followed by the development of a strategy (the 
ways) for achieving them, and the marshalling of the resources (the means) needed to implement the 
strategy. Hayes questioned whether this model was always appropriate. Particular areas of concern 
were the possibility of goals being set which are too short term or two quantitative; concentration on 
modes of thinking which are based on forecasts rather than visions; undue emphasis on structural, 
rather than behavioural means for the achieving of objectives; and excessive bureucracy. leading to 
rigidity of plans. An alternative approach based on means-ways-ends was examined, with the general 
idea that capabilities should be built, and ptans developed in order to exploit these capabilities. Such an 
approach was seen as being particularly useful when the competitive situation is unpredictable and 
changing. Organisations adopting such an approach rely for their success on their ability to exploit 
opportunities as they arise, their ingenuity, their capacity to learn, and their determination and 
persistence. Success is likely to be based on an incremental approach, but requires the development of 
expertise and adaptability at low levels.
Various papers have been written by practising planners, which have made comments along the 
same lines as those outlined above. Particularly interesting papers are those of Robinson (1986), Blass 
(1985), Hussey (1984), Wemham (1984) and Carpenter (1986). These papers made It clear that 
many of the criticisms identified are now recognised by practising planners, and that actual strategic 
planning systems are continuing to develop along these lines.
Brunsson (1982). in a particularly interesting analysis of the irrationality of much decision 
making, argued that rational decision making affords a bad basis for action, since some irrationalities 
are necessary requirements for organisational actions. Brunsson pointed out that in spite of continued 
emphasis on normative research supporting rational decision making, empirical research has found 
ample evidence of decision making processes which appear irrational by the normative standards. 
These irrationalities were not confined to insignificant decisions. Three common ways of explaining this
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irrationality were identified.
(0 The people studied are not clever enough to behave rationally.
(ii) Certain types of irrationality represent inherent characteristics of human beings, difficult to
change by training. Consequently not even experts can be fully rational.
(iii) There are practical restrictions on rationality. In real decisions values, alternatives and 
predictions interact, and decision makers have either incomplete information, or more than human 
beings can grasp. Such a view, according to Brunsson, implies that normative research should design 
systems for gathering and processing data.
Brunsson argued that these explanations cannot be said to be inherently wrong, but that there is much 
evidence that they do not suffice. Hence if  actual behaviour is to be understood, other explanations are 
needed.
Brunsson then went on to argue that an 'action perspective" would be more fruitful for
understanding large areas of organisational behaviour. He argued that the decision-making perspective
failed to recognise that practitioners do more than make decisions. Making a decision was seen as a
step towards action. A decision is not an end product. Practitioners get things done, and induce others
to act. An action perspective makes it easier to see
“... that there exist both decisions without actions and actions without 
decisions. Some actions are not preceded by weighing o f objectives, evaluating o f 
alternatives or choosing; and decision processes and decisions do not always 
influence actions, particu larly not when the actions precede the decisions. On the 
other hand, decision processes often comprise some o f the processes associated with 
actions . . . '
'in fact, the very relationship between decision making and action helps explain 
why decisions deviate from normative rationality. Since decision processes aim at 
action, they should not be designed solely according to such decision-internal 
crite ria  as the norms o f ra tiona lity ; they should be adapted to external crite ria  o f 
action. Rational decisions are not always good bases fo r appropriate and successful 
actions.'  (P32)
if decisions are to initiate action, they must incorporate cognitive, motivational and commltal aspects. 
The stronger the expectation, motivation and commitment expressed in a decision, the better that 
decision as a basis for action. Hence action can be influenced by the decision process itself. The 
implication of this may well be that the most effective decision processes are quite different to those 
implied by the rational decision making approach. For example, few alternatives should be considered, 
only positive consequences of the chosen actions should be considered, and objectives should not be 
formulated In advance. The consideration of multiple alternatives, or negative consequences of
decisions, were both seen as Increasing uncertainty, which in turn reduces motivation and commitment. 
For producing action, it was considered better to start from the consequences of decisions and to invent 
the objectives afterward. Predicted consequences were judged as good because they can be 
reformulated as desirable objectives.
In summing up. Brunsson recognised two kinds of rationality, decision rationality and action 
rationality, which correspond with the two problems of choosing the right thing to do. and getting it 
done, The two kinds of rationality serve different purposes, and imply different norms. Difficulties of 
reconciliation may exist because rational decision making processes may well be irrational from an 
action perspective. Ideologies were proposed as a means of solving the dilemma.
An ideology was perceived as some knowledge, perspectives and/or attitudes which persist over 
time, generally shared by individuals within an organisation. Organisational ideologies were seen by 
Brunsson as being closely interrelated with decisions, since they make it easier for agreement to be 
reached on objectives, alternatives and outcomes. They offer short-cuts to decision makers by 
permitting the shortening or elimination of some steps in the process. Ideologies may even substitute 
for decisions, where agreement and co-ordination arise as a result of similar perceptions, expectations 
and values. For either of these to occur, however, ideologies need to be clear, and to change slowly. 
Where rapid environmental change occurs such ideologies might well prevent the kind of changes needed 
to cope, presenting something of a dilemma. Brunsson argued, however, that if change actions are 
preceded by shifts in ideologies, they can attract enough support to be achieved. He quoted Jonsson and 
Lundin (1977). who found that organisations jumped from one dominant ideology to another. The 
dominant ideology was seen as being likely to be strong under normal conditions, and to be questioned 
only during crises. When faith in the dominant ideology is lost it will be replaced by another.
Various other writers have attempted to qualify the arguments on rationality, to soften Its 
Impact. Reference has already been made to the idea of bounded rationality. Other ideas, such as 
limited rationality, deliberative rationality, and selective rationality, have also been raised (for a 
review of this area see Bryman 1984). Perhaps even more important is the fact that different 
standards or criteria of rationality may exist within organisations (e.g. Pfeffer 1977. Weick 1969). 
Under such instances the focus of the concept of rationality would need to change to the divergent 
rationalities which might be found in an organisation. Such a view has much in common with the political 
perspective on organisations identified in earlier sections. It has much to commend it. not least because
It implies that the idea of rationality is still useful, and operates at a number of levels. Bryman quoted 
the empirical work of Bower (1972) as providing credence to both a politicised approach to 
organisations and the notion of multiple rationalities. It needs to be recognised that rational decisions at 
the level of the individual decision maker do not necessarily lead to rational decisions at the level of the 
organisation.
The above ideas are interesting, and pose real problems for the concept of rationality and hence 
for both finance theory and much of the theory relating to corporate strategy. Clearly many criticisms 
of rationality have been made, and a high degree of scepticism exists about rational models of 
behaviour. However, the criticisms take a variety of forms, and many can be seen as providing a 
rationale for broadening the process of corporate strategy to include other dimensions, particularly 
behavioural and political. Certainly the criticisms do not seem to have changed fundamentally the views 
of many writers on corporate strategy, although greater awareness of the problems of implementation 
now exist. By way of example, it is interesting to note that Ansoff (1904). in predicting trends in 
strategic management, included a number of propositions which appear to have been heavily influenced 
by the kind of criticisms made. These included:
(i) the rapid development of theoretical insights into strategic behaviour, which will be useful, 
among other things, for the development of the contingency perspective:
(ii) the increased use of systematic approaches that are specifically tailored to the needs of each
individual firm;
(iii) the increased use of what Ansoff describes as the strategic learning mode, which implies a 
gradual commitment to ventures, blending learning by analysing with learning by doing:
(iv) the increased use of a multi-capability design approach, enabling firms to remain strategically 
responsive and competitive in a variety of different environments;
(v) the development of concepts for managing mature business areas:
(vl) the increased blending of technological and socio-political variables with economic and
competitive variables:
(vii) an increased concern with managing in complex organisations.
Perhaps the greatest impact of the criticism of recent years is in the recognition that strategic planning 
must be seen as being a completely integrated part of management, and not something which is separate 
and self-contained. (See for example Steiner 1983: Taylor 1986.)
5. Empirical work on Corporate Planning and Strategy
Reference to certain empirical work on corporate planning and strategy has already been made in 
previous sections, particularly that relating to critiques of rational plannning. The purpose of this 
section is to provide an overview of empirical work on the use and usefulness of systems of corporate 
planning and strategy.
Denning and Lehr (1972) in a survey of the top 300 U.K. companies, found that only a small 
percentage of British companies had Introduced long range planning by 1967. with most systems having 
been introduced between 1962 and 1967. By the mid 1970s Grinyer and Wooller (1975) and Higgins 
and Finn (1977). had found evidence that planning and modelling systems were well established in the 
large companies, but were still rare among small and medium companies. Since that time far greater 
use of planning and modelling systems has been made, with substantial growth in the number of 
companies using financial modelling (see Grinyer 1983). In the UJC. studies it is interesting to note that 
concerns with the effectiveness of formal planning systems were identified as early as 1974 by 
Grinyer and Norburn. They concluded (inter alia) that the important decision making process is informal 
and political, and that formal planning systems can do no more than provide a framework for the real, 
political decision making systems. Al-Bazzaz and Grinyer (1980) perceived a further swing towards 
greater dissatisfaction with formal systems from 1974. but noted that the calls for greater Informality 
generally came from companies with the greatest experience of planning. They also argued, from their 
evidence, that a contingency approach to the design of corporate planning systems Is required, to 
ensure that the design of the system best matches its needs.
Wills and Beasley (1982) conducted a survey Into the use In the UX. of a number of the 
techniques typically associated with strategic planning, including experience curves. Pins and various 
business portfolio matrices. Out of 55 replies 23 companies indicated that they did not use any of the 
techniques, while 28 indicated that they had used or still used one or more of the techniques. A number 
of interesting observations were made by respondents (e.g. the fact that experience curve benefits did 
not just happen, they had to be worked at; the need to back up the share-growth matrix with sound 
financial analysis; the usefulness of PIMs in considering acquisitions.) Wills and Beasley concluded that, 
of the companies using the techniques considered, many found them a valuable aid to their strategic
planning.
In the United States a variety of studies have provided evidence of the relative use of corporate 
planning systems, and several are referred to below. There appears to be little doubt that systems of 
corporate planning and strategy were generally adopted earlier in the U.S.A. than in the U.K., and their 
use is now widespread. For example. Higgins (1985) in reviewing trends in corporate modelling, noted 
that by 1979 nearly every Fortune 1000 company was using a corporate simulation model. A 1982 
study (Klein) reported that 86X of a sample of 204 organisations were using corporate models. 
Various other studies are referred to below, which lend support to the view that sytems of Corporate 
planning and strategy are well developed in the United States. Certainly Steiner (1983). in assessing 
the state of strategic planning in the United States, was able to give fairly high marks to approximately 
two-thirds of the criteria which he had established as being necessary for first rate strategic planning 
systems. He concluded that formal strategic planning in the United States had been immensely improved 
in recent years, in spite of a highly uncertain and turbulent environment, but that there was still much 
opportunity for improvement.
With regard to the relative usefulness of strategic planning, a number of studies have been 
undertaken over the last 15 years, which attempt to establish relationships between planning and 
performance, or to establish effective strategic actions. Greenley (1986) has recently reviewed a 
number of these studies. He refers to nine such studies, five of which concluded that companies which 
utilise strategic planning achieve higher levels of performance than those which do not. However, the 
other four studies identified did not claim any such relationship. Greenley identified a number of 
methodological problems with the surveys, and concluded that the research is in fact far from 
conclusive in establishing a relationship between strategic planning and performance. He further argued 
that although there is a strong a priori case that strategic planning provides a range of both advantages 
and intrinsic values, empirical evidence is lacking to substantiate them.
One of the most significant of the studies in this area was the PIMS study (Profit impact of 
market strategies) run at Harvard (Schoeffler. Bussell and Heaney: 1974). This study was designed to 
help answer two basic questions:
(i) What factors influence profitability in a business -  and by how much?
(ii) How much does ROI change in response to changes in strategy and in market conditions?
In attempting to answer the first of these the study group constructed an equation which explained more
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than 80S of the variation in profitability among the businesses in the PIMS data base. This equation 
included more than 60 terms made up of various combinations of 37 basic factors. Some of the more 
important factors were ROI, (the ratio of net pretax operating income to average investment), market 
share, product or service quality, marketing expenditures, R andD expenditures, Investment intensity 
(ratio of total investment to sales) and an index of corporate diversity. Particularly Important factors 
were market share, investment intensity, and the existence of certain company factors. The PIUS 
study found that ROI went up steadily as market share increasesd. The findings Indicated the 
importance of the economies of scale that are often associated with strong market positions. High 
market share and superior quality were associated with the best returns. With low quality there was 
found to be a strong negative relationship between marketing expenditures and ROI. On investment 
intensity the study found that the higher the ratio of investment to sales, the lower ROI tended to be. 
This appeared to be because businesses with high investment intensities were not able to achieve large 
enough profit margins to offset the greater amounts of investment. Other company factors which 
influenced profitability included size, diversity, and flexibility, though in certain markets specialization 
yielded high returns.
Hamermesh. Anderson and Harris (1978) expressed concern with certain Inferences being drawn 
from generalisations such as those in the previous section, particularly those relating to ROI and market 
share. They pointed to the fact that In many industries, companies having a low market share 
consistently outperform their larger rivals. In a small, but detailed, study. Hamermesh et al found four 
common characteristics used by successful companies with smalt market share. These were: careful 
segmentation of their markets; the efficient use of research and development funds; thinking small; 
and the pervasive influence of their chief executive.
8loom and Kotler (1975) concerned themselves with strategies of companies with high market 
share. They pointed out that while high market share is likely to result in higher profits. It can also 
mean headaches. In particular, they argued that companies with high market shares are seen as 
tempting targets for actual and potential competitors, consumer organizations, and government 
agencies. They must therefore make their decisions and manage their operations with considerable 
care. In spite of strong support for an objective of market share maximisation (e.g. Boston Consulting 
Group) Bloom and Kotler argued for a strategy of attaining an optimal market share. Such an approach 
requires a more careful analysis of the relationship between market share and profitability, to enable
an assessment to be made as to whether the extra profits to be made with higher market share are 
adequate rewards for the extra risks being taken. It displays an approach conceptually similar to that 
found in the finance literature.
Hall (1980) has pointed to the increasingly hostile environment in which companies now find 
themselves. He argued that the broad range of corporate strategies and business success formulas' 
which once brought prosperity no longer work. There now exists a much narrower range of strategic 
choices if companies are to survive in this hostile environment. Hall's study examined strategies and 
evolving competitive positions of the 64 largest companies in eight different industries. All eight 
industries had been subjected to heavy inflationary pressures; all were under some kind of regulatory 
pressure; all were subject to fierce foreign competition; all were facing lower profitability; and 
consolidation had occurred in some way in all eight industries. Nevertheless, some companies and 
industries did rather better than others. Hall was thus concerned to identify how some companies had 
survived and prospered in the hostile environment, while others had had serious survival problems. A 
careful comparison of success and problem strategies demonstrated that great success was possible, 
even in a hostile environment. It further showed that the strategies which led to success shared 
common characteristics, with successful strategies frequently being associated with purposeful moves 
towards a leadership position, and problems coming from a failure to gain or defend such a position. 
Hall proceeded to examine these in some detail. Particularly interesting was the fact that the top two 
companies in all eight Industries:
'demonstrated a continuous single-minded determination to achieve one or both 
o f the following competitive positions within their respective industries:
'Achieve the lowest delivered cost position relative to competition, coupled 
with both an acceptable de/ivered quality and a pricing policy to gain profitable 
volume and market share growth.
'Achieve the highest product/service/quality differentiated position relative  
to competition, coupled with both an acceptable delivered cost structure and a 
pricing policy to gain margins sufficient to fund reinvestment in product/service 
differentiation.'  (P78/79)
Careful strategic analysis was used In all of these top 16 companies, as opposed to the simplistic 
adherence to various doctrinaire approaches. Indeed. Hall found that the performance leaders often 
made decisions which conflicted with such approaches. For example, he found that leadership positions 
were not being milked, high sustainable returns came from average cost but highly differentiated
positions.
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Gluck (1984) referred to recent work done by McKlnsey and Company on what makes succesful 
companies tick. As a result of its study McKlnsey defined five organisational and process requirements 
for effective strategic management. These were: the need for a planning framework; the need for 
strategic thinking throughout the corporation; the need for an open process of negotiating objectives; 
the importance of defining the performance review system; and the need to develop supportive 
motivational systems and management values. The requirements were seen as being capable of 
achievement In a variety of different ways. These requirements clearly recognise the validity of many 
of the criticisms of the last section.
Ramanujam et al (1985) have attempted ’to systematically investigate and synthesize 
the perceptions and experience o f managers as to the role and value o f planning in 
their organisations’ . Their study was thus concerned with assessing the extent to which planning 
objectives were being achieved, with assessing the extent to which differences could be traced to 
specific facets of design or use, and with developing guidelines for improving systems. Six different 
planning objectives were assessed, namely improving short term performance; improving long term 
performance; predicting future trends; evaluating alternatives based on more recent information; 
avoiding problem areas; and enhancing management development. Rather more than half of the 
executives questionned indicated that they were generally satisfied that all of the objectives were being 
achieved, with in excess of 60K indicating that three of the objectives were being achieved (improving 
long-term performance; predicting future trends; and evaluating alternatives). Ramanujam et al were 
thus able to conclude that responding executives were, in general, satisfied with their planning 
systems, but that considerable scope exists for improvement. Discriminant analysis was used to 
identify facets associated with the successful achievement of objectives, with seven different 
discriminant functions being developed, namely capability of the system; use of planning techniques; 
attention to external facets; attention to internal facets; functional coverage and integration; resources 
provided for planning; and resistance to strategic planning. Different factors were associated with the 
successful achievement of of different objectives, but in general the more important discriminating 
factors were: capability of the system; functional coverage and integration; and resistance to strategic 
planning. Interestingly, the survey found that the use of planning techniques had the lowest rank, 
implying that uncritical use of some or the techniques referred to in earlier sections will not 
necessarily help much. Ramanujam et al used their results to:
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'. .  underscore the importance o f epproaching systems design from e
'situations/' o r 'contingency' design perspective, since the influences o f any system 
factor is  found to very depending upon the system objective sought to be fu lfille d ." 
(P306)
Clearly criticisms can be made of the discriminant functions used, and of the more general approach of 
contingency theory. Nevertheless, the study is useful in indicating the relative level of satisfaction of 
managers with their planning systems.
(W a ll, the empirical evidence suggests a fairly high degree of use of strategic pfenning, 
particularly among large companies. It further suggests that confidence in such systems is reasonably 
high, but that greater maturity of systems is likely to lead to less formality. The evidence on the 
relationship between planning and performance is less conclusive, although a number of effective 
strategies and relationships have been identified.
&. PARE A nalysis
ILL Intrailiirtton and Basis of the Analysis
Derklnderen and Crum (1979) In their book entitled “Project Set Strategies*, have argued that 
the two academic disciplines of Management* and finance* have much insight to ofTer to eech other. 
Their book represents an attempt to link the strategic management area to a theoretically sound and 
usable financial economic foundation.
Derklnderen and Crum started by considering the importance of planning, and the effect of 
increasing environmental complexity on planning. They pointed out that todays managers are confronted 
with an increasing need to plan, yet at the same time are facing substantial difficulties In making the 
long range forecasts which are required for successful planning. Under such circumstances they must 
ensure that data are used effectively, to obtain the maximum amount of information from it. This 
Information can then be used to position the firm as advantageously as possible to meet the challenges of 
the environment as they arise. Because of the complexities and environmental uncertainties which now 
exist it is likely that attention will be concentrated on those variables which can be forecasted most 
reliably. However, adequate attention must also be given to the development of a capability to respond
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to factors which might arise in the future, even where the identification of such factors is difficult or 
impossible.
A methodology that can serve as an aid was then discussed, namely preplanning. Preplanning
*refers to the process o f determining the direction o f movement o f the firm 's 
strategic posture, including appropriate actions that need to be taken to move in the 
intended direction, supplemented, i f  possible, by a rough but situationaiiy conditioned 
indication o f the magnitude and rate o f change o f this movement as far as it is 
concerned with the fu ll project se t.'  (P3)
This determination was seen as having two dimensions. The first part of preplanning is concerned with 
analysing the firm's strengths and weaknesses, and its ability to respond appropriately to opportunities 
and threats as they arise. The second part concentrates attention on the Identification of those actions 
that can be taken to improve the firms strategic posture so as to make it better able to capitalize on 
opportunities or handle adverse events as they arise.
Preplanning, as used by Derklnderen and Crum is based upon comparisons between the company in 
question and an appropriate reference firm. Selected features can then be compared and evaluated, so 
that the 'current departure position'  of the company can be established. This situation can then 
be subjected to the analysis of strategic strengths and weaknesses from which inferences can be drawn 
for possible changes in strategy. In arriving at this departure position Derkinderen and Crum specified 
a number of "typification steps" which might be of assistance. These steps Involve plotting a 
series of matrices setting one attribute against another. Fourteen such steps were Identified, namely: 
market share/market growth; familiarity with markets and technologies; knowledge and skill with 
regard to markets; cash flow margin; cash flow balancing; cash flow growth/sales growth; 
concentration of cash flow/concentration of sales; economic circumstances; environmental change 
impact; inflation impact on profitability; operating profitability/operating risk; bankruptcy risk; 
insolvency chance; and the weathering ability of the firm.
Derkinderen and Crum discussed strategy and strategic analysis. The ideas discussed (most of 
which are covered in the previous section on corporate planning) are held to be of great significance for 
the study of business finance. By its very nature, financial management is a process involving the 
commitment of large amounts of scarce resources. However, commitment of resources is also an 
integral part of the strategic process. Since strategy is a broader, more encompassing field than 
finance, financial management can only be valid if  set in the context of the overall strategic situation. 
However, as was pointed out earlier, in the finance literature there is little mention of the strategic
dimension of asset planning and selection. Yet misdirected or inappropriate asset planning and selections 
may well lead to serious problems and consequent financial distress.
Derkinderen and Crum reminded us that:
"the present value o f a company is a runetion o f its cash-fiow stream in 
perpetuity capitalized at a rate o f return sufficient to induce investors to hold the 
stocks and bonds o f the firm. The perpetual cash-fiow stream implies that the cash 
throw-off from the current project set is important, but so is the ability o f the firm  
to find and exploit profitable projects in the future. The all-encompassing 
capitalization rate is designed to compensate investors for the variability o f the 
cash flow, as well as for another important component that may only be indirectly 
linked with variability o f cash flow : the chance that, for whatever reason, the firm  
w ill have to cease operations and liquidate, or in other words, become bankrupt.' 
(PI7) (emphasis added)
Derkinderen and Crum argued that these considerations are in fact broader than implied by the 
traditional risk-return trade-off included in finance theory, and offer PARE analysis as an alternative. 
The essence of the PARE (Potential and Resilience Evaluation) logic is as follows. In assessing the 
ability of a company to achieve its strategic objectives, a corporate planner will initially focus 
attention on the potential of the firm. Potential is taken as the ability of the company to generate and 
implement projects which offer the possibility of good returns in both the present and the future. 
Potential, however, requires the existence of opportunities m i the ability to actually carry them out. 
Projects which possess potential are said to be opportunities. Indeed, without opportunities no firm will 
remain competitive in the market place in the long run. However, having opportunities, while necessary 
to success, is not sufficient. A further most important factor is the likelihood that such opportunities 
can actually be exploited. This capability to act is referred to as the action range of the firm. It 
depends not just on the financial competence of the firm, but on its other resources, in terms of 
management, skill, technical ability etc.. Without the capability to exploit opportunities, potential 
cannot be realised. Derkinderen and Crum argued that the two strategic elements of opportunities and 
action range , combined into potential, give a richer concept than traditional ideas on return.
Having said this, potential represents only one part of the analysis. The second part concerns 
the ability of the firm to withstand environmental threats and other unfavourable occurrences. This 
ability to cope with adversities and contingencies is referred to as the corporate resilience. Resilience 
is in turn further subdivided into risk and endurance. Risk relates to the uncertainty to which the 
relevant cash flows are exposed, in terms of variability and sensitivity to contingent setbacks. 
However. Derkinderen and Crum argued that risk alone is not sufficient to describe adequately the
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concept of resilience. An additional consideration is the capability of the company to accumulate or 
obtain sufficient resources to ensure the survival of the company even when the market turns against 
it. Derkinderen and Crum referred to this as the firm's endurance.
Derkinderen and Crum went on to argue that condensing the four strategic elements into a 
'single or grand indicator" will help provide directional guidance in terms of assessing the 
company's posture. They suggested the use of a PARE chart with comparison being made with an 
appropriate reference firm. Such an approach can be used to assess the appropriateness of the current 
strategy, against the background of the company's objectives. A do-nothing-strategically-new scenario 
could be used to identify and reflect on possible deviations from the desired path of development, and 
attention could be focussed on changes that need to be made to make the strategy more appropriate.
Derkinderen and Crum argued that Potential and Resilience are conceptually closer to the ideas 
underlying the Gordon and Modigliani-Miller valuation methodologies than the generally recognized 
measures of return and risk. They pointed out that, at the level of the firm, a concept such 
as "growth rate o f the cash flow " could be seen as compatible with the concepts of 
"opportunities ’  and "action range". but that such a concept does not help in achieving a proper 
strategic balance. Similarly, the capitalization rate represents a compression into a single indicator of 
risk and endurance, which may not be valid. Derkinderen and Crum extended this argument somewhat 
by pointing out that “return'' tends to specify the effect of actions, and to ignore the causes, whereas 
potential focuses primary attention on the characteristics of the firm that are likely to lead to good 
cash flows. Clearly such a result need not. indeed should not. hold true, but the possibility exists, 
particularly in areas where detailed forecasting is difficult. The concept of action range is also one 
which needs to be explicitly considered, since it is likely to act as a constraint on the ability of the firm 
to generate cash flows in the future. Similar points are made in comparing resilience and the 
traditional concept of risk. Derkinderen and Crum argued that the conventional measures of risk assume 
implicitly that there is a direct cause-effect relationship between the chance of a cash flow loss and the 
risk of bankruptcy. Yet endurance clearly has an important role to play in the determination of the risk 
of bankruptcy. It is seen as supplementing risk measurement by the introduction of a different set of 
characteristics, which add another dimension in terms of potential bankruptcy or financial stress.
Derkinderen and Crum thus argued that:
"Since the PARE approach is  richer in variety than the conventional measures
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o f return and risk, and it  is indeed in harmony with the long-run concepts that are 
the basis for valuation o f the firm, it  should prove to be useful as a too! for financial 
managers. in the PARE method, dimensions o f the business environment that
practitioners have identified as important for financial decisions are considered 
explicitly. Also, this method is consistent with the thrust o f academic thinking on 
simulation and goal programming as to the need for mu/ti-aspect criteria for
financial decision making." (P21)
Derkinderen and Crum recognised the difficulty of deriving reliable quantitative measures for the four 
strategic elements, but considered that an approach which concentrates on identifying the direction and 
rough magnitude of the effect of managerial actions on each element is both possible and useful. The 
typlflcatlon steps, referred to earlier, were seen as a means of shedding further light on the strategic 
elements.
As a further supplement to the PARE analysts, Derkinderen and Crum suggested the use of the 
Balancing Identification Method (BIM). This Idea is to couple often contrasting facets of strategic 
behaviour, so as to ensure the identification of a range of significant policy viewpoints that deserve 
attention in devising strategy. The couplets identified were: maintenance - adaptation; individual 
action -  Joint action; initiative -  caution; growth -  harmonization; concentration -  spread; and shifting 
of action -  change in intensity.
Derkinderen and Crum saw the use of PARE analysis as providing a sound foundation for the 
effective preparation of strategic decisions. That it presents useful Insights into the decision making 
process, and provides a useful framework for analysis, is undoubted. Those of most significance to this 
study are as follows;
(f) The concept of strategic positioning is developed. A concept which appears to be realistic in a
complex environment.
(ii) The four strategic elements cover different aspects of the decision making process, and offer
richer insights than the risk-return trade-off.
(iii) Attention is placed on those variables which can be forecast most easily, and with reasonable 
accuracy.
(Iv) The emphasis is on causes, not effects.
(v) The emphasis is directional, rather than on precise figures.
(vi) The Importance of being in a position to deal with the unexpected if recognised.
(vii) The importance of detailing and interpreting environmental signals accurately is recognised.
(viii) The system developed appears more relevant to explain behaviour in private companies.
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(ix) The typification steps outlined provide useful insights into areas of most strategic importance.
(x) The Balancing Identification Method provides a useful way of approaching strategy.
Little empirical research seems to have been done on the applicability of the PARE method. Nor is 
It the Intention here to test the system empirically. However, In attempting to devise a model or 
models of the behaviour of companies in the shipping Industry, it seems likely that at least some of the 
ideas outlined above will be useful.
Various efforts have been made to relate the theory and practice of planning to the shipping 
Industry (e.g. Rich: 1982). Until recently such efforts have tended to be somewhat abstract. However. 
In 1982 the Maritime Administration published "A Guide to Strategic Planning for the U.S. Liner 
Industry." This study was prepared jointly by Delta Steamship Lines. Inc. and Temple. Barker and 
Sloane Inc. The study is based on the practice adopted in Delta Lines and the orientation is towards liner 
shipping. Some modifications would appear to be necessary to the model proposed if it were to be 
applied to shipping activities other than the liner trades.
The study started by outlining a structure for planning which should enable companies to deal 
with the challenges of the future:
The process begins wfth an analysts o r the various ’environments' within 
which the company operates. This analysis provides a basis Tor the projection o f the 
company’s future environments. Against this projection, an assessment o f the
company's capabilities is  overlaid to determine issues o f strategic importance 
factors which may plan a c ritica l role in the company's future success.'
"Alternative strategies are designed to address the challenges o f the strategic 
issues. These strategies are rigorously tested in the context o f the future 
environment to select the most effective. Finally the cycie is  completed with the 
implementation o f the selected strategy. Monitoring performance against strategic 
objectives w ill lead to the identification o f new strategic issues. The process would 
then begin anew." (PI-2)
While it is possible to disagree with certain aspects of the above process, or with the implicit weighting 
given to the various parts, the model developed represents a very serious attempt to apply planning to 
one section of the shipping industry.
oriented Literature
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The use or an effective planning system was seen as leading to the development of strategies 
which focus on areas of opportunity while avoiding threats, yet which have enough flexibility to respond 
to the unforeseen. The system should also provide yardsticks' to monitor progress towards strategic 
objectives.
The study described the first phase of the planning process as the analysis of the environments 
within which the company operates. This analysis was separated into five major segments, covering 
the industry, company, market, competition, and other environmental factors.
The industry analysis should include careful analysis of both domestic and foreign operators in 
the particular sectors of the shipping industry which are relevant, and some comparison with other 
industries, particularly other transportation industries. This last stage is essential to ensure that the 
industry is making enough returns to continue to attract funds Into the Industry. Financial comparisons 
should be made, for different companies over time, covering such things as revenue, net income, profit 
margin, total assets, return on assets, stockholder equity, return on equity, debt/equity ratios, etc. 
Such comparisons are fairly easy for public companies in the OECD countries. This is less true for 
other foreign competitors. With detailed industry data it  should be possible to identify those firms 
which are successful. The principal factors that have contributed to success or failure should be 
Identified where possible. The NARAD study identified a number of possibilities for differentiating 
strong from weak companies, and also identified those factors which had apparently contributed to the 
success of the stronger firms in the liner industry in the USA. These included: careful fleet planning; 
market oriented fleet replacement programmes; involvement in US flag protected trades; relatively 
low debt burdens; and Involvement in a number of trades, giving a kind of portfolio effect.
The company analysis was seen as being concerned with the determination of the company's 
particular strengths and weaknesses. The major focus of this analysis should be at the trade route or 
individual service level, with the economics of each service being analyzed to answer questions 
concerning such things as: cargo mix/rate levels; break-even capacity, utilisation and market share 
levels; costs and margins (and trends therein); and the economics of different ship types. Trends in 
market share were also viewed as important indicators of strength in the liner trades. (The study did 
not cover the bulk trades, where such factors may not be considered important.) Strategic analysis of 
a company's costs was also seen as extremely important, with the focus being on those components for 
which significant variations would have the greatest impact on the company's performance.
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Company strengths and weaknesses then need to be related to the expected supply and demand 
conditions, and put in the context of any remaining environmental considerations. These latter 
considerations are likely to include political factors, business-environment factors, and social factors. 
Trade forecasts may well need to be modified, sometimes considerably, to incorporate these factors. 
The study suggested that In estimating the potential impact of such events the analyst should try to 
ascertain both their likelihood, and their potential impact on trade. Actual demand analysis is no longer 
easy in shipping. The aim. however, should be to develop an understanding of the factors underlying the 
demand for shipping services within specific market areas.
An analysis of supply represents the logical next step. In making such an analysis the logical 
starting point is to profile competitors, both existing and potential. Details need to be collected on their 
operations to enable a thorough analysis of their strengths, weaknesses, and current strategies to be 
made. Useful historical data was seen as including information on the following: fleet profile by 
competitor; vessels on order; market share; and performance figures. Information like this should help 
answer a variety of questions of use in strategic planning, which in turn should help the planner 
determine the nature of the competitive environment. In considering this, further questions may well 
be necessary, covering such things as: the rate of change in the trade; profitability; barriers to entry, 
and the nature of the system (i.e. conferences, pools, bi-lateral agreements, independents).
The above procedures can then be used to ascertain the overall level of supply. Total available 
capacity can be estimated for each competitor. Published sources regularly provide corroborating 
information. Trends in capacity supply should also be identified. Particular features which could be 
identified (or at least suggested) by trend analysis include such things as: commitment to a particular 
technology by a competitor; relative aggressiveness of competitors in a particular market; shifts from 
cross traders to national-flag owners; overall trends towards containerisation, etc. Other factors may 
well influence estimates of demand, such as: competitors response time; the potential for joint action; 
technological trends; the degree of competition from alternative modes of transportation; possibility of 
new entrants; and new buildings, either currently on order or expected to be ordered in the future.
Careful supply/demand analysis should then result in a number of important insights being 
obtained into competitive strategy in a trade, including such things as: an indication of the effect of 
additional capacity on utilization levels; the need for new vessel technologies: a sense of the timing of 
new vessel or equipment decisions; and the impact on profitability caused by the level of capacity
127
utilization. The Interaction of supply and demand, when coupled with other competitive and 
environmental factors, should enable some assessment of freight rates to be made, or at least some 
measure of the impact on freight rates. This in turn, when related to costs, enables the impact on 
carrier profitability to be assessed. Profitability thus depends on cost levels, both capital and 
operating, capacity utilisation, and the nature of the competition in the trade. Possible structural 
changes In the industry need to be considered as well.
Once all this has been done the planner can turn to the development of appropriate strategies. In 
the first instance strategy development should be focused on the most critical issues. This is done by 
overlaying the company "strengths and weaknesses" analyses over the environmental projections. The 
result should be the identification of a number of strategic issues. These tend to relate to areas of 
potential change which are likely to create opportunities or threats for the company. The identification 
of strategic issues should enable senior management to define a "mission" for the company. The 
definition of the mission needs to be followed by the setting of strategic objectives, which provide a 
basis for the allocation of resources, for trading and controlling performance, and for obtaining 
commitment of necessary personnel.
A number of strategic alternatives should then be designed, to cover the planning period (thought 
to be about ten years for the liner industry). Strategic alternatives should be sufficiently well 
developed to enable resource requirements, cash flows, and market position to be clearly defined over 
the planning period. The proposed strategy should define the company’s position in relation to: market 
share; market role; competitors and their likely actions or reactions; requirements for new equipment, 
capacity, and services; marketing strategy; organizational structure; possible synergies with other 
sections of the corporation; and the regulatory environment.
The strategic alternatives then need to be evaluated, and the best chosen. The study suggested 
the use of computer simulations as a means of objectively evaluating alternative strategies. Suggested 
output is in the form of income and cash flow statements, capacity utilization tables, and market share 
tables. The alternative strategies can then be evaluated taking into account such things as: the internal 
rate of return; the demand on scarce resources; the timing and impact or cash flows, and the effect on 
the corporation’s financial statements. Other factors seen as worthy of consideration include such 
things as: consistency with the company's objectives; compatibility with expected environmental 
conditions; flexibility; the level of risk; whether the company's economic resources are being
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effectively utilised; and the internal consistency of the strategies.
It should be noted that this selection process is far more complex than that proposed under 
finance theory. The use of discounting techniques would appear to be perceived as only one of many 
aspects in the selection process. Virtually no empirical work on the shipping industry has been done to 
ascertain how decisions are actually made, and the relative importance of the different aspects 
referred to above. Such an examination is a significant part of this work.
Selection of an appropriate strategy is followed by preparation of this formal strategic plan, 
necessary if  the strategy is to be successfully implemented. The study suggested detailed plans 
covering: marketing; operations/services; competition; finance; technology; organizational/personnel 
development, and corporate development. Appropriate monitoring of the plans, and feedback on 
implementation differences, should enable the whole planning process to be started afresh.
fL Conclusions on the literature on corporate planning &
strategy
In general the writings on rational planning systems suggest some measure of agreement on the 
kinds of steps and elements typically found. Among the more Important elements identified were : the 
setting of objectives; company appraisal; environmental analysis; definition of assumptions and 
forecasts; identification of alternative strategies; integrated plans and action programmes; budgets; 
and a review process. Rather less consistency exists with regard to the approaches to planning which 
have been identified, although the different approaches may well be compatible and complementary. 
Little published work exists on strategic planning in the shipping industry, with the 1962 U.S. Maritime 
Administration publication. ‘A guide to strategic planning for the U.S. liner Industry", representing the 
major attempt to relate ideas on strategic planning to the shipping Industry. Similar key elements were 
identified, one of the more important being the analysis of the environments within which the company 
operates, covering industry, company, market, competition and other environmental factors. The 
company analysis was seen as being concerned with the identification of the company's strengths and 
weaknesses. When related to supply and demand conditions, and put in the context of other
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environmental considerations, it is argued that a number of important insights can be obtained, from 
which alternative strategies can be developed. Alternative strategies can then be evaluated using a 
variety of criteria, including such things as IRR, the timing and impact of cash flows, the effect on the 
corporate financial statements, flexibility, and level of risk.
The literature also Includes reference to a variety of techniques and approaches to assist in the 
development of appropriate strategies. Some of these e.g. SWOT analysis, the stakeholder approach, 
can be Incorporated quite naturally into the corporate planning process. Indeed, corporate strategy is 
particularly concerned with looking for opportunities and Identifying threats, and with analysing its 
resources to Identify its strengths and weaknesses. Other techniques, such as business portfolio 
matrices, represent attempts to devise some kind of systematic procedure for generating and choosing 
strategic alternatives. These have been fairly severely criticised when used in a simplistic way, and 
also when used In mature industries. Nevertheless, consideration of the underlying principles of these 
matrices seems likely to provide useful strategic insights. Other Interesting techniques identified 
relate to political planning and futures research. This latter approach is seen as being particularly 
useful when forecasting is difficult and conditions volatile.
PARE analysis, developed by Derklnderen and Crum (1979), represents an attempt to link 
strategic management and finance. It provides both interesting Insights into the decision making 
process, and a useful framework for analysis. Its more important ideas Include the development of the 
concept of strategic positioning, which appears particularly Important in a complex and volatile 
environment; the Identification of the four strategic elements of opportunities, action range, risk and 
endurance; the attention given to variables which can be forecast most easily; the importance of being 
in a position to deal with the unexpected; and the importance of detailing and interpreting environmental 
signals.
Finally, it must be recognised that a body of writings exist which severely criticises rational 
approaches to planning, with a variety of alternative approaches being proposed, based upon such things 
as institutional and political factors. These approaches are generally regarded as being antithetical to 
rational systems. They appear, however, to be having an impact on the rational approaches, with an 
increased recognition that a more broadly based approach to strategy development and implementation 
is required. Undue formality and rationality have been identified as the cause of inflexible and 
excessively quantitative systems which may result in a degree of inertia and the stifling of creativity
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and Innovation. Current writings In this area reflect the need to ensure the maintenance of an
/
organisational environment conducive to innovation and the successful implementation of plans.
The empirical evidence available suggests fairly widespread use of corporate planning systems 
or models in the larger companies in both the UX. and the U.S.A., and that confidence in these systems 
is generally high. Interestingly, it suggests that increased maturity is likely to lead to less formality in 
the systems.
<L Direction of the research and its relationship with the 
literature
<LL Introduction
It is apparent from the above sections that the literature on the area is extensive, but lacks 
coherence and consistency. Some measure of consistency exists within the area of finance. Rather less 
exists within the area of corporate planning and strategy, particularly with regard to the variety of 
approaches and techniques being proposed, although some measure of agreement on key steps and 
elements can be found. Certainly, with relatively few exceptions (e.g. see Marshall 1985). little real 
attempt to integrate finance and corporate strategy has been made, in spite of suggestions which have 
been made that this should be done. Further, considerable criticism has been made of the literature in 
both areas, particularly with regard to the question of relevance in times of increased complexity. 
Clearly there is scope for considerably more empirical research. This project has necessarily to be 
limited in scope. The remainder of this section is thus concerned with providing an indication of the 
direction and emphasis of the research to be undertaken, and its relationship with the literature review.
<L2 The theory and literature on finance
The theory of finance has some measure of general acceptability. The objective of shareholder 
wealth maximisation, while subject to some criticism, seems still to have pride of place in most text 
books. With it goes the concept of Net Present Value. The internal rate of return does not meet with the 
same level of theoretical approval as the NPV method, and it has been shown to be deficient in the areas
of mutually exclusive investments, projects with non-conventional cash flows, and capital rationing 
situations. Whether such circumstances are of much practical significance is open to some doubt, 
particularly in the area of capital rationing. It should be possible to identify the importance of capital 
rationing in practice, at least Tor the particular industry that is the concern of this thesis, and some 
consideration of this issue will be given later. Also, if the specific industry of shipping is considered, it 
is unlikely that expected cash flows would be non-conventional. even if actual flows turn out so. Hence 
it is possible that, at least when applied to shipping, the objections to the use of the yield method may 
prove to be of little consequence. Alternative methods of investment appraisal have met with very 
little support, leaving discounting techniques as the clear theoretical favourite.
When turning to surveys of practice the dominance of NPV (or even of discounting techniques) Is 
less obvious. Alternative methods of appraisal, particularly payback and the IRR, seem to be 
preferred. Exactly which methods are used In evaluating projects In shipping, and the reasons for their 
use, is an issue which is addressed in this thesis. However, questions of this sort need to be put into a 
wider context. The relevant questions are: How are investment decisions actually made, and how 
significant are the component parts of the process, in reaching a final decision? Research needs to be 
somewhat more Qualitative If the importance of evaluation methods Is to be determined.
Techniques of risk analysis have been well developed, at least in theory, and the industry 
specific literature certainly suggests that such techniques could be applied to shipping, though no 
empirical research exists specifically concerned with this area. Even the more general empirical 
research tends to be quantitative. However, some of the discussion in recent research has indicated a 
certain cynicism regarding risk analysis. In analysing the way in which capital decisions are made, this 
thesis incorporates consideration of such things as attitudes towards risk, the Identification of these 
factors considered most important in terms of total risk, and methods of risk analysis.
The literature on the choice of a discount rate fits into two categories, based upon the weighted 
average cost of capital or a modified CAPM. Exactly which method (if any) is used In practice, and the 
rationale for its choice, is less clear. The methods used in the shlooing Industry, and their rationale, 
are identified in this study.
The literature on the interaction of the financing and investment decisions seems clear, where it 
is actually discussed in detail. It is less clear that the implications are fully understood in practice. 
The analysis thus includes a consideration of the evaluation processes actually used and the impact of
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different financing packages on the decision. The scope for confusion in this area is considerable in the 
shipping industry.
The literature on capital structure Is conflicting, though the “majority" view appears to suggest 
that an optimal capital structure exists. Questions remaining unanswered are: Do managers or
companies themselves, ac Luall y worK towards a capital structure., and what is the .rationale for this? 
Where leverage does change significantly, what are the overall effects on value? How does the 
interaction between the suppliers of finance and individual companies affect the capital structure 
decision? This thesis considers the first and third of these questions In some detail, and Identifies 
some insights into the second question.
Both the criticisms of finance theory, and the theory regarding corporate planning and strategy, 
suggest that a more flexible approach to investment is necessary. Multiple objectives appear to be 
more likely than the single objective assumed by finance theory. Objectives and their relative 
importance can be identified and assessed, in the context of the shipping industry.
A factor which re-appears consistently In the literature Is the increased complexity and 
turbulence associated more and more with todays markets. The chapter on the shipping industry 
indicates that this is undoubtedly true for the area currently under consideration. In considering 
investment decisions in shipping considerable attention is devoted to determining how managers respond 
to such difficulties, and the effects on their forecasting and appraisal methods. While the PARE method 
is not specifically tested, a number of ideas incorporated in the method are considered, and if  necessary 
built into the models developed. Specifically, the ideas of potential, action range, resilience and 
endurance, are kept closely in mind in the subsequent analysis, together with the ideas of strategic 
positioning. Such ideas have much in common with some of the other criticisms on the real extent of 
financial evaluation.
5L2 The theory and literature on corporate planning and strategy
Much criticism has been made of the fact that the financial evaluation techniques generally 
recommended appear to be based on the assumption that the fundamental strategic decisions have 
already been made. This simply may not be true in many major investments. While it is more likely to 
be true of minor investments, strategic considerations may well override narrow financial evaluation
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completely. It is Interesting to note that the literature on corporate planning and strategy does not 
place great emphasis on financial considerations, though financial constraints need to be recognised, and 
objectives are often financially oriented. In short, the relationships between corporate planning and 
financial evaluation and planning are far from clear. This thesis therefore aims to identify the areas of 
overlap and linkage between finance and corporate planning and strategy, with regard to investment and 
financing decisions in the shipping industry. To achieve this aim a number of factors relating to 
planning and strategy are examined, and their contribution to the investment and financing decision 
making process assessed. The first such factor relates to the extent to which planning systems are 
actually in use, and the period for which plans are drawn up. More detailed questioning also enabled the 
nature of the planning process in the shipping industry, as it relates to capital projects, to be identified. 
Part of this process involves consideration of the nature and importance of the background 
environmental and economic analysis used to support strategic decisions. The strategic issues^ een as 
being of most Importance to investment and financing decisions are also identified and explored. 
Consideration of these factors, when coupled with earlier areas of investigation more directly related 
to finance theory, enables a clearer picture to be obtained of the Investment and financing decision 
making process in the shipping industry, which draws upon both corporate strategy and finance.
In considering the review of the literature In this area It Is important to recognise the nature of 
the aim set out in the proceeding paragraph, relating to the Identification of areas of overlap and linkage 
between finance and corporate planning and strategy. Not all sections of the literature review are 
equally relevant to its achievement. The factors identified above relate largely to section 2, on the 
development and nature of corporate planning and strategy, section 6, on PARE analysis and potential 
links between strategy and finance, and section 7. on strategic planning in the shipping industry. Rather 
less attention is given to consideration of the techniques supporting corporate planning, reviewed in 
section 3. although attention is given to the establishment of criteria for project acceptability, and to 
Identifying the strategic issues seen as being important, both of which are likely to overlap with the 
ideas underlying these techniques. It is also important to note that within the areas of investigation 
Identified above, attention Is focussed on economic and financial factors. No systematic attempt is 
made to establish the extent to which the decision making process is influenced by political. 
Inter-personal or motivational factors, or by Internal organisational structures, although In certain 
instances executives volunteered information relating to these factors. This approach is not intended to
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deny the validity of the criticisms of rational planning (reviewed in section 4). or the relevance of such 
factors, but to recognise that the closest links between finance theory and the theory relating to 
corporate strategy are likely to be in the areas of concentration identified above.
<L4 Achievement of the aims nf Thesis
The above approach should enable the aims of the thesis to be achieved, by facilitating analysis at 
several levels
(i) actual practice can be ascertained, from which a range of behaviour patterns can be identified. 
In doing this due consideration can be given to the examination of managements attitudes and priorities, 
and to identifying the range of strategic considerations underlying recent investment decisions.
(ii) Actual practice can be compared with finance theory, so as to assess the practical relevance of 
the theory of finance to investment and financing decisions in the shipping industry. This should permit 
the identification of areas in the theory which require extension or alteration, so as to bring theory and 
practice closer together, to reflect managements attitudes and priorities, and to handle increased 
market complexity and volatility.
(iii) The areas of overlap and linkage between finance and corporate planning and strategy can be 
identified.
From these analyses a descriptive model can be developed of investment and financing decisions in the 
shipping industry, subject to the limitations of rational planning systems identified in the proceeding 




As was pointed out In Chapter 1, an Important part of this study was an empirical assessment of 
the relevance of traditional finance theory to investment and financing decisions in the shipping 
industry. A detailed set of questions was thus devised, which would assist in making such an 
assessment. The basis of the questioning is set out in Chapter 7. However, before embarking on a wide 
range of interviews, two pilot studies were carried out. in which these questions were used and 
tested, and areas of investigation clarified.
(i) The firs t of these consisted of an analysis of ten shipping companies. The firs t three companies 
were analysed in considerable detail, with extensive case information being collected. The basis of this 
pilot study and its findings are dealt with in Chapter 7.
(ii) The second pilot study was a survey of nine banks, to identify attitudes and practices relating to 
the financing of capital investment in shipping. A considerable amount of consistency was found in this 
study and the same approach was considered appropriate for the main survey on banks. This is found in 
Chapter 6.
The results of the pilot studies tended to suggest that conventional finance theory did not 
adequately explain the situations and methods found in the shipping industry. Indeed, the contribution of 
finance theory to investment practice in the industry seemed to be rather limited. This is not to say 
that this conclusion is unimportant, and the earlier specific questions were continued throughout the 
study to complete the assessment. However, strategic and other considerations, often on a corporate 
wide basis, appeared to be of far more consequence than the financial analysis itself. In some cases this 
was attributed to difficulties in forecasting, in other cases the financial analysis developed naturally 
from the corporate planning process itself, and was an integral final hurdle to be overcome. In some
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cases planning and decision making was done in Heel terms, making traditional project analysis less 
relevant. A range of background environmental, market and financial information was found to be 
collected, sometimes as part of a formal planning system, sometimes Informally, while the decision 
making process was often seen as being spread over some considerable time. Behaviour patterns were 
found to vary quite considerably, depending upon the size and nature of the companies concerned. For 
these reasons it was decided to :
(i) extend the analysis of shipping companies to consider a number of additional factors not dealt 
with in the pilot study, principally to do with the relationship between corporate planning systems and 
investment and financing decisions, and
(ii) to increase the emphasis given to other areas, principally with regard to the identification of the 
strategic issues considered Important In investment and financing decisions, and the identification of the 
range and importance of the background information used in the decision making process.
The shipping company pilot study also resulted In some re-thlnklng of the main thrust of the 
thesis, and of its overall balance. While the assessment of the relevance of the theory of finance to 
investment and financing decisions in shipping was still considered worthwhile, the second aspect, 
namely the analysis of the way in which companies actually approached and made their investment and 
financing decisions, together with the Identification of both the rationale for these decisions and the 
links between strategic and financial aspects of these decisions, now seemed to be the more important 
area. Attention was thus turned to consideration of the best ways of dealing with this particular 
aspect.
The methodology eventually decided on was significantly influenced by the approach suggested by 
6laser and Strauss (1967). The essence of their ideas is that a theory or model should be derived, 
based upon some perceived facts or evidence. Comparative analysis can then be used to determine 
whether or not this theory or model is generally valid, with further evidence being collected from 
comparable groups to ascertain whether the Initial evidence was correct. This comparative analysis 
proceeds, using a process referred to as 7heoretfcaf simp ling". until an adequate sample has been 
achieved. In general, theoretical sampling should be continued until a "theoretical saturation“ 
point Is reached. Saturation means that no additional data are being found which helps to develop the 
theory or model any further. As similar instances repeat over and over again. It becomes empirically 
reasonable to treat a category as saturated.
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In fact, using this approach. It Is highly unlikely that a theory or model will be derived which 
does not require further extension, refinement or modification. Indeed, in many cases multiple theories 
are needed to build up a complete picture. Single theories seldom Include all relevant aspects, and 
multiple theories permit a more all inclusive analysis. The process of theoretical sampling permits such 
a development, once the need is recognised for breaking down the sample into various relevant groups 
or categories. Once one category is saturated, the logical next stage is to shift attention to new groups 
or categories, to develop other theories which can be tested to saturation. In doing this it is important 
to look for groups and categories which have significant differences, since this will give greater 
confidence in the theories which are developed. Nonetheless, since It is clear that not all categories 
w ill have the same importance or relevance, the depth of the analysis of each category is likely to 
vary.
The end result should be the derivation of a theory or set of theories relating to a number of 
groups or categories. The approach has a number of advantages.
(i) Such an approach means that one can be relatively sure that the theory will f it the actual facts 
and will work.
(ii) Since the categories are chosen after careful examination of the data, and the theories are 
derived from observed data, laymen involved in the area to which the theory applies are likely to be 
able to understand it.
(iii) Theory which is based on data is likely to last, albeit with some modification and reformulation 
over time.
(tv) The emphasis is on the generation and development of new theories. Since accurate evidence is 
not so crucial for generating theory, the nature and type of evidence is not as crucial as in other forms 
of analysis. This approach facilitates the use of a wide range of material, some published, some 
anecdotal, as well as that obtained by more formal methods.
(v) The way In which categories emerge solves the problem of fit, relevance, forcing and richness. 
Indeed Glaser and Strauss argue that an effective firs t strategy Is to ignore the current theories and 
literature, so as to avoid the possibility of being unduly influenced by them. Once the categories have 
been defined and analysed comparison with existing theories and literature can be usefully made.
Such an approach could be used to develop a set of theories or models of behaviour for different 
categories of company, and Is thus consistent with one of the objectives of this thesis. However, it
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does have the disadvantage that it tends to mitigate against the use of scientific samples (in a statistical 
sense). This poses something of a problem, given the various aims of this thesis, in that the best data 
to develop a theory or model of investment behaviour w ill not necessarily be the best to assess the 
relevance of alternative existing theories. A further problem of building a general model or models is 
that instances of unusual behaviour, or responses to specific circumstances or conditions, are likely to 
be played down in, or excluded from, the results, simply because they are unusual. This was 
considered undesirable, since such exceptions are themselves often quite interesting.
Inevitably, therefore, a compromise solution was reached. The Glaser and Strauss approach was 
adopted in terms of the use of theoretical sampling, to a level sufficient to identify virtually all of the 
key issues in investment and financing behaviour, so as to be able to set out a range of analyses of 
behaviour, from which a model or set of models might be developed. It perhaps needs to be emphasised 
that these analyses are broadly based, and further research could usefully expand certain aspects of 
the findings. However, in addition to this approach, questions were also asked in such a way as to 
facilitate an assessment of finance theory, while the analyses of behaviour include both usual and 
unusual behaviour.
The above ideas were implemented as follows:
(i) Certain general conclusions concerning the behaviour of shipping companies were derived from
the pilot study.
(ii) In analysing the shipping company pilot study it became clear that while some broad 
generalisations could be made, there were other areas where practice differed considerably. For 
example, corporate planning models seemed to be well developed in the large public companies, but to be 
almost non-existent in smaller companies. Attitudes towards risk varied considerably, as did 
availability of finance. Some kind of categorisation of the type referred to above was clearly needed to 
encapsulate and explain these differences. The pilot study had suggested three distinct categories, and 
it was decided to analyse behaviour in these three categories in much more detail, with a view to the 
possible development of a model for each category, or the development of a model with branches 
reflecting the approaches found in the different categories. The categories identified were as follows:
(a) Large widely held public companies
(b) Small or closely held public companies or medium/large private companies
(c) Other small or “entrepreneurial" companies. This category included certain companies in the
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Greek shipping industry, often represented as behaving in a particularly 'entrepreneurial" way.
(iii) A series of interviews were then conducted with the explicit purpose of analysing behaviour in 
the companies, so as to build up a fairly complete picture of behaviour with regard to investment and 
financing decisions in each category. Interviews were conducted to saturation point in these three 
categories, to ensure that all important aspects of behaviour in the areas under consideration were 
actually considered.
(iv) As the study progressed it  became clear that these categories needed further subdivision or 
refinement, particularly to cover the nature of the activities carried out. e.g. bulk or liner trades, 
conglomerate or transportation company. Some interesting differences arose with regard to UK-USA 
public companies, though these were not as great as one might have expected. In some cases certain 
difficulties arose with regard to categorisation. For these reasons it was decided to continue with a 
standard approach to the questions asked, in terms of broad structure, but with the facility to pursue 
certain areas in much more detail for certain categories than for others. Indeed, given the desire to 
develop the kind of model/s referred to above, there was a clear expectation that this would occur. For 
example, there was an expectation that large public companies would have more formalised corporate 
planning systems than smaller companies. Hence, it  was likely that questions on corporate planning 
would be covered much more quickly in discussions with smaller companies, whereas considerable 
detail was likely in the public companies. Once categories of activity were included other significant 
differences became apparent. For example, it became clear that companies involved in the liner trade 
were likely to be concerned with such things as market share and detailed competitor analysis, whereas 
bulk operators, particularly those operating on a world wide basis, were unlikely to find this 
particularly relevant. Overall, this use of a standard approach, with flexible use and extension of 
certain sections, was considered to be the most suitable, since it ensured consistency of questioning, 
enabled a continuous assessment to be made of the validity of the findings to date, yet also permitted 
further developments and refinements to be made to the analyses as the study progressed.
(v) The assessment of finance theory was based on the same sample of companies. It is thus 
difficult to make precise quantitative judgements on its applicability, since the sample was not, of 
necessity, as scientifically derived as it  would have been had these tests been the sole or main 
criterion. Nevertheless, examination of the sample basis should indicate that this is far less of a 
problem for public companies than for the other companies. Also in developing the analyses for each
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category it was possible to draw strong inferences about both traditional finance theory and various 
alternatives.
It Is perhaps worth noting that the approach outlined above Is consistent with the ideas on 
contingency theory outlined earlier. Contingency theory suggests that there is no one best way of 
managing in all situations. It is suggested that the strategies which are most effective for a particular 
company are contingent on (l.e. depend on) the particular environment In which the company finds Itself. 
Different circumstances lead to different optimal solutions. The contingency approach identifies various 
types of "if-then“ relationships and suggests general directions in which policy can go. depending upon 
the situation. As has already been pointed out. contingency theory has been criticised (unless modified 
along the lines suggested by Miller (1981) -  see page 106). principally because it assumes that a 
particular environment is given. Such an assumption may not be valid, since it can be argued that 
management can be proactive and hence influence or change Its environment. The identification of 
categories and sub-categories outlined above will enable different approaches to be identified and 
analysed, and w ill thus provide an indication of how management reacts to different circumstances, and 
the strategies and approaches likely to be associated with these different circumstances. As such, it is 
consistent with a contingency approach, but Is not limited by the assumption of this approach. No 
attempt has been made to assess the relative effectiveness of the different approaches.
This approach, apart from having the advantages outlined earlier, has the further considerable 
advantage that it permits the identification of approaches and behavioural patterns which are not unduly 
influenced by one particular theory. Hence linkages between the various theories which exist are more 
likely to be identified, and a more general set of models or theories derived.
In both pilot studies structured interviews were used, in which certain specific areas were 
discussed, and specific questions asked, but where those being interviewed were encouraged to discuss 
the industry fairly widely.
The use of structured interviews, rather than postal questionnaires, was considered important in
141
the firs t Instance, because of what has been described by one person Interviewed as “the shipping 
dub" . Personal contacts are extremely important in the Industry, and it seemed likely that a better 
picture of the Industry would be built up by the use of contacts than would have been possible using a 
more random approach. There is no doubt whatsoever that a reasonably high proportion of the 
companies interviewed would simply not have responded to a postal questionnaire. As it was. the 
degree of willingness to divulge information, and to discuss actual cases, varied quite considerably. 
Generally the public companies were very willing to discuss issues, with private companies being less 
so. Nevertheless, the success rate in organising interviews was extremely high.
The pilot studies reinforced the arguments for the use of structured interviews. In many 
companies a certain amount of probing was found to be needed as far as answers were concerned. For 
example, the question. “Do you use dcr techniques?“ was answered In the affirmative by one 
company in an early interview. Further discussion and clarification, particularly by the use of case 
material, made It clear that dcf methods would be used under very restrictive conditions (e.g. a long 
term charter of 10-15 years) but that such conditions "very ra re ly " existed. In practice dcf 
techniques were of very limited significance to actual decision making In this company. This type of 
problem was found in an extremely large number of companies, reinforcing the view that postal 
questionnaires would be a misleading tool.
In carrying out the interviews, answers were obtained wherever possible to specific questions, 
and case material was collected for acquisitions made over the last five years. Case material was not 
always made available in detail, but as a corroborating and reinforcing mechanism it proved extremely 
useful. It also provided insights into behaviour which could not always be Identified from more direct 
questioning. Specific questions asked, and an outline of the structure of the interviews held, are found 
In Appendix 1.
The pilot study relating to the banks also used structured interviews. As previously mentioned. 
It soon became apparent that no major amendments to the structure of the questions was necessary, 
and considerable consistency of answers was found. In fact, the consistency was so great that it  was 
decided to merge the pilot study for the banks with the main study, and to limit the size of this study. 
The questions asked, and the analysis of results, are covered separately in Chapter 6. Because of their 
importance on shipping company decisions, these results are covered before those of the company 
studies, and relevant aspects are then integrated into later chapters.
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i  Sample Selection
The 1901 Falrplay World Shipping Year Book listed some 603 shipping companies in the world, 
together with 41 banks with shipping interests. Given the present state of flux in the shipping industry, 
these figures were probably Incorrect when they were published. However, they give some idea of the 
size of the industry. When broken down by country there were approximately:
90 companies with Head Offices or registered offices in 6reat Britain
75   ‘ North America
75   ' Scandinavia
30   * Greece
150 * In the remainder of Europe
Clearly it was impossible to handle more than a relatively small number of these companies, and 
severe geographical constraints had to be imposed. The cost and time of travel to Interviews also 
imposed other constraints. For all of these reasons it was decided to concentrate on two main 
geographical areas, namely the UK and the North Eastern part of North America. In both these regions 
there were a number of Greek owners, so some analysis of this sector of the industry was possible. 
Data on UK companies and banks (including London offices of US banks), were obtained between August 
1982 and July 1983. while that for North American companies and banks was obtained principally from 
September to December 1983, with a smaller amount being collected In the first half of 1984. This was 
made possible by a period of teaching and study at the United States Merchant Marine Academy in New 
York from July - December 1983, and at Maine Maritime Academy from January -  April 1984. These 
periods provided an opportunity to carry out a wide range of interviews, but in turn meant the 
implementation of a more rigid interview schedule. On occasions it proved impossible to conduct 
interviews simply because time schedules did not coincide.
Given the research methodology to be used the study attempted to incorporate as many 
companies as was necessary to develop acceptable models of behaviour. It thus incorporated the 
following:
(I) As many public companies as possible, provided that they had sizeable shipping interests, and had 
made recent investments in ships (say in the last five years).
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(ii) A sample of medium to large private companies, covering both bulk trades and liner trades.
(iii) A sample of small private companies, to include a reasonable number of Greek owners.
In deciding on sample size for each or these a number of factors were influential:
(i) Relevance. Company size clearly has a considerable effect on the ability to influence the industry. 
Also models of public company behaviour seem likely to be transferable, at least in some measure, to 
other public companies in non-shipping areas. Greater emphasis was thus placed on public corporations 
and the larger private corporations.
(ii) Complexity. The issues involved in running a public company tend to be more complex than those
of running a private company. The sample size thus needs to be larger for public companies if  these
complexities are to be identified and encapsulated in a model.
(iii) Availability of data and access to companies. In general it proved slightly easier to arrange 
interviews with public companies than with private ones. Very much more case material was made 
available in these companies, and much more corroborating evidence was publically available. Even 
annual accounts proved difficult to obtain from some private companies.
(iv) The assessment of finance theory. Since one of the aims was to assess the practical relevance of 
finance theory, which, rightly or wrongly, seems to be generally written with public companies in 
mind, it was felt that the sample for public companies should be as large as possible, enabling a more 
valid assessment of the contribution of finance theory to be made.
For all of these reasons, greater emphasis was placed on public companies than on any other 
category. Interviews/discussions were held with a total of 52 companies, the majority of which are 
listed in Appendix 2. Several companies were prepared to discuss issues and methods, on condition that 
they were not identified. These are therefore excluded from the list.
The approach to public corporations was broadly as follows. Of the 14 companies quoted in the 
shipping section of the London Stock Exchange (with offices In the UK), seven were interviewed, 
informal discussions by telephone were held with four, (though results were not incorporated) and two 
were discounted as being no longer In the business of Investing in ships. The final company in this 
section was also omitted since It was diversifying into new non-shipping areas and running down the 
Investment in ships. In the final analysis it must be admitted that distance was a contributing factor in 
determining precisely which companies were visited. In the four cases referred to above where 
discussions were held by telephone, interviews would have been possible had time been available. In
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addition to the above, interviews were held with a further four publicly quoted conglomerates with a 
significant interest in shipping. In the USA all the major shipping companies (or public companies with 
major investments In shipping) in the New York area were interviewed, with the exception of one oil 
major where diary clashes prevented a meeting, in total, interviews were held with ten such U.S. 
companies.
Interviews were also conducted with three other companies and/or Individuals which did not fit 
the above criterion exactly, but which were of sufficient size or nature to warrant inclusion in this 
section. The total for companies of this type was thus 24. representing approximately an 80% sample 
for the geographical area covered.
For the private companies the sample was necessarily less complete, and somewhat more 
arbitrary. In general, considerable advice was taken from contacts with regard to the following, and a 
balance was sought between them:
(i) Size of company
(II) Type of activity -  liner, bulk, or mini-conglomerate
(iii) Amount of shipping investment currently being embarked on.
The degree of *saturation'  with regard to each model was also constantly reviewed.
Thirteen companies of this type were interviewed in the UK together with 15 in the USA. Eight of 
these companies were Greek owned. While the majority of these companies were involved In bulk 
shipping, they included some with interests in the liner or specialist trades. A number were involved in 
a variety of activities, generally, but not exclusively, shipping related, while at least three were 
mini-conglomerates.
Given the size of the UK market, the above sample represents a relatively small proportion of the 
private companies based in the UK. Using the total numbers in the Fairplay Year 8ook, it represents 
about 20% of the total. There is Inevitably a certain amount of randomness about the selecUon. The 
15 private companies interviewed in the USA represented approximately 60% by number of such 
shipping companies in the New York area, but approximately 90% of those still actively investing In 
ships.
Probably of most significance in considering the size of the various samples, and the approach 
used, is the fact that in both the UK and the USA it proved impossible to arrange interviews in only ten 
cases. In six of these the problem was simply one of time restrictions. In two cases the explanation
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was given that the company was not Investing In shipping, and that many questions would be 
hypothetical. In only two cases were outright refusals given, and In one of these cases a takeover made 
such a refusal understandable. Using the above method, the degree of co-operation by companies was 
extremely high. In the final analysis discussions were held with 52 companies, 19 for category 1. 18 
for category 2. and 15 for category 3.
As regards banks, some 41 were shown in the 1981 Year Book, as providing ship finance. The 
geographical breakdown of these was as follows:
Great Britain 16
North America 10
Rest of Europe 12
Rest of World 3
The above breakdown relates to the location of Ship Finance Offices rather than world headquarters. A 
total of 19 banks or similar were Interviewed, 13 In Great Britain and 6 in North America. Given the 
geographical area to be covered, this represents a 70% sample.
Given the methodology used, the sample basis and size Is not as Important as It might be In a 
verification oriented project. Nevertheless, the sample size for both public companies and the banks is 
such that a very high degree of confidence exists in the results.
Chapter 6
The Banka
L  Introduction and Basis of Study
U .  Rationale for Study
The reliance of the shipping industry on yard credit and the Banking Community for large amounts 
of debt finance has been made clear in chapter 2 on the Shipping Industry. Given the importance of debt 
finance it  was considered appropriate to enter into discussions with banks and associated providers of 
debt finance, so as to establish the extent to which terms and conditions of lending, and attitudes and 
approaches of lenders, actually influenced investment and financing decisions within shipping 
corporations. The purpose of an analysis of the banking sector was thus Ofli to provide a detailed 
analysis of bank lending per se. but to provide a framework within which corporate decisions could be 
set.
1.2 Survey Sample
In total 19 interviews were held with representatives of banks and related organisations in the 
UK and the USA. A detailed lis t is included in Appendix 3. Interviews took place in both London and 
New York with one bank. One of the interviews was with representatives of the Maritime 
Administration in Washington, where discussion took place on a range of issues, particularly those 
relating to Title XI finance. In many ways the Maritime Administration acted along similar lines to 
those of the banks. Nevertheless, it  was felt that, in assessing and quantifying responses, it was more 
appropriate to exclude MARAD, since the potential for political influences on decisions was greater than 
that in banks. The total number of banks for which detailed responses were obtained was thus taken as 
17. Given that at the time of the survey (September 1982-December 1983), the Fairplay Shipping Year 
Book listed only 43 banks in the world with shipping interests, such a number represents a substantial
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proportion of the worlds banks with shipping interests. A further point of considerable importance, 
already referred to in Chapter 5 (on methodology), is that a high degree of consistency was found in the 
answers to questions. The pilot study for banks was thus extended into the main study and the results 
are contained in this chapter. With regard to the sample size, given the high degree of consistency 
found, it  was decided that little  more information would be obtained by extending the survey beyond the 
numbers already referred to, given the geographical limitations of this project. The banks included 
covered the UK, the USA. Scandinavia and Ireland. Whether the findings of this survey can be 
generalised to cover other parts of the world is a debatable point, since, of necessity, no interviews 
were conducted with banks from other parts of the world. Nonetheless, many of the banks with which 
Interviews were held have offices in parts of the world other than those covered in this survey, and it 
seems unlikely that practice w ill vary significantly in different branches of the same bank.
1 5 Basis of the questioning
As with the main survey, the survey of banks was based upon an approach using structured 
interviews, hence, while respondents were encouraged to discuss issues and approaches in a wide 
ranging way. all the interviews focussed certain parts of the discussion, by specifically asking 
questions in the areas given below:
(i) Distinguishing features nf the industry
Banks were asked to identify those aspects ( if any) of the shipping industry which distinguished it 
from other industries, which might require special treatment by lending bankers. The main purpose of 
this question was to establish whether or not the particular industry under consideration did have 
characteristics which effectively differentiated it from other industries. The identification of 
distinguishing features might explain different behaviour patterns in both lenders and borrowers. The 
absence of distinguishing features would make the results of the survey more capable of generalisation 
to other industries.
(ii) Organisation and allocation of funds within banks
Banks were asked to identify whether they had specialist divisions dealing with shipping, and 
whether a specific amount of funds was set aside for shipping transactions. This was considered useful 
in establishing the degree of commitment each bank had to the shipping industry, and the extent to which
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specialist knowledge of the industry was likely to exist within the bank.
(iii) Basis of lending
Banks were then asked whether loans were given on the basis of assets, or whether general loans 
could be made. This question was asked principally because the shipping industry appeared to be largely 
asset financed, whereas the financing of other industries appeared to be balance sheet oriented. Such a 
difference in approach could have considerable implications for corporate Investment and financing 
decisions. Some clarification with regard to actual bank practice was thus deemed appropriate.
(Iv) Information sought and used by banks
The banks were then asked to provide an indication of the kind of information they would look for 
from a shipping company, to support a request for assistance with the acquisition of a vessel. In 
particular, they were asked whether they expected companies to provide estimates of:
(a) world trade
(b) other economic indicators. e.g. 6DP etc.




(g) cash flow forecasts (and the period of such forecasts)
If a different approach were taken depending upon the type of vessel to be acquired, or its intended use. 
banks were asked to give reasons for the differences.
The rationale for such a question was to identify bank expectations in the area, since such
expectations might well have knock-on effects In terms of project appraisal by the borrowing
corporation.
The banks were also asked to Identify the type of information currently available from within, 
which would be incorporated into an analysis.
(v) Tvoes of finance
Detailed questions were asked about the categories of finance available, the proportions which 
typically would be financed, the maximum proportions which would be financed, and the periods of such 
finance, for both new and second hand vessels. Questions covered loans, leases, hire purchase, equity 
and convertibles, and banks were asked to specify other forms of finance provided for the industry.
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They were also asked to detail any restrictions which might apply, or would be likely to apply, to any of 
these forms of finance. All of these are issues likely to be of considerable relevance to a company in 
considering its investment and financing decisions.
As the study progressed more detailed questions were asked about leasing. In later interviews 
detailed questions were included as follows:
(a) Are different criteria used in considering a request for a lease, from those used in considering a 
request for a loan?
(b) Is a lease seen as being different to a loan, in terms of perceived risk, from the viewpoint of both 
the bank and the lessee?
(c) Is leasing typically arranged for longer periods than loans?
(d) Are security requirements different for a lease to those required for a loan?
(e) Does leasing increase likely debt capacity?
(vi) IcemlS
The banks were then asked to identify any major trends which had occurred over the last decade, 
with regard to the types of finance offered by them, and also about their expectations for the next 
decade. They were asked if they considered whether there was scope for any new form of finance 
specifically related to shipping. The purpose of this area of questioning was to ascertain the direction 
and extent of changes in bank financing in recent years, and to identify any further changes considered 
possible or likely. All banks were asked if they provided any equity for shipping purposes, and whether 
a greater equity Involvement was likely to be considered.
(vil) Security
All banks were asked to provide details of the security generally looked for with regard to any 
vessel acquisition proposal. Details of covenants, required accounting ratios, etc.. were also sought, 
particularly those relating to interest cover and liquidity. Clearly any such covenants or ratio 
requirements need to be incorporated into any appraisal carried out within the client companies.
(viil) Capital Structure
Detailed questions were asked about capital structure. Specifically, banks were asked whether 
they considered that optimal capital structures existed for the industry or particular organisations 
within it. Considerable discussions took place in all banks on gearing levels, and the possible impact of 
different gearing levels on both the availability and cost of borrowing. Given the Importance of debt to
I
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the shipping Industry, this area of questioning was considered to be most important, since it  seems 
highly likely that bank views will be fairly rapidly communicated to borrowers. If banks do have a dear 
view on capital structure, and da change the supply and cost of funds to any marked extent in response 
to differences in gearing levels, there are likely to be significant implications for the capital structure 
of Individual corporations. Conversely. If banks attitudes to lending do not change significantly in terms 
of either the amount they are prepared to lend, or the 'price* of such lending, as gearing changes, there 
are equally interesting implications for the debate on capital structures.
As has been pointed out. not all banks identified all of these eight areas as particularly important. 
Probably the firs t two areas identified above provided the greatest scope for differences of opinion. 
Certainly, as w ill be seen, the importance of asset finance may be more apparent than real. An 
extremely important point which must be borne in mind, in any analysis of bank behaviour. Is that 
different banks have rather different clientele. Certain banks. e.g. Morgan, concentrate primarily on 
the large, corporate borrower. To such banks the importance of asset based finance, and of 
'individuals' in the lending process, is likely to be minimal. Other banks specialise in different markets - 
e^. Williams and Glynn have had considerable interests in . and experience of. the Greek market over a 
long period of time. While the differences identified between banks were insufficient to justify separate 
categorisation, the implications of different target clientele need to be recognised. At the corporate 
end of the clientele range, emphasis was typically placed on quality earnings, corporate lending, and 
fairly detailed information flows from client to bank. In the Greek sector the emphasis is likely to be 
placed on track record in terms of success and integrity of the individual owners, and asset finance is 
more likely to be used. A variety of intermediate stages are possible.
2. Summary of Findings
2 J . Distinguishing features nf the Industry
A variety of features were identified in the discussions, some dealing with the industry itself, 
others dealing with particular aspects of financing. A considerable amount of consistency was found, 
although occasionally differences of opinion were expressed. The most important features identified
4
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were broadly as follows:
(i) The asset (I* . the ship. rig. etc.) can typically be sold fairly easily and quickly, although the
price is subject to all the vaguaries of a highly competitive market. Assets of this type are more likely 
to be associated with asset-based loans than assets such as plant and machinery, and typically are 
likely to provide better security than such assets In the event of a default.
(ii) The importance of ’ individuals’' in the lending process, with several banks (though by no means
ail) placing great emphasis on things such as integrity and honesty as they relate to individuals. 
Decision making in shipping was frequently seen as being somewhat more ’entrepreneurial’  than in 
other industries.
(iii) High levels of gearing, either corporate or in relation to specific assets, partly influenced by the 
large amounts of subsidised credit available to preserve shipbuilding capacity.
(iv) Conditions of volatility in the industry.
(v) The disparity between loan periods typically available to shipowners, and the life of the vessels 
themselves. This imposes serious liquidity pressures on borrowing shipowners in the early years of a 
vessels ownership.
7 7 Organisation and nl Inrat inn of funds within Banks
Of the 17 banks included. 13 had specialist departments dealing with shipping transactions. Of
the four which did not. one had actually closed down its specialist division, on the grounds that “too
many s ta ff were try in g  to do deals". A more conservative *>proach was being adopted to
shipping by this particular bank, and the closure of the specialist division was consistent with this
approach. The 13 banks with specialist divisions appeared to have a commitment to the shipping
markets, or at least to certain sectors, and typically displayed a fa irly detailed understanding of such
markets. None of the banks providing answers to the question on allocation of funds within the bank
worked to a set allocation of funds for shipping transactions. One bank made it  very clear that it
regarded an allocative policy as inconsistent with good lending practice.
"Because it  (the bank) doesn't have an allocative philosophy, decision making is  
based upon what is  good tending practice, as opposed to  how much we want to  be in  
any one industry."
No other bank expressed views in quite this way. though the absence of an allocative policy tends to
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provide implicit support for such a view. Six banks stated that there was a limit to the amount they 
would be prepared to invest in the industry in total. Sometimes this was expressed as an absolute lim it 
(e.g. $750M). More typically it  was expressed as a percentage of total advances. In no case had a lim it 
of this type posed any effective constraints, so answers tended to be somewhat hypothetical. Indeed it 
is possible that other banks which did not specify a limit, might well have some kind of lim it beyond 
which they would not go. Such banks may well have been sufficiently far within any notional lim it not to 
attach any significance to the idea, and to regard the question as hypothetical. It is interesting to note 
that only one bank explicitly stated that no overall lim it existed. A small number of banks indicated that 
they imposed limits on the amounts they would be prepared to lend to individual customers. (e.g. not 
more than $40t1).
2A Basis of lending
Very few cases were found in which lending was made without being formally linked to the
purchase of a particular asset, and secured on that asset. However, six banks made it very clear that
their lending was effectively on a corporate or personal basis, subsequently, and formally, backed by
an asset. One of these banks expressed its view as follows:
" if we’re  heppy lending on en unsecured basis, w e ll lend on a secured basis.'
Another made the following observation:
"We always in s is t on knowing the debt position fo r the re s t o f the fle e t 
because there ’s no sense in  having your ship as a clean pro ject i f  he (the owner) has 
trouble w ith others. Sure you can take possession o f the ship .. but i t ’s not a healthy 
situation i f  the owner is  in  troub le ."
Three other banks made it  dear that they would take a similar view, under certain conditions, but that 
asset loans were also possible. Asset based finance was typically associated with small or medium 
companies, or with projects with fairly certain earnings (e.g. with long term charters). Even in such 
cases the point was often made that personal or corporate guarantees would be required. Loans 
assessed on a corporate basis and subsequently secured on an asset were more typical for large 
corporations and the liner trades. The bulk trades were typically financed on an asset base. The earlier 
comments on the type of clientele associated with particular banks have relevance in this area.
Even where asset finance was used, knowledge of total corporate (or individual owners) position 
was often an implicit factor in decisions, as was the potential for fee income or other income. For
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example, one bank made the following observation, having already made clear that its finance was 
typically asset based.
I f  fVe got a chap whose got $20(1. on deposit here, and he buys a ship fo r 
$5(1. and says Van /  borrow  $6t1?' ... /In  fa ir ly  lik e ly  to say Yes', i f  the resu lt o f 
saying No' is  going to  be that he removes his t20M. deposit and does a ll his business 
with someone e lse."
Clearly in reality rather more is likely to be taken into account than simply figures relating to single 
projects, even where asset finance is the principal form of finance.
2A information Sought and Used by Banks
A high degree of consistency was found in this area, although clearly differences of emphasis 
existed. Few banks expected clients to provide detailed estimates of macro-economic or related 
indicators, though in some cases discussions clearly took place on such issues, in broad terms, or on the 
underlying assumptions made by owners in such areas. In a number of cases banks took the view that 
such indicators would be available within the bank, and little  useful purpose would be achieved by 
requiring them from prospective borrowers. One bank nevertheless said that it would be more 
favourably inclined to potential borrowers who did provide such estimates. Expectations were 
generally higher for companies involved in the liner trades.
Detailed estimates of operating costs were expected by eleven of the banks. In a few cases these 
were estimates covering only the near future (i.e. the next year or so.) In others cost estimates were 
expected for longer periods. Only approximately half of these banks also expected estimates of 
revenues to be given. Where charters existed revenue estimates could be. and typically were, 
incorporated into the figures required. In the absence of charters, however, most banks seemed to feel 
that an insistence on detailed revenue estimates was not particularly useful. Where forecasts were 
required it  was typically made clear that banks did not expect such figures to be accurate. For 
example, one bank which did require cash flow projections from the owner justified this requirement as 
follows:
*We want the owner to show us he's thought about i t  (i.e. the p ro je c t) ... it's  
not an act o f fa ith ., it's  a requirement that the owner shows he's capable o f thinking 
about i t . "
Very few banks expected estimates of disposal values of assets. In general it must be said that bank 
expectations with regard to forecasts were fairly low. and somewhat variable. Only four banks
appeared to expect anything in the way of sensitivity analysis from prospective borrowers.
Considerable consistency was displayed with regard to information regarding track record, 
current financial position, vessel details, and details of debt. Virtually all of the banks required some 
evidence with regard to track record. In a small number of cases this related even to results of 
Individual vessels. Fifteen of the 17 banks normally expected past and current financial accounts to be 
available, and there is little  doubt that most were now obtaining them. A small number of banks made it 
clear that they would not lend without having the facility to examine past accounts.
Most of the banks required a clear indication of the use to which the vessels or related assets 
being financed would actually be put. together with details of these assets themselves. Less emphasis 
was placed on this for liner vessels or vessels operating in a pool or consortia. Ten of the banks 
required details of the overall debt (and leasing) commitments of any prospective borrower. Eleven 
required details of the entire fleet, its current use. and associated charters. Seven banks specifically 
referred to expectations about liquidity levels or related Information on liquidity. This latter emphasis 
reflects the seriously depressed state of the market at the time of the Interviews, with many owners 
operating ships at a loss, and no clear sign of any change in circumstances for some time to come. 
Under such circumstances banks are clearly interested in the ability of an owner to survive several 
years of poor freight rates.
A number of other expectations were identified in the course of the discussions, often on an 
individual basis. For example, one bank indicated that it  would expect information on the ownership of 
the corporations shares and on the location of the corporation itself, and would require bank references 
(if the applicant was not already a client). Others made reference to expectations about shareholder or 
owners guarantees. One bank, in explaining its philosophy of "no surprises ’ . expanded this by saying 
that potential borrowers had to display a willingness to provide Information on contingent liabilities and 
any constraints on further equity which might exist. A small number placed considerable emphasis on 
the ability of potential borrowers to display a commitment to the industry.
While a high degree of consistency existed overall, differences arose with regard to the amount 
of detailed information looked for by banks, according to the type of venture being proposed. Loans 
related to the liner trades were typically associated with greater emphasis on corporate track record, 
and with the liner trade or route as a whole, rather than on figures for Individual ships. For the bulk 
trades the emphasis was more on figures for individual ships, backed up by an overall view on
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corporate security. Loans for specialist vessels were typically associated with a very detailed
analysis of track record in the area, and more emphasis on a guaranteed usage.
Not surprisingly, every bank in the survey had access to a great deal of general information on
the shipping industry or relevant parts of that industry. This was typically obtained through a variety
of magazines, books, statistical surveys and related reports. Most spent a lot of time in discussions
with owners and brokers. Informal communication networks were clearly important, as is evidenced by
the following observation:
“It's  a market where we a lt ta lk to each other. More than almost any banking 
market i t ’s one where the banks, the brokers, meet and exchange. They almost, 
almost breach confidences. . . '
Clearly a detailed understanding of the fundamentals of the business existed in all cases. Thereafter 
rather less consistency was found. Only four banks appeared to prepare detailed industry forecasts. 
These, and three others, kept detailed files on individual sectors of the shipping market. Eight kept 
detailed customer files, into which any information gleaned from the press or other sources was put. 
(Clearly all banks would of necessity have detailed customer files, recording transactions between the 
bank and customers. The above files wore more extensive than this, and made use of a grea te r variety 
of sources.)
2 5  Types of Finance
Loans were the most common form of finance provided by the banks. Typically loans were 
arranged for 50-808 of the cost of a vessel, over periods from 5 -I0  years. Higher percentages and 
longer periods could be obtained. For example, one bank stated that it would provide 1008 finance over 
12 years for a new vessel on charter to say. Exxon, for the period of the loan. These higher figures 
could only be achieved if  additional security could be provided.
A number of broadly based guidelines with regard to the amount and length of loans were 
referred to in the course of the discussions. These included such things as:
(i) 508 of the value of the ships for a period not greater than the time to the next special survey
(ii) no debt to be outstanding on a vessel by the time it was 15-17 years old
(iii) for second hand vessels, one half of the value for half of its expected remaining life.
Refinancing was fairly common, and provided a useful means of extending loan periods, horatoria on
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loan repayments in the early years were also found in a number of banks.
Leases had been arranged by all but two of the banks. However seven of the banks made it clear 
that leasing was either not a large part of their business, or that they were effectively acting as agents 
for other providers of finance. In practice this did not appear to lead to any significant change in the 
analysis carried out by the banks. Only two banks stated that different criteria were used in 
considering a lease application, as compared with a loan application. One of these made the point that 
since it  was acting as an agent for providers of finance who had no knowledge of shipping, it was looking 
for a "to ta lly secure package", supported by guarantees, since the maximum exposure on a lease 
is typically more than the cost of the vessel Itself. Most leases were effectively tax leases. Almost 
all were for periods of 12-15 years, a period which was greater than that typically obtained for loans. 
In general leases were only given to "blue chip" companies. Several banks made general observations 
on leasing. Some pointed out the problems caused by leasing, for shipowners, in terms of loss of 
flexibility. Penalty clauses were typically severe. Tax repayment was identified as a particular 
problem if  a deal goes wrong. Several banks required slightly more security for a lease, as compared 
with a loan. Only two banks saw the use of leasing as a way of increasing corporate debt cspactty. In 
neither case was a significant change seen, but the longer periods associated with leasing impose less 
severe debt service requirements, facilitating some small increase in debt potential. No other bank 
perceived leasing as a means of increasing debt capacity. The major advantages of leasing appeared to 
be 10075 financing, over longer periods.
The use of Hire Purchase in the shipping industry appeared to be almost non-existent, as was the 
use of convertibles.
Seven banks indicated that they had actually put in equity into certain ventures. Typically the 
amounts Involved were small, and such transactions were rare. In spite of the fact that a number of 
banks had seriously discussed the provision of greater equity finance. Virtually all of the banks made it 
dear that greater provision of equity finance was unlikely.
Interestingly, a number of cynical observations were made by bankers not involved in equity 
provision. The gist of these comments was generally that moves to provide greater equity had been 
forced onto certain banks as a result of bad lending decisions. For example, on being told that certain 
banks had stated that they had an involvement (albeit slight) in equity provision, one banker observed:
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“They may be blowing a tittle  b it o f smoke a t you, because that kind o f decision 
recently is  the resu lt o f bad loans ... The owner who's a good owner, doesn't have to 
give up equity to raise h is financing ... the industry’s never been short o f capital. 
So i f  you're going to  have to take equity in  a deal, o r a guy's prepared to give up 
equity, i t ’s probably not the best o f loans. '
There is Insufficient evidence to ascertain whether such a comment is fair or true. The fact that such a 
comment can be made in this way, however, indicates that certain banks clearly have no intention of 
providing equity.
2Jt Trends identified
hv the discussions on past and expected trends a variety of ideas were put forward, covering 
both market trends, and trends in banking. The most commonly identified market trends over recent 
years were as follows:
(i) increased market volatility/reduction in quality of earnings
(ii) oversupply in certain sectors/poor freight rates
(iii) markets more segmented/specialised
(iv) many of the major participants were leaving the market
(v) medium sized companies being squeezed
(vi) higher cost of vessels/lack of appropriate equity support
(vii) changes in the liner trades
(viii) greater emphasis on fuel efficiency
(ix) greater intervention by Government/UNCTAD
These trends were generally expected to continue over the next few years.
With regard to banking practice and procedures the following recent trends were identified:
(i) more detailed customer investigation and greater reliance on track record
(ii) more conservative attitudes towards security and lending
(iii) more emphasis on Euromarkets and mixed currency loans
(iv) higher proportions lent, for longer periods
(v) more use of moratoria and grace periods
(vi) less guaranteed usage, so greater problems of security
(vii) owners shop around more/decreased spreads
158
(vtii) changes In the approach to syndication, though some banks were now more likely to syndicate 
than they had been, while others were now less likely to do so.
Many of these trends were also expected to continue over the next decade. It was clearly 
recognised that current (and expected) market conditions were making it  much more difficult for banks 
to negotiate secure long term contracts. A number of banks were moving away from one-off deals to a 
more '’corporate*' approach to financing and the provision of financial services. Some banks expected 
further developments in the provision of equity finance from banks, managed funds, or public issues, 
though earlier comments make It clear that In reality further such funds are unlikely to be provided in 
any quantity by the banks. Several banks cited interest rates as a problem, and expected to introduce 
forms of finance which included some maximum interest rate, in return for some kind of “equity 
kicker “ at the end. (Verall. however, few banks identified any major new developments in the field of 
ship finance which they expected to come on stream over the next decade.
7.7 Security
Security required by banks tended to follow a fairly consistent pattern, although variations 
clearly existed depending upon the type of customer and the type of deal. All of the banks typically 
required a firs t mortgage on any asset being financed, irrespective of any comments made concerning a 
corporate approach to lending. Approximately two thirds typically required an assignment of earnings 
and/or insurance. Ten of the 17 banks usually looked for corporate or personal quarantees. Most 
imposed covenants of some kind, typically relating the market value of the secured asset to the debt 
outstanding. Figures of 125-150% for this covenant were normal. A small number of banks referred 
to other security they might look for in particular circumstances. These included second mortgages, 
pledges of shares, and blocked deposits or Interest bearing collateral.
Z& Accounting Ratios and Capital Structure
In discussions on credit analysis questions were raised about the use of accounting ratios, and 
specifically, whether targets or minimum requirements existed, for such things as interest cover, 
liquidity and working capital levels, and debt/equity ratios, frera il it  was apparent that there were 
few cases where dear targets existed, although in many cases a standard credit analysis was carried
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out. and the usual ratios calculated. Overall a high degree of cynicism appeared to exist in this area, 
with one executive stating, 7 hate those ra tio s '. Another regarded shipping as ’one o f the 
/east suscept/h/e (industries) to ordinary financial statement a n a lys is '. The most 
consistent areas identified for detailed analysis were liquidity and the ability to service debt, but the 
underlying theme of most of the discussions was that the calculation of ratios was a relatively small 
part of this analysis.
Specific questions were asked about capital structure ratios. The ear lier references to 
covenants relating market values to debt outstanding indicate a clear concern with the relationship 
between debt and security. The same ideas were frequently encountered in discussing overall 
debt/equity ratios. To be meaningful, debt/equity ratios would need to be expressed in terms which 
reflected the current market value of the assets. Yet such figures are subject to significant changes in 
a volatile market, even in the short term, making debt/equity ratios a quite volatile measuring device. 
Under these circumstances it is thus not surprising that no bank concerned itself with ideas of optimal 
capital structure. Indeed. IA banks indicated that there were no dear limits with regard to overall 
debt/equity ratios. In the remaining cases typical maximum debt/equity ratios were 50-60*. though 
even in these cases the figures quoted were seen as general indicators only. Most banks preferred to 
look at broad indicators of the relationship between earnings, market value of assets, and debt service, 
rather than at debt/equity ratios per se. The type of client, the type of trade (and hence the quality of 
earnings), interest rates, the extent to which corporate or individual back-up was available, were all 
factors influencing attitudes towards overall debt levels. Hence companies trading mostly on the spot 
market would be in a very different position to those trading with long term charters to reliable 
companies or governments.
A further interesting aspect of the capital structure debate concerns the pricing of loans. No 
evidence was found of spreads increasing significantly as debt/equity ratios rose. Where spreads were 
identified, figures of 1 1/2 -  2 * were typically expected. Owners were seen as being particularly 
efficient at keeping spreads low, by hard bargaining based upon sound knowledge of what was currently 
being obtained elsewhere in the industry. Additionally competition within the banking sector is fierce. 
Taken together the effect on spreads is predictable.
Such a view on pricing has undoubted knock-on effects in terms of quantity. If pricing is 
relatively low. one might expect the availability of funds to be low. In considering this issue it  is worth
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reconsidering the type of clientele associated with particular banks, a point already made. For
example, a large bank dealing mainly in corporate loans has no reason to lend to a shipping company
under any different conditions to those associated with loans to companies in other industries. An
executive in one such bank expressed his view as follows:
“Whenever /  make a shipping loan /  also think about the allocation o f the banks 
capital, though /  don't have restrictions. /  allocate capitaI by price and also by 
cred it quality. /  know that /  can put as much money out in to the corporate world as 
I  want, a t a particu la r price, and it's  be/ow i/1 , and i  can't get any more than say 
I  i/2 X  (Spread) on the loans Urn making, so why should i  be much more than / / /  i f  /  
can t  get any more out o f i t . "
In fact this bank made it dear that debt/equity ratios were not seen as a particularly effective measure 
of credit quality or risk, but the implication of the above statement is nonetheless clear, namely that 
further credit simply w ill not be extended beyond a certain point. This same bank made it  abundantly 
clear that it  was only interested in certain kinds of owners, and would be very selective in its 
approach.
7 don't want to stay awake a t night wondering whether someone's going to pay 
me in three days. Spreads on our types o f foan are so siim  that it's  not worth having 
a deal w ith the other types (o r ow ner)."
Other banks with different clientele adopted rather different stances to credit quality. The net effect 
was to extend the amounts such banks lent to owners, with relatively marginal increases in spread. 
Loans of this type were typically associated with more security and a greater number of restrictive 
covenants, presumably to reduce the perceived risk. Virtually all the banks made it clear that if the 
credit risk was too great, loans simply would not be provided. This was partly due to the fact that it 
was considered impossible to recover a spread appropriate to such risk, and partly because the banks 
did not consider that lending on high risk ventures was appropriate for them.
X  Conclusions and Implications for Borrowers
In considering this chapter a clear distinction must be drawn between the aims of the owner and 
the aims of the banker, in terms of project or corporate analysis. The owner could reasonably be 
expected to have views on project and corporate profitability, as well as liquidity, financing and
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survival. Hence while liquidity and financing are likely to be important facets of the decision, an 
inherent interest in potential profitability is almost certain to exist. The banker, on the other hand, 
does not have the same interest in profitability. The banker typically is interested in answering a 
rather more simple and fundamental question, namely, w ill the customer be able to service the debt In 
accordance with the prescribed conditions? The emphasis Is thus on liquidity and debt service ability, 
rather than profitability. To the extent that bank finance is needed to actually carry out corporate 
plans, shipowners will need to be aware of bankers attitudes to certain issues, broadly outlined below, 
and these are likely to be a consideration within their own analytical framework.
These considerations can usefully be broken down into four main headings:
(i) Target Clientele and client relationships
Banks typically appear to be associated with certain kinds of client, and related deals spring 
naturally from the type of client. In most cases, but not all. banks appear to be looking for a long term 
relationship. Such a relationship can have considerable advantages for the customer, as is evidenced by 
the following statement.
'Our philosophy is  that i f  we want to do business w ith an owner we want to do 
i t  on a long term  basis, and we want to be there in  the good times, and we're w illing  
to be there in  the bad times and help them out. as long as they're w illing to make as 
much e ffo rt as we are
The fact that banks receive considerable income from fees and charges associated with banking 
activities other than lending, provides further impetus for banks, and a counterveiling power for 
owners, in terms of the possibility of transfers to other banks.
(ii) Track record
Virtually all banks identified "track record" as being an extremely important part of its client 
analysis. This appeared to include such things as experience and success in the industry (or 
appropriate sector), operating ability, and integrity -  in terms of payment of debts and other 
contractual obligations. It must be remembered that bankers are interested more in the ability to 
service debt than in profitability per se. Hence it  is s till likely to be the case that the owner knows 
more about the commercial risks of a particular undertaking than the banker. The better the history of 
past decisons. subsequent operations and debt service, the more likely it  is that high levels of 
confidence in the commercial judgement of that owner w ill continue.
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(HO Ability to service debt
The detailed analysis carried out by a bank is most likely to centre on this area. Earlier sections 
have made clear that even if  project finance is provided, considerable emphasis is likely to be placed on 
the analysis of the overall corporate position. Detailed forecasts of revenues, disposal values and 
discounted returns were seldom expected, whereas detailed analysis of contractual obligations and 
operating costs were. Clearly therefore, reliance on a single project approach by a potential borrower 
would leave considerable gaps in the analysis from the banks viewpoint. The only exceptions to this 
corporate’ approach by banks related to individual projects which could be tied in closely to a set of 
guaranteed earnings (e.g. a long term charter).
The earlier section on information sought and used by banks identifies a range of information 
sought and analysis carried out. A high degree of consistency was identified. Particular attention was 
paid to overall debt and other contractual obligations, overall use and potential of the entire fleet, the 
current and expected market situation, and levels of liquidity. Even if  detailed forecasts were not 
expected, banks did expect potential borrowers to display a sound understanding of the markets, a 
reasonably secure position with regard to debt service overall, and strong liquidity. Recent market 
conditions have meant that greater emphasis has been put on liquidity. O/erall most banks want to feel 
that any agreement entered Into with a client w ill be complied with, and an emphasis on liquidity is one 
way of assisting this. One such view was expressed as follows:
~We put a premium on liqu id ity . Owners who do not hove liq u id ity  reserves that 
we think ere prudent, we ju s t won't dee! w ith them, because we think he's taking too
much risk . We tike to go in to a deal and know that it's  going to end in year 5  or
whatever. We dont want to  get in to the situation where we have to  constantly
restructure and restructure, i f  we have to do that we’re  not doing our jo b  rig h t."
In carrying out the analysis little  attention appears to have been given by banks to traditional 
accounting ratios. Analysis related to cash nows overall, rather than to specific accounting ratios. 
Capital structure ratios, where calculated, were related to current market values of assets, but were 
not generally regarded as particularly significant per se. Clearly, from the viewpoint of the banks, the 
Idea of optimal capital structures is of little  consequence. Little evidence was found that pricing of 
loans was closely related to capital structure. Indeed, pricing was more closely related to security 
given.
(iv) Security
Sorrowers must be able to provide what the bank regards as an adequate level of security for
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any advances made. Projects which have higher risks tend to be associated with greater security, 
rather than with significantly higher interest rates.
Any company wishing to borrow needs to recognise this aspect of loan pricing. In practice 
security is seen as serving a number of purposes. Firstly, as already Indicated, it provides a means of 
relating pricing to risk. Secondly, it ensures that no single loan will be lost due to its being less well 
secured than any other loan. Comparable security conditions are thus the banks way of keeping In the 
queue in the event of a default. Thirdly, security or associated covenants may provide some basis for 
controlling or Influencing decisions within the borrowing organisation. Fourthly, adequate security does 
reduce the risk of loss in the event of a default on a debt servicing contract. In practice, it must be 
recognised that few banks ever actually foreclose on a loan, since the difficulties and problems 
associated with arresting a vessel are considerable, as are those of trying to operate the vessel and 
dispose of it. subsequent to arrest. Foreclosure Is thus the ultimate sanction, and few cases ever come 
to this. Nevertheless, the banks have a responsibility to their own shareholders, and in the final 
analysis, if all other alternatives have been tried, foreclosure will result.
In practice, a division such as that shown above is somewhat artificial. An assessment of track 
record is an essential part of an analysis of ability to service debt. Security required is clearly 
affected by the kind of client and markets. The net effect is a decision making framework within banks 
which displays considerable consistency of approach, but where minor variations in approach or 
attitudes can be found at almost any time. Clearly certain issues are given a low priority. The 
priorities given by bankers, managers and shareholders need not. Indeed almost certainly will not. be 
the same. Nevertheless, decision makers in shipping companies need to be aware of the views of 
bankers, and incorporate them somehow or another, into their planning and strategy.
Chapter 7
Shipping Companies -  Pilot Study
JL Introduction
Before embarking on widespread interviews and questionnaires concerned with the attitudes and 
methods found in shipping companies, it  was decided that a small pilot study should be undertaken, in 
which detailed questions would be asked, and case material sought. This study, as well as being 
interesting and useful in its own right, would also provide a basis for assessing the relevance of the 
questions posed, and therefore lay a more solid foundation for the later research.
2* Basis of the Study
Representatives of ten companies were interviewed. A number of detailed questions were asked 
in all cases, so as to provide a logical and coherent framework for the study. Nonetheless, those 
interviewed were encouraged to discuss the industry and investment appraisal and financing methods in 
general terms, as well as in relation to their own organisation. This they did, providing a great deal of 
useful background material, and provoking a certain amount of re-thinking with regard to certain areas 
of study, in particular, it  became apparent that the study ought to include rather more on the strategic 
aspects of investment appraisal, and on liquidity aspects. Questions were thus subsequently amended to 
give these aspects greater weight. In three of the ten cases extremely detailed information was sought 
and obtained, through follow up interviews and procedural documentation provided. This material 
proved particularly important in identifying the weighting given to strategic considerations in decision 
making.
The ten companies included in the pilot study included:
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(i) Five large British companies, three of which were well diversified conglomerates, while the 
other two had diversified to a more limited extent, with the majority of their assets still in shipping.
(ii) Two smaller British public companies, and one well established private company, ail with long 
traditions in shipping. Two of these companies were involved primarily in bulk shipping, while the third 
operated in a more "entrepreneurial* fashion.
(iii) Two Greek companies operating in a variety of trades.
The choice of companies was partly influenced by the desire to choose a balanced sample, and 
partly by pragmatic considerations, namely contacts. In all cases contacts and introduction permitted 
extremely free and open discussions.
As indicated above, discussions were fairly wide ranging. Nevertheless careful consideration 
was given to the structure of the interviews and to the questions asked.
The firs t area of questioning concerned the actual structure of the companies being interviewed. 
This was necessary to ascertain the importance of the shipping elements of the company, and to identify 
who had the responsibility for strategic decisions.
Detailed questions were then asked on the objectives of the companies, and the areas of interest, 
in terms of type of trade, geographical area, links with other companies, etc. Particular attention was 
paid to financial objectives and targets, covering such things as profits, growth, and dividends. A 
specific question was asked in all cases, as to the extent to which share price or wealth maximisation 
was seen as an objective. The aim of these questions was to ascertain the objectives which actually 
existed in the companies questioned, and to ascertain the extent to which the objectives put forward in 
finance theory were valid.
The next area of discussions concerned the main strategic issues which were considered in 
recent vessel acquisitions. While the main aim was to establish how investment and financing decisions 
are made, it was nevertheless considered important to ascertain the strategic context of decisions, 
since it was possible that behaviour might vary considerably depending upon the strategy actually 
adopted. Potential strategic issues included such things as diversification, risk reduction, replacement.
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expansion and speculation. Companies were then asked about the extent to which estimates of trade 
levels and/or related economic indicators were made or used in reaching investment decisions. These 
questions covered both general indicators and estimates of particular trades, since the range of 
activities of the companies involved was wide, and it  seemed likely that significantly different 
estimates would be made for different types of companies.
In order to assess the usefulness of the more traditional techniques suggested by finance theory, 
it was then necessary to establish the typical period for which investments would be kept in use, and 
the nature, type and period of anv specific estimates made, or at least those which actually formed part 
of the investment decision process. Questions were thus asked on these areas, with specific questions 
being asked about estimates of operating costs, operating revenues and disposal values. In all cases a 
question was also asked as to whether any inflation adjustments were incorporated into the estimates, 
and if  so. how.
Clearly one of the major aims of the thesis, certainly in the early stages, was the identification 
of the investment appraisal techniques actually used. Companies were thus asked if  they used payback, 
accounting rate of return, net present value, internal rate of return/yield, or any other techniques. 
They were then encouraged to discuss the context in which these techniques were used, and to indicate 
their importance. In the pilot study no attempt was made to rank these techniques, or to apply any 
quantitative measurement of their perceived usefulness. The results of the pilot study suggested that 
this would have been extremely difficult, and almost certainly inappropriate, as w ill be discussed later.
The next stage of questioning covered the area of risk and uncertainty, factors possibly of more 
significance in the shipping industry than most industries, given the volatile market conditions described 
in chapter 2. Questions were asked about the use of a variety of techniques for assisting with project 
risk (e.g. sensitivity analysis), and also about any overall approach to corporate risk. Given the 
international nature of the industry it was considered appropriate to ascertain the attitude towards 
exchange risk, and the steps taken to reduce such risk. Nevertheless, it  must be admitted that the 
questioning in the pilot study was fairly broadly based, becoming more detailed in later interviews, as 
the overall picture became clearer.
Questioning then turned to the relationship, if  anv. between the investment and financing 
elements of the decision to acquire capital assets. Finance theory suggests a fairly clear division 
between the two elements (although the benefits of subsidised finance clearly need to be included).
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Previously observed practice suggested a much closer relationship, with financing being a critical part 
of the final decision, rhe aim of the questioning in this area was thus to clarify the actual position.
The next area of questioning concerned the methods of financing capital investment. Possibilities 
included equity, retentions, loans, shipyard credit, leasing, hire purchase, and any other sources. 
Questions were then asked about the proportion of available credit actually taken up, the typical period 
of credit, and the security given. Answers to these questions would enable a dear picture to be drawn 
up of current practice in the industry. This picture may in turn have some interesting implications for 
the various theories proposed. Given the view put forward in chapter 1 about the shortage of equity 
capital in the shipping industry, particular attention was paid to establishing the extent to which equity 
had been considered as a means of financing new investment. Similar questions were raised with regard 
to newer alternatives, particularly leasing.
Questioning then turned to the general area of capital structure. A specific question was asked as 
to whether there was a view on the total level of debt overall, and the extent to which external funds 
were limited. A further specific question was asked as to whether companies worked towards the 
achievement of a particular long run capital structure, which was broadly adhered to over time. If 
there were such a structure, companies were asked to identify the target debt/equity ratio as a 
percentage. Answers to these questions were expected to make it  possible to assess the practical 
relevance of theories regarding optimal capital structure.
As with all the questions, encouragement was given to discuss issues in broad terms, so as to 
provide a better picture of the logic behind particular decisions, and to ascertain the range of 
contributory factors to the final capital structure. Supporting questions were also asked on such things 
as other ratios considered to be of vital importance, e.g. interest coverage, liquidity ratios, etc. A 
question was asked about the perception of leasing in terms of capital structure ratios and debt 
capacity. A specific question was also asked as to whether, in considering the level of debt, any 
attempt was made to assess the impact of changes therein on the value of ordinary shares.
The final area of questioning concerned the choice of an appropriate discount rate, where 
discounting techniques were actually used. Companies were asked to identify the rate of discount they 
were using, and to indicate the basis for the calculation of this rate. Possibilities envisaged included the 
weighted average cost of capital (theoretically justifiable if an optimal capital structure was being 
achieved), a minimum cut off rate (based on CAPM or a more ad hoc approach), the interest rate on the
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loan (clearly incorrect but equally clearly used by some companies and banks).
Reference to the literature review chapters should make it  apparent that the pilot study was 
initially aimed at assessing the perceived relevance and therefore practical usefulness of the theories 
and techniques found in most standard finance texts. Some clear cut answers could be obtained to 
specific questions, and these would provide an initial assessment to be made. The sample could then be 
widened to make a more systematic survey if  this were considered appropriate. However, as had 
already been indicated, while the discussions did cover certain specific points, those interviewed were 
encouraged to discuss issues in a much broader way. with a view to identifying further areas of 
interest which warranted a more detailed analysis. The detailed interviews which were to follow might 
need to be modified in the light of the results of the pilot study.
A  R esu lts  o f the P ilo t  Study
While a sample of this size was Insufficient to come to any definite conclusions, certain general 
trends were found to be common to the majority of the companies in the pilot study. These are dealt 
with in section 5 below.
Besides these general trends, the pilot study further suggested that different behaviour patterns 
existed in different types of company. It was therefore fe lt that some kind of categorisation of 
companies would enable the conclusions reached to be more detailed, and would facilitate the analysis of 
behaviour, and possibly the building of a number of models. Initially three distinct categories were 
identified, namely:
(I) widely held public companies;
(II) closely held or small public companies or private companies of a good size;
(ill) Greek or “entrepreneurial” companies.
A broad summary of behaviour was then drawn up for each of these categories, and these are 
also detailed below in sections 6, 7 and 0 of this chapter. These three summaries then form the basis of 
the subsequent chapters, where the aim is to further refine and develop the analysis outlined in this 
Chapter. The analysis for category 1 companies is developed in Chapter 8. category 2 in Chapter 9.
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category 3 in Chapter 10. Chapter 11 summarises the proceeding three chapters and focuses on 
similarities and differences between the categories.
5 .  General C h a ra c te ris tic s  o f Shipping Companies
Corporate structures differed significantly across the ten companies in the pilot study, and areas 
of acttvity were equally diverse, as w ill be pointed out in the subsequent analysis by category. 
Nevertheless, it  was clear that many of the companies included had clear market objectives, with well 
defined areas of involvement, at least with regard to their shipping activities, particularly in terms of 
the type of trade, and. to a lesser extent, their geographical area of operation. It was also evident that 
overall strategic factors appeared to be of vital importance in considering investment decisions.
Less consistency was found with regard to objectives. The only common feature was that 
maximisation of shareholders wealth was not seen as an operational objective in any of the companies, 
though in some companies such an objective was considered to be theoretically desirable. Differences 
in the size and nature of companies and their activities appeared to be an important variable, a fact 
which w ill be discussed more fuily in later sections.
Real difficulties were seen to exist In the industry with regard to. forecasting The features of 
the industry outlined in Chapter 2. particularly those relating to the complexity of the industry and its 
volatility, make the forecasting of revenues and the sale value of vessels especially difficult. 
(Generally costs were known with much more accuracy). This problem with regard to forecasting 
provided a considerable disincentive to the use of discounting techniques, since forecasts for more than 
a few years ahead have little  credibility. In fact discounting techniques were not used with any degree 
of consistency. Even where they were used, most projects were carefully considered in relation to the 
achievement of strategic objectives, and discounting techniques would only be used once other 
considerations had been satisfied. Where discounting techniques were used results were generally 
presented in terms of Internal Rate of Return. NPV was very seldom used.
All companies were very concerned with the liquidity aspects of their investment decisions, 
although rather different emphasis was found from one company to another. Certainly the identification 
of the potential cash flow effects of projects on total corporate cash flows was generally considered
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important. However, while some considerable doubts exist about future revenues, repayments of 
principal and Interest can be forecast with reasonable accuracy (though the interest rate fluctuations of 
recent years have made even this more difficult). Emphasis, therefore, tended to be given to potential 
liquidity problems associated with debt servicing.
in considering plans the financial .accounting. framewQrK.,was.Qf.undQUbteUfTiDQC.taDC£. with 
forecast profit and loss accounts and Balance Sheets being prepared in a number of cases. Coupled to 
this was the calculation of certain accounting ratios. The degree of sophistication of such forecasts 
varied considerably in this area, usually in line with company size.
Attitudes towards risk varied considerably, but techniques for dealing with it  were not generally 
very sophisticated. Sensitivity analysis was found to be the most common method of dealing with risk. 
Currency exchange rate risk was generally avoided where possible. It perhaps should be pointed out 
that all interviews to do with the pilot study took place in Britain.
The relationship between the investment and financing decisions was clearly close. In some cases 
the two aspects of the decision were considered to be broadly separable, but there is little  doubt that in 
many cases, because of the amounts of subsidised credit available, the financing decision has a very 
considerable impact on the investment decisions.
New investment was financed almost entirely from internal funds and loans (either from yards or 
from commercial banks). Very little  new equity (i.e. issues) has been involved, although joint ventures 
on a project basis were a source of small amounts of funds to one company. Leasing was perceived as a 
useful source of funds under certain conditions, but had not been used extensively as it reduced 
company flexibility, since leases could not be got out of quickly or cheaply. In many cases the maximum 
amount of loan finance available on new capital assets would be taken up. Typically loans were for 
60-80% finance spread over 7-10 years, at interest rates of about 8 1/2%. Commercial loans carried 
higher rates. Depreciation on vessels is normally spread over periods between 12 and 20 years. This 
goes some way towards explaining why liquidity is given such emphasis, since aceptable returns (from 
a profitability viewpoint) may not be sufficiently large to give adequate liquidity levels to pay off debt.
In general it  may be said that target capital structures were not seen to be very important. 
though more concern was expressed on debt/equity ratios by public companies and large private 
companies. The size of capital projects in shipping, coupled with traditional debt service requirements, 
also meant that debt/equity ratios could vary (quite significantly) from one time to another. The idea
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of a single target figure was thus unrealistic. Leasing, where used, was not seen as a way of increasing 
debt capacity.
fL  Summ ary o f P ilo t Study fo r  Category 1 Companies 
f ij .  Introduction
This summary was based upon interviews with five public companies. While the conclusions were 
inevitably tentative at this stage, there was nonetheless a considerable measure of agreement, 
sufficient to suggest that further analysis along these lines would yield interesting results.
&2 Objectives
While few companies had explicit objectives it  was apparent that some broad earnings oriented 
objective was implicit in all cases. Often these objectives were in turn related to the amount invested 
in a company. The achievement of a satisfactory return on capital was considered to be the best way 
of achieving a satisfactory share price. This was seen as being needed for both offensive and defensive 
reasons. No company saw maximisation of shareholders wealth as being an operational or necessary 
objective.
Philosophies and Strategies
This general earnings objective tended bo be applied with certain implicit philosophies and 
strategies in mind. Firstly, regular earnings were preferred, as opposed to speculative earnings. 
Companies in this category were not very interested in capital gains on ships. This approach was due to 
feelings of accountability and responsibility as a public company. It resulted in a tendency for 
investments bo be long berm, and also for them to be at the high technology/high quality end of the 
market. Such an approach, by requiring a long term and substantial commitment to an investment, also 
frequently results in lower effective competition, and higher quality earnings.
Diversification was seen as a way of reducing exposure to one area. However, it was generally 
limited, and concentrated on particular areas of business, which were clearly identifiable.
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Diversification was sometimes scientific, but frequently fa irly naive.
JL4 Strategic Planning and Individual Project Appraisal
Fairly sophisticated corporate planning systems were found in the companies in this category, 
with plans usually covering 3-5 years. The plans were typically effectively based upon a financial 
model consisting of the three major financial statements, namely:
(i) Profit and Loss Statement
(ii) Balance Sheet
(iii) Funds Flow Statement
Projects considered were generally of two types:
(i) those which ''grew out“ of the strategic plan
(ii) “opportunistic" projects.
The firs t type were considered very carefully along strategic lines before individual project analysis 
occurred, as part of the strategic planning exercise. The second, which were much more ad hoc. 
usually included an analysis of the strategic considerations as an essential part of the process. In 
general companies were looking for a "market slot" which was consistent with the business. "Projects" 
often related to whole fleets or classes of ships, rather than single ships, so strategic factors were 
extremely important.
Projects were usually analysed on an incremental basis, as part of a fleet. Analysis of such 
things as supply/demand, age and capacity of the fleet etc. were thus very important aspects of the 
decision process. The actual evaluation of a particular project was very much the last stage in a fairly 
lengthy strategic planning process. The calculation of dcf returns, while commonly done, was really 
only a final hurdle, and not a significant part of the decision making process.
Typically, for all major projects the effect on the five year strategic plan would be worked 
through. This was very important because the resulting cash flows might well create undesirable 
problems for the overall organisation. The principal evaluation was thus the effect on group figures 
overall. Projects which produced unfavourable earnings or cash flows in odd years were frequently 
rejected even though dcf returns were high.
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6 5 Risk and Uncertainty
Very little  project risk analysis was carried out. Where such analyses were done they tended to 
move from the certain to the less certain, with an emphasis on sensitivity analysis and the 
identification of critical variables on which judgements could be made. Probabilities were seldom used. 
In the main, concern was with the risk of adverse effects on overall company results, and the analysis 
concentrated on these, notably liquidity risk and revenue risk, host companies were concerned 
principally with downside risk, and were concerned to reduce or eliminate those projects which had 
significant downside risk, in terms of the overall group position. Diversification was used to reduce 
risk, as were such approaches as specialist markets and. where possible, more flexible tonnage. 
Exchange risk was generally eliminated wherever possible. When it  was not possible to do this a 
decision not to take the risk was often made (i.e. the investment would not proceed).
&& Financing and Capital Structure
The investment and financing decisions appeared to be more likely to be separate the larger the 
group. Most companies took advantage of subsidised credit where available, but few were concerned 
with any extension to the 102m period. Leasing was not generally favoured because tax planning was an 
important part of the diversification planning. Where leasing was used it was perceived as being the 
sane as borrowing, for debt/equity purposes.
No company set target debt/equity ratios, though some implicit maxima were quoted for this 
ratio. In general it  seemed that the positive decision variables were:




The debt/equity ratio was thus in practice very largely a residual or resultant figure, rather than a 
causal variable. However, the balance between debt and equity, in terms of the variables given above, 
was clearly seen as an important market consideration, and accounted for a number of very important 
strategic decisions made by companies involved in the industry.
Weighted average cost of capital was seldom used as a discount rate.
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Z  Summary. flLRUuL Study. . Lon C a lo ry
Z 1  Introduction
This summary was based upon only two companies, and was thus perceived as somewhat 
inevitably failing somewhere between categories 1 and 3. The development of a single model was thus 
viewed as slightly more difficult. It seemed likely that private companies would adopt a behaviour 
pattern somewhere between the other two, depending upon a number of factors, including such things 
as:
(i) size
(ii) commitment to the industry
(iii) market and economic conditions
(fv) nature of the ownership or controlling group
The summary itself is based upon a small public company and a similar sized private company, both with 
considerable experience and reputation in the industry.
Z 2  Objectives
Objectives tended to be implicit, rather than explicit. Hence specific financial objectives did not 
appear to be very important in the decision making process, though some broadly based financial 
objectives were implicit in the process. In general the earning of an adequate return on investment was 
considered desirable, but this objective was long term. In the short term the aim was generally to 
‘try  to  do the most p ro fitab le  business'  The market conditions experienced in recent years 
had tended to change the emphasis from profits. The single most important aim in existence at the time 
of the study was clearly survival. This aim manifested itself in an emphasis on liquidity and gearing, 
with cash flow effects being paramount. Consideration of the Profit and Loss Statement also appears to 
be secondary to that of the Balance Sheet and gearing.
1A  Philosophies and Strategies
The companies in this category tended to be rather more committed to the industry than those of 
category 1, with shipping assets tending to be a much larger proportion of total assets than for
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category 1 companies. Some diversification existed, but it  was of relatively limited importance. Even 
within shipping a certain amount of specialisation was common and a very clear view usually existed of 
the type of trade within which the company wished to be involved. This provided a set of constraints 
which significantly limited the companies’ range of action. In many cases decisions were largely forced 
on a company because of some prior strategic commitment to the industry or some section thereof. It 
is perhaps worth noting that these commitments were not always consciously arrived at. but were the 
result of tradition or instinct. Considerable concern existed with regard to corporate reputation 
through such things as good customer relations, efficiently run vessels, etc. This of course is 
influenced by the factors referred to above.
In the past there has been a tendency to invest on a long term basis, with relatively little  regard 
for ship values and speculative profits in ships. This process is beginning to change, though some 
resistance s till exists. The move is one of necessity rather than choice.
Companies in this category, recognising that they needed some advantage in order to be able to 
compete effectively, generally aimed to have ships which were the most efficient and technologically 
advanced of their type. Considerable emphasis was thus placed on obtaining the right ship (or ships) to 
provide a competitive advantage, but where, if  the going gets tough the " asset is  always 
substantia lly capable o f being sold to  pay o ff debt* Market conditions in recent years have 
made this more difficult to achieve, but the overall philosophy remains.
Given their exposure to the markets, one of the most important considerations in investment 
decisions was the preservation of flexibility. This was typically reflected in the careful balancing of 
the fleet, in terms of size and type, or in the acquisition of handy sized, general purpose ships.
Taxation planning was an extremely important factor in the investment decision. Dividend 
patterns, while different from one company to the next, displayed considerable consistency over time, 
and were generally a consideration in considering investment decisions.
1A Strategic Planning. and Individual. Project Appraisal
Individual project appraisal clearly took place in the context of the philosophical and strategic 
issues raised above, although calculations were then typically made which relate specifically to the 
project itself. In making investment decisions considerable attention was normally given to world
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supply and demand figures for detailed categories of vessels. When coupled with information on new 
buildings, scrappings. and estimates of world trade, a picture of the industry could be built up which 
would help bo identify areas of shipping which were in the most scarce supply relative to expected 
demands. Subsequent analysis could further refine this.
Because of the uncertainties involved with the industry, forecasts are extremely difficult to 
make, so traditional investment appraisal methods did not currently carry very much weight in the 
decision making process. Typically, good estimates of costs could be made for several years ahead, but 
revenues were difficult to forecast for more than one or two years. No real attempt was typically 
made to quantify expected revenues beyond this. On the basis of the short term expectations about 
operating costs, which as was pointed out earlier, can usually be estimated fa irly accurately, the 
breakeven daily rate was calculated. Cost escalation was then assumed, to calculate expected 
breakeven rates further on in time. These current and expected breakeven rates could then be 
compared with current and expected charter rates. A judgement about the probability of achieving such 
rates was then made, providing one variable in the decision making process.
Because of the pre-occupation with survival, manifested in a close concern with liquidity and 
gearing, detailed estimates of the costs of servicing debt were made, covering several years ahead. It 
should also be noted that in calculating the breakeven rates referred to in the last section, loan interest 
and principal repayments were included with operating costs. Hence the breakeven point calculated was 
effectively a cash flow break even point.
2-5 Risk and Uncertainty
As mentioned in section 7.3 above, some limited diversification was typically found, and this has 
helped smooth out earnings to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the preponderance of activities was still 
typically shipping or marine related. Within shipping, risk was usually reduced by careful fleet 
balancing and/or the use of advanced, handy sized vessels of considerable flexibility. It should perhaps 
be noted that such a policy may give a relative advantage and not an absolute advantage, with very 
considerable risk remaining in the sector.
No formalised or analytical models for dealing with risk were found.
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2A Financing and Capital Structure
For category 2 companies the investment and financing aspects of the decision were closely 
inter-related. In general decisions were composite, and the separation of the two aspects implicit in the 
finance literature is thus far from clear cut.
In recent years vessels have been very largely financed from loan, typically with 80% finance 
being used, over 8-10 year periods. Longer periods would generally be preferred, but are not usually 
available. Typically the maximum amount of finance available would be taken up. Leasing was not seen 
as particularly useful, partly because tax planning plays such an important part in the investment 
process, but also because leasing reduces corporate flexibility with regard to selling a vessel. The 
longer periods associated with leases were seen as attractive, but the disadvantages referred to above 
carried more weight.
All companies were concerned about their ability to continue to service debt in an extremely 
volatile industry. However, that is not the same as saying that they had any kind of target capital 
structure. Limits generally existed with regard to the M a i amount of debt taken up. but the ratio of 
debt to equity was not a fixed ratio, but was dependent upon interest rates, security requirements and 
liquidity considerations. Because of the high cost of new vessels a new acquisition was inevitably likely 
to change the debt/equity ratio quite significantly.
S . Sum m ary o f P ilo t S tudy fo r  Category 3 Companies 
fiJL Introduction
This summary is based upon a small British public company considered to act in an 
“entrepreneurial- way. and two London based 6reek companies.
& 2 Objectives
t
Generally organisations interviewed appeared to be very concerned with the creation and 
increase of wealth. This increase in wealth could be achieved in a number of ways, but in the main it
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supply and demand figures for detailed categories of vessels. When coupled with information on new 
buildings, scrappings. and estimates of world trade, a picture of the industry could be built up which 
would help to identify areas of shipping which were in the most scarce supply relative to expected 
demands. Subsequent analysis could further refine this.
Because of the uncertainties involved with the industry, forecasts are extremely difficult to 
make, so traditional investment appraisal methods did not currently carry very much weight in the 
decision making process. Typically, good estimates of costs could be made for several years ahead, but 
revenues were difficult to forecast for more than one or two years. No real attempt was typically 
made to quantify expected revenues beyond this. On the basis of the short term expectations about 
operating costs, which as was pointed out earlier, can usually be estimated fairly accurately, the 
breakeven daily rate was calculated. Cost escalation was then assumed, to calculate expected 
breakeven rates further on in time. These current and expected breakeven rates could then be 
compared with current and expected charter rates. A judgement about the probability of achieving such 
rates was then made, providing one variable in the decision making process.
Because of the pre-occupation with survival, manifested in a close concern with liquidity and 
gearing, detailed estimates of the costs of servicing debt were made, covering several years ahead. It 
should also be noted that in calculating the breakeven rates referred to in the last section, loan interest 
and principal repayments were included with operating costs. Hence the breakeven point calculated was 
effectively a cash flow break even point.
13. Risk and Uncertainty
As mentioned in section 7.3 above, some limited diversification was typically found, and this has 
helped smooth out earnings to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the preponderance of activities was still 
typically shipping or marine related. Within shipping, risk was usually reduced by careful fleet 
balancing and/or the use of advanced, handy sized vessels of considerable flexibility. It should perhaps 
be noted that such a policy may give a relative advantage and not an absolute advantage, with very 
considerable risk remaining in the sector.
No formalised or analytical models for dealing with risk were found.
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category 1 companies. Some diversification existed, but it  was of relatively limited importance. Even 
within shipping a certain amount of specialisation was common and a very clear view usually existed of 
the type of trade within which the company wished to be involved. This provided a set of constraints 
which significantly limited the companies' range of action. In many cases decisions were largely forced 
on a company because of some prior strategic commitment to the industry or some section thereof. It 
Is perhaps worth noting that these commitments were not always consciously arrived at. but were the 
result of tradition or instinct. Considerable concern existed with regard to corporate reputation 
through such things as good customer relations, efficiently run vessels, etc. This of course Is 
influenced by the factors referred to above.
In the past there has been a tendency to invest on a long term basis, with relatively little  regard 
for ship values and speculative profits in ships. This process is beginning to change, though some 
resistance s till exists. The move is one of necessity rather than choice.
Companies in this category, recognising that they needed some advantage in order to be able to 
compete effectively, generally aimed to have ships which were the most efficient and technologically 
advanced of their type. Considerable emphasis was thus placed on obtaining the right ship (or ships) to 
provide a competitive advantage, but where, if  the going gets tough the “ asset is  always 
substantia lly capable o f being sold to  pay o fr debt * Market conditions in recent years have 
made this more difficult to achieve, but the overall philosophy remains.
Given their exposure to the markets, one of the most important considerations in investment 
decisions was the preservation of flexibility. This was typically reflected in the careful balancing of 
the fleet, in terms of size and type, or in the acquisition of handy sized, general purpose ships.
Taxation planning was an extremely Important factor in the investment decision. Dividend 
patterns, while different from one company to the next, displayed considerable consistency over time, 
and were generally a consideration in considering investment decisions.
1A  Strategic Planning and Individual Project Appraisal
Individual project appraisal clearly took place in the context of the philosophical and strategic 
issues raised above, although calculations were then typically made which relate specifically to the 
project itself. In making investment decisions considerable attention was normally given to world
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seemed to be reflected in an implicit growth objective. Growth was seen as being capable of 
achievement in one (or combinations) of three ways:
(i) growth in the number of ships
(ii) larger ships
(iii) growth through an improvement in the quality of the tonnage.
Share price maximisation was not seen as a relevant objective, since the shares themselves 
were not traded on any stock exchange. Some kind of implicit wealth maximisation appeared to be more 
important, but such an objective was seen as a long term objective, and there was not the same concern 
with regular earnings that was seen with category I .
On a number of occasions decisions appear to have been made on completely non-economic 
grounds, with sentimentality being an often quoted reason.
JL2 Philosophies and Strategies
In considering the types of activities in which this category of company are involved it  is well to 
remember that certain areas of shipping are largely closed to them, notably the liner trades and high 
technology trades. The majority of owners in this category are thus forced back to short term 
charters, tramping and the spot market, principally in dry cargo which means that they are subject to 
the vaguaries of that market. The opportunity for high, regular profits is unlikely to exist, hence the 
preoccupation with ships as commodities. This point has certain implications for investment decisions, 
in that the ships that are acquired are generally those which have a wide variety of uses, and which 
would thus appeal to a similarly wide variety of potential customers if  the market were right. A 
limited amount of diversification was seen as desirable, but this tended to be confined to areas within 
shipping, or to similar capital intensive investments, such as real estate.
The growth objectives referred to in section 82  were generally achieved in two ways.
(i) By selling and buying ships at opportune times.
(ii) By ensuring that revenues are adequate to cover operating costs and repayments of any loans and 
associated interest, such that at the end of a certain number of years the vessel is owned, and has a 
certain value.
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&A Strategic. Rlanning. and Individual Project Appraisal
Given the findings of 8.3 it  was not surprising to find that there was little  emphasis placed on 
regular profits and therefore on regular financial statements. The concern was with:
(i) the overall value of the fleet, and
(ii) cash flows
Also, since many fleets are operated by a series of single ship companies, owned and controlled 
by individuals/families/small groups of shareholders, projects bended to be analysed individually, with 
the owners taking an overall view of their cash flows. Companies in this category typically did not 
operate a detailed planning system, mainly because their response needs to be opportunistic. Formal 
sections for collecting and analysing economic data were rare, but most owners had long experience of 
the industry, and fe lt confident of their ability to read the market. Accounting records were of varying 
degrees of sophistication, and were certainly seldom used as regular control mechanisms, which again 
has the effect of focusing attention on wealth (through overall asset values) and cash flow.
The overall effect of the above considerations is to put the emphasis on ensuring that purchases 
and sales are made at the right time, namely purchasing at or near the bottom of the market, and selling 
at or near the top. This emphasis on buying and selling at the right time does mean that owners need to 
spend a lot of time studying the market, and a lot of effort clearly goes into this area. Particular 
attention seems to be paid to analysis of current capacity and order books, with a view to picking out 
areas of under tonnaging. Owners typically had a very good knowledge of freight rates, so were in a 
position to estimate these for at least some time ahead.
Cash considerations were extremely important in making investment decisions. All companies in 
this category placed great emphasis on ensuring that cash outflows associated with a ship acquisition 
did not place a great strain on the business in cash flow terms. Great care was taken to ensure that the 
companies did not go beyond their means, and most companies wanted to be in a position to repay loans 
out of their own assets. (Note that the above comments relate to family groups of companies. Many 
6reek companies are single ship companies, so some sort of informal balancing process would probably 
be carried out.)
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&5 Risk and Uncertainty
It is somewhat strange that, within the industry, this category is regarded as entrepreneurial or 
risk taking, since risks were kept to a minimum. Basically risk was reduced by the acquisition of 
general purpose ships, preferably with good scrap values, at times when the market is low. and unlikely 
to get much lower. Debt was kept to a level which was low enough to prevent any major cash flow 
problems. Currency risk was avoided where possible.
8.6 Financing and Capital Structure
In general the investment and financing decisions were perceived as being related.
Few owners in this category were buying new vessels, so subsidised credit was not typically 
available. This meant that companies looked at the amounts they were borrowing extremely carefully. 
The companies in this category said that they would not necessarily borrow the maximum amount 
available, and 508 was a typical maximum. In general companies would borrow a higher proportion 
when the market was low. and all were very careful when the market was high, though not many 
vessels were acquired in such markets. Very great emphasis was placed on the cash commitments 
implied by the use of loan finance, and typically no loan would be taken out which posed any problems of 
long berm survival for the company. Unencumbered vessels could be traded at low rates for fa irly long 
periods, whereas this is unlikely to be true for vessels with large debt. Such a policy enables vessels 
to be operated, even in bad times, without making a loss. Then when the market turns up, high profits 
can be made, often in the form of capital gains.
Leasing of vessels was not generally favoured by companies in this category, since it reduced the 
flexibility the company had with regard to vessel disposal.
9. Im p lic a tio n s  o f the P ilo t  S tu d y /S tru c tu re  o f Main Study
The pilot study indicates fa irly clearly that investment and financing decisions take a form 
somewhat different to that implied by finance theory. The main points arising from the pilot study may 
be summarised as follows:
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(i) Behaviour patterns varied quite considerably, depending upon the size and nature of the 
companies concerned.
(ii) Strategic considerations were of undoubted importance.
(iii) A variety of philosophies and strategies were identified, which appeared to be important in 
reaching decisions. (These had many similarities with Brunnson’s 'ideologies" -  see page 112)
(iv) A range of background environmental, market and financial information was collected, sometimes 
as part of a formal planning system, sometimes informally. The decision making process was seen as 
being spread over some considerable time.
(v) Formal evaluation techniques represented only a small part of the process, and were used 
inconsistently. Difficulties of forecasting were a commonly cited reason for this.
(vi) Liquidity considerations were given particular attention, and the financial accounting framework 
was useful in putting plans into an overall or corporate context. An assessment of the impact of 
projects on corporate figures was often important. Target capital structures were not seen as 
important, but analyses of debt service ability were common.
As has already been pointed out in the chapter on research methodology, the effect of the pilot 
study was to change the emphasis of the main study. While the same range of questions on finance 
theory could be retained, a number of additional questions and changes in emphasis were needed, so as 
to deal more adequately with the points referred to above. It was fe lt to be particularly important to 
incorporate more specific questioning on corporate planning and its relationship with the investment and 
financing decision. Additional areas of questioning were thus included, as follows :
(i) whether a system of corporate planning existed, and if  so. the period for which plans were made.
(ii) the nature of the planning and review process
(iii) whether a system of annual budgeting existed, and the links between the planning system, the 
budgeting system, and specific capital project approval.
Greater emphasis was also subsequently placed on the following areas of questioning :
(i) the identification of the strategic issues facing a company, together with any underlying 
philosophies which might influence the choice of strategy.
(ii) the range and importance of the background information used in the decision making process, and 
whether this was set in a corporate planning context.
The extended range of questions (set out in appendix I) could then be applied to the three basic
categories identified in the pilot study, so as to enable a more rigorous set of models of behaviour to be 
built up. This is the purpose of the next three chapters, which w ill test, extend and develop the three 
basic models outlined above. The similarities and differences in attitudes and emphasis identified within 
the pilot study w ill be examined in more detail within these detailed chapters. For consistency, the 
same broad headings w ill be used for all three categories, namely:
(i) objectives
(ii) philosophies and strategies
(iii) corporate planning
(iv) project appraisal
(v) risk in investment decisions
(vi) financing aspects of investment decisions
A consistent approach of this type permits the development of a comparative analysis of behaviour 
patterns, which is found in chapter 11. This in turn provides an empirical base for assessing the 
practical relevance of the theory of finance, for identifying areas of overlap and linkage between 
finance and corporate planning and strategy, and for developing a descriptive model of investment and 
financing decisions in shipping.
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8.5 Risk and Uncertainly
It is somewhat strange that, within the industry, this category is regarded as entrepreneurial or 
risk taking, since risks were kept to a minimum. Basically risk was reduced by the acquisition of 
general purpose ships, preferably with good scrap values, at times when the market is low. and unlikely 
to get much lower. Debt was kept to a level which was low enough to prevent any major cash flow 
problems. Currency risk was avoided where possible.
8.6 Financing and Capital Structure
In general the investment and financing decisions were perceived as being related.
Few owners in this category were buying new vessels, so subsidised credit was not typically 
available. This meant that companies looked at the amounts they were borrowing extremely carefully. 
The companies in this category said that they would not necessarily borrow the maximum amount 
available, and 50X was a typical maximum. In general companies would borrow a higher proportion 
when the market was low. and all were very careful when the market was high, though not many 
vessels were acquired in such markets. Very great emphasis was placed on the cash commitments 
implied by the use of loan finance, and typically no loan would be taken out which posed any problems of 
long term survival for the company. Unencumbered vessels could be traded at low rates for fa irly long 
periods, whereas this is unlikely to be true for vessels with large debt. Such a policy enables vessels 
to be operated, even in bad times, without making a loss. Then when the market turns up. high profits 
can be made, often in the form of capital gains.
Leasing of vessels was not generally favoured by companies in this category, since it reduced the 
flexibility the company had with regard to vessel disposal.
Q. Im p lic a tio n s  o f the  P ilo t  S tu d y /S tru c tu re  o f Main Study
The pilot study indicates fa irly clearly that investment and financing decisions take a form 
somewhat different to that implied by finance theory. The main points arising from the pilot study may 
be summarised as follows:
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(i) Behaviour patterns varied quite considerably, depending upon the size and nature of the 
companies concerned.
(ii) Strategic considerations were of undoubted importance.
(iii) A variety of philosophies and strategies were identified, which appeared to be important in 
reaching decisions. (These had many similarities with Brunnson’s 'ideologies" -  see page 112)
(iv) A range of background environmental, market and financial information was collected, sometimes 
as part of a formal planning system, sometimes informally. The decision making process was seen as 
being spread over some considerable Ume.
(v) Formal evaluation techniques represented only a small part of the process, and were used 
inconsistently. Difficulties of forecasting were a commonly cited reason for this.
(vi) Liquidity considerations were given particular attention, and the financial accounting framework 
was useful in putting plans into an overall or corporate context. An assessment of the impact of 
projects on corporate figures was often important. Target capital structures were not seen as 
important, but analyses of debt service ability were common.
As has already been pointed out in the chapter on research methodology, the effect of the pilot 
study was to change the emphasis of the main study. While the same range of questions on finance
theory could be retained, a number of additional questions and changes in emphasis were needed, so as 
to deal more adequately with the points referred to above. It was fe lt to be particularly important to 
incorporate more specific questioning on corporate planning and its relationship with the investment and 
financing decision. Additional areas of questioning were thus included, as follows :
(i) whether a system of corporate planning existed, and if  so. the period for which plans were made.
(ii) the nature of the planning and review process
(iii) whether a system of annual budgeting existed, and the links between the planning system, the 
budgeting system, and specific capital project approval.
Greater emphasis was also subsequently placed on the following areas of questioning :
(i) the identification of the strategic issues facing a company, together with any underlying 
philosophies which might influence the choice of strategy.
(ii) the range and importance of the background information used in the decision making process, and 
whether this was set in a corporate planning context.
The extended range of questions (set out in appendix 1) could then be applied to the three basic
categories identified in the pilot study, so as to enable a more rigorous set of models of behaviour to be 
built up. This is the purpose of the next three chapters, which w ill test, extend and develop the three 
basic models outlined above. The similarities and differences in attitudes and emphasis identified within 
the pilot study w ill be examined in more detail within these detailed chapters. For consistency, the 
same broad headings w ill be used for all three categories, namely:
(i) objectives
(ii) philosophies and strategies
(iii) corporate planning
(iv) project appraisal
(v) risk in investment decisions
(vi) financing aspects of investment decisions
A consistent approach of this type permits the development of a comparative analysis of behaviour 
patterns, which is found in chapter 11. This in turn provides an empirical base for assessing the 
practical relevance of the theory of finance, for identifying areas of overlap and linkage between 
finance and corporate planning and strategy, and for developing a descriptive model of investment and 
financing decisions in shipping.
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Chapter 8
Category 1 Companies 
Large Public Companies
L  Aims and Objectives
1.1 Introduction and overall findings on objectives
As was pointed out in Chapter 3. finance theory is based upon objectives of share price 
maximisation. The research m this thesis enables an assessment to be made of the relevance and/or 
necessity of such an objective in the case of public companies in. or with interests m. the shipping 
industry. Further, it  helps in the identification of alternative objectives, goals, philosophies and 
strategies. These w ill be discussed later in this section. This chapter is based upon a sample of 19 
companies, of which 17 were large public companies, and two were large private companies acting in 
most respects as if  they were public companies. The firs t point that needs to be made is that in fact 
identifying goals and objectives was not easy. Even where specific questions were asked, answers 
were seldom clear cut and unambiguous. What did soon become dear was that very few companies 
included in this sample had spedfic objectives set out in any formalised way. Careful examination of 
published reports indicated that while discussion of strategies was common, based upon implicit (and 
sometimes changing) objectives, the formal setting out of written objectives was almost non-existent. 
It therefore needs to be recognised that the conclusions and comments made in this section are almost 
entirely based upon discussions with senior executives, and not on written statements. Even where 
such statements exist, they tend to be very genera), as indicated by the following:
'Some corporations are run fo r the management, some fo r the stockholders, and
some fo r the public. We try  to run Ogden fo r the stockholders and view dividends as
ren t which must be paid. We see dividends as more im portant to stockholders a t th is
tim e than m inor changes in  pre-share earnings and we view the continuation o f our
dividend as our most serious obligation. ’  (Ogden Corporation -  1982 Annual Report -  P3)
The conclusions reached are also based upon a comparison of broad comments on objectives and goals.
with actual strategies implemented, since these provided the best supporting evidence in determining
objectives. Hence this section on aims and objectives needs to be read in close conjunction with that on
philosophies and strategies.
In considering the overall aims and objectives of companies in this category, and particularly in
relating these aims and objectives to philosophies and strategies, it  was sometimes found useful to
distinguish between three sub-categories of company.
(i) Oil majors
(ii) Conglomerates
(iii) Companies with the bulk of their activities in shipping or marine related activities 
Where appropriate, attention w ill be drawn to distinctions between these three in later sections.
No particularly clear picture emerged with regard to objectives from the discussions held. In
three cases the main reason for the lack of clarity was principally attributable to the fact that 
discussions were held with senior staff of subsidiary shipping companies, rather than with Head Office 
staff. Even if  clear objectives did exist centrally, they certainly were not communicated to 
subsidiaries. In the remaining companies a variety of ideas were put forward, sometimes interrelated, 
sometimes not. In the main, objectives could be related to the following general areas.
(i) share price and related issues
(ii) profitability and return on capital
(iii) dividends
(iv) other areas
These are dealt with in more detail below. Overall, the objectives to do with profitability, 
particularly return on capital, appeared to be the most important, with share price concerns, as 
opposed to share price maximisation, being an important feature in a number of cases. In some cases 
growth was identified as an important objective. Some implicit views on dividend policy were obtained.
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_L2 Share Price Maximisation/Public Company Responsibilities
Probably the firs t dear factor that emerged was that few companies in any of the sub-categories 
saw maximisation of share price per se as either an appropriate overall objective or an operational one. 
In response to a question on the extent to which share price maximisation was a specific objective, 
answers tended to be anything but specific. Only five companies emphasised the importance of share 
price maximisation. Another three companies, while accepting that share price maximisation might be 
an appropriate theoretical objective, did not see it as an operational objective. Eight companies 
attached little  importance to it. and it  was not a significant consideration in the decision process for 
these companies. (Two of these eight companies were in fact large private companies, which behaved in 
most respects like a large public company, but which dearly did not regard share price maximisation as 
appropriate) In three cases no dear picture was obtained, since interviews took place in subsidiary 
shipping companies. In at least one of these cases some share price "concerns’  existed, although their 
exact nature was not communicated to the subsidiary, as is evidenced by the following observation.
"There is  obviously known to  be eiways great concern as to  the le ve l o f the 
share price , and i ’m sure i t  is  im p lic it that there is  an attem pt to  maximise it, but 
which comes fir s t I'm .no t sure. "
As has already been pointed out. only five of the companies included in this category said that 
they were concerned with share price per se. In some of these cases decisions made and subsequent 
discussions held were supportive of this claim, but more typically there were other factors which 
might have influenced these decisions, rather than share price alone. Separation of such influences is 
almost impossible. For example, in one of the five companies the shipping activities were disposed of. 
This disposal was explained partly on the grounds of share price considerations (i.e. the volatility of 
shipping earnings when compared with earnings elsewhere in the group), and partly on the grounds of 
incompatability of interest (parent company management simply did not understand, and therefore were 
not comfortable with, the shipping industry). Which of these two aspects was the more crucial was 
unclear. Indeed the decision appears to be one reached by weighing, intuitively, several criteria.
In two of the remaining four cases similar arguments were put forward, and spin-offs resulted. 
Again the arguments with regard to share price and compatability were put forward. However, in both 
cases, while spin-offs resulted, there is little  doubt that the mechanics of the capital budgeting process 
were not consistent with an overall approach aimed at share price maximisation. In each of these two
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cases investment decisions were initiated in the subsidiary shipping companies, and no formal targets 
(e.g. ROI or similar) were set by the parent. In the fourth case referred to above, share price concerns 
were attributable to the fact that the company was seen as a growth company, and expansion was 
frequently financed using company paper. A good share price was seen as making such issues much 
easier and more effective. In the fifth  company which indicated that share price maximisation was an 
objective, subsequent discussion made it  clear that it  was not an operational objective, since all 
decisions were viewed from two standpoints, namely the impact on earnings, and the impact on cash 
flow.
It should be recognised that none of the above comments are intended to imply that other 
companies in the study ignored share price, but that its relevance was variable, and that it  was not 
seen as a particularly useful objective in an operational sense. It has already been pointed out that 
three other companies did express some concern with share price, and many executives could see its 
virtue as a theoretical goal. However, in practice goals were generally related to earnings levels or 
return on shareholders equity, since such goals were more tangible, and could be made operational. 
Doubts were expressed about the stock markets and the way in which company performance would be 
translated into an effect on share price. Six companies (three of the five already mentioned, plus three 
more) therefore fe lt that the best way of dealing with the problem was to concentrate on business 
which gave the prospect of an appropriate rate of return, or level of earnings. For example:
“We have a view that we would like  to be earning p ro fits  a t a ieve i which would 
therefore re su lt in  the share price  being a t a leve l which, i f  we wish to  a t a 
pa rticu la r moment in  tim e, would enable us to go to the m arket to ra ise more 
equity. '
Concentration on profitability, even if  not leading to share price maximisation, appears to be considered 
likely to lead to reasonable share prices.
Another factor of potential importance in the share price "concern", was dividend policy. 
Dividend policy was not always, or even usually, made explicit. However, in the cases studied, there 
were very few instances in which dividends per share were reduced, even in times of volatile or 
declining earnings, suggesting implicit concerns. These are dealt with in more detail in section 1 A.
Other factors, such as capital structure, quality of earnings, diversification, etc., were also 
seen as having some implicit bearing on share price. In certain of the larger companies sheer size 
tended to prevent anything other than simply a general concern about share price. In the majority of
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such companies investment initiatives came from the subsidiary companies or from divisions. In most 
cases these decisions had to be approved by the main Board. However, in many such cases this 
appeared to be in the form of rubber stamping. A number of examples were found where senior staff of 
subsidiary shipping companies were unaware of any specific objectives or strategies being held or 
implemented by parent company management, which suggests no overriding concerns with share price. 
Even had such concerns existed, non communication would have made achievement of such an objective 
difficult.
A small number of companies in the survey had considerable growth aspirations, which in turn 
often meant that their stocks were seen as “growth stocks*. These companies generally spent a 
considerable time on cultivating relationships with the financial markets and with existing shareholders. 
This is not quite the same as attempting to maximise share price, although some connection clearly 
exists. In general it  may be said that concern with share price appeared to vary somewhat with the 
potential need for further equity issues. While some of the concerns in this area were of the traditional 
type, there were a number of cases where a good share price was seen as a way of preserving 
flexibility, since company shares could then be used very effectively in takeover situations. In passing, 
it  should be noted that a good share price was also seen as a defence against takeovers.
A further related point which arose was that in a small number of cases reference was made to 
the nature of the ownership of shares in the company. Several instances were cited where shares were 
substantially owned by institutions. In such cases attention was frequently paid to the maintenance of 
good shareholder relations, with comments being made such as:
They are very concerned w ith th e ir a b ility  to market equity in  the US market, 
and they spend a lo t o f tim e on shareholders relations, which, in  our case. ... 
involves a lo t o f pension funds, banks, etc. (We’re  very much in s titu tio n a lly  owned.) 
They have a io t o f analysts meetings, that type o f thing. I'm  not saying they're  
concerned crassly w ith share price, but they 're concerned w ith the re lations w ith 
the equity m arke t."
Unfortunately, the questioning did not systematically address the issue of the ownership of shares, so it 
is difficult to ascertain the extent to which institutional ownership existed in the companies included in 
the study. However, where institutional ownership was identified in the discussions, the maintenance 
of good shareholder and financial market relationships was seen as important. This is not necessarily 
the same as concern with share price per se. Indeed, the cultivation of good shareholder relationships 
was seen in a small number of cases as implicitly substituting for share price concerns, since it
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facilitated far better communication between the owners and the company.
Another aspect of the nature of share ownership concerns those companies which, even though 
publicly traded, were so closely held that share price was not seen as very important. In one such case 
the idea of share price maximisation had 'zero tearing on decisions". The reasons for this
appeared to relate to two factors:
(I) very little  trading in shares occurred, making share price a less effective indicator than in more
widely held companies.
(ii) probably more importantly, the fact that owners were, or could be. as involved in the 
management of the business as they wished to be. and could effectively control its future direction as 
managers.
Under such circumstances share price concerns have little  relevance. It needs to be recognised, 
however, at the opposite end of the spectrum, that large and diverse public ownership did not 
necessarily lead to great concern about share price. Concerns existed, but these were seldom of 
overriding importance. In practice, these concerns translated into certain philosophies and strategies, 
which are dealt with later.
Before leaving this section it  is worth noting that the cultivation of the financial markets or 
institutional investors was a feature which arose in a number of companies, irrespective of the nature 
of the share ownership. Indeed, this was particularly important for companies with substantial 
interests in shipping, since further finance was likely to come from this area. In most cases however, 
the process was very broadly based, mainly consisting of the maintenance of good contacts and the 
holding of fa irly regular meetings with bankers and brokers.
Some kind of profitability objectives appeared to be implicit ( if not explicit) in almost all of the 
companies in this category, with particular emphasis being placed on quality of earnings, a point which 
w ill be returned to in the section on philosophies and strategies. As with the questions on share price 
maximisation, however, the precise nature and importance of the profitability objectives was unclear. 
In ten cases discussions led to the identification of some kind of return on capital objective, while in the 
remaining cases concerns were much more general. In two cases the discussions did not reveal very
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much about corporate wide profitability objectives. One of these companies was very closely held, 
while in the other the discussions took place within the shipping subsidiary.
Attitudes towards return on capital also varied considerably. Seven of the ten companies which 
had identified return on capital objectives appeared to set formal ROC targets, and these were given 
high priority. The firs t such company regarded return on shareholders investment as the highest 
priority, and looked for a return of the order of about 25% per annum. A second company set a target 
return on ordinary shareholders funds, which was then converted into a profit target. In fact these 
profit targets were 1averages " . because of the cyclical nature of shipping, but they should always be 
within certain limits of the target. This company had no set dividend policy, and regarded return on 
ordinary shareholders funds as the "best o b je c t iv e A third company adopted a similar view, 
setting return on capital targets, yet allowing some averaging. Interestingly, this company pointed out 
that targets would not change as conditions changed, reflecting the importance of the achievement of 
adequate returns, irrespective of industry conditions. Only one company set targets on a current cost 
basis, with a required ROC of 8% on a CCA basis. In one company financial targets were set by the 
subsidiary, so they could (and did) reflect prevailing market conditions in that industry. Nevertheless, 
these targets had to be approved by the parent, since a certain range of return on investment was 
considered minimally acceptable. In two companies, while it  was made clear that formal profit and 
growth objectives were set. no details of the precise targets set were obtained.
Three companies appeared to have implicit ideas on return on capital, but had reservations about 
the advantages of following through their ideas into the setting of formal targets. In one of these cases 
the main reservations related to the behavioural problems associated with the setting of specific target 
figures for the next four or five years, since it  was perceived that budgets and forecasts would be 
prepared which fitted with the target set. however unrealistic that target might be. In the second case 
the company simply aimed for the highest profits it  could, rather than set precise targets. This 
reflected current difficulties in the industry, and the problems of forecasting associated with them. 
Nevertheless, a reasonable return on investment was looked for. In the third case no mandated levels 
of profitability were set out. but it  was dear that each profit centre was to remain profitable.
In the remaining companies concerns with profitability were much more general in nature, and 
less emphasis was placed on target setting and return on capital per se. This should not be taken to 
imply less concern with profitability as an objective, but rather with the precise quantification of
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earnings objectives or targets, in most of these companies subsequent discussions indicated that 
earnings quality was fa irly high, and rapid growth had occurred in at least two companies, funded in 
large measure by retentions. Two of the companies which did not set targets were engaged 
predominantly in shipping activities, and the current uncertainties of that particular market appeared to 
be a significant factor. In one of these companies profitability objectives translated into a short-term 
objective of not actually losing money. One company placed great emphasis on the profile of profits, 
and looked for profits on new projects *from  day / '  In one company, part of the strategic plan 
involved the shipping subsidiary being given the remit of turning losses into profits so that it could be 
sold.
Overall, there is little  doubt that profitability objectives were of considerable importance, 
whether explicit or implicit. Particularly interesting was the emphasis on return on capital referred to 
earlier. This was identified as important in virtually all of the diversified conglomerates. Indeed, 
reference to the later section on philosophies and strategies w ill make it  clear that high quality 
earnings, which by definition w ill provide both regular and reasonable returns on capital, are an 
important part of corporate objectives for category 1 companies. In general, although some exceptions 
existed, return on capital, at least in terms of formalised targets, appeared to be less important in 
those companies in which most activities were shipping oriented. This is probably due to the volatility 
of the Industry at the time of the study, and the difficulties of achieving reasonable returns, especially 
on a regular basis.
LA Dividends
Very few cases were found in which dividends were perceived to be a significant objective or 
decision variable, with only six companies making positive statements concerning dividend policy. Of 
these two had a policy of paying low or no dividends, while the other four had policies covering the 
payment of dividends. In two of these the policies were substantially influenced by the structure of the 
group and the nature of the ownership. In a third case dividends were viewed as a kind of economic 
rent. The fourth company discussed its approach as follows:
"We do have a dividend po licy . ... but o f course. a t the end o f the day the Board 
decides on the dividend i t  believes i t  can maintain in  the lig h t o f the circumstances a t 
the timeM and what they foresee."
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A detailed analysis of actual dividends and earnings for category 1 companies in fact suggests a 
more positive approach to dividend policy than might be obtained from the discussions held. Figures for 
earnings per share and dividends per share are given in Table 5 for 14 of the category 1 companies. 
Twenty four cases of reductions in earnings can be seen. Compared with this only two instances of a 
reduction in dividends occurred. Such a set of results would certainly suggest that category 1 
companies do not wish to pay dividends at a rate which cannot be at least maintained in the future.
Earnings per sh are / Dividends per share
V
Company /currency 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
EPS DPS EPS DPS EPS DPS EPS DPS EPS DPS
Alcoa $ 4.45 .95 7.15 1.30 6 54 1.60 3.97 1.80 .11 | l  65 |
Exxon $ 3.10 1.65 4.87 1.95 6.15 2.70 5.58 3.00 4.82 3.00
Moore McCormack $ 3.90 .65 4.73 .727 5.50 .827 6.01 .933 .78 1.02
Ogden $ 20.52 1.03 22.64 1.27 24.82 1.40 27.01 1.70 28.31 1.80
OSG $ 2.11 .169 2.56 .220 3.06 .305 3.43 .416 2.35 .50
Sea Containers $ 3.48 .36 3.68 .42 4.62 .42 4.38 .42 3.83 .42
Reynolds $ 4.29 1.79 5.05 1.95 6.12 2.18 7.03 2.50 7.82 2.85
Texaco $ 3.14 2.0 6.48 2.12 9.79 2.45 8.75 2.80 4.92 3.00
Booker McConnell £ 13.7 2.0 15.5 3.1 9.5 3.1 10.2 3.5 10.0 3.8
Burmah £ 4.71 - 29.92 6.5 19.51 6.5 23.75 8.5 18.3 9.0
Ocean £ (2 J ). 8.3 13.9 8.9 23.5 9.0 13.8 9.0 & 2 ).
P & O  £
(dividends in to ta l)
5^2 9.2 17.6 9.9 20.9 11.3 21.0 14.2 14.0 14.2
Powell Duffryn £ 41.8 10.0 29.9 11.0 39.9 13.25 36.8 14.25 31.8 14.25
Trafalgar House £ 16.1 3.84 11.4 461 12.7 5.35 20.4 6.2 20.6 7.20
A
Table S Relationship between earnings and dividends -  category 1 companies
Dividends could thus be perceived as being a significant constraint, rather than as an objective. Such a 
view is re-inforced by the fact that the proportion of earnings paid out as dividends is generally low, 
with relatively few instances being found of dividend payout ratios in excess of 50%, and 11 of the 14 
companies having average payout ratios of 35% or less. Ratios of this order are relatively 
conservative, and are unlikely to pose problems of maintenance for most companies. This may explain 
the apparent lack of concern in the discussions with dividend policy.
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U i Other. Objectives
The only other objective specified by more than two companies was one related to growth. Six 
of the companies explicitly stated that they had some kind of growth objective, although often the 
extent of desired growth was unclear. For example:
7 can't quota you a percentage number and say. we want shareholders funds to 
grow  by 20X o r something ... i t  wouid be a nonsensical objective. But yes. we want 
shareholders funds to  grow. Obviously as a general objective, we have an objective 
to  make a given re tu rn  on shareholders funds, p a rt o f that w ill be retained in  the 
business to make i t  grow. ’
The figures set out in the previous section on dividends also indicate that considerable retentions 
are to be found in category 1 companies. Such figures w ill typically lead to substantial growth over 
time, suggesting the possibility of implicit growth objectives in many of the remaining companies. This 
is reinforced by the fact that few category 1 companies had any significant limitations with regard to 
raising funds in the financial markets.
The only other objectives specifically identified related to market shares (two companies in the 
liner trades), and survival.
1 £  Conclusion on Objectives
In discussions on objectives clear distinctions were sometimes drawn between long term 
objectives of a somewhat abstract nature, and short term objectives required by necessity. This 
distinction was most frequently drawn by companies with considerable interests in shipping. Well 
diversified companies, or those in stable industries, seldom made such a distinction. Clearly the impact 
of the current recession in shipping was having an effect. This section needs to be considered further in 
the li^ it  of the philosophies and strategies used to provide a framework for decisions, since volatile 
markets such as shipping appear to require (or cause) a different approach. In such markets, while 
broad objectives may be set. their operational value is almost nil. In practice it  would appear that the 
more volatile the industry the less likely it  is that management w ill devote much time to objectives.
Indeed, in considering both published material and the discussions on objectives, it  became clear 
that there were very few cases where objectives were formally thought through, let alone written 
down. Managers seemed to act with some sort of general view along the lines that they would do the 
best they could in the way of business. Goals related to return on investment or earnings levels are
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practical ways of implementing such goals. General goals or objectives of this type are extremely 
environment oriented, and permit a very flexible approach, including the recognition of survival as an 
appropriate goal under certain conditions.
On the basis of the above findings it  seems clear that share price maximisation cannot be viewed 
as providing a clear or workable objective for management. Concern with share price is real, but in this 
study there were few examples of share price considerations seriously affecting a decision. The 
figures on dividend policy suggest that dividends are seen as either one of several objectives, or as a 
market constraint. Differentiating long and short run objectives poses problems, as does volatility of 
earnings in shipping related companies. Probably most significant is the fact that management seems 
able to make decisions without any clearly defined overall objective, but with only some vague earnings 
oriented implicit objective in the background. Having said this, the next section on philosophies and 
strategies should make it  clear that implicit objectives may be no less influential than explicit 
objectives.
In passing, it  is perhaps worth referring to the work of Quinn (1977). He has provided a logical 
set of reasons why management does not set clear, explicit, formalised objectives, or follow 
traditional corporate planning theory particularly closely. The above comments go some way to 
explaining the non-identification and quantification of goals or objectives in the context of the shipping 
industry. This thesis concentrates more on financial aspects of decision making than on behavioural 
aspects, so many of the arguments proposed by Quinn cannot be tested formally. However, many of the 
arguments he puts forward appear extremely plausible, and further empirical testing seems likely to 
support many of his observations, at least as far as the shipping industry is concerned. In the context 
of this study, there is no doubt that Quinn is right about management not announcing goals. The main 
reasons appear to be related to the volatility of the shipping industry, forecasting difficulties, and 
confidentiality with regard to decisions.
One final point needs to be made concerning objectives, although it  was a point discussed in only a 
small number of interviews. The importance of the personalities of chief executives and other top 
managers, and particularly of changes therein, was seen as being very significant in at least three 
companies. Again, too much should not be made of this, but in the few cases where such changes 
occurred, some changes in objectives and philosophy certainly occurred.
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2* Philosophies and..Strategies
Z l introduction and.ovecalL findings
In the discussion of underlying philosophies and strategies adopted by category 1 companies, a 
number of ideas stood out fa irly  clearly.
(i) Category 1 companies were extremely concerned about the quality of their earnings, and most 
fe lt that, as public companies, they should only engage in business with high quality earnings.
(ii) Concern with quality of earnings had led to clear views emerging on the areas of business within 
which category 1 companies should operate, and on diversification, in most cases considerable 
emphasis was placed on areas of business which could be protected in some way, and on a positive 
approach to diversification. Some differences in the approach to diversification were found, in terms of 
the range and type of activities undertaken.
(iii) Most acquisitions were intended to be long term, rather than speculative, with very little  trade 
in ships (or other fixed assets) occurring. Apart from the bulk trades (and few public companies were 
involved substantially in this sector) most investments were made in fleet terms.
(v) Considerable emphasis was placed on the desire to preserve flexibility of action, and the ability 





(d) financial strength and flexibility
These ideas are particularly interesting, and suggest that decision makers in category 1 companies are 
very concerned to keep their options open, and to be able to absorb shocks and respond to opportunities 
with relative ease, rather than to be unduly concerned with optimising policies in the normal sense.
In addition a number of other ideas were raised by a smaller number of companies covering such 
things as the preservation of market shares, being the lowest cost supplier etc .
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7 7  Philosophies w ith  regard tn earnings
As was pointed out in Chapter 7 the pilot study had suggested that greater emphasis was placed 
on earnings and return on shareholders capital than on ideas of share price maximisation. The 
comments of the last section indicate that such a view holds good for the majority of companies in this 
survey. The pilot study further suggested that companies in this category were generally very 
concerned about the quality or regularity of their earnings. This type of thinking was also found to be 
common in the further studies made.
In a number of cases this philosophy was spelt out in some detail, often to explain differences 
between public and private companies, or to explain the rationale behind a particular choice. In 
particular, reference was made to profits on the purchase and sale of ships, which were becoming an 
increasing part of private company profits. Very few public companies saw this as a legitimate course 
of action for them. In general, public companies had a different philosophy, and were mainly interested 
in a regular stream of earnings. This attitude can be seen in the following two quotations, both from UK 
companies.
"... it's  a difference in  philosophy, a public company cannot take that attitude. 
We are in terested in  earnings, a regular stream  o f earnings . and, i f  you take it  to  its  
absolute maximum iim it. you could argue that a public company should not be in  tramp 
shipping a t a ll, because i t  is  a highly volatile, highly speculative m arket. Though 
th is  is  probably taking i t  to extrem es.m
7 think that the priva te  companies in  th is  country w ill tend to  be a litt le  b it 
more entrepreneurial in  s p irit than the public companies, because they do not have to  
answer to the shareholders."
In considering the philosophies underlying certain actions, it  is necessary to differentiate 
conglomerates from companies mainly involved in shipping, or at least in marine related trades. While 
virtually all category 1 companies were very concerned with the quality of their earnings, those which 
were predominantly shipping companies, or which had substantial interests in shipping, were clearly not 
as capable of achieving such high quality earnings as a well diversified conglomerate. Having said this, 
most public companies were still concerned to maintain as high a quality of earnings within shipping as 
was possible. Nevertheless, the differences between shipping and other activities found within the 
conglomerates did sometimes lead to tensions, and certain differences in philosophy were found between 
shipping people and others. For example, one senior manager in a shipping subsidiary expressed his 
frustrations as follows:
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“That is  one o f the problems you fin d  in  the American business. Where 
conglomerates own shipping companies they could not look on the capitaI assets as 
something that had to be traded ju s t as much as the charters had to be traded. We 
had to have the a b ility  to  dispose o f vessels and to buy vessels as quickly and as 
easily as we could do a charter, and American business is  not structured that way ... 
I  sometimes think that other corporate reasons than the pure shipping reasons enter 
in to  those decisions, and they are not always rig h t, and sometimes given undue 
influence. YouVe got a pub lic ly traded US company (which is ) depending on a 
constantly ris in g  leve l o f earnings, fhey do not want to  dispose o f a vessel and take 
a book w rite -o ff. Nor do they want to dispose o f a vessel a t an enormously high 
p ro fit in  a period, and in  the next period not be able to match it. so disposition o f 
assets had been a constant problem. ’
These tensions have been apparent in a number of companies in recent years, with a considerable impact 
being apparent with regard to the areas of business in which companies operate, and the extent to which 
diversification takes place. These are dealt with in the next section.
2Jl Areas of Business/Approaches to Diversification
Concern with regular earnings has in turn led to fa irly specific views on the areas and types of 
business in which a public company should be involved (or perhaps out involved). These views can be 
subdivided to cover three distinct, but related facets.
(i) the relative importance of shipping as part of the activities of category t companies;
(ii) the approach to diversification;
(iii) the type of activities within shipping, which are likely to be concentrated on by category 1 
companies.
Importance of Shinning Activities
It is interesting to note that the concern with regular earnings appears to have resulted in a 
considerable reduction in the proportion of activities of many companies, which could strictly be called 
shipping activities. For example, the proportion of total assets employed taken up by shipping in P & 0 
declined from 80-903? in the early 1970*s. to about 55% in early 1983. In most other companies the 
balance between shipping and other activities has also changed in a similar direction. In one major UK 
group the shipping activities were seen as a 'weakness' because of the volatility of earnings in the 
area. In another the shipping subsidiary was disposed of subsequent to the interview held. In two 
instances in the USA whole shipping subsidiaries had been sold off in recent years. Moore McCormack 
Resources disposed of Moore McCormack Lines to Unites States Lines, while Holiday Inn disposed of 
Delta Lines.
197
An interesting feature found in the American industry, related fairly closely to the above points, 
is the importance of ’spin-offs’ in recent years. Where these have occurred parent companies have 
effectively separated their shipping interests from the rest of their activities, usually by issuing new 
shares in the shipping company in proportion to existing shareholdings. Such spin-offs have occurred in 
at least four cases (Reynolds/Sealand. 6ATX/MTL. Ogden/Ogden Marine. Natomas/APL). Interviews 
were held with companies which were party to three of these. An analysis of these discussions, 
together with press reports and related information, suggests that the reasons for the spin-offs were 
broadly related to the following areas:
(i) Quality of earnings
(ii) Compatability of business interests
(iii) The capital intensity of the shipping industry, and its effect on overall gearing/leverage
Given the increased volatility and uncertainty of the shipping industry, it  is not surprising that 
the quality of earnings from shipping were seen as being lower than those from other existing 
activities. In one of the above cases the lower quality of shipping earnings was seen to have a 
significant effect on P/E ratios.
They are concerned w ith th e ir share price, rhey have been try in g  to  get the 
qua lity o f th e ir share p rice  up. The shipping business has tra d itio n a lly  been a t Tive 
o r s ix  to  one. A company like  ... would like  to s e ll a t nine o r ten to one. The qua lity  
o f earnings is  something they would always like  to convince people o f but you can 
never convince people o f the qua lity o f shipping earnings because they may turn  
around next y e a r.m
In a second case the returns from shipping were compared unfavourably with returns from the base 
business of the group, which were of a very high quality. Clearly in both cases the quality of earnings 
within shipping was not high enough to justify maintenance of the shipping activities as part of a public 
quoted conglomerate. This is consistent with the earlier comments on the reductions in the proportion 
of shipping activities now found in most category 1 companies.
Compatability appears to relate to the idea that a corporate group should comprise areas of 
business which provide some kind of synergy, and/or where the fundamental approach to business is 
broadly similar. Areas of business which are volatile and difficult to predict are thus likely to be 
viewed as being incompatible with more stable areas of business. In one of the spin-offs which 
occurred, attention was drawn to the fundamental differences between the acquisition of vessels for 
use in the volatile bulk markets, and the acquisition of fixed assets for use in other more predictable
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industries, in the latter industries a fa irly clear use could be foreseen for the assets acquired. This
was not the case for the acquisition of ships, as can be seen from the following observation.
7 know o f no vessel where we had the charter before we b u ilt the vessel. J  
know the parent company would love th a t, but i t  Just does not work that w ay." 
(Emphasis added)
Part of the rationale for a second spin-off followed similar lines:
7 think the s p in -o ff is  p rim a rily  non-com patabi/ity w ith the general p o rtfo lio  
o f the parent. This is  an assumption, but i  think i t  was considered compatible.
However as they have changed some o f th e ir overa ll comprehensive objectives, 
transportation fits  less w ell, plus the fa c t that transportation goes through cycles 
and these provide shocks fo r people unfam iliar w ith the transportation business.'
The sheer size of investments needed to maintain an interest in shipping also posed problems.
since inevitably such investments have high opportunity costs, and also have potentially serious
implications for overall gearing levels.
The weighting given to each of the above areas is unclear, and actual decisions appear to reflect a
combination of them. A useful illustration is provided by Schreffler (1984). who conducted an
interview with senior executives of Ogden Corporation on the subject of the Ogden/OMI spin-off. In this
interview the chief reasons for the spin-off of Ofll were identified as follows:
(i) the higher capital demands of the shipping industry, and the lower overall return on equity found 
in the ocean shipping business. It was fe lt that this might impair the ability of the parent to support 
fully its other businesses. The spin-off would thus provide greater flexibility;
(ii) the volatility and Yisk taking" approach associated with shipping, coupled with the fact that the 
shipping activities were not seen as likely to be profitable for several years;
(iii) tax benefits associated with shipping activities could now be obtained from other alternatives, 
which were also likely to give more regular earnings;
(iv) the spin-off was consistent with a decision to implement a long range strategy to emphasise 
service activities which were not debt intensive, capital intensive, or cyclical. The capital needed to 
maintain or expand the shipping activities would conflict with this;
(v) the spin-off improved the long term debt position and the working capital position.
Precisely how much importance was attached to each of these is unclear. Nevertheless, this interview 
is useful in identifying the range of factors deemed important.
Importance of diversification
Concern with regularity of earnings has caused most public companies to diversify. Of the 19
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companies in the sample two were oil majors, twelve were companies or conglomerates with three or 
more substantial areas of activity (or markets), and five were companies with limited diversification 
outside of shipping. (It is interesting to note that since the interviews, one of these five companies 
(OCL) has been taken over (by P & 0). while another (Ocean) has changed its attitude towards shipping, 
and appears to be embarking on a significant diversification strategy.) Three of the last five companies 
had well diversified areas of interest atithin shipping, with only two companies being largely restricted 
to a single area of activity (the liner trades). In almost all the cases where diversification had 
occurred, the diversification process, at least in recent years, has been a fairly positive one, with the 
aim of reducing exposure to one particular sector, and thus reducing the volatility of earnings. For 
example, one such company discussed its approach as follows:
There were deliberate d iversifications which have taken piece, re a lly  in  the 
la s t eight years, the obvious one is  ... , I  suppose ... Now the o rig ina l rationale fo r 
... was that we had large quantities o f tax allowances, and we wanted UK p ro fits , and 
we wanted p ro fits  tha t were counter-cyclical to  shipping p ro fits  ... I t  was a 
positive decision to  search out a company like  th is .'
A similar approach was found in the case of RJ. Reynolds Inc., which was. in the early 1970’s, 
predominantly a tobacco company. An orderly diversification plan was devised which put it  into 
everything from fresh bananas to vodka, and which boosted company sales to $ 13.6 billion in 1982 and 
earnings to a record $870M. The impetus for the diversification programme was provided by 
consideration of the company future under the worst possible scenario for the tobacco industry. A 
series of carefully planned acquisitions followed, with the result that by 1983 tobacco accounted for 
less than 50% of revenues. In 1973 the figure had been in excess of 70%. (Source Los Angeles Times. 
March 6th 1983).
The major diversification decisions were sometimes the result of specific ad hoc investigations, 
and sometimes the result of a regular review of the overall company profile. However, in practice, the 
diversification process appeared to go only so far. In fact very few companies in this category had 
more than five major areas of business, although within these areas further diversification was 
frequently found. Four companies made it  clear that their activities would be confined to areas which 
were marine or transportation related. Two companies expressed views which implied that, having 
gone through the diversification process and found it  uncomfortable and not particularly effective, they 
were now concentrating more on their basic areas of business.
interestingly, differences in attitudes appeared between UK and USA companies. Links between
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various activities seemed generally closer in the USA than the UK. In the majority of cases in the UK 
the various areas of business were often unrelated, and divisions/subsidiaries were run in an 
autonomous way, with very broad central control. In the USA the overall focus of corporate activities 
was generally clearer, and similarities between divisions/subsidiaries could be recognised, and 
synergies sought. For example. R J . Reynolds Industries Inc.. has. to a great extent, realized the goal 
it  set nearly a decade ago. of establishing itself as a premier, worldwide consumer products company. 
Its strategies have been geared to achieving this objective, and its foods and beverages interests have 
been expanded considerably. Its other main interests at the time of the interviews were tobacco, 
transportation and energy. The relationship between tobacco and food and beverages is clear, and the 
transportation subsidiary. Sea-land. has been spun off. leaving a fairly cohesive unit behind. JP. 
Sticht, Reynolds head, has stated that he has a vision of R J . Reynolds products being in every grocery 
basket with items ranging from cigarettes to canned vegetables, a frozen food entree to a bottle of 
California wine. However, Sticht has also said that although a few other acqusitions could not be ruled 
out. it  was now time to consolidate the company's activities.
Moore McCormack Resources is another example of a company with considerable breadth of 
interests, yet which has a clear view of its interests.
'Moore McCormack Resources is  a natural resources company: exploration, 
production and transportation. Our p rim ary m arkets are construction, energy, and 
the stee l industry. ~ (1982 Annual Report)
Clearly companies exist in the UK with similar orientations. e.g. The Burmah Oil Pic., with 
interests in five areas, namely exploration and production of oil and gas, lubricants and fuels, retailing 
(the Halfords Shops), shipping (liquified natural gas. tankers and an oil transhipment terminal), and 
speciality chemicals. However, in other companies the links, while sometimes close, are not always 
quite so readily obvious. For example. Powell Duffryn are involved in engineering, shipping, bulk liquid 
storage, fuel distribution, and construcUon services. A t the time of the interview Booker McConnell 
had eight mam operating businesses (a rather larger number than most) covering engineering; food 
distribution; health products trading; spirits, liquors and international trading; shipping; agriculture; 
authors; and service companies. Interestingly, by 1984 the shipping interests had been sold off, and 
the Annual Report indicated that the spread of activities had been reduced, with concentration now being 
on agribusiness, health products, and food distribution. This was the result of a clear development 
strategy.
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As far as the conglomerates are concerned, it  is probably a mistake to make too much of this 
distinction, which is fa irly marginal. However, where substantial differences between the UK and USA 
now arise is with regard to the large public shipping companies. In the UK there are very few langa 
public companies where the majority of funds are tied up in ships or marine related activities. P & 0 
and Ocean, being the only two at present. Even in these two companies clear evidence exists of positive 
moves towards qreater diversification. In the USA the effect of shipping company subsidiaries being 
sold or spun off is to provide a category of large public shipping companies that has not existed for
some time. Given that concern with the quality of earnings cannot realistically be as great for a
shipping company as for a conglomerate, the future actions of these companies is potentially very 
interesting.
At present it  is too early to judge either market reaction to these 'new' companies, or whether 
a change in status w ill result in a change in philosophy. Initial impressions in discussions suggest that 
the spin-offs are not envisaged to have any significant effect on the type of business carried on. but 
that shareholder concerns, particularly debt/equity relationships, are likely to become more important, 
rhe long term result is far from clear, and the area provides rich material for continuing research.
Before leaving this subject it  is perhaps worth noting that diversification, while important, 
represents thinking at a strategic level. Once a reasonable strategic mix of markets has been identified 
it  was common to find that the emphasis of the investment search changed, typically to a much more 
detailed consideration of: 
i i i  the areas of concentration
(ii ) replacement and upgrading of existing assets
As far as the areas of concentration are concerned, it  is interesting to note that almost all companies 
considered that they had a clear view of the business/es they were currently in. Many new ventures 
'grew out' of existing areas, or were extensions of existing interests, perhaps re-inforcing the earlier 
comments about limits of diversification.
Areas Qf. Activity within shipping
in discussions it  became apparent that the pre-occupation with regular earnings referred to 
earlier had a very strong effect on the type of business within which the companies typically operated. 
In some cases this resulted in a more negative approach to the area. In other words, were there areas 
the company did not want to be in? When this question was applied to shipping some fairly clear
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answers emerged, although the answers were not tfte same for all companies. In general, tankers and 
dry bulk carriers, particularly when operating on the spot market, were not favoured. Cruise ships, 
liner trades, and high technology ships e.g. LN6/LP6 carriers, were. The emphasis in this category of 
company was clearly on the high technology, high quality end of the market, which was less likely to be 
subjected to the same degree of market competition, at least in the short term, as the less advanced 
areas of shipping. Costs of entry into such areas are extremely high, the operation of such ships often 
requires a sophisticated corporate infrastructure, and fa irly long commitments are needed to obtain 
adequate returns on investment. Most of the larger public companies involved in the liner trade were 
also well established members of consortia and conferences, which typically used high technology ships, 
frequently, though not necessarily, dedicated to a specific trade. One company summarised its 
approach to shipping as follows:
The areas o f shipping where a B ritish  public company can operate successfully 
are becoming few er, ... and, basically we have been getting out o f low  technology and 
tramping, things which lack some special characteristic which m ight enable us to  
carve a p a rticu la r niche ... We have ju s t sold some ree fe r ships because there is  no 
p a rticu la r s k ill in  operating a ree fe r ship ... the m arket is  overtonnaged a t the 
moment, and there is  no p a rticu la r characteristic that we can bring to  it .  So we are 
not making very much money out o f it .  So we are selling our (ree fe r) ships. "
This same company was nonetheless investing substantial sums of money in other areas of shipping, but
in areas with significant barriers to entry.
This is not to say that there are not public companies with shipping interests mainly in the bulk 
trades. In this study eight of the nineteen companies fell into this category. However, in five of these 
cases clear reasons for this choice could be identified by reference to the other activities of the groups. 
The shipping subsidiaries and divisions of companies like Exxon. Texaco and Alcoa had significant 
interests in the transportation of their own parent company's supplies and products. Even so. the 
majority of oil majors were actively disinvesting in this area at the time of the interviews. Stephenson 
Clarke, the shipping subsidiary of Powell Duffryn. operate a fleet of ships in the European short sea. 
bulk trades, and have filled a kind of market niche. Clear links exist with other areas of the group's 
activities. Their tanker trade has been phased out. and they are now involved in the disposal of waste 
at sea. Moore McCormack has bulk shipping interests which are consistent with and supportive of their 
other activities. The remaining three companies in this category with considerable interests in bulk 
shipping were Marine Transport Lines (MTL). Ogden, and Overseas Shipholders Group (OSG). At the 
time of the interview Ogden had a shipping subsidiary. As has already been pointed out, this subsidiary
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has been spun-off, leaving a shipping company with considerable bulk interests, covering both dry bulk 
and tankers, together with product tankers. LP6 ships. Car carriers and Ro-Ro‘s. MTL was in a similar 
position, having been spun-off from GATX, and having considerable interests in dry bulk vessels and 
tankers, together with product tankers, chemical tankers, molten sulphur tankers and gas carriers. 
0S6 has substantial bulk interests, together with product carriers and combination carriers (e.g. 
car/bulk). Clearly these last three companies have other shipping interests over and above their bulk 
interests, but they are nonetheless far more exposed to the vaguaries of that particular market than 
any other category 1 company. It is probably fair to say that all three are experiencing considerable 
change in the markets they have traditionally dealt in. The effect on market perceptions of these 
companies is not yet clear, nor is the long term effect on their attitudes and strategies.
2A  Types of Asset and Approach to Acquisition
The vast majority of investment decisions made by category 1 companies were long term 
decisions, again reflecting concerns with regularity of earnings, in oq cases were investments made on 
a speculative basis (i.e. where no clear long term use for the asset has been identified, but profits may 
be made by reselling the asset in the short or mediwn term). This is not to say that vessels were not 
sold at opportune moments. Such sales occur, probably more than they used to, but generally vessels 
were acquired with the intention of holding them for in excess of ten years, and sometimes for as long 
as 20 years.
It is also interesting to note that in a surprisingly large number of cases investment decisions 
were made on the basis of the acquisition of whole fleets or classes of ships, dealing with a specific 
trade, or indeed, on the basis of the acquisition of another shipowning company. For example, Cunard 
entered the fru it carrying market by the acquisition of ten fru it carriers from Maritime Fruit Carriers. 
The company saw an opportunity to buy itself into a market with potential, at a low cost. The decision 
was clearly a strategic one, with the fleet being the objective. It is unlikely that the company would 
have been interested in the acquisition of a smaller number of ships, since it would not then have been a 
sufficiently large force in that relatively specialised market. Clearly the rationale for such a decision 
is rather different to that for a single project. In general, the large public companies were more likely 
to think in this way. The Finance Director of one such company pointed out that it  would have great
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difficulty in justifying one o(T investments.
Similar examples and attitudes can be found in the USA business. Sealand planned and 
implemented the introduction of a fleet of twelve new D9 containerships. Mdean Industries did the 
same with a fleet of twelve new 4216 TEU containerships for United States Line, their largest 
subsidiary. They also acquired Moore McCormack Lines, a company which owned 13 vessels and 
operated on different routes to those of US Lines, for $60M.
In fact of the 19 companies included in this large public company category, nine companies very 
clearly made shipping investment decisions in fleet terms, six made decisions on an individual vessel 
basis, while the remainder said that it  would depend upon circumstances. More importantly, in only 
two instances were vessel acquisition decisions made on an individual basis, where the vessels were 
intended for use in the liner trades. In one of these cases the acquisition was a replacement ship for a 
small liner service, where even a single additional vessel represented a significant factor in the trade. 
The second case represented a rare speculative venture into the liner trades, so it  should not be viewed 
as typical. Similarly, while the oil majors clearly made decisions about individual ships to acquire (or 
to dispose of), the initial analysis and the broad decision was fleet oriented. For most other companies 
dry bulk carriers and tankers tended to be appraised on an individual basis, although overall fleet 
balance and other strategic factors were usually considered firs t.
in considering replacement of ships the emphasis was very much on cost reduction and 
improvements in efficiency. The analysis was usually (though not always) done on an incremental 
basis, with the emphasis being on fleet costs, with no really dear revenues, rather than an estimate of 
revenues or project surpluses.
The comments made above concerning regularity of earnings should not be seen as implying that 
public companies do not behave in an opportunistic fashion. A distinction needs to be drawn between 
speculation and opportunism. It has already been pointed out that no cases were found of category 1 
companies making speculative investments, and few seemed prepared to consider such ventures. In the 
context of shipping this means that few companies would acquire a vessel unless they had a fairly dear 
idea as to its long term use. (This is of course rather different to having detailed charters in existence 
before building commences.) However, opportunities come along, and are responded to. Having said 
this, many opportunities which are taken appear to be closely related to existing activities of the 
business, re-inforcing (again) the earlier points on the limits of diversification. One company put it
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this way.
I f  we were presented w ith  a gold mining company we would not Puy it. Pecause 
tha t is  not our business; ... so what we have said is . we w ili be in  certain a c tiv itie s  
and i f  we have an opportunity in  those areas ... we w ill certa in ty look a t it .  and we 
m ight w e ll buy i t . "
In practice it  was often difficult to tell whether an acquisition or investment was opportunistic or 
the result of careful planning. In some cases, indeed, in most cases, the planning process and strategic 
thinking undertaken by a company frequently threw up the kind of areas of activity which should be 
considered, should an opportunity to do so actually arise. This w ill be considered in more detail in the 
next secion. However, by way of example, it  is clear that the purchase of Heublein by RJ. Reynolds 
falls into this type. JP. Sticht. the Reynolds Head, in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, 
admitted that when he laid out his acquisition plan in 1973. although Heublein was on the list, he never 
expected to acquire them. They were too strong and doing very well. The lis t was regarded as a kind of 
wish list. However, in 1982. when General Cinema Corporation purchased about 18X of Heublein's 
stock, a move the company considered 'unfriendly'. Heublein began looking for a white knight to rescue 
it  from a possible wwanted acquisition. Reynolds duly obliged. Clearly other examples can be found. 
In general it  seems likely that management frequently has a broadly based plan to try  to expand in a 
certain direction. When an opportunity comes up it  can then be taken quickly, in a way which is 
consistent with the long term strategy of the business. This is the subject of the next section.
23 Flexibility and. Opportunism
Underlying the actions of most companies in this category was a desire to preserve flexibility of 
action, so as to be able to respond to opportunities and to threats as they arise. It is precisely because 
opportunities generally do arise in an unplanned way that such flexibility is sought. Flexibility of action 
is also extremely important under adverse conditions, and permits a variety of alternative responses 
to problem areas. Under present market conditions it  may be that this second aspect is the more 
critical, but the philosophy appears general.
Preservation of flexibility and "strategic positioning" appear to be very closely related 
concepts, and the terms were sometimes used interchangeably. This was in some measure due to a 
certain amount of imprecision with regard to terminology. In fact a large measure of sim ilarity was 
found in the approach and attitudes of companies in this category, and further analysis suggested that a
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number of different aspects of positioning and/or flexibility could be identified, and these are dealt with 
below. Interestingly, published statements were found relating to some aspect of flexibility, positioning 
or opportunism, for ten of the category 1 companies. This is not to say that such statements were 
necessarily set out in the form of a carefully considered statement on flexibility. In many cases it  was 
necessary to pull together various statements within, for example, the Annual Report or other 
published statements. However, when re-inforced by the interviews some extremely useful insights 
were obtained into the thought processes and philosophies underlying various decisions and actions, in 
the remaining nine companies in category 1, reference to some aspect of flexibility or positioning was 
made in the interviews. However, it  needs to be recognised that the views on positioning and 
flexibility, and their subsequent analysis, tended to emerge and develop as interviews progressed. 
Later interviews were therefore more comprehensive in their coverage than earlier ones. Such an 
approach means that a precise quantitative analysis is not possible. Having said this, re-examination of 
earlier interviews identified various actions and attitudes which were consistent with those found in 
later interviews, although clearly the same level of confidence could not be attached to these results.
A number of the published statements available were fairly general, and represented little  more 
than the statement of a general philosophy. This does not make them any less interesting, however, 
since they indicate a somewhat different approach to that normally assumed in most finance texts. By 
way of example extracts from Annual Reports for two companies are given below.
(i) Exxon (Source 1982 Annual Report)
'Our immediate goat is  to  put Exxon in  the Pest possible position to respond to  
th is  unsettled short term  environment ... while establishing a so lid  base from  which 
to participate in  the longer-range energy future. We have therefore been looking 
rigorously a t the p ro fita b ility  of, and fu tu re  prospects fo r, a ll Exxon's business 
iines, and a t our strategies fo r achieving success in  an intensely com petitive m arket 
place.m
"... in  the follow ing pages you w ill fin d  examples o f the steps which were taken 
in  1982 to size Exxon's operations to low er levels o f demand in  a w orld which uses 
energy more e ffic ie n tly . This is  not a one-time o r one year process, in  some areas 
o f the business i t  began much e a rlie r than 1982. and in  most i f  not a ll areas o f the 
business i t  w ill continue throughout 1983 and beyond. Other companies appear to  be 
making th e ir own adjustments to these changed conditions, thus in tensifying the 
com petitive environment, but we believe that the steps we are taking w ill position us 
w e ll fo r the future. We expect to  maintain a substantial resource base, trim  and 
flexible operating capabi/itv and financial strength which w ill enable Exxon to adapt 
to the unexpected and the unfor seen. thereby continuing the productive growth and 
industry pacesetting tha t marked its  fir s t hundred yea rs .9 (P2/3XEmphasis added)
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(ii) Qgden-Corpocation (Source 1982 Annual Report)
'  we moved in  1982 in to  the position we think appropriate to  the 
environment o f the next tw enty years. Since 1962, our most im portant task has 
heen to  constantly seek answers to two questions. What k ind o f  w orld  w ill we be 
liv ing  in, and what k ind o f company do we need to  be? The answers to  these 
questions are o f  lit t le  value w ithout the fle x ib ility  t o act from  them . To p re d ic t the 
need w ithout the a b ility  to  adapt is  sim ply to  foresee one's own end." (P8)
"... we w ill concentrate on cash flow , dividends, and preparation fo r  the future. 
Our external and in te rn a l balance models are the measure o f  our corporate posture. 
Our external model shows approxim ately equal balance between Services,
Transportation, and Products. That balance enables us to  m aintain the fle x ib ility
which is  o f  p rim a ry  im portance." (P12XEmphasis added)
Other companies were rather more specific, and identified particular areas of concern, or 
approaches to flexibility actually adopted. For example, Texaco, in its 1982 Annual Report, emphasised 
the steps which it  had taken to improve its efficiency and competitive position. These steps included: 
the expansion of exploration; improved operating efficiencies; a flexible inventory management 
programme to take advantage of rapidly changing market condition; and a widening of its supply base. 
The company also emphasised the importance and size of its capital resources, and its ability to 
maintain liquidity through easy access to the financial markets. Overall the actions taken were seen as 
maintaining a strong operational and financial base during a period of recession, which would permit a 
rapid and effective response as conditions improved.
A second example was provided by Sea-Land, again in its 1982 Annual Report. In this report the 
company emphasised the importance it attached to being strategically positioned for the 1980's. It also 
detailed a number of factors which were considered important to the positioning process, in which they 
were favourably placed. These included: diversity of markets; a sophisticated and extensive
information data base; fuel efficient ships of a size which gave greater flexibility in terms of trade 
route development; equipment ownership, giving greater flexibility to deploy equipment where deemed 
appropriate; efficient facilities strategically located worldwide; a superior sales force; multiple 
service areas; U.S. flag status, seen as giving greater flexibility to share in U.S. Government cargo and 
that related to bilateral agreements; freedom from subsidies and related conditions; and financial 
strength, through good cash flow and consistent earnings.
Statements such as these provide useful indicators of managerial attitudes and priorities. Both 
examples indicate multi-level concerns with flexibility. The extracts from the Texaco Annual Report 
indicated concerns at at least three levels. For example, concerns with strategic flexibility were dealt
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with by such things as extra sources of supply and more exploration. Operational flexibility was sought 
through such things as flexible inventory management. Financial strength and flexibility was achieved 
through adequate capital resources and access to debt and capital markets.
The extracts from the Sealand Annual Report are particularly interesting, since they represent 
one of the most comprehensive statements found in the survey. As with Texaco, the concerns with 
flexibility and positioning were apparent at various levels. Concerns with strategic positioning were 
dealt with by diversity of markets. New markets could be entered into with relative ease, due to a 
superior sales force, a highly sophisticated database on international trade, vessels with considerable 
flexibility in terms of potential ports, and US flag status. Operational flexibility was sought through the 
use of vessels able to operate on a variety of routes and through a large number of ports, and equipment 
ownership. Underlying all of this was a strong financial position, with good cash flow. It is worth 
noting that at the time of the interview, and the above publication. Sealand was a subsidiary of 
Reynolds, and earlier comments on this particular company reinforce the depth of thinking on positioning 
within the group as a whole.
Other examples were found which indicated similar thinking to that identified above. For 
example. Powell Duffryn in its 1981 Annual Report, made clear its desire to maintain a balanced 
diversity of industrial activities, to increase its geographical spread, and to balance its fleet so as to 
ensure flexible and effective operations, while at the same time ensuring that adequate financial 
resources were available to support the planned future development.
Such an approach is consistent with the multi-level approach identified earlier. In other cases 
published concerns were with particular aspects of positioning and flexibility. For example. Alcoa in 
one of its own publications ('A  brief history of Aluminum and Alcoa*) placed great emphasis on the 
‘versatility* of Aluminium, and identified interests in an extensive range of products, in the following 
markets: containers and packaging; transportation; building and construction; aerospace and ordnance; 
consumer goods; electrical components; machinery and equipment; and chemicals. In another part of the 
same publication emphasis changed to concerns with supply, making it  clear that ways were being 
sought to make Alcoa less dependent on imported bauxite.
Concerns with positioning and flexibility in shipping companies tended to reflect current market 
conditions. The emphasis in published material was thus more oriented to a flexible approach to 
markets and operations. For example, in an interview published in American Shipper. (‘Strategic
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Planning for Bulkers-. Pp 69-70, June 1983) with senior executives of Marine Transport Lines, it  was 
made clear that the company intended to move into a wider range of bulk commodities. This in turn was 
seen as placing greater emphasis on the development of new vessel types which were primarily 
multipurpose and combination in nature, giving the line greater flexibility in securing a revenue load and 
in working out long term contracts. The company was developing an operating philosophy of positioning 
itself so as to capture a market niche in which contractual arrangements could be effectively fulfilled. 
Interestingly, apart from an emphasis on market and operational flexibility, the company also placed 
great emphasis on protecting itself when things go drastically wrong. Similar views were expressed in 
the 1982 Annual Report of Overseas Shipholding 6roup (OSG), a company involved in virtually all of the 
major bulk trades. Considerable importance was attached to the composition of the fleet, which was 
seen as affording the company a high degree of flexibility in expanding its participation in those markets 
offering the most attractive chartering possibilities. A modern diversified fleet operating substantially 
under time charters was seen as rendering the company well positioned to compete effectively in the 
market place and to take advantage of expansion opportunities as they may emerge.
Several companies made reference to financial resources in their annual reports. The references 
made above for Exxon. Texaco, Sealand, Powell Duffryn and Marine Transport Lines provide some 
examples. In other cases the concerns were less explicit, but emphasis was nonetheless given to strong 
finances, as can be seen from the following extract from the 1982 Annual Report for Sea Containers.
"Our stra tegy in  the meantime is  to make ourselves lean and e ffic ie n t in  our 
existing businesses and to  acquire assets which w ill produce m ajor grow th o f 
earnings when the recession is  over, ye t not be a significant drain while the 
recession continues. Our finances are strong, thanks in  p a rt to our Finance Division, 
carrying out in  t982  a complex re -s tructu ring  o f much o f the Group's debt, reducing 
the cost o f such debt and im proving our cash flow . We have also in  1982 and ea rly  
1983 ra ised some $6711 through sale o f p re fe rred  and common shares. The blended' 
fixed  cost o f these funds is  9 .4 IX  per annum.'  (P4)
The above examples display considerable sim ilarity in approach, although emphasis differed from 
one company to another. A further feature worth noting is that emphasis and hence approaches to 
strategy changed over time, even within the same company. For example, a company which has just 
completed a major re-think in terms of its overall strategy, and has established itself in its chosen 
lines of business, is then less likely to devote too much of its time to consideration of new areas of 
business, at least until the quality of earnings comes wider threat. It is more likely to concentrate on 
exploring market opportunities for its chosen lines of business, and on operating efficiently and
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economically. Such a company is also likely to have a different attitude towards its finances, and 
financial flexibility, since few major acquisitions are likely to be anticipated in the short term. By way 
of example consider the case of Moore McCormack Resources, which completed and Implemented a 
major strategic review in the early 1980’s. The company was thus able to state in its 1982 Annual 
Report, that ft was well positioned for growth in its primary markets (construction, energy and steel) 
as these markets recover and develop in the 1980’s. This was attributable to the fact that no further 
substantial investments were needed to repair or replace obsolete assets, and that modem, efficient 
facilities were in use in virtually all parts of the company. This was seen as providing considerable 
financial flexibility.
When the published information was backed up by detailed discussions a clearer view emerged, 
although the earlier reservations on the confidence associated with this analysis need to be noted. The 
analysis of the discussions and published information suggested that the ideas on positioning could 
usefully be broken down into four levels, although inevitably some degree of overlap occurred between 
them. In some cases such a split had a certain artificia lity about it. Nevertheless a breakdown into 
various levels provides useful insights into the complexity of the 'positioning* process. The levels 
identified were broadly as follows:
(i) Strategic positioning, in the sense of having alternative lines of business which could be 
embarked on. expanded or contracted as the environment changed. As defined, strategic positioning has 
a somewhat narrower meaning than is frequently found.
(ii) Market positioning or flexib ility, relating to the ability to enter, leave, expand or contract the 
markets for goods/services currently being provided somewhere in the organisation.
(iii) Operational flexib ility, relating to the ability to modify operations quickly in the short term, in 
response to changed circumstances.
(iv) Financial strength and flexib ility, relating to the ability to survive problems and crises, and to 
implement opportunities as they arise, either based upon existing financial resources available, or on an 
ability to raise further funds, included in this category are concerns with share price and 
survival/bankruptcy.
The earlier section on areas of business and diversification indicated the extent to which 
category 1 companies were diversified. While this approach was principally related to quality of
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earnings, it  also afforded the companies considerable flexibility with regard to the areas of business in 
which they operated, and considerable changes had taken place, or were planned in 14 of the category 1 
companies. A t the time of the interviews however, only seven of these companies were actively 
engaged in serious consideration of changes in the major lines of business. It seems likely that in 
practice concerns with strategic flexibility of this type w ill be major concerns arising on a periodic 
basis, rather than a continuing basis, although a few companies said that a review of their lines of 
business was a regular part of their corporate planning process.
In practice ideas on strategic flexibility and strategic positioning took a variety of forms, which 
did not necessarily f it  the particular approach outlined above. This is clear from the quotations used 
above for Sealand. MTL. and 0S6. Indeed, virtually all of the companies which were involved almost 
entirely in shipping activities clearly considered themselves to be strategically positioned for the 
future, within the industry. Using the four levels outlined above, such positioning would be classified 
under market, operational or financial flexibility.
Examples of concerns with market flexibility were very clearly identified in ten of the category 
1 companies. Typically market flexibility was sought through such things as:
(i) efficient facilities and/or assets
iii)  the use of vessels with inbuilt flexibility, being either multi-purpose, combination, able to use a 
large number of ports, and/or able to trade on a variety of routes
(iii) superior information/data bases
(iv) efficient agencies spread across all market areas
(v) a superior sales force
(vi) a balanced approach to chartering, with a reasonable number of vessels on medium or long term 
charters, and limited numbers on the spot markets
(vii) a balanced fleet
(viii) U.S. flag status, giving access to Jones Act trades, cargo preference. U.S. Government cargoes, 
and subsidies
(ix) being a low cost producer/supplier, giving an ability to retain current markets and to expand 
others in almost any conditions
<xi providing a high quality service, often on an intermodai, door to door basis
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(xi) high market shares, giving a greater degree of control over the market.
Of the nine companies which did not emphasise market flexibility, seven were already engaged in
a number of different shipping markets. Their principal concern was thus to put themselves in a strong
position to compete effectively within those markets. Given their involvement in a number of markets.
such an approach may well be consistent with ideas on strategic positioning (and undoubtedly was in at
least four of the companies), but attaches a much lower priority to ideas on market flexibility.
However, of these seven companies, five had actually taken actions which were consistent with the
ideas outlined above on market flexibility, although the emphasis was clearly not as great as in the nine
companies referred to initially. For example, even in those companies which were building vessels for
particular routes (often highly specialised and competitive routes), a certain amount of flexibility was
nevertheless being built in. One company which was building vessels for use on one of the most
competitive liner routes in the world, where the expectation was that the vessels would spend their
entire working lives on that route, made the following observation:
"We are building in  features now which mean tha t those vesse/s could be 
operated in  other trades. For example, the new generation have side ramps, and we 
usually see that they can go through the Panama Cana! ... any shipowner now would 
bu ild  in  as much fle x ib ility  as he could."
in spite of these comments it needs to be recognised that a small number of companies existed
which had very little  strategic flexibility or market flexibility in the short or oven medium term.
Operating flexibility
Twelve of the category 1 companies expressed concerns with what might be termed flexibility of 
operations. In most cases this was achieved through such things as:
(i) efficient facilities and/or assets
(ii) the use of vessels with inbuilt flexibility 
(ii) a balanced fleet
(iv) flexible inventory management
(v) equipment ownership
It has already been noted that in practice some overlap existed between the four levels. The 
overlaps were most noticeable in the areas of market flexibility and operating flexibility, particularly, 
though not exclusively, in those companies which were largely engaged in shipping or marine related 
activities. For example, the use of vessels with inbuilt flexibility clearly provides flexibility of
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operations as well as with regard to markets. The following quotations from the 1982 Annual Report of 
the Sea Containers Group illustrates this point well.
‘AH our vessels have been designed w ith special features which make them 
em inently suitable fo r  the grow ing container trades w ith the developing world, o r the 
carriage o f fu ll loads o f  re frig e ra te d  containers, o r the p o ss ib ility  to c a rry  rofhon, 
r o ll- o f f  cargoes interchangeably w ith  containers ...
"We are studying the p ra c tic a lity  o f combining passengers and containers in the 
same vessels. rhere are many fascinating routes served by container vessels but 
passenger accommodations are generally lim ite d  o r non-existent. Passenger ships 
receive p r io r ity  berthing which can be a ttrac tive  to  containership operators 
accustomed to  delays in  congested p o rts ." (Pp 6/7)
A few companies had very limited operating flexibility, having committed themselves to certain 
lines of business. This was true of certain liner operations, and a number of the specialist trades, e.g. 
LNG ships.
Financial flexibility
Detailed questions were asked of all companies about capital structure, which w ill be dealt with 
later. Answers to these questions indicated more general concerns with finance and financial 
flexibility, over and above capital structure issues. Again, these ideas on financial flexibility 
'’emerged* as the interview progressed, with later interviews being more comprehensive than earlier 
ones. Five of the early interviews indicated little  more than broad concerns with liquidity, and ability 
to service debt. In most of these, the level of financial resources was fairly high, thus reducing the 
perceived importance of such factors in the decision making process. In the remaining 14 companies 
concerns were expressed rather more strongly. In general these companies wished to maintain (or 
have access to) resources adequate to take opportunities that came along, or to respond to any threats 
for some time ahead. While never expressed in these terms, the ideas of "action range" and 
"endurance" put forward by Derkinderen and Crum appeared consistent with the action of most category 
1 companies. Concerns with financial flexibility were mainly found in the following areas:
(i) Adequate financial resources, in terms of cash and short term investments. For example, 
McLean industries Inc., the holding company for United States Lines, made a prospectus issue of stocks 
and debentures in August 1983, the net proceeds of which were aproximately $J28M. This issue 
coincided with a massive investment in 12 new containerships. although these were largely debt 
financed. The prospectus stated that:
2 M
'The Company intends in itia lly  to  apply the proceeds towards working capitaI 
and may in  the fu tu re  apply a portion o f a ll the proceeds towards capita l 
reguirements, the retirem ent o f debt and genera! corporate purposes, rhe Company 
intends to  invest the proceeds tem porarily in  short term  in te rest bearing 
securities. ’  (P4)
This implies considerable concern with ensuring that adequate financial resources were available to 
support the company's major new investment programme.
(ii) Access to the financial markets, for more equity, debt or leases. Substantial lines of credit 
were held. For example as at December 31st 1982, Texaco had unused bank lines of credit in excess of 
$18.
(iii) Good quality earnings, leading to good quality cash flow patterns.
(iv) Conservative debt/equity ratios, or concerns with the ability to service debt.
(v) Well financed assets, leaving adequate financial resources within the company, but not imposing 
too great a debt service burden on the company.
Interestingly, the level of financial concerns was seen to vary considerably depending upon the 
kind of activities the various companies engaged in. Reference has already been made to the reasons 
underlying the disposal of certain shipping activities, and the spin-offs that had occurred in the USA. 
There is little  doubt that in these cases the financial resources needed to support shipping were 
considered to be far greater than those needed to support other activities, and that certain companies 
were unhappy with this.
Reference to the subsequent section on capital structure (Section 6.5) provides further support 
to the above ideas.
2JL Miscellaneous Mills. mLPhilosophy and Strategy
Apart from the various philosophies and strategies identified above, a number of philosophies and 
strategies were found in a relatively small number of companies.
(i) Several companies ran shipping subsidiaries principally to provide efficient, low cost and reliable 
transportation for their own products or inputs.
(ii) Several companies were concerned to be market leaders, or at least to maintain a reasonable 
market share. This was often reflected in a policy of providing high quality goods or services, or of 
being a significant contributor to a particular market sector.
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(iii) Two cases were found where the personality and attitudes of particular senior executives, or of 
changes in such staff, had a considerable influence on the companies.
(iv) Several cases were found of past experience influencing, possibly even distorting, attitudes 
towards future investments or lines of business.
i  C orporate  Planning
3 1 Introduction and Summary of Findings
This section is concerned with the identification of the nature, form and content of corporate 
planning systems, and their importance in investment and financing decisions, for category 1 
companies. Overall it  is clear that most companies in this category did have formal and sophisticated 
systems, and that the contribution of these systems to decision making was considerable. Specialist 
planners and related support staff were frequently found, and there is no doubt that the market analysis 
done was very sophisticated. Most companies have been fa irly successful in identifying areas with a 
high probability of problems, which goes a long way towards explaining the apparently negative view on 
certain areas of business referred to in earlier sections. For example, most of the larger public 
companies recognised at a fa irly early stage (many well before 1973/4) the problems which were 
likely to occur in tankers, because of obvious overtonnaging. and their effects on earnings and their 
volatility, and made conscious decisions not to enter that market, or to leave it. This negative aspect 
of corporate planning is interesting. It implies that companies in this category are very concerned with 
downside risk, because of the effect this would have on the earnings of the group. It is thus completely 
consistent with the earlier comments on the quality of earnings.
These comments should not be taken to indicate that corporate planning was a negative process. 
In general the emphasis was positive, and there is little  doubt that the detailed planning had helped in the 
identification of the slots in the market referred to earlier. Indeed, as the research progressed it 
became clear that a great deal of information was collected as part of the planning system.
This information, which covered a number of areas, provided the basis for most strategic and 
operational decisions. The precise emphasis varied from company to company, but broad similarities
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existed for companies in particular trades, namely the oil majors, the liner trades and the bulk trades. 
Irrespective of the trades, it  is clear that the planning systems provided a context within which 
individual project decisions could be made. Project evaluation was generally seen as the final stage of a 
more complex process than is generally assumed in finance theory, with decisions being heavily 
influenced by the planning process and the philosophies and strategies outlined earlier.
2J2 Corporate Planning Systems
Of the 19 companies in this category, 16 had formal systems of Corporate Planning. Typically
these covered periods of five years ahead (12 companies), with one company preparing plans for three 
years, and two companies preparing plans for in excess of five years. Plans for the later years were 
generally regarded as more tentative than those of earlier years. Plans in excess of five years were, 
with only one exception, concerned only with broad trends and related strategic issues. Forecasts for 
shipping activities were generally regarded as more tentative than for other activities. One company 
did not specify the period for which it prepared plans. This company commented that, while a formal 
planning system was in use, the planning department of the shipping division was now smaller than it  
had been, partly because of a reduction in shipping activities, partly because much of the planning was 
now done by conferences and consortia. Of the three companies which did not have a formal system of 
corporate planning at the time of the interviews, two had undertaken major ad hoc strategic planning 
exercises. In one of these the plans, which were extremely detailed, covered a fifteen year period. 
This company has since introduced a formal corporate planning system. In the other company the 
strategic review had led to some highly significant investment and disinvestment decisions. In the 
remaining company which did not have a formal planning system, there nevertheless were two full time 
economists and associated staff constantly reviewing markets and economic conditions, effectively 
carrying out some of the functions of a planning department. Two of the three companies which did not 
have corporate planning systems were involved largely in shipping activities.
In several of the companies plans existed for certain aspects of the business for periods well 
beyond the five years referred to above. For example, a number of companies involved with oil 
exploration, or natural resource industries, had outline plans for the exploration and sources side of 
their business for well in excess of five years. In terms of detailed corporate plans, however, five
years was seen as a reasonable compromise, for example, one company rationalised its choice or' five 
years in the following way:
"U'8 worked our way to the five years. it's been three years, i t ’s been ten, 
but for most o f the time it's been five, and it  probably w ill stay five  ... in this 
business its  difficult enough to look to next week, and it's ludicrous in a lot o f ways
to look ten years, although we do have capita! projects that are twenty five year
capita/  projects. It  doesn't do you any good, fo r planning purposes, to look 
significantly beyond five years when it  comes to forecasting markets and 
competitive actions. You can't just look five years. You've got to at least think 
about what's going to happen beyond that, but in terms o f forecasting markets and 
competitive actions, and financial information, it  doesn't make much sense to go 
beyond five years, so we Ye chosen five years. “
Other companies expressed similar views. In general five years seems to be regarded as a long enough
period to consider a range of strategic, market and operational issues, yet one which is not so long as to 
reduce confidence in the planning system to a low level.
While specific reasons for planning were seldom given, the general attitude underlying the 
preparation of plans was consistent with a search for regular earnings, or at least with the avoidance 
of shocks caused by a rapid decline in earnings. Fairly well developed corporate planning systems were 
also seen as being appropriate for companies in this category, since this was what the market was 
thought to expect of companies in their position. Whether such expectations really exist is far from 
clear, but certain management teams clearly fe lt the need to respond to such implied requirements, 
fhis is consistent with earlier ideas on the responsibilities that go with being a public company. Careful 
planning was also considered necessary to ensure flexibility of the type referred to in earlier sections.
3JS Form and Content of the Corporate Plans
It is interesting to note that in spite of all the many criticisms that have been made of financial 
accounting, almost all companies in this category used the three basic financial statements as a financial 
model of the business, and plans were essentially fed into this model. Planned results were then 
expressed in terms of five year figures for:
(i) Profit and Loss
(ii) Balance Sheet
(iii) Funds Flow Statement
The rationale for this was clear, in that these statements, when prepared historically, provide the
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basis of the majority of official communications to the market. Also financial control systems, which 
are undoubtedly the most sophisticated of the internal control systems, provide basic information of 
this type, thus enabling actuals to be carefully monitored against plans. Detailed annual budgets were 
almost universally prepared.
An extremely important part of the planning framework concerned with cash flows was the 
preparation of a forecast to do with debt service requirements. While in some instances ships were 
s till owned by ‘single ship" subsidiaries, and occasionally parent companies attempted to avoid giving 
guarantees to cover subsidiary debt, there is no doubt that the debt service commitments for companies 
in this category were seen as corporate wide commitments, and the planning was consistent with this 
view. Practice varied somewhat, with approximately half of the companies dealing with debt service 
as a ‘highlighted* part of the funds flow forecast, and half making separate detailed forecasts. In 
almost all cases serious consideration was given to the relationship between potential earnings and debt 
service commitments, both in terms of size and timing. Exceptions to this occurred only where 
debt/equity ratios were low. and thus debt service commitments represented a relatively small part of 
potential earnings.
As the study progressed it  became apparent that, in the course of the preparation of corporate 
plans on a regular basis, a great deal of basic ground work was carried out. In general, 
macro-economic variables were fa irly thoroughly analysed, as were the industries of most relevance 
to the company. Supply and demand conditions were typically analysed in some detail. Political factors 
were frequently considered. Indeed, it  was typical to find that the strategic issues facing a company 
had been carefully considered well before detailed thinking about an individual project took place. The 
preparation of detailed corporate plans usually meant that most companies had. within their plan, a 
pretty clear idea as to when they would need to acquire new assets. For example, one company, in 
discussing the relationship between its corporate plans and its decisions to buy ships, said:
“One is  laying down, in  our case certa in ly, in  the five  year plan a p re tty  dea r 
idea as to  when we regard ourse/ves as requiring. Then when we come down to the 
individual decision our number crunching is  essentially based upon our earnings fo r 
that pa rticu la r ship, and how that comes back in to  re tu rn  on capital, and what the 
impact is  on the overa ll p ro fita b ility  and earnings o f the fle e t o r the company. '
The context of individual capital decisions therefore needs to be recognised. In almost all cases careful
consideration had been given to strategic and economic variables well before detailed individual analysis
took place. This is a point which w ill be returned to later.
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The research and discussion on this area expanded considerably as the interviews proceeded. In 
the pilot study the questions asked were fa irly general, as the original intention was to concentrate 
more on individual project analysis than on corporate planning systems. As has been pointed out above, 
it  soon became clear that such an approach was simply not realistic, and in later interviews in the UK 
more detail was sought, particularly on macro-variables and supply and demand forecasts. In the 
United States questions were based on the model set out earlier, derived by Temple, Darker, Sloan and 
Delta lines for the U.S. Maritime Administration (1992). This approach made difficult any kind of 
quantitative analysis, but did permit the gradual identification of the critical factors in investment 
decision making.
The general informational content of the TBS model was based upon the following areas:
(i) Industry data
(ii) Company data
(iii) Market data -  which included large sections of economic and demand side data
(iv) Competition/Capacity data -  which included supply side data
(v) Other environmental data
Such a model is clearly based upon shipping activities, and many of the companies involved in this 
survey were diversified. Given the aims of this thesis, the analysis nevertheless concentrates on 
general issues and issues relating to shipping.
In practice companies did not usually think in quite the way implied by the above headings, but the 
information generally sought was similar. Typically the information collected could be categorised as 
follows:
(i) Macro-economic factors -  including forecasts of world trade, GNP of various countries, interest 
rates, exchange rates, inflation rates, etc.
(ii) Applications to shipping -  including forecasts of product and commodity flows. These usually 
attempted to estimate the demand for the company's shipping services.
(iii) Supply side analysis -  including the analysis of present fleet configurations (in detail), new 
buildings, scrappings, lay-ups. changes in technology.
(iv) Competitor analysis -  including detailed comparisons of cost and, in some cases, market share, 
quality of service, etc.
(v) Company data -  covering past and current performance figures.
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(vt) Environmental data -  covering legal, regulatory, political and other environmental factors.
Not all companies In the survey collected all of the above information, and the relative importance of 
each section varied somewhat. However, as before, the main differences arose between the oil majors, 
the liner trades, and the bulk trades. Companies with both liner and bulk interests tended to have 
different implementation and weighting procedures, even if  a central information data base was used.
Table 6 provides an indication of the number of companies collecting information of the type 
outlined above, both in total, and in terms of a broad division between the oil majors, the liner trades 
and the bulk trades. It should be noted that several companies had significant interests in both liner and 
bulk trades. These companies are thus shown In the columns for both trades. The final column 
represents the total number of companies collecting information of a particular type, and is not a total 
of the previous three columns. Several companies also had shipping activities in other areas (ejg. 
cruise ships, LN6 ships etc.). Information collected for these varied somewhat, but a high level of 
background Information was typically collected for such activities, of a type which is consistent with 
the total figures shown above. Given the earlier comments made about the development of questions on 
this area. Table 6 should be seen as an Indication of the minimum numbers collecting information of a 
particular type, rather than actual numbers.
Information Sought Oil Majors Bulk Liners Totalcompanies
M a cro -fac to rs 1 6 7 13
Shipping applications 2 7 8 16
Supply side analysis 2 9 10 19
Com petitor analysis 2 - 7 9
Company data 1 3 2 6
Environm ental factors 2 1 3 6
Total companies 2 9 10 19
*
Table 6 Background information sought as part of the planning process in Category I companies
This table Indicates the high degree of sophistication or planning systems for category I companies. Of 
particular interest are such things as detailed supply side analysis, found in every company in the 
sample. Also of Interest Is the striking difference In attitude towards competitor analysis. On 
reflection this is not particularly surprising, since most bulk operators, however large, s till make up a
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relatively small part of the total market. The identification of competitors would not he easy, so a 
detailed analysis of specific competitors would be of little use. This is not the case with the liner 
companies or the oil majors. Competitors are small in number and easily identified. Concerns with 
market share and its preservation were typically found. Hence detailed competitor analysis formed a 
significant part of the planning for such companies.
In some respects the above table is misleading. In particular, it does not provide an indication of 
the amount of information collected, or the emphasis given to it. In detailed discussions it became clear 
that for the bulk trades the collection of information of the firs t type was extremely broad and general, 
and even the second type was fa irly  broad and sporadic. On the other hand, the emphasis given to the 
analysis of supply/demand relationships at a global level, but for different size and types of vessel, 
was considerable. A further factor which is potentially misleading in the table concerns company data. 
While not emphasised in the discussions there is little  doubt that knowledge of costs, both operating and 
financing, and of cost/revenue relationships, was detailed and accurate, and provided a broad 
background to the planning systems.
In order to provide a better indication of the type of information collected, and its importance in 
the planning process, and associated decision making, a broad summary is given below of the approach 
in the three major areas of activity. These summaries cover the information collected as part of the 
planning/decision making process, but also provide a lead in to decision making on a project basis. They 
thus provide a link between this section on corporate planning, and the next on project evaluation.
The Oil Majors
These appeared to s ta rt with a sophisticated and highly integrated picture of world economic and 
energy development. From this the outlook for oil and gas in terms of total energy needs could be 
established. Estimates, which were typically reviewed annually, usually covered 15-20 years. These 
estimates were usually broken down to cover different countries of the world, and these latter figures 
provided specific inputs into shipping decisions.
The next stage typically consisted of what one executive described as "lots o f marine 
analysis" . starting with a detailed tracking of the industry as it currently existed. Typically the 
exact usage of ships in the trade was known, even down to tied up ships. Forecasts were made, usually 
of a very detailed type. Both sides of the supply and demand analysis were given a lot of attention, as 
was the analysis of competitor behaviour, in making forecasts and estimating future rates a iot of
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sensitivity analysis was typically done.
In terms of Investments In shipping (or disinvestment), one of the principal concerns of the oil 
majors was estimating future chartering rates, since this would enable decisions to be made about the 
relative merits of the buying or chartering of vessels. In attempting to make rate forecasts 
considerable attention appeared to be devoted to ascertaining the rate setting mechanism. For example, 
one executive expressed his views as follows:
'We go through a lo t o f  pain try in g  to fin d  what is  the ra te  se tting  ship out 
there ... What is  the ra te  se tting  mechanism, near term , on out through the long 
term , which then involves estimates o f what a new building vessel w ill be like, what 
are the characte ristics o f it, what's the fu e l consumption o f it, what's i t  going to  
cost to but id  it .  it 's  a cost based ra te  setting system that we re ve rt to in the longer 
term . Then we estim ate ranges around that as to the uncertainties that may exist. '
Once the rate setters had been identified, competitor analysis concentrated on ascertaining whether the
current tanker mix put the company at a cost advantage or disadvantage.
In the final analysis, decisions were made about individual ships, but decisions were typically 
made initially in fleet terms, with a number of different classes of ship being identified. Total 
requirements by class of vessel were ascertained, and compared with current supply, thus raising the 
relevant issues. A cost of service analysis was then typically made, enabling the companies to sort out 
the best and w orst vessels. Alternative courses of action would then be considered, including the 
extension of the economic life of vessels, tying up vessels for several years with the possibility of 
subsequent break-out and re-use, buying or selling, chartering in or out. (This approach was of course, 
usable for both investment and disinvestment decisions, and the latter are currently more common.)
In coming to a final decision discounting techniques were usually used, but cash flow profiles 
were also important, since the rate forecast was recognised as suspect.
Legal, political and environmental issues were generally watched carefully, with a number of 
'what if" questions being asked.
The Liner Companies
In general similar procedures were followed to those of the oil companies, although variations 
clearly existed, particularly with regard to the degree of sophistication found. The starting point in the 
more sophisticated companies was generally some kind of forecast of the economies of the countries 
with the greatest influence on the trade of the shipping company. This in turn provided the basis for 
forecasts of the shipping markets themselves, which appeared to be done in considerable detail in all
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companies in this category. For example, the model set out by Temple. Barker. Sloan was based upon 
the planning work done at Delta Lines. The database and Forecasting ability of Sealand is most 
impressive. The detailed market analysis and forecasting done by the various conferences and/or 
consortia also needs to be recognised. One of the means of assisting such forecasts was through the use 
of information provided by various agencies and offices throughout the world, and such agencies and 
offices tend to go hand in hand with a regular liner trade. A very wide range of sources appeared to be 
used by the liner companies to support their forecasting processes, the general aim of which appeared 
to be to obtain an estimate of demand.
The supply side analysis was also typically done in considerable detail, and covered capacity 
analysis through the identification of new buildings, scrappings, companies leaving particular markets, 
new entrants, etc. In the liner trades the concept of market share appeared to be important. As has 
already been pointed out, competitors can be easily identified and analysed, both from a cost of service 
aspect, and from an overall assessment of financial strength and flexibility. Particularly important in 
this analysis was a comparison of cost per TEU slot, since individual liner companies tend not to be able 
to set the market rate individually. The philosophy would appear to be that if  you cannot control the 
market rate, the best way to survive and/or make profits is to be a low cost operator. In fact 
knowledge of competitors costs appeared to be widespread in the liner trades, and certain investment 
decisions (e.g. US Lines recent decision to build 12 new large containerships) appeared to be motivated 
largely by a search for lowest costs per TEU. In certain cases, concern with cost was far greater than 
concern with revenues, presumably on the grounds that revenues were (or should be) heavily influenced 
by cost considerations. While this may be true in some circumstances, conditions of overcapacity can 
destroy such a relationship, at least for a time. A search for low cost, while a necessary part of any 
investment decision, needs to be recognised as only part of the process. Indeed, there are already signs 
that the emphasis on more efficient ships with lower operating costs may well be about to plunge the 
liner trades into the same kind of overcapacity situation which has bedevilled the tanker trades for the 
last ten years, and sections of the dry bulk trade in more recent years.
Once estimates of supply and demand were put together the question of the need for further 
capacity could be raised. Thus in the liner trades decisions tended to emphasise total corporate 
capacity with the result that decisions were thought of in fleet terms, rather than individual vessels. If 
further capacity was needed then various alternative ways of achieving this needed to be identified and
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examined. A t this stage alternatives such as fleet re-deployment, chartering or building were typically 
considered. The decisions appeared to have three phases.
(i) Was extra capacity needed -  which was probably the most important part of the decision?
(il) What was the best way to add capacity -  redeployment, chartering, or buying?
(iii) Then -  and only then -  what was the best kind of vessel to acquire?
The firs t of these required careful consideration of the expected supply/demand relationship, and 
expected utilisation rates. This in turn enabled estimates of additional loads to be made, from which 
more detailed estimates of operating costs, operating revenues and fixed costs could be made. Such 
estimates were made in broad terms, and further refinement was required later, if  stage (c) was 
reached.
The second aspect of the decision required careful consideration of longer term needs, timing 
considerations, and the current state of the market. Only at the third stage would detailed 
consideration of vessel type come in. although clearly some broad alternatives would have been 
considered in the firs t stage. However, it  needs to be recognised that decisions about specific vessels 
were only the final part of a more lengthy process. For example, the "replacement" for the Atlantic 
Conveyor, sunk in the Falklands w ar. was in no sense a pure replacement, but a ship built to slot into a 
specific liner trade, where the emphasis was on the total trade.
The extent to which other environmental, legal or political information was built into the various 
decisions was less clear. Generally i t  seemed that little was done to plan for changes in these areas, 
other than where there was a very high degree of probability of occurrence. Occasionally “what ir 
analysis was done, but even this was rare. However, the nature of a liner company is such that a 
constant stream of information comes into the head offices from agencies and branch offices overseas. 
Thus most liner companies have a fa irly  clear idea regarding the following items, even if no formalised 
data collection system is used.
(i) Legal factors -  domestic legislation (e.g.MARAD) -  UNCTAD
(ii) Political factors -  state of economy and politics of countries with which trade occurs.
(iii) Labour relations.
(iv) Technology -  particularly, but not exclusively, in new ship design and fuel economy.
The bulk, trades
It has already been noted that two of the three category 1 companies that did not operate
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corporate planning systems were in the bulk trades. Even where such systems did operate, the 
emphasis was generally different to that found in the oil majors and liner companies. In very few cases 
were detailed forecasts made of general macro-economic conditions. In practice most bulk companies 
kept general information on macro-economic factors, but this information was not typically used to 
forecast future conditions, but to provide a general background to the planning and decision making 
process. Similarly, most such companies obtained information on an historic and forecast basis, for a 
variety of bulk trades, such as oil, ore. agriculture, etc. In a small number of cases specific forecasts 
were made in house. More usually they were purchased from consultants or similar agencies. Such 
forecasts again typically formed a general background against which decisions were taken. Very little  
detailed work appeared to take place with regard to breaking down estimated product movements to 
particular trades. The analysis was typically global with limited regional subdivisions.
Not surprisingly, therefore, considerable attention was paid to overall supply/demand 
relationships. Typically this was subsequently broken down into quite small divisions with regard to 
classes of vessel. Companies tended to search for vessels which were not in oversupply in the world 
markets, (or in protected markets such as the Jones Act market). Decisions were usually made on an 
individual vessel basis, though most companies involved in the bulk trades were concerned with the 
overall balance of their fleet. In very few cases, in todays market conditions, were decisions made on 
the basis of detailed or sophisticated forecasts of product movements, or long term charters. In 
general the approach seemed to be much more opportunistic, and concerns were more with the 
preservation of flexibility. As has been pointed out. detailed competitor analysis was virtually 
non-existent, although most companies had a reasonably good idea what was going on in the market in 
general terms. Limited environmental and related information was automatically sought, though in some 
cases particular information was sought e.g. in relation to U.S.aid.
Conclusion
Clearly substantial differences exist between the three types of activity, and the relative 
importance attached to each kind of information sought is not made clear by the numbers shown in table 
6. Since companies were not specifically asked to rank the information sought, in terms of its 
importance to the decision making process, any attempt to do so must be necessarily somewhat 
subjective. In spite of this, table 7 attempts to summarise the discussions so as to provide a broad 
indication of the relative importance attached to each area, but its limitations must be recognised.
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In fo rm a tio n  Sought R e la t iv e  im p o rtan c e  High m edium low
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Macro-factors |Oil majors | iBulkl 
flmersl
Shipping applications [Oil majors] (Bulk] 
|Liners|





Company data [Liners] [Bulk] 
[Oil majors
Environmental factors [Oil majors)[Liners] [ Bulk)
Table 7 Relative importance of information sought -  category 1 companies
4. Project Appraisal
4 I introduction and Summary of Findings
This part of the study aimed to ascertain the extent to which traditional financial evaluation 
techniques were used in practice, and the weighting given to them. It also aimed to identify any other 
factors of relevance in project appraisal. A great deal of overlap was found to exist, for category I 
companies, between the corporate planning systems and individual project appraisal. Indeed, it was 
clearly the case that most projects effectively ’grew out’ of the strategic plan, and had thus been very 
carefully discussed in the planning process. In many cases decisions to invest had been made in 
principle, at the planning stage, leaving the final project evaluation to fine tune the decision. In such 
cases the question of where and when the decision was effectively made was found to be extremely 
difficult to answer. Other projects were rather more opportunistic. The analysis of such projects 
typically concentrated rather more on strategic issues.
Substantial use was made of the traditional evaluation techniques, with virtually all companies 
using at least one of the discounting techniques. The IRR was the most favoured. Nevertheless, 
subsequent discussion and analysis made it clear that these techniques formed a relatively minor part of
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the overall evaluation process, albeit a necessary hurdle. in practice more emphasis appeared to be 
placed on the overall erfect of projects on corporate financial statements. Projects which had adverse 
effects on any such statements were frequently rejected. Cash and earnings profiles were significant, 
as was debt service ability. In a small number of cases breakeven rates were calculated. Overall the 
conclusion must be that the investment decision in category I companies is a multi-stage decision, in 
which discounting and other traditional evaluation techniques have a role, albeit relatively minor. These 
writings are consistent with the criticisms of finance theory made by writers such as King (1975) and 
Pinches (1982). discussed in Chapter 3.
± 2 Background lo_Erqject Appraisal
in general most companies investment decisions fell into two main types, but the division was 
implicit rather than explicit.
(i) those projects which were consistent with, and "grew out" of the strategic plan:
(ii) opportunistic projects.
The firs t type were clearly considered in strategic terms as part of the planning process, and 
were thus the result of a careful study of a variety of strategic, economic and market factors of the 
type discussed in the section on corporate planning. In general, it may be said that in this part of the 
process, the companies were looking for a "slot in the market" which was consistent with their existing 
business. It has already been pointed out that in the majority of cases, and virtually all cases other 
than bulk shipping, this "slot" referred to large investments, in fleets or classes of vessel, rather than 
in single ships, so the analysis made consisted of large elements of "system" analysis, rather than 
project analysis. There is no doubt that this "system" or corporate analysis was far more important 
than individual project analysis. The detailed project analysis was thus very much the last stage in a 
fa irly lengthy planning process.
Several companies explicitly made the point that inclusion in the strategic plan was a normal 
pre-requisite for consideration of an investment, although non-inclusion would not automatically 
preclude consideration of a project. Virtually ail companies adopted such an approach implicitly, and 
there is little  doubt that most decisions were of the type that "grew out" of the strategic plan. Funding 
considerations were sometimes an important factor in this. For example, one very large company, with
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a high level of financial strength, nevertheless adopted a policy of 1robbing Peter to pay Paul". in 
the sense that funds for new projects, not previously considered in the strategic plan, could only be 
obtained by dropping other projects in the strategic plan.
Consideration of the decisions made on the acquisition of vessels provided good illustrations of 
the above points. In a number of cases so called ‘new building* programmes were in fact ‘replacement* 
programmes, where the aim of the strategic plan was to make the fleet more cost efficient or more 
flexible. In other cases decisions were made which helped to support an existing trade, or to develop a 
new trade. The rationale for two such cases, both of which were clearly developed through the 
corporate planning process, are given below by way of example.
“Cruising is  an area that we have decided we want to  be in, and support, 
stra teg ica iiy  ... the rationale is , supporting a business which has been successful, ... 
but which (a ) needs to  keep up to  date w ith the competition, ... and (b) to expand a 
business which has proved, in  a fa ir ly  com petitive market, that i t  can do quite w e ii."
"The rationale basica/ly was to  get in to  a new trade, a fa ir ly  high technology 
trade, which we could probably develop and get an expertise in, which would give us 
a m arket lead, a t least fo r some years. "
The second group of projects might be termed "opportunistic”, in that they represent projects 
which are the response to an opportunity. A small number of examples of this type were found, such as 
the acquisition by Cunard of the fleet of fru it carriers owned by Maritime Fruit Carriers, which was 
clearly an opportunistic decision. The earlier sections on positioning and flexibility indicate that in 
many companies an ability to respond to opportunities was seen as being an essential part of the 
strategic planning approach, and such companies clearly kept an eye on the market.
In practice it  is sometimes difficult to distinguish the two types of decision. For example, the 
take-over bid made in 1983 by Trafalgar House for P & 0 was made at a time when it  is unlikely that 
Cunard (the TH subsidiary) could justify major expenditure on new ships, as ships. In a sense such a bid 
may therefore be viewed as opportunistic. However, with a company like Trafalgar House, which has a 
reputation for sound acquisitions, it  is unlikely that the bid was not extremely well researched over a 
lengthy period of time. The acquisition of Heublein by Reynolds Industries, discussed in section 2.4. 
provides another example of the difficulty of categorisation of this type. Clearly it  is possible for the 
categories to be related in the sense that the strategic plans may well point to the need for further 
major developments, but that such developments have to arise on the market before they can be taken.
It was generally found that the approach to these "opportunistic" projects was rather different
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to that for the firs t category, and that a more ad hoc approach was used. Typically, very much more 
time was spent In specifically considering the strategic Issues that arose from individual opportunistic 
projects than those which grew out of the strategic plan. This was simply because the strategic factors 
had been regularly considered for projects in this firs t category; whereas they had not. at least not in 
the same way, for the second group. Hence the analysis of this second group included very much more 
consideration of risk and the overall effect on group figures. Once this strategic analysis had been done 
it was usual to find the same kind of numeric analysis being made, but this analysis, while Important, 
tended to be secondary to the strategic considerations. Nonetheless, if  the numeric analysis Indicated 
that the project was not really viable, it probably would not be done, in short, project evaluation of the 
type included in the majority of finance text books has a role in investment appraisal, but as only one 
fairly small part of the total process.
4 2  Appraisal Methods used
Given the initial emphasis of this project, detailed questions were asked throughout the survey 
about the kind of forecasts prepared, to support individual project analysis, and the appraisal methods 
used. Specific questions were asked about forecasts of revenues, costs and disposal values, and the 
periods for which such forecasts were prepared. The results for the operating costs and revenues are 
shown in table 8. Nine companies made estimates of disposal values, but reservations about the 
usefulness of such an estimate were common.





Operating revenues 1 — 1 1 14 1 (1 )
A
Table 8 Forecasts of costs/revenues -  Category 1 companies
The company which did not forecast operating revenues typically used its knowledge of current 
freight rates to give it  a reasonable idea of the expected revenue/cost relationship. The two companies 
preparing forecasts of revenues and costs for less than five years were both involved predominantly in 
the bulk trades.
Eleven companies adjusted their forecasts for inflation, typically using a variety of indices. Four
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companies used figures expressed In "current* terms. Two companies did not adjust their project
forecasts, but discussed the Inflationary issues and assumptions In detail as part of the evaluation. In
two cases answers to the question in the context of project forecasts were unclear, but inflation was
dealt with in detail in the corporate planning system. In most cases, where adjustments were made the
basis for the figures was set out in the corporate plan. At least four companies used forecasts on both
a constant basis and an inflation adjusted basis (or bases), with the idea of getting a better
understanding of the potential Impact of Inflation on the profitability of the project.
In discussions the problems of making inflation adjustments were made fairly clear, as is
Indicated by the following comments made by the Finance Director of a large UK company.
"We're be-devilled w ith the problem o f in flation. We have big debates on 
whether to  inc/ode an in fla tion  ra te  o r not, as we haven't re a lly  resolved it. 
decause o f course i f  you include any so rt o f in fla tion ra te  your revenues soon go sky 
high, and your margin is  getting wider and wider, so your p ro fit's  looking wonderful. 
But i t  doesnt actually happen like  that ... Everybody predicts an ever upward trend  
and it  doesnt happen ... no-one can actually predict when th is  w ill happen o r when 
that w ill happen."
In spite of these comments this company included inflation adjustments in its forecasts, though little 
reliance appeared to be placed on any figures going out beyond five years.
The next set of detailed questions concerned the project appraisal techniques actually used. 
Specific questions were asked about the use of Payback. Accounting Rate of Return (ARR), Net Present 
Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Information on other techniques used was also sought. 
Table 9 provides a summary of the use of the traditional techniques.




One method 1 1 2 4
Two methods 3 1 1 3 4
Three methods 6 3 5 7 7
Four methods 2 2 2 2 2
11 7 9 14 18
a
Table 9 Appraisal methods used *  Category 1 companies
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In only one case was a dear cut answer not obtained. In this case no major decisions had been 
made in shipping in recent years, so It was Impossible to back up the questions by reference to actual 
decisions. The discussions nevertheless suggested that, in principle, the company would use most of the 
available techniques. The company shown in the table as using none of the traditional techniques had in 
fact carried out a major strategic review of its activities, included in which were detailed forecasts 
for the company, including major new initiatives, over a long period. It was thus not considered 
necessary to follow through these figures to obtain an NPV or IRR for the new ventures, since the 
overall corporate return on capital was adequate. In discussions it  was explained that discounting 
techniques would be used to help evaluate non necessary investments where alternative courses of 
action were available. In the remaining cases few examples were found of companies relying on single 
techniques. Of the four companies shown as using one method in the above table, two indicated that 
other methods might be used in certain circumstances. In the other two companies a number of other 
calculations and techniques were used, other than the traditional techniques referred to above, in both 
cases the decisions were made as part of a rigorous planning process.
As shown in table 9, payback was used in eleven cases, though for shipping transactions this was 
usually done on an after interest and loan repayments basis. Two companies specifically referred to the 
use of discounted payback. The accounting rate of return for individual projects was seldom calculated, 
but the effect on overall return on capital was calculated In seven of the 18 cases, as part of a wider 
analysis of the type discussed below. Sixteen of the 18 companies included in table 9 used one or two of 
the dcf techniques, with the IRR being favoured. The calculation of NPV was less common than IRR. and 
some answers indicated confusion with regard to its meaning. Other criteria were identified in a small 
number of cases, usually being concerned with profiles over time of cash flows or earnings, or the 
calculation of break even rates. Six companies placed great emphasis on cash or earnings profiles for 
individual projects. Four companies calculated break-even rates, three relating to freight rates, one 
relating to utilisation. Three others paid particular attention to careful consideration of the relationship 
between revenues and costs.
Detailed follow up questions were asked about the cash flows used for discounting purposes, and 
about the choice of discount rate. The results are summarised in table 10.
232
Basis o f Cash Flows
Basis o f discount ra te








Linked to borrowing rate 4 4 8
Other 1 2 3




Table 10. Oasis of cash flows used In discounting/choice of discount rate -  category 1 companies
Two of the 16 companies using discounting techniques carried out computations based on both of 
the two methods shown above, accounting for the total of 18. Somewhat surprisingly, only 5 companies 
used weighted average cost of capital as the basis of the discount rate. In two of these cases the 
impression given was that the figure used was an approximation (even a guess), without any formal 
calculation being carried out. In one case the calculation was based upon book value weights. In eight 
cases (representing 6 companies), a rate was used which was linked to the borrowing rate. Four of 
these companies used a rate based very closely on the actual cost of borrowing. Two used the rata of 
interest as a base, but added sizable percentages (3 -  8%) as risk premiums, thus converting the rate 
into a more appropriate figure. Of the three companies using "other" rates, two appeared to use figures 
deemed appropriate to equity returns for a given degree of risk (typically 20 * 25%. according to the 
perceived risk), while the third used a variety of rates, depending upon circumstances, few of which 
were made clear. Two companies did not specify particular rates. These results indicate that a variety 
of approaches existed, with regard to both discounting, and the choice of discount rate. A number of 
errors, inconsistencies and a certain amount of confusion clearly exists with regard to the application 
of the traditional techniques. These w ill be examined further in chapter 11.
The above results appear consistent with other empirical studies referred to in Chapter 3. They 
indicate a role for the various techniques, particularly the discounting techniques. However, the 
comments of the previous section have already made clear that these techniques represented only a
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relatively small part of the total analysis. In the course of this study considerable follow-up discussion 
took place with regard to the importance of these techniques in the total appraisal process. No attempt 
was made to formally assess the relative importance of the various techniques, in the sense of using a 
structured ranking approach. The concern was more with the identification of broad indications of the 
importance of various techniques in the appraisal of different types of projects in different kinds of 
company.
Inevitably such an approach can only be impressionistic. However, reservations about the 
usefulness of the four traditional techniques were expressed in a number of cases. Examples of the sort 
of comments made are given below:
7 don't think any o f them (the four appraisal techniques) could be looked on as 
a sacred cow type o f approach ... There’s always a danger o f people saying. 'weVe 
done th is  sc ie n tifica lly , therefore it's  correct'. Often a ll you're doing is  putting  
your assumptions down a d iffe ren t way ... it's  the assumptions which are the 
problem. The calculation, tha t's arithm etic, i t  helps, but no more than th a t."
7 have a very strong feeling that ... whoever invented re tu rn  on investment did  
a great d is-service to  American business, because what happens ... is  that you tend 
to depend too much on the quantitative analysis which replaces business judgem ent."
An executive in another company summarised his views on investment decisions by saying that the final
decision was m80X a business decision, and 20X a numeric decision" The implication of this
is that numeric analysis of the traditional type is a relatively small part of the overall investment
decision.
Reservations of this type are essentially based upon the problems of defining assumptions and 
making forecasts of reasonable accuracy. Other reservations were concerned with the weighting given 
to the techniques. They typically confirmed the earlier comments that in general the various techniques 
used are viewed as hurdles, but that they represent a quite small part of the total investment decision 
making process. One such example is given below.
"We do not give much weighting to the dcf. We do look quite closely a t the 
im pact on the p ro fit and loss in  the fir s t few  years. We look a t the impact on the 
groups gearing and on the groups in te rest cover. So financia lly, these are re a lly  the 
numbers that we look at. And then o f course, the judgement is  on a ll the other 
underlying assumptions which make up the pro ject. ’
In fact subsequent discussions made dear that in many companies calculations as to the effect, on 
the strategic plans and overall group figures, of various projects, were more important than the 
traditional techniques, and often represented the most important aspect of the decision. Examples were 
found where projects were rejected because of an adverse effect on one of the corporate financial
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statements, as indicated in the following statement.
'So, autom atically, as a m atter o f routine, a new p ro ject would be fed in to  the 
system  to  see its  e ffe c t on both group and divisions P ro fit and Loss and Cash. I t  is  
thus quite possible fo r a p ro je ct w ith very good returns, but which has adverse 
effects on the Balance Sheet fo r a couple o f years, to  be re jected  on the la tte r 
basis,’
In other cases comments on the role of discounting were followed by further discussions of the 
factors given weight in decision making. For example:
“Yes, we do use dcf, and we do a lt the numbers, and we say, isn 't that a good 
yie ld , and then we spend fa r more tim e looking a t the p ro fit and loss account fo r the 
f ir s t five  years, and looking a t the earnings level, compared to  todays earnings 
level, necessary to  make an investment which provides an adequate ra te  o f return. 
This re tu rn  means in  an accounting sense. What w ill i t  do to  the re tu rn  on 
shareholders funds? What w ill i t  do to  our in te rest cover? What w ill i t  do to  our 
Balance Sheet? These are fa r more im portant than what the d c f calculation shows 
... A t the end o f the day any investment decision is  a highly subjective decision, 
p a rticu la rly  in  shipping ".
Clearly analyses of this latter type were not particularly important for smaller projects, since global 
estimates would already have been included in the plans, but for all major decisions this represented an 
extremely important part of the decision. The previous section on corporate planning has already 
shown that forecast financial statements were prepared for some years ahead, as a matter of routine, 
for virtually all category 1 companies. The overall effect of the various proposals on corporate 
financial statements were thus automatically considered. It is not dear whether every individual 
project was assessed in terms of its effect on the financial statements, although this appeared to be the 
case in at least six companies. Within the overall analysis particular emphasis was placed on cash 
flows because, given the size of cash flows involved, a lack of careful planning in this area might well 
create undesirable problems for the overall organisation. Apart from general concerns with cash 
flows, eight companies emphasised careful analysis of debt service requirements, typically on both a 
project and a corporate basis. Most of these companies had very considerable activities in shipping, 
which made up the bulk of their activities. The high cost of assets, the relatively large debt typically 
associated with vessel acquisition, and the current volatility of the markets, all contributed to the 
perception of shipping as a potentially very risky business. Debt must be serviced if  a company is to 
survive. A debt service analysis of the type referred to above is thus perceived as an essential part of 
the decision making process. As one executive put it: I f  everything went down the chute, can 
we absorb the shock?"
Overall, therefore, it  appears that the cash profiles of a project, and their effects on overall
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group results, as measured by the financial statements, are a more important part of the decision 
making process than the calculation of dcf returns. Particular features which were given weighting 
were:
(i) regular earnings were much preferred to volatile earnings, so that it  is likely that less volatile 
projects with lower returns would be preferred to more volatile projects with greater expected 
returns. ‘Expected values’ did not figure very large in the decisions;
(ii) earnings profiles, with some companies requiring the making of profits from day 1. though this 
varied according to the proportion of total company business that was in shipping. The higher the 
proportion of shipping business, the less important such an objective becomes;
(iii) shipping projects are typically long term, but loan repayments, and associated interest, are 
usually required over shorter periods (typically 8 1/2 years). Satisfactory profits may thus be 
achieved at the same time as a fa irly  disastrous cash flow pattern is occurring. Great attention is thus 
paid to the cash flow effects of projects, particularly over the firs t five years or so. The poor 
management of cash flow can have very serious, possibly catastrophic, consequences for a business.
Interestingly, very few of the ideas discussed in this and the previous section are mutually 
exclusive. The above comments certainly do dqL invalidate the use of the traditional evaluation 
techniques. Such techniques can, and should, form part of a multi-stage evaluation process. In 
practice, however, a number of stages of evaluation appear to exist, and the weighting given to the 
traditional methods is quite low.
5 . Risk in Investment Decisions
5J. Introduction and Summary oLEiMOSS
The earlier sections on philosophies and strategies, particularly those parts relating to quality of 
earnings and flexibility, makes it  clear that most category 1 companies are risk averse. One might 
therefore expect to find that the treatment of risk analysis would be fa irly sophisticated, with a 
variety of techniques being used, to deal with risk at two levels, namely:
( i)  Project risk
(ii)  Corporate risk
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Considerable emphasis is placed on the former in finance texts, and a variety of techniques have been 
developed for dealing with it. Serious consideration of the latter is a more recent innovation, and the 
emphasis is on bankruptcy costs. In practice the emphasis found was somewhat different, with 
consideration of corporate risk generally being given a much higher priority than individual project risk. 
Other than sensitivity analysis, which was used in the majority of cases, very few applications were 
found of the techniques used to deal with project risk, and very little  consistency was found in the use 
of such techniques. The use of probabilities, expected value, simulation techniques, and similar 
analytical techniques was found to be almost non-existent.
1L2 General approaches to Risk
In practice assessments of corporate risk were generally made in two areas
(i) Corporate financial risk -  related to the ability to service and raise debt, and to make the 
necessary payments to cover operating costs.
(ii) Business risk -  related to the ability to keep a balanced diversity of interests, or (in the case of 
shipping companies) to keep a balanced fleet in full or near full employment, so as to achieve an 
appropriate quality and level of earnings.
Clearly the need for profits, and the risk of not making profits, would need to be covered in both 
areas, and in a sense was the overriding consideration. However, the nature of the corporate planning 
systems for category 1 companies needs to be remembered. Undoubtedly a primary, if  implicit, aim of 
these systems was the identification of the kind of circumstances which might pose problems over the 
next five years or so. in terms of markets, profits, liquidity, etc. Hence risk analysis of the above 
type must be perceived as an essential and integrated part of the planning systems.
In passing it  is perhaps worth noting that companies did not attempt to make any estimates of 
possible bankruptcy costs. Rather, they attempted to ensure that liquidity was sufficient to carry them 
through a series of adverse events. If insufficient resources were held to carry a company through, 
then the chances of such an investment being made were almost zero. The concern with bankruptcy 
costs found in the finance literature had no exact counterpart in practice. Circumstances and 
investments which might lead to possible bankruptcy (or lesser financial difficulties) were typically 
identified, and then avoided if  it  were at all possible. Risk could be. and frequently was. reduced by the
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holding of cash reserves or short term investments, and credit lines or revolving credit agreements.
As far as business risk is concerned, earlier sections have identified the concern with 
diversification and a spread of interests. For shipping companies this usually translated into a desire to 
have interests in a number of different types of vessels, and/or use of a number of different sized 
vessels, and/or involvement in a number of different markets/geographical areas. However, almost by 
definition, such an approach is part of strategic planning, rather than individual project appraisal.
5L2 Analytical Approaches to Risk
The only analytical approach to risk which was used regularly and systematically was sensitivity 
analysis. Seventeen of the 19 companies used this technique as a regular part of their planning process. 
The majority of companies analysed sensitivity to a number of factors, and in a small number of cases 
very large numbers of variations were gone through (e.g. 80-100). usually with the aim of obtaining 
some sort of "profile" regarding risk. The most important factors analysed were as follows:
(i) changes in utilisation rates of vessels, which threw out break-even utilization rates for given
freight rates.
(ii) changes in freight rates/revenues
(iii) changes in operating costs
(iv) changes in interest rates
(v) changes in currency exchange rates
(vi) market share/market growth rates
(vii) disposal values
Only variations in the firs t four of these factors were analysed in almost all companies using 
sensitivity analysis. The last three, while fa irly common, were nothing like as universally found. U.S.
companies, for example, had little  need to worry about changes in exchange rates, whereas UX.
companies clearly did, since most revenues were dollar denominated. Concerns with market 
share/market growth were found more often in the liner companies. Concern with disposal values was 
smaller than might have been expected, though the earlier discussion on philosophy provides some 
rationale for this.
In considering the application of sensitivity analysis the earlier comments on the form and nature
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of the corporate plan need to be borne in mind. It has already been pointed out that in the majority of 
cases the figures for individual projects would be fed into the corporate figures. This principle follows 
through into the sensitivity analysis, in that the effect of variations in certain factors was generally 
determined in relation to the corporate figures, as well as to the individual project figures. Indeed, the 
effect on corporate figures generally seemed to be given more weight.
In a small number of cases other specific approaches to risk were found.
(i) the calculation of break-even rates
(ii) estimates of vessel disposal values at different stages, so as to assess the risks involved if  a 
project were abandoned at different stages of its life
(iii) the use of different discount rates to compensate for differences in perceived risk
(iv) the development of different scenarios
(v) the use of alternative forecasts associated with low or high probability of occurrence
(vi) the use of a 'doomsday' forecast or scenario.
None of the above items were specifically identified in the discussions in more than two companies each. 
Overall their importance in decision making would thus appear to be low (though this may not be the 
case in the individual companies concerned). Having said this, there is little  doubt that many companies 
knew their break-even rates in detail. Even if  not identified as an explicit part of the analysis, such 
figures may form a small implicit part. Such a possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. A further 
factor worth noting is that in practice it  was difficult to establish where sensitivity analysis ended and 
scenario planning started. In a sense it  might therefore be argued that (ii). (iv). (v) and (vi) above are 
variations on a sensitivity analysis/scenario planning theme. What did become clear is that sensitivity 
analysis and scenario planning were popular principally because they do not require judgements per se 
to be made of the future. A judgemental stage clearly occurs, but sensitivity analysis and scenario 
planning help to identify those areas which require most careful consideration and subsequent control. 
In volatile markets such an approach has particularly clear advantages.
There is no doubt that in practice a considerable amount of time goes into risk assessments for 
category 1 companies. However, as has been shown, the majority of the time spent relates to 
corporate wide strategic and financial considerations. There is some danger that the real risk inherent 
in individual projects may be overlooked, if  such projects do not pose serious problems at a corporate 
level.
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fL  Financing Aspects o f In vestm en t D ecisions
6 .1 Introduction and Summary of Findings
This section is concerned with the consideration of various aspects of the financing decision. 
Questions thus covered the relationship between the investment and financing decision, methods of 
finance, security, and capital structure.
The relationship between the investment and financing decisions was found to be closer than 
might have been expected from a study of the theory, with concerns covering a number of different 
areas bo do with availability of finance, the use of subsidised finance, the financial packaging of a 
project, and the effect on the overall financial position. The two aspects were generally kept further 
apart in larger companies. The main reasons for this appeared to be linked to the relative importance 
(or unimportance) of project finance on the corporate financial position, and the development of a 
bureaucracy supporting the finance function.
Methods of finance were found to follow fa irly standard patterns, covering corporate loans (in a 
relatively small number of cases), loans related to new ships. Title XI finance, and bank financing. 
Leasing was used in some companies, generally under fa irly specific circumstances. Associated 
security was found to be based on mortgages, assignments and guarantees, with variations occurring 
depending upon circumstances and preferences.
Questioning on capital structure revealed a somewhat more complex picture than is found in the 
theory. While limits existed in most companies for which clear responses were obtained, virtually no 
companies set target capital structures. Capital structure was seen as depending upon a variety of 
factors, including: the effect of capital structure on share price and bond ratings; the ability to finance 
capital expenditure internally; the relationship between debt service commitments and profitability; 
debt repayment profiles; the nature of the assets being funded; and economic conditions. Capital 
structure was seen as being something of a residual, rather than as a positive decision variable.
(l 2 Relationship between the Investment and Financinq Decisions
Under the MM assumptions finance theory suggests that investment decisions should be 
considered separately from financing decisions. However, the benefits from tax and subsidised credit
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clearly need to be considered in reaching a final decision. Overall the theory in this area is less than 
universally accepted. In practice considerable confusion also existed in this area, and 
misunderstandings appeared to exist in a number of companies. For example, as has already been seen, 
it  was found that even in this category, a significant number of companies were found to be discounting 
future cash flows -  including debt service commitments -  by a rate which reflected the cost of 
borrowing. Since such cash flows represent a return on equity, a more appropriate discount rate 
would appear to be one which reflects the cost of equity -  typically for a highly geared project.
Attitudes also differed somewhat, with eight of the 19 companies in this category separating the 
investment and financing decisions in a fairly clear-cut way, though in four of these companies it  was 
apparent that a fa irly clear view was held as to where finance could be obtained, and the conditions 
likely to be attached to such finance. Seven companies considered the two aspects to be bound together. 
The remaining four companies all saw links, but opinions and practice ranged from having a general idea 
on the availability to finance, to calculating ROI on both a 100X equity base and an after debt service 
base, so as to identify clearly any differences, and to see if  differing financial packages could improve 
the profitability of the project.
In general it  appeared that the separation of investment and financing was at its most clear cut in 
the largest companies, such as the oil major and some conglomerates. In three cases total capital 
employed was in excess of $ 10B. In each or these cases the investment and financing decisions were 
kept completely separate, so much so that there appeared to be a possibility that relatively cheap forms 
of asset related finance had been overlooked, with debt being automatically taken out in large corporate 
chunks. Whether the separation of the investment and financing aspects was the result of a specific 
policy, or merely the result of the setting up of the large bureaucracy necessary to run a very large 
enterprise, was far from clear. Certainly in ail three companies there were either maritime divisions 
responsible for initiating shipping projects, or the shipping activities were dealt with in a strong 
subsidiary company, but with central financing. The only other company in the survey with assets 
substantially in excess of $5B also kept the two aspects of the decision separate, but increasingly the 
Head Office of the parent was expecting the initiating subsidiary to come in with alternative suggestions 
for finance. For companies with total assets employed of less than $5B, size did not appear to be an 
explanatory variable in terms of the separation of investment and financing decisions. Interestingly, 
all five companies which used the weighted average cost of capital as the discount rate did keep the
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investment and financing aspects separate, implying an understanding or. and compliance with, 
traditional theory in this area.
The companies which were most concerned with the financing aspects and their relation to the 
investment decision were mainly interested in four factors:
(i) Availability of finance. Was sufficient finance available to enable the project to be adequately 
funded?
(ii) Could the use of subsidised finance enable further gains to be made on the project?
(iii) Would the availability of different financial packages for various alternative courses of action 
lead to a different decision being made as to which course of action was most appropriate?
(iv) Would the undertaking of the project, financed in the assumed proportions, pose any problems for 
the company, in terms of bond rating, share price, or long term survival?
Given the very high cost associated with investment in shipping, the importance of question (i). 
relating to availability of finance, is dear. However, in practice yard finance is usually available for 
new ships, so concerns can be narrowed down to the non-yard financed portion of new ships, or second 
hand ships. The cost of shipping investments for the oil majors and large conglomerates, relative to 
existing funds and earnings size and quality, was sufficiently low to enable these companies to 
effectively ignore questions (i) and (iv). In ignoring these the danger exists that questions (ii) and (iii) 
may also be missed. For most of the remaining companies the four questions appeared relevant, with 
very heavy emphasis being placed on questions (i) and (iv) by the companies engaged primarily in the 
bulk trades, where the size and quality of earnings is lower now than has usually been the case. Earlier 
comments on the importance of corporate planning clearly indicate the general relevance of question
(iv). Questions (ii) and (iii) remain. Benefits exist in the use of subsidised or preferential credit, and 
such benefits need to be quantified if  possible. Existing methods of calculation did not usually provide a 
clear cut answer, nor did they enable a sensible assessment of the project risk to be made. However, 
the financial package available clearly did influence the choice of shipbuilder in 12 cases. The financial 
package available was viewed as an essential ingredient in arriving at the total cost, in the remaining 
cases the choice of shipbuilder was more heavily influenced by such things as technical expertise, past 
performance, delivery dates, etc.
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6 3 Methods of Finance
By far the most popular methods for financing capital assets were those providing some kind of 
subsidy or preferential interest rates. For ships these typically consisted of:
(i) Loans through the Ship Mortgage Finance Corporation on OECD terms
(ii) Yard credit
(iii) Title XI Finance in the USA
Fifteen of the 19 category 1 companies had used one or more of the above to finance vessels acquired in 
the last five years. In almost all of these cases it  was apparent that such finance was regarded as the 
principal source of finance, at least for dsol ships. Most of the remaining companies were oil majors or 
conglomerates, where financing was done centrally. In such cases funds were more likely to come from 
a corporate debt pool -  with corporate loans or debentures being raised if  necessary -  or from company 
retentions. While it  is difficult to be objective about this particular question, the impression gained was 
that "spin-offs" would cause, or had caused, a significant re-think in the financing methods of newly 
spun-off shipping corporations, with more reliance on the three categories listed above.
Bank loan finance was also found to be important in financing vessels and other shipping company 
assets, with particularly important areas being:
(i) loans for second hand vessels
(ii) top-ups -  finance beyond the amount provided by one of the methods referred to above
(iii) stretching or re-financing of loans -  effectively to extend the financing period of a vessel -  often
to 12-15 years.
Seven companies explicitly identified examples of the use of bank finance for the above. Five companies 
made it  clear that bank finance might well be used under certain circumstances.
The only other source of finance used with any degree of consistency was leasing. Eleven 
companies indicated that they had used, or had seriously considered using, leasing. Nevertheless the 
use of leasing was generally confined to three areas:
(i) vessels which were backed by a very long term charter
(ii) vessels where the company could not use the tax allowances itself, but could obtain greater
benefit through the leasing company
(iii) containers.
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The vast majority of leases were tax based, since long term charters are currently in short supply. In 
a small number of cases leases were preferred to loans because longer periods of financing could 
usually be obtained (typically up to 15 years).
In the remaining companies a considerable resistance to the use of leasing was found. Eight 
companies stated that they had not. or would not. seriously consider leasing. Reasoning was usually 
based on two arguments.
(i) Loss of flexibility, since vessels could not be sold without prohibitive default clauses coming into 
operation.
(if) Capital allowances could be beneficially used somewhere within the corporate group.
New equity (in the form of new issues of capital) was raised by only a small number of 
companies, none of which were regarded principally as shipping companies. Increases in equity came 
about almost entirely through retentions.
In negotiating loans for new vessels the companies typically took out the maximum possible 
amount, This was found to be true in 14 of the 19 cases, most of the exceptions again being the largest 
conglomerates or oil majors. In a few cases it  was made dear that exceptions to this might occur if 
cash flow patterns were favourable, or if  the currency of the loan was not favourable. In several 
companies maximum loans were only sought if  they were associated with lower interest rates or 
similar subsidy. In one such case while asset based subsidised loans were taken, debt management was 
clearly done on a corporate basis, and more expensive loans were frequently retired from the proceeds 
of the subsidised loans. Undoubtedly this went on to a lesser degree in other companies, but in only one 
case was such a policy clearly defined. The proportion of the cost of new vessels typically financed 
from loan was 80-100%, sometimes with a combination of yard credit and bank loans being taken out.
For second hand vessels the position was rather less clear. Only about half of the companies in 
this category had made major acquisitions of second hand tonnage. Of these only three typically sought 
the maximum loans, and. as has been seen in the chapter on banks, the maximum amount usually 
depended on the type and age of the vessel. Finance for second hand vessels was almost entirely bank 
finance, with loans being typically for 50-70% of cost over periods of 5-7 years.
Loan periods did not appear to be a major problem for companies in this category, since banks 
typically were prepared to top up and “stretch" yard credit, so that typical loan periods on new ships 
were 10-12 years. Also, almost all companies were able to re-finance borrowings fairly easily, thus
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further extending the repayment period if  necessary. 
i L4  S ecurity
Security needed for yard credit was typically a firs t mortgage on the vessel. Security required 
for bank loans usually consisted of one or more of the following:
(i) firs t mortgage on the vessel
(ii) assignment of earnings
(iii) second mortgage on the vessel
(iv) parent company guarantees
The firs t of these was given in almost all cases except the oil majors and large conglomerates. The
second was also fa irly common. Second mortgages were much less common, being associated with
more risky projects, or those where the loan proportion was very high. Parent company guarantees
were avoided by some companies, while others saw no problems with them. In the final analysis the
security given is the result of a process of negotiation, which reflects corporate and bank attitudes as
well as prevailing market conditions.
The use of detailed security measures such as those outlined above is somewhat surprising, at
least in the context of category 1 companies, since one might expect lending to be balance sheet
oriented, rather than asset oriented, for such companies. Two possible reasons for this were
identified. One was that if  certain banks required security of this type, every other bank would require
it. simply b  remain mp a ri passu '  with other banks. In effect, the banks need b  ensure ba t ober
lenders are not "preferred" credibrs in be event of a winding up. The ober reason why additional
security may be given is b  obbin slight reductions in be rab  of inbrest charged. One company
expressed its views in be following way:
"Banks have tra d itio n a lly  required fo r th e ir shipping loans a fir s t p re fe rred  
mortgage on the vessel, a parent company guarantee, and assignment o f monies under 
a charter, which we are very happy to give them. As a public company some banks
have enough com fort in  our balance sheet that they would make us a s tra igh t balance
sheet loan, ju s t w ith a parent company guarantee. But we would s t iii give them the 
mortgage and the assignment because the p ric ing  is  a litt le  be tte r i f  they have assets 
as co lla tera l, and we have no hesitation in  giving i t  to them. '
Overall, security does not appear b  be a major problem for category 1 companies.
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fL5 Capital. Structure
A number of detailed questions were asked in this area, covering total debt limitations, capital 
structure targets, the effect of different capital structures on share price, and related issues. In a 
number of cases clear answers were not obtained to these questions, principally because interviews 
took place in subsidiary companies, while decisions on capital structure were made centrally. In spite 
of this reduction in the effective sample, the answers provided did suggest a dear concern with the 
level of debt, although generally for reasons of financial prudence and flexibility, rather than for any 
reasons to do with share price per se. Of course financial prudence and flexibility may well affect 
share price, but the emphasis was very much on the former rather than the latter.
The firs t question asked in this section was whether the company set a lim it to the total amount 
of debt taken up. Clear responses were obtained from 13 companies. Of these 11 stated that there was
a lim it, with only 2 companies stating that there was no effective lim it. These two companies qualified
their statements in subsequent discussions. In one case it  was made dear that the company was 
operating at a debt level well below the levels it  had become accustomed to in earlier years, so a 
substantial increase in debt was not seen as posing any particular problems. Debt levels for this 
particular company had been amongst the highest of the category 1 companies. In the second company 
concerns were not with debt limits per se. but with the company's ability to service debt. Clearly the 
two are related, but the emphasis was not on the level of debt as such, but on the ability to service 
debt. Of the six companies for which clear answers were not obtained, five had overall levels of debt 
which were amongst the lowest of all the companies in the survey.
Several of the 11 companies which stated that there was a lim it to the debt taken up referred to 
specific limitations, such as those included in the following statements.
"Years ago we had a house lim it o f not having debt more than tw ice equity. 
Right now we have a house lim it that we would be closer to 1:1"
7 .7  is  a leve i beyond which we wouldn't wish to  go ."
Other illustrative quotations in this area are included in later sections. In other cases no specific figure 
was given, often because actual debt-equity ratios were so far within any notional or conceivable lim it 
that concerns with overall levels were not particularly great.
The next area of questioning related to target capital structures. In a small number of cases 
published comments were found which might be taken to imply that a target capital structure existed.
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Two such examples are given below:
“AH things considered, a debt to  capita l ra tio  o f about SOX is  appropriate fo r 
Moore McCormack, and the actions taken, plus an improvement in  the economy, 
shouid move us back towards that le ve l." (MM Annual Report 1982-P4)
“A t December 31st 1982 and 1981, the sum o f long-term  debt and redeemable 
pre fe rred  stocks as a percentage o f to ta l capita/  was J3X and 28X  respectively, and 
has averaged 3 tX  over the la s t fou r years. The company believes that these 
debt-to-eguity ra tio s  re fle c t the maintenance o f an adequate capitalization position 
and that i t  has the a b ility  to ra ise additional funds in  the long term  debt market 
without im pairing present cred it ratings. “ (Reynolds Annual Report 1982-P37)
In the discussions a specific question was asked in all cases, as to whether the company worked
towards the achievement of a particular long run capital structure. Of the 19 companies in this
category, 14 provided dear answers to this question. None of these 14 companies had target capital
structures as such. In one of the five companies where a clear answer to the question could not be
obtained, because the interview was at a divisional level, the following comments were made:
7 am not aware o f any overa ll corporate target fo r debt, o r any debt equity 
ra tio , other than /  know that our Finance and Treasury Department are conscious o f 
that as i t  re la tes to  the corporate ra tin g ; Standard and Poor's, Duns o r whatever. 
We do not concern ourselves w ith it, but when there is  a corporate concern we hear 
about it .  “
While not conclusive, such a comment suggests that no target capital structure existed for this 
company.
Clearly, therefore, target capital structures were not seen as important for category 1 
companies. However, the fact that limits to the amount of debt were almost universally acknowledged, 
suggests that some kind of capital structure related concerns exist, in fact discussions in this area 
were wide ranging, and a number of variables were identified as being important contributors to the 
final capital structure. The most important of these variables were:
(i) the perceived effect of capital structure, and changes therein, on share price
(ii) the relationship between new investment opportunities and the availability of internal funds
(iii) the perceived effect of capital structure on bond ratings and the ability to finance further
investments
(iv) the relationship between profitability and debt service requirements, with interest cover often 
being used an an imperfect surrogate
(v) the repayment profile of debt, and the ability to re-finance debt;
(vi) the nature of the assets being funded by debt
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(vii) market fashion with regard to gearing, and the effect of changing economic conditions on 
desirable ratios.
Consideration of ail these factors typically means that the actual gearing level is something of a 
residual, representing nothing more than a balancing of the above factors. The relative importance of 
each of these is difficult to assess since both the shipping markets and the economics of the western 
world have been going through rather traumatic times. Nevertheless some broad generalisations can be 
made.
Capital Structure and Share Price
With regard to the firs t of the above, a fairly firm  conclusion can be reached. A specific question 
was asked as to whether companies, in considering the level of debt, attempted to assess the impact of 
changes therein on the value of ordinary shares, either in general terms, or in a quantified way. 
Fourteen usable responses were obtained. None of the respondents made any formal quantified attempt 
to relate share price and capital structure. Three companies gave general consideration to this 
relationship.
The Relationship between capital expenditure needs and internal funds
A selection of debt/equity ratios is given in table I I .  The ratios calculated are based broadly on 
the ratio of long term debt divided by long term debt plus equity, expressed as a percentage. Inevitably 
some inconsistencies exist between the figures for certain companies. However, while different 
treatment of certain peripheral items may alter the precise percentage slightly, the figures in table 11 
are seen as providing a good indication of the range and level of gearing ratios. The table indicates 
considerable variation in practice between companies, and (though to a much lesser degree) over time. 
The companies with the lowest ratios were the oil majors and the large conglomerates, which typically 
had very high internal financing ratios. Examination of the accounts (and related information) of the 
four largest corporations in this survey yielded the information shown in table 12.
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Company 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1981
>
1 9 8 2
Alcoa 3553 2953 2653 3153 3693
Exxon 1655 1653 1553 1653 1493
M oore M cCorm ack 4493 5053 5253 5393 5793
Ogden 4893 4793 5193 5793 5493
OSG 5453 5453 5453 5193 4993
Sea Containers 7453 7553 6993 6553 5893
Reynolds 2393 2453 2493 2153 2453
Texaco 2853 2753 2253 1953 1693
Booker McConnell 1453 1153 1353 653 553
Burmah 4553 4153 4153 4253 3993
Ocean 4193 3653 3693
P S  0 4293 3593 3193 2753 3493
P ow ell D u ffry n 1053 1393 2293 2393 2693
T ra fa lg a r House 3193 2393
Furness W ithy 4593 5053 4753
*
Table 11 6eartng ratios for category 1 companies.
Company C apital Expenditure Funds from  operations
V
Gearing range
Alcoa 1 9 7 8  -  1 9 8 3  (m id )  
Texaco 1 9 7 8  -  1 9 8 2  
Exxon 1 9 8 0  -  1 9 8 2  
Reynolds 1 9 8 0  -  1 9 8 2
$ 2 7 5 4  m 
$ 1 0 6 9 3  m 
$ 2 4 5 0 7  m 
$ 2 4 9 7  m
$ 3 0 2 8  m 
$ 1 6 2 4 5  m 
> $ 3 0 0 0 0  m 
$ 3 9 7 6  m
2 6  -  3953  
15 -  2893  
14 -  1653 
21 -  2493
Table 12 Relationship between internal funds generation and capital expenditure -  largest companies
This table identifies the capital expenditue of these companies over a number of years just prior to the 
interviews, together with the funds available from normal operations (broadly net profit before tax - 
adjusted for depreciation). The aim was to establish the extent to which internal funds were being 
generated, which might be used to fund further investment.
Clearly figures such as these do not necessarily mean that capital expenditure can be financed 
entirely internally, since other commitments, such as debt repayments, may well need to be funded.
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Nevertheless, relationships of this type have a potentially very significant effect on capital structure 
over time. Certainly Exxon, in its 1982 Annual report, made clear its expectations in the area.
I t  is  anticipated that the company w ill continue to finance its  capita! and 
exploratory expenses p rin c ip a lly  w ith in te rna lly  generated funds. However, some 
external financing may be employed by the company subject to m arket conditions. " 
(P25)
A brief consideration of the Texaco accounts in recent years, and its debt-equity ratios make it  clear 
that it  has been in the same position for most recent years.
In an attempt to follow this idea up in more detail, the equivalent figures for as many of the other 
companies in this category as possible were calculated, with the results as set out in table 13. This 
information, and that included in table 12, was then combined with that of table 11 on debt equity 
ratios, with ratios being calculated for the relationship between funds from operations and capital 
expenditure (a kind of self-financing ratio). Companies were then ranked according to size of the 
self-financing ratio and the debt equity ratio, and the results are as set out in table 1 4. The ratios for 
Ocean Fleets were excluded because of insufficient data.
The rankings are undoubtedly interesting, with only two companies having one of the rankings 
different to the other by more than three places. One of these was Powell Duffryn, which had a 
consistently rising debt/equity ratio over the six years to 1982. In fact the increase in debt (from 
C 10.7M in 1978 to almost £40M in 1982) appears to be closely linked to a positive drive for expansion, 
and non-current assets increased over the same period from £66.7M to £122M. By 1985 the 
equivalent figures were £7311 and £153M respectively, with the self financing ratio for 1983 -  85 
being .85 and the gearing ratio at the end of 1985 being approximately 36%. The other company with 
rather different rankings was Trafalgar House, where earnings for the period in question (1981 and 
1982) were significantly higher than in previous years, suggesting an unusually high self-financing 
ratio, rather than one which was sustainable in the long term. In fact, for the period 1983 -  85 the self 
financing ratio dropped to an average of 1.06 (.88 for 1984 -  85), while the gearing ratio was 31% at 
the end of 1985. Both of these figures tend to support the above view, namely that the self financing 
ratios shown for Trafalgar House in table 14 were unusually high.
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Company /p e rio d C apitalexpenditure




£.82,8m * £111 6m *  includes goodwill 
& investments









$356 .3m * $220m * net additions to 
capital assets
Ocean (1981) £12.1m £34m * *  excludes £22.5m 
profit on exchange 
adjustments




OSG (1980-1982) $412m * $341m * * *  includes net 
investment in 
subsidiaries and 
additions to net 
inv. in finance 
leases
* *  WC from
operations
P & O  (1980 -1982) £214m £182.7m
Powell Duffryn 
(1980 -  1982)
£77m * £57m * includes purchase 
o f investments, 
goodwill ♦ interest 
in assoc, comps.
SeaCo (1980-1982) $274,7m * $203.7m *  additions to fixed 
assets, net of 
disposals
Trafalgar House 
(1981 -  1982)
£103 86m * £178.7m *  includes investmts
A




Ratio o f funds from  operations  
to cap ita l expenditure
>
Average debtyequity  
ra tio  fo r same period
ra tio ranking ra tio ranking
Trafalgar House 1 72 1 2795 6
Reynolds 1.59 2 2395 4




Booker McConnell 1.35 4 1095 1
Exxon 1 22 5 1595 2
Alcoa 1.10 6 3155 8
Burmah 1.07 7 4195 9
P&O 85 8 2795 6
OSG .83 9 5195 11
Ogden .75 10 5495 12
Powell Duffryn .74 11 2495 5
SeaCo .74 12 6495 14-
Furness Vithy .65 13 4795 ID
Moore McCormack .62 14 5495 12
................... >
Table 14 Relationship between internal financing ratios and gearing levels -  category 1 companies
O/erall. the above figures suggest a close link between the generation of internal funds and 
capital structure. In some senses this might be viewed as something of a tautology, since having 
internal funds available will almost inevitably reduce or eliminate the need to borrow. However, 
traditional theory suggests that such a policy is not optimal in terms of shareholder wealth, and that the 
advantages of, and benefits from, borrowing, ought to be carefully evaluated. The implication of this 
section is that this careful evaluation does not occur in the way implied by the theory, but that debt will 
be incurred where needed to take what appear to be good opportunities. If high internal funds are 
available the need for new debt will be much reduced, if not eliminated. High internal funds are likely 
to be associated with high quality earnings from well established businesses. In turn this suggests that 
size and the degree of diversification are likely to be important contributory factors to internal funding 
and hence capital structure. The oil majors and the well diversified conglomerates are thus likely to be
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associated with the lowest gearing ratios, while those companies with a high proportion of shipping
activities are nicely to be associated with higher gearing levels.
Nevertheless, it  must be recognised that internal funds are only one aspect of the self financing
ratio. The other is capital expenditure, and this is basically lilcely to depend upon the need for
replacement expenditure and, probably more significantly, on expenditure on new business
opportunities. Even high quality earnings may s till be insufficient to fund ambitious expansion or
acquisition programmes. The figures for Powell Duffryn over the period 1978 -  1985 have already
been noted, with a growth in the gearing ratio from 10X to 36X. This increase occurred in spite of
fa irly high quality earnings (between 12 and 1SX return on assets over the period), simply because of
the significant expansion programme which had been undertaken.
The effect of capital structure on bond ratings
in a number of cases references were made to a concern with bond ratings and the ability to
finance further investments. For example:
"Basically tneyve always trie d  to haye a 40X  debt lim it. ... there s no ru le  
on that, but the financia l people do not like  to go above that, fo r purposes o f bond 
ra tings and debt ratings, m at is  the re a l reason. "
However, given that there were very few cases where debt/equity ratios changed dramatically over 
time, it seems unlikely that such concerns were particularly important taking one year at a time. This 
is not to say that they are not important from an overall strategic viewpoint.
TIM relationship Detween prQntabilitvLanade&LsecYica. rsquirements
The earlier section on appraisal techniques made dear the importance attached to debt service 
ability. In practice, the examination of the potential relationship between profitability and debt service 
requirements was seen as more important than capital structure per se. Indeed one company expressed 
its views very clearly:
"As Iona as we can cover our debt service ... they (lenders) do not care what 
the cap ita l structure  is  ..."
Few companies seemed prepared to go quite this far, but the emphasis on debt service ability was dear. 
Interest cover was often used as in imperfect surrogate for the relationship between profitability and 
debt service ability, and several companies made it  clear that the prime limitations on debt was related 
to ideas on interest coverage.
The current volatility of the shipping industry caused other companies to be more concerned with
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the ability to service debt in total. i.e. interest and capital repayments. Maximum debt levels were 
tnus affected by market volatility, interest rates and related factors, as indicated by the following 
observation.
"We probably have a (debt/egu ityj ra tio  or' a litt le  be tte r than 3 /2  ... /  would 
like  to  see i t  reduced a litt le  ... I / I  is  a nice figure. I  don't think i'm  ever lik e ly  to  
see it ,  but /  would like  to get down a litt le  under the 3 /2  level, because debt service 
being what i t  is  makes it  very d iffic u lt to weather the valleys o f th is  business ... 
We know what our debt committments are, but we don t  know what our revenues are
going to  be ... We can s it down here and te ll you a ll our estim ates o f cost, but ... /
can't get our chartering peopfe to give me a revenue estim ate from  now u n til
December ... I t  (debt) becomes very hard to support. We sat here a year and a h a lf
/tw o  years ago and paid 22X in terest. ~
It needs to be recognised that in shipping the size of typical debt service commitments is such 
that the very survival of the business may be threatened if  profitability falls too low. 6iven the 
current state of the shipping markets, opportunities for substantial, or even normal profits for the 
industry are not likely to be great, so companies may well be forced to rely entirely on cash flows from 
current operations to service existing debt ami to provide adequate funds for new investments. (Though 
this is less of a problem for the acquisition of new vessels -  given current support through yard credit.)
The importance of this particular aspect of the capital structure debate varies considerably 
within category 1. Concerns were found to be greatest in those companies most involved in shipping. 
For the diversified conglomerate or oil major the quality of earnings was typically much higher than 
those relating to shipping. (The steady move of many category ) companies out of shipping activities 
has already been noted.) Even within shipping most category 1 companies had concentrated on the high 
quality/specialist end of the business, where the volatility was less marked. Those companies most 
exposed to the bulk trades were most concerned with this particular aspect. Since the interviews took 
place the liner industry has become less stable, and it  seems likely that this aspect of the capital 
structure debate w ill become an important consideration for liner companies as well.
The Repayment Profile of Debt
Linked to both of the above points is the question of the profile of debt repayment and the ability 
to re-finance debt. Examples of debt repayment profiles are shown in table 15 .
The table indicates considerable variation in the debt repayment profiles of the companies, with 
the companies most involved in shipping activities typically having less favourable profiles (i.e. larger 
short and medium term commitments) than the oil majors and conglomerates. Typically for these 
larger companies, the profile of debt repayment was long and well spread. In any debate on capital
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Company Long te rm  debt repayable -  years ahead Notes
& Source 1 2 3 4 5 5 +
Exxon
(1982 Annual Report)
9.395 7.495 6.595 6.193 1295 58 753 2353 1 5 uears *  
3593 5 years *
Texaco 
(1982 Annual Report)
12 895 2 995 2 853 8 453 3 853 69 395 Based on LTdebt 
without leases 
Approx. 50*3 
1 5 years *
Reynolds 
(1982 Annual Report)
3 593 8 693 1 3 453 893 2 353 64 253 Approx 2553 
due 15+ years 
or sinking fund 
over 1 5 years
Burmah
(1981 Annual Report)
^  ' i  a  tctt w C err 36.153 Approx 2053 
5-10  years 
1653 10*
P & 0 
(1981 Annual Report)
23 335 1 n cose 20 653 Ex overdrafts
8.553 for 9 *
• U q t O . . . w
Moore McCormack 
(1982 Annual Report)




















Table 15 Debt repayment profiles -  category 1 companies
structure these differences need to be recognised and considered. A particularly important aspect of 
this, linked to ideas from earlier sections, relates to the balance between long and short term debt, and 
its effect on working capital. One company expressed its concerns in the following way:
I f  you how too much debt in a company the curront proportion o f long torm 
debt may become so overwhelming that you do not have any working capital, so we 
have to be concerned about that.'
Concerns of this type were almost untversally found, but were typically dealt with as part of the 
planning system, as has already been indicated.
In passing, it is worth noting that a small number of companies appeared to place great emphasis 
on re-financing their assets regularly. This was not typical for category 1 companies (although more 
common for categories 2 and 3), but. where found it was of undoubted importance, as can be seen from 
the following quotation from one interview:
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“We always refinance mem (vessels/  So m e ffect we end up w ith IS  year debt 
on a 15 year ship, because we re-finance them every 5  years, assuming the m arket 
value supports that, fha t is  one o f the problems, o r apparent problems, the company 
has. i f  you look a t its  debt m a tu rity  schedule compared w ith its  in te rna l cash flow , 
coverage is  not good, and that is  because the average life  o f debt is  short, because it  
is  bank debt. ... The problem w ith looking a t i t  that way, what i t  ignores, is  the 
company's a b ility  to  re-finance the s tu ff, and its  h is to ry  o f re-financing ... The 
s tu ff is  constantly ro lle d  over. So there the only ris k  o r the only issue is  the
company's a b ility  to  continue to do that, which is  going to  be a function o f its
p ro fita b ility  and a ll the re s t o f i t . “
The Nature of the Assets being Funded
A point made on a number of occasions was that gearing levels were also related to the type of
asset being financed from debt. One company, in defending its relatively high gearing, expressed itself
as follows:
“A t tim es there is  a fa ilu re  to recognise that p roperty and shipping are highly 
geared industries, and mey are lo s t w ithin the overa ll resu lts  o f (the company). 
Therefore our borrow ings are more lik e ly  to  be covered by substantia l asset backing 
man many om er companies which may have borrowed heavily ... (You) have to look 
a t the borrow ing in  re la tion  to  me asset backing, and decide whether we are highly 
geared, and the type o f asset backing m at mere is  mere. “
Generally property and vessels were the two main types of assets put forward as supportive of high
gearing, with the presumption being made that such assets can always be sold at a price which is likely 
to cover any outstanding debt. In relatively stable or expanding markets this is probably true. The 
current volatility of the shipping markets make such an assumption less valid than was once the case. 
Nevertheless the arguments remain, even if  the security is less than it  used to be. This ought to lead to 
lower overall debt-equity ratios than existed several years ago, but levels of gearing in shipping are 
still likely to be higher than that associated with many other assets. If the security referred to above 
is coupled with easy access to finance for new vessels, as occurs in practice, it  should be clear that the 
opportunity for higher gearing in shipping is there, even if  managers conservatism sometimes keeps it 
lower than is possible. One company specifically referred to the view of analysts that, given the nature 
of the assets being funded, gearing was too low.
'Some analysts have offered the opinion m at perhaps we are too conservative, 
and i f  we could leverage ourselves up a litt le  higher i t  wou/d create more earnings 
fo r the same amount o f eouity, and therefore, benefit the shareholders. We do not 
share that opinion.'
In passing, it perhaps needs to be pointed out that financing institutions probably now require rather 
more in the way of cross-default cover than they used to, so as to compensate for the increased 
volatility on the sale and purchase markets, which increases the risk of inadequate security on an
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individual asset.
Apart from providing tfie opportunity for greater borrowing, the acquisition of assets such as 
ships, for a highly capital intensive industry, are also likely to be associated with a need to borrow. 
The capital costs of assets of this type are now so high that few companies could actually afford to play 
for them without borrowing. If greater need and greater opportunity co-exist, the chances of higher 
levels of gearing are increased substantially.
Market Fashion and Changing Economic Conditions
In concluding this section on influences oh capital structure, it  is important to recognise that 
many companies were conscious of market fashion and market conditions as an influence on the gearing 
ratio. Examples of the type of comments made are given below:
I f  you s ta rt to  get the debt exceeding the shareholders funds substantially, 
then people s ta rt to  w orry. We are very conscious o f m arket reaction to gearing. 
A t one stage it  was very fashionable, but fashions seem to change here. We went 
through a period when i t  was considered that you were not doing your jo b  property i f  
you were not borrow ing to the maximum and using those funds p ro fita b ly  and 
investing in  new businesses, expanding. That was before the bubble burst, and people 
today take a much more conservative view, and rig h tly  so. “
‘One o f the problems w ith it  is  that the perception o f the m arket anyway is  
going to  to ta lly  change, depending upon not ju s t how the Balance Sheet looks, but 
depending upon what the P and L looks tike, because you can have one debt/equity m ix 
in  a certa in economic clim ate where you are making good p ro fits , and the same 
debt/equity ra tio  under d iffe ren t m arket conditions w ifi give a com pletely d iffe ren t 
pictu re  o f the ris k  perceived by the m arket. ’
The firs t of these quotations indicates that a view exists that market fashion does change over time. 
The second relates market conditions to expected profitability, with a consequent knock-on effect as far 
as an appropriate (or maximum) gearing level is concerned. Other examples were found in which 
considerable attention was paid to the effect of changes in some particular facet of market conditions, 
such as interest rates, on attitudes towards gearing.
Exactly which is the more important is not clear. It may be the case that market fashion is 
entirely determined by market and/or economic conditions, or it may be that views on capital structure 
would change over time even if economic conditions stayed broadly the same. Intuitively one would 
expect changes in market conditions to lead changes in fashion or expected profitability rather than the 
other way around. Be that as it may, what is clear is that a substantial number of companies consider 
that the capital structure needs to reflect changes in the factors identified above, which in turn implies 
that preferred or maximum debt/equity ratios may well change over time.
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Miscellaneous points on Capital Structure
A number of miscellaneous points on capital structure were raised in the course of the 
discussions. Most of the points raised related to a small number of companies. Issues raised covered 
the following points:
(i) Growth. A small number of companies had funded growth/expansion principally through the 
raising of debt. Reference has already been made to the expansion of Powell Ouffryn. resulting in an 
increase in the debt-equity ratio from 7% in 1977 to 26% in 1982. A more dramatic increase in 
debt-equity ratios was associated with the expansion of United States Lines in 1983-85.
(ii> Spin-offs. A number of spin-offs occurred with companies in the survey. Inevitably this is 
likely to lead to some re-adjustment of gearing levels over time.
Conclusion omapitaLstrucluro
A number of different influences on capital structure exist. Precisely which are the most 
important at any one time is unclear, although share price considerations do not appear to be very 
important. A point of considerable interest, however, is the fact that while a certain amount of 
fluctuation and variation in gearing ratios was found, both within companies and over time, no maiDC 
changes were found to have occurred rapidly. For example, the substantial change in the gearing ratio 
for Powell Ouffryn between 1978 and 1985 occurred gradually, with sound documented warnings and 
support in the Annual Reports. Similarly, the increased gearing of Moore McCormack, from 44% to 
57% over the same period, was also associated with a significant expansion programme. A gradual 
policy was used in the company, and care was taken to make clear the limits of the expansion 
programme and the associated capital structure (50% being identified as an appropriate level). These 
examples, when coupled with the findings on limits to the amount of debt which companies are prepared 
to take up. suggest that category 1 companies are concerned to remain within certain limits, but that 
within these limits fluctuations were acceptable, depending upon the amount of internal funding and the 
availability of good opportunities. The ideas on limits are most likely to be influenced by concerns to do 
with share price, bond ratings, debt service ability.the nature of the assets, and economic conditions. 
However, since most category 1 companies appear to be operating within their perceived (but probably 
hypothetical) limits, the main determinants of capital structure in the short and medium term are likely 
to be internal funding and the availability of opportunities. As a matter of good practice, probably 
related to share and bond price (or other re-financing issues), most companies paid considerable




Smaller Public Companies and Large Private Companies
1. A im s and O b jec tives
1.1 Introduction and overall findings on objectives
Much of traditional finance theory appears to have been written with public quoted companies in 
mind. Since ideas of share price maximisation are arguably of less relevance to private companies the 
application of the theorv to private companies appears more dubious, in the course of the discussions 
held with the 18 companies in this category an attempt was thus made to ascertain what objectives 
actually existed, explicitly or implicitly.
As with the category I companies, considerable discussion took place on objectives, and an 
attempt was made to draw out the objectives underlying the various philosophies, strategies, and 
subsequent activities of the companies in this category. In all cases the discussions on objectives were 
guided through elements to do with share price or wealth maximisation, profitability, dividends and 
growth. In spite of this, very little  consistency of approach was found, where any clearly discernible 
objectives existed.
The firs t general point that needs to be made is that no company made any reference to any 
formally written down objectives, and published information (in the form of annual reports and other 
company publicity information) where available, did not include any specific references to objectives as 
such. Having said that, it  needs to be recognised that companies in this category were much more 
reluctant to hand out accounts and other information, and published information of possible use in this 
area was only obtained in nine of the eighteen cases. Even where such information was available the
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discussion parts or tne documents were rather trim, certainly by comparison witn those of public 
companies.
The second general point, is that the overall results of this section on objectives were no more 
satisfactory for category 2 than they had been for category I. In fact only two conclusions could 
clearly be drawn from the discussions.
(i) Share price maximisation was not an appropriate objective, and had no bearing on decisions in 
any of the companies in this category.
(ii) Decisions were generally being taken without reference to. or apparent need for. a specific dear 
cut objective/s.
Very few cases were found in which clear cut objectives existed. Nevertheless, in the discussions a 
certain amount of consistency was found in the areas which provoked most comment or interest. 
Whether these ideas could be regarded as implicit objectives, or merely as possible influences on 
decision making, is unclear. Responses fell broadly into six areas, namely:
(i) share price maximisation (and its extension into wealth maximisation)
(ii) objectives to do with being a public company (only applies to five of the 18 companies)
(iii) profit maximisation (and related profitability objectives)
(iv) comments regarding dividends
(v) personal or family related objectives
(vi) a variety of other objectives or criteria
These areas are discussed more fully in the sections which follow. The firs t two areas tended to 
overlap to some extent, and they are thus dealt with together in the next section.
1.2 Share Price Ma&imisflHon/Public Company.. Responsibilities
Ot the 18 companies in this category, five were actually public companies quoted on the Stock 
Exchange, so the question of objectives to do with share price was considered relevant. In fact it was 
decided that, as with the category I companies, a question should be asked in all companies about the 
extent to which share price maximisation was seen as an appropriate objective. The reasons for this 
were threefold.
(j) The responses to this question in the category I companies had suggested that in fact objectives
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were far more complex man might have Deen expected. A similar question was needed in this category 
to ascertain the extent to which commonality of objectives existed between categories, and the extent 
to which significantly different objectives existed.
(ii) A question of this type would open up concerns about wealth maximisation or related ideas, which 
might be considered relevant extensions of share price maximisation.
(Hi) Responses would enable the direct relevance of this particular objective to be assessed for 
companies in this category.
Not altogether surprisingly, of the eighteen companies in this category, thirteen explicitly 
rejected share price maximisation as an objective. Of the five remaining there is little  doubt that share 
price maximisation was implicitly rejected, with a number of alternative objectives or ‘concerns’* 
being put forward. These are dealt with in later sections. Of the five public companies in this category 
four explicitly rejected share price maximisation as an objective, while the fifth  implicitly rejected it.
As with category I companies, the public companies did generally express some concerns about 
certain ‘shareholder responsibilities*1, though these concerns were found in varying degrees. One of 
these companies argued that its objectives were far more complex than share price maximisation, and 
that far more had to be taken into account. Further discussions along these lines made it  dear that 
personnel aspects in decision making were given considerable importance in this particular company. 
The net effect of all of this was translated into an objective:
'to  have a w e ll managed company, w ith a growing level o f p ro fits  from  year to  
year -  but a fte r recognising the cyc lica l nature o f shipping. ’
This company was thus paying less attention to its results on a year by year basis. Interestingly, this 
company, which had an active investor relations programme, did have doubts as to whether its 
institutional investors shared this view. It was felt that these investors might well be more concerned 
about "quality” of earnings. The investor relations programme was seen as a means of making 
shareholders more aware of the conditions within which the company was operating, and thus reducing 
misunderstandings about company performance. The second public company argued that in fact 
decisions were made by a management team more concerned with staying in business than with stock 
price. This company did not have an active investor relations programme, but this might change if the 
company became more profitable, and concerns with survival thus became less pressing. The third 
public company expressed cynicism over the efficiency of the capital markets, and the irrelevance of
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snare price maximisation for companies witn relatively limited snare trading, This view was 
expressed as follows:
"At the moment there are very few  transactions, and our shares have moved up 
sim ply because the m arket has moved up. rhere is  no ju s tifica tio n  fo r saying that 
our shares should be any be tte r than they were s ix  months ago, and in  fact we keep 
in  very dose touch w ith it. We had a buyer fo r a (00 shares in the market two 
weeks ago, and i t  pushed the p rice  up Pp. Alow that is  quite ridiculous, i  suspect, 
and /  think most people do, ... that the people who make most o f the money have to be 
the jobbers, who p lay w ith prices . *
The fourth of the public companies had implicit objectives to do with profitability, and the earning of a 
reasonable rate of return. The objectives of the fifth  public company were complicated by part 
government ownership, with an overriding objective being the maintenance of a strategic fleet. In this 
company subsequent discussions on philosophy and strategy also suggested implicit profitability 
objectives as well.
In general, it  appears that shareholders concerns were less pressing in category 2 than they 
were in category 1. This is mainly attributable to the nature of the ownership, with shares typically 
being fairly closely held, and management thus being in closer contact with owners.
Seven of the eighteen companies explicitly identified some kind of profitability objective in the 
discussions. These objectives tended to be related to either a general search for profitability (three 
cases), or the achievement of an acceptable return on investment (four cases).
The firs t of these companies. Lyle Shipping Co. pic., included the following statement in their 1981 
Annual Report.
'Our broad stra tegy is  to secure optimum returns over the years on our 
shareholders funds, through the worldwide deployment o f our trading resources." 
(P6)
A second company, although having an implicit aim that the company would try  to do the most profitable 
business it could, in fact translated this into profitability targets for new projects. The view was then 
expressed that the company should be looking for a ’‘reasonable'' rate of return on investment. 
'Reasonable* was considered to be 15-20!?, although returns of this size were not currently being 
achieved. Two other companies also had objectives related to return on investment. In one case, 
while clear criteria were not specifically identified in terms of ROI. the necessity for projects to
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compete on profitability terms with each other, across unrelated divisions, meant that an implicit ROI 
criterion existed. In the other case the ROI objective was spelt out in detail, as follows:
"Our objective, o f course, is  to meke a fa ir  return, ... 15-2OS re tu rn  on
investment is  not unreasonable in  the shipping business, rhat 's what everybody 
thinks o f in  every other business, and we should be no d iffe rent. But i f  we end up 
w ith a iOX re tu rn  we would be delighted. ‘
The other three companies which specifically identified profitability objectives tended to be 
rather less precise in terms of required or expected profits. In two cases current market conditions 
were causing a significant reduction in profitable opportunities, and the objective was really one of 
making a profit, as opposed to a loss, to ensure survival. In both cases reasonable profit levels would 
be hoped for in the medium and long term, but decisions were being made on the basis of much shorter 
time scales. The third company was concerned with the maintenance of a freight rate level that gave 
acceptable profitability.
The fact that only seven of the companies explicitly identified profitability objectives should not 
be taken to mean that profitability was not important in the other companies, in fact in most cases 
profitability objectives were implicit in the discussions. For example, in one case a decision had been 
made to sell the company simply because the returns currently being achieved could not justify the 
amount invested in it. Such a decision changes the short term objectives, but implicitly recognises a 
long term objective related to return on investment.
1.4 Dividends
Very few companies in this category expressed major concerns over dividends, and certainly no 
objectives were couched in terms of dividends. In a few cases dividends were seen as something of a 
constraint, notably in three of the five public companies. For example, Lyle Shipping Co. pic., in a 
document supporting a rights issue (13/5/81) asserted that:
"The amount o f ordinary dividend which the D irectors w ill declare in respect o f 
the year ending J is t December 1981, w iii depend on the fevef o f p ro fits  achieved by 
the company, in  the absence o f unforseen circumstances the d irectors expect that 
the to ta f dividend per ordinary share on the enlarged issued O rdinary Share Capital 
w ill not be less than 9.5p net fo r that year. ’ (Pd)
In 1981 dividends paid were actually lOp per share. In 1982 a substantial loss was made, and dividends 
were reduced to 7.5p. Clearly in this company dividends are likely to be reduced in times of adversity.
264
However. Ihe impression given In the above statement is that dividend maintenance would be given a 
fairly high priority. This is reinforced by the actual dividend trends for Lyle, which were as shown in 
table 16.
A similar approach was found with London & Overseas Freighters (LOF), which also reported a 
substantial loss in 1982.
In  view o r th is  re  su it end the uncertein outlook your Board has decided w ith 
regre t that it  would be inappropriate to recommend the payment o f a dividend th is  
year. The Board has not lig h tly  taken th is decision and fu lfy  intends to restore the 
dividend to an acceptable level as soon as profitable trading perm its." (LOF Annual 
Report 1982 Pd)
Clearly the desire for dividends exists, but adverse results override this desire.
Reardon Smith Line pic., in the same year
"... re fe rred  to the proposed dividend and, w hilst trading resu lts and present 
conditions do not warrant the payment o f a dividend, nevertheless, taking into  
consideration a fa ir/y  substantial capitaI cred it in the financial statements and the 
fa c t that stockholders have given an appreciated support during the past few  years, 
during which period, w ith the exception o f the fast year, only token dividends were 
paid, i t  is  fa it that a modest dividend can now be ju s tifie d  in  respect o f the year 
under review  ... Unless there is  a dramatic Improvement in  trading conditions i t  is  
unlikely that th is  dividend can be maintained fo r the current ye a r." (1982 Annua!
Report Pd)
EPS/Dividends per share trends for Lyle. LOF and Rearden Smith are shown in table 16. In the
remaining two public companies in this category, no cash dividends had been paid in recent years.
E a rn in g s  p e r s h a re / D iv id e n d s  p e r sh a re
V
Company 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
EPS DPS EPS DPS EPS DPS EPS DPS EPS DPS
Lyle (9.6) 5.5 53 7.5 98.6 9.5 75.9 10.0 (51.8) 7.5
LOF (7 1) - (3.4) 0.8 6.8 1.5 (2.1) 1.5 (4.2) -
Reardon Smith
I
(152) 0.15 (25) 0.14 4 0.14 17 2.5 (2) 1.25
Table 16 Otvldend/eamings per share relationship -  category 2 public companies
Of the private companies in the sample only three made any specific reference to dividends in 
their discussion of objectives. In one of these the reference was simply to assert that dividends were 
not a consideration in terms of objectives or decisions, since none were paid. In the second such 
company similar comments were made, with further emphasis being placed on the importance of 
retentions as a source of funds. In the third, dividends were related to the tax position of private
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companies, and were thus effectively relegated to a quite small factor in decision making. The following 
observation was made:
There is  actua lly a point here that comes hack to the whole concept o f p rivate  
companies ... the dividend is  probably much tower than it  otherw ise would be, to keep 
the value o f the shares down, to  keep the ... capita! tran sfe r tax under control, so 
that when an e lde rly shareholder dies there is  enough money around to pick his 
shares up, and, as you probably know, the typ ica l method o f vafuing shares is  re lated  
to the dividend, so that dividends are kept to the absolute m inimum."
It is interesting to note that concerns with dividends appeared to be greater in the public 
companies than the private companies. This presumably relates to the idea of certain responsibilities of 
public companies referred to earlier. However, the smaller public companies included in category 2 
were clearly less able to obtain high quality earnings than those of category 1, and dividends were thus 
more likely to be affected by adverse trading results than for the larger companies. Indeed, as will 
become apparent later, the smaller companies were generally unable to obtain the same quality of 
earnings overall (through such things as diversification), and were thus likely to have more variability 
in total earnings and consequently dividends.
1.5 Family/Personal Objectives
While there is little  doubt that certain individuals were clearly influential in the decisions of the 
large publicly quoted companies, there were very few cases of large corporations being dominated by 
individuals or families. This is far from the case with the second category of companies. At least 
seven of the 18 companies in this category were under the control of individuals or families, while a 
further nine were very strongly influenced by individuals, families, or small groups of owners. Of the 
remaining two. one was partly government owned, and one was not prepared to disclose the necessary 
information to ascertain this.
Given this background, it is clear that the objectives, philosophy, and approach of the controlling 
groups or individuals are likely to be of significance. However, clear identification of this was not 
possible. Nevertheless certain factors were discussed which are worthy of note, as providing useful 
insight into the area.
(i) Family or individual control sometimes meant that ail major decisions were effectively taken by 
the family or individual, rather than by the management. In other cases the family/individual had the 
final word on projects initiated by management, e.g.
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"A m ajor new investment decision would always oe re fe rred  back to (Head 
O ffice) management. I t  would go in fact back to the shareholders, and a m ajor new 
investment decision may not even be sh ips."
(ii) In most of the family controlled businesses, there was a clear commitment to retain control of 
the company. e.g.
"They are very keen to re ta in  the business w ithin th e ir own contro l and pass it  
on to the next generation, bigger and be tte r than it  was when they inherited i t . "
(iii) In some companies, but by no means all. there was a commitment to remain in the same industry. 
e.g.
7 am very pleased to be able to say that the ... fam ily, notwithstanding the 
d ive rs ity  o f in terests, are very desirous o f continuing in  the shipping business, and 
even though most o f them have litt le  o r no connection, except through stock 
ownership, they treasure the fam ily relationship and they want to see us succeed. ’
(iv) Tax factors appeared to be given a high weighting, since, among other things, they influence the
ability to retain control. e.g.
I t  wou/d be fa ir  to say that o f every working hour in  ... s lives, 10% o r 20% 
o f it  is  spent thinking about tax. Every investment decision, every move that is  
made. How w ill th is  a ffe ct the bloody tax position? Which is  no way to run a 
business, but i f  you are in  that situation what else can you do?"
At least one company made a decision to acquire a new ship solely for tax reasons.
(v) In certain companies, where family relationships were complex, there was a need to balance out
conflicting personal objectives. e.g.
The fam ily  is  like  a ll fam ilies. Its  composed o f individuals who have 
substantial personal estates, and many individuals who have practicaH y nothing. 
They have some ... stock, and it  's my jo b  to be the coordinating link between them a il 
and keep them happy.9
(vi) In the case of control by individuals, the style of that individual, and his personal objectives,
were extremely important.
"Even though we're a big company, it's  s t ill very much an entrepreneurial 
company. He 's an extrem ely b rillia n t man. He gets h im seif in to every facet o f the 
business, and he has a grasp o f an aw ful lo t o f things, and he's surrounded h im self by 
some ra the r capable people."
1.6 Other Objectives
The only other objective which was identified by more than one company concerned a desire to 
stay in the business of shipping. This in turn could be broken down further, as follows:
(i) a desire to stay in a business which has proved profitable in the past, and in which the company
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has expertise;
til) a desire to survive in business, where the main activity was shipping of some sort;
(in) a desire to keep the fleet at the same sort of level.
These three w ill all be dealt with in more detail in the next section on philosophies and strategies.
Other objectives put forward by individual companies related specifically to the shipping 
elements included in the range of activities undertaken. They were as follows:
(i) The sheltering of earnings for tax purposes (foreigh flag).
(ii) Transport for the main activities of the Corporation.
(iii) The maintenance of a strategic fleet.
2. Philosophies and Strategies
2.1 Intmrtimtinn nnri Overall Findings
While precise figures were not available for many of the private companies included in this 
category, it  is fa irly clear (with probably only one or two exceptions), that companies in category 2 
were generally considerably smaller than those in category 1. This in turn had a significant effect on 
philosophies and strategies of companies in this category, when compared with those of category I 
companies.
In an attempt to provide a better basis for comparison between the two categories the same 
broad headings w ill be used as were in category 1. However, considerable differences were found in 
the approach of companies in the two categories. The main areas which arose were:
(i) Comments on the quality of earnings, with far greater problems being found in this area by 
companies in category 2. This in turn was influencing attitudes towards the period of investment 
decisions, with much more use being made of the sale and purchase markets.
(ii) Areas of business and approaches to diversification. While there were a small number of notable 
exceptions, in general companies in this category were considerably less well diversified than 
companies in category I .
(iii) The greater concentration on a small number of activities in the shipping industry tended to lead
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to investment decisions being "replacement” or "upgrading" decisions, with less time being spent on 
strategic factors.
(iv) Considerable emphasis was placed on the preservation of flexibility, which in turn enabled an 
opportunistic approach to be taken to investments, disinvestments and market opportunities. While this 
approach had some similarities to that of strategic positioning referred to in category I , the sheer 
difference in size did lead to considerable differences in the effect that this view had on decisions.
(v) A number of other ideas were raised, usually on an individual basis, covering taxation policy, 
borrowing, market share, dividends, etc.
2.2 Philosophies with, cegacd. lo-Earninqs
With companies in this category there seemed likely to be differences between desired earnings, 
in terms of both level and quality, and achieved earnings, due principally to major changes in the market 
in recent years. Virtually all of the companies in this category were fairly well established names in 
the business of shipping, in one area or another, and had long histories of fa irly high quality earnings. In 
recent years, however, due to the dramatically increased volatility of the shipping markets, the quality 
of earnings from trading had fallen significantly. This in turn had led to a change in attitude towards the 
period of holding assets, with increased attention being paid to the sale and purchase markets; with the 
aim of achieving capital profits to balance up poor trading results. Examples of the kind of comments 
made include:
7 think the only way to make p ro fits  in  the tramp m arket is  to buy and se ll, i f  
you get i t  rig h t. '
"One has to  say, that where B ritish  owners have been iax is  that they should 
have had the guts to s e ll the odd ship when it  is  a t the top o f the m arket ... You have 
to consider trade in  ships as a very im portant p a rt o f shipowning. '
Whether such an attitude is solely the result of market conditions, and is thus a response to these
changes, rather than an actual change in philosophy, is not totally clear, though it seems highly
plausible. What is clear is that six of the companies in this category considered that a fundamental
change had taken place in their overall thinking about the market they were in, and very clearly flagged
it in discussions. Interestingly, all six companies were mainly engaged in the bulk trades, a point which
will be referred to again, both below and in the next sections.
While other companies did not emphasise this point in quite the same way, some reinforcement
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was found in slightly different ways. The response of one company was to move from owning ships to 
chartering ships, and subsequently to the outright sale of the shipping business, principally because 
earnings were simply not high enough, or of the right quality. At least three other companies clearly 
considered capital profits on ships important, but did not emphasise it. in the same way as the firs t six. 
principally because it  had always occurred to some extent. It was thus not seen as an important change 
in philosophy.
As indicated above, the major changes in attitudes seem to be found in the bulk trades. There is 
little  doubt that, at the time of the interviews, the bulk trades were going through a somewhat 
traumatic period, as is evidenced by the following comments:
“Were a t! figh ting  fo r our lives a t the moment., to  even exist, because . . . i f  you 
look a t the back page o f Lloyds, and you work out the running costs, the average 
running costs fo r our so rt o f ships is  something in  excess o f $4000 a day. We it  you 
won t  fin d  a fix tu re  tha t equates w ith that s itu a tio n ."
Similar concerns with survival were found in four of the remaining five bulk carrier companies 
referred to above, and in three liner companies.
In comparing the attitudes of category t and category 2 companies towards quality of earnings a 
single striking difference arose. The category 1 companies clearly considered quality of earnings to be 
paramount, and areas of activity were very largely influenced, if  not actually determined, by reference 
to earnings quality. With the category 2 companies the emphasis tended to be the other way around. 
Companies in this category were more likely to find themselves fairly well committed to a particular 
set of activities, and were then subject, much more certainly, to the vaguaries and volatility of that 
market. This w ill be dealt with in more detail in the next section. It does of course pose problems of 
flow for this thesis, in that a similar order of headings is sensible for purposes of comparison, but, in 
terms of the logical development of ideas within the category, section 2.3 ideally should preceed section 
o o
2.3 Areas of Business/Approaches to Diversification
Reference has already been made to the fact that the vast majority of the companies in this 
category are considerably smaller than those in category I. This in turn means that, however 
attractive diversification into different activities may seem, it is not always a practical proposition, as 
is shown by the following observations:
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"We've re a lly  got no d iversifica tion a t the moment ... One o f the problems in  
our so rt o f company is  that your cap ita l base is  too sm all re a lly  ... Quite fran k ly  
we can't a ffo rd  to  do anything else a t the moment."
They (the public companies) have been in  a position to have a much bigger
capita / base. They have much bigger resources. rhey don't have a cash problem. 
They say they have, but a ll that means is  that it  is  down to what i t  was. But they 
have been able to  have th is  cash to  invest and d ive rsify, which is  what we would 
dear/y fove to  do. ’
In fact of the Id companies in category 2 at least six (at the time of interview) had no
diversification at ail outside of shipping. Five of these were actually confined to one small area of
shipping, with the sixth having only two different shipping oriented activities. Two companies had 
extremely limited diversification, into areas which seemed closely related to their mainstream shipping 
activities in one way or another (e.g. incinerator ships, real estate, etc.). Overall the level of 
diversification fell far short of that found in all but a few of the category 1 companies. Two cases 
were found of diversification into fa irly closely related areas, with broad rationalisations being given 
as follows:
"We have, fo r be tte r o r fo r worse, decided to concentrate on marine re la ted  
opportunities. We do not go fo r what we would term  the easier side o f the business. 
By that /  mean we go to  the more sophisticated side. Everything we do is  
sophisticated. A great deal o f s k ill is  required. The bulk c a rrie r market, one can 
say, well, there's not much s k ill required there, and that's probably true. That's 
why, in  recent years, we have tended to go to the more expensive end o f the bulk 
c a rrie r market, because there we fe e l that we can compete w ith the Far Eastern 
com petitors. I f  we go to the the cheaper end. w ith our crew  costs we ju s t cant 
compete."
"O riginally we were a typ ica l shipping company and considered to be deep-sea 
transportation. Since then we have evolved in to  a transportation company, and 
consider our business to be the handling o f transportation from  the point o f orig in  to  
the doorstep o f the end user. Therefore, in  addition to  deep-sea transportation, we 
have added ra il, road, inland waterway, coastal tankers and storage term inals to the 
services we can provide our custom ers." (Stolt Nielsen. The Bulk Liquid Distribution Company. 
P4)
Clearly assessing success for private companies is a difficult thing to do. However, there is little  doubt 
that the last two companies referred to above, which have built on their considerable expertise and 
experience to move into related areas, are among the most highly regarded companies in this category.
In the remaining eight companies diversification was more widespread, and in six of these cases 
the diversification was the result of a positive decision, influenced by the same kind of ideas on quality 
of earnings as were referred to in category 1. For example, companies such as Lyle and Hogarth 
appear to have searched for, and achieved, a greater spread of interests. At the time of the interviews
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Hogarth's activities included, inter alia, housebuilding, motor distribution, leasing and travel, as well as 
shipowning. Lyle's activities included insurance broking, offshore services and electronics as well as 
shipowning. In both of these cases however, the shipping activities still accounted for the vast 
majority of turnover. Ellerman was involved in brewing and travel, as well as shipping. Brewing 
appears to have been consciously entered into as a diversification, since it  was seen to be a nice steady 
profit producing business that would help carry shipping through the lean years which were associated 
with it. Of the other three companies in this six referred to, one was well diversified in shipping 
related areas, but also had at least one other totally unrelated area of activity, while the remaining two 
were mini-conglomerates, each with four or five broad areas of activity, with shipping representing 
only a proportionate part of its activities.
The remaining two companies unaccounted for in the 18 companies of category 2 were somewhat 
different in character. In one company the shipping activities were both supportive of a second (more 
important) area of activity, and earned additional revenue and profits. In the second company a 
massive amount of funds had been invested in a second line of business, with the result that the shipping 
activities were now a minority part of the total.
Clearly the companies in this category provided a wide spectrum of attitudes towards 
diversification, and its effective achievement. However, there is no doubt that overall levels of 
diversification were much lower than those in category 1. As pointed out above, some of this 
difference is accounted for by differences in funds and therefore opportunities. Some, however, is 
clearly related to attitudes, with managers not really seriously considering diversification to any 
significant extent, or indeed asking why they are in the areas of activity they are in. The area of 
activity was frequently seen as a given factor, unlikely to be changed, as is illustrated by the following 
comment:
"We have not looked objectively a t whether we should be in  th is  business o r 
not. We've ra th e r adopted the tack, that we are in  th is  business. There are to ts o f 
good reasons fo r saying that ... i f  ones fam ily has been working in  it  fo r 150 years 
... the fam ily has seen i t  a il before. There have been bad periods before, and ye t it's  
remained a good business fo r people to be in, and we've heard pessim istic 
prognostications before, and we've seen these reverse. Now unfortunately that 
philosophy in  the la s t ten years has seen the undoing o f some fa ir ly  established 
names. Whether in  the end we sha ll be rig h t, and it  is  the rig h t thing to be in, /  don t  
know. But we did not give su ffic ien t thought to whether we should be in  th is  business 
or n o t."
Returning again to the question of size, and opportunities, it is clear that many companies in this
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category were in ratner different areas of business -  even within shipping -  to the larger public 
companies. Ten of the 18 companies were involved largely in the bulk trades, both dry bulk and 
tankers. Five were involved largely in liner trades, but this was generally on relatively minor routes, 
or as members of consortia. Two were operating in specialist trades (LNG ships and parcel tankers), 
and one was involved in a variety of activities. In short, a large proportion were in relatively low cost 
areas of shipping, where barriers to entry were low, where It was very difficult to bring any special 
skill or expertise to bear. This is certainly the case with the bulk trades, though admittedly many of 
the companies in this category tried to be the most efficient/lowest cost operators in the trade. 
Inevitably, the achievement of this kind of advantage is difficult in the bulk markets. Even in the liner 
trades care was generally taken to ensure that the market was not one in which the company would be 
in direct competition with the large liner companies. Consortia were often the only way in which some 
of the smaller operators could continue in the liner trades, since the larger trades required a certain 
minimum number of ships to provide a viable service with a reasonable time interval, and few individual 
category 2 companies could afford such an involvement.
Overall the ability of companies in this category to insulate themselves against risk was 
seriously limited. Sheer size (or lack of it) prevents the achievement of the policies found in category 
1. with the result that companies are forced to accept the vaguaries of the market they are in. to a 
much greater extent than category 1 companies. This in turn causes the attitudes referred to in 2.2 and 
results in differing attitudes towards the type of assets acquired, and to debt and liquidity. These w ill 
be dealt with in later sections.
2.4 Types of Assets and Apprnanh tn Anqnisitinn
Given the comments of the previous sections it was not surprising to find that in investment 
decisions there was a major emphasis on obtaining the 'right ship". The majority of new investments 
appeared to be of a replacement type, and were usually associated with the idea of upgrading tonnage, 
although examples of expansion were also found. Most companies in this category had a fairly clear 
view of the business they were in. and hence the type of assets which were needed. This was 
particularly true of the companies in the bulk trades, which appeared to have a fa irly clear idea of what 
type of vessel was needed, as is evidenced by the following two illustrative observations:
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“As fa r as were concerned, the so rt o f business that we operate in, the 
26-27,000 tonner, w ith e ffic ie n t gear, that is  cranes o f the 25  ton type, i  think has 
a place in  the w orid fo r quite some years to come, i  believe that sim ply because one 
o f the main reasons why people fee I that i t  is  a good so rt o f workhorse o f the future  
(is  tha t) so many po rts  o f the w orld have not been improved, they haven't been 
enlarged, very few  have spent money in  producing e ffic ie n t p o rts ."
“We have certa in constraints in the trade on the size o f a ship. From a
p ractica l basis we can’t  bu ild  a ship that's much la rger than 560', because most o f
the berths we go in to  are re s tric te d  to that. The d ra ft has probably got to be
somewhere in  the region o f 55', perhaps a tittle  more than that , ... so probably 
40,000 dw t is  probably about the maximum you're ever going to see in  the near term  
fo r th is  kind o f ship ... also you're dealing w ith a trade that is  shipping sm all lo ts  o f 
cargo. I f  you get too b ig it's  going to  cost you an unholy amount o f money to handle 
it .  Even now ... we do a great deal o f barging to m inimise the number o f berths we go 
to. In other words there's a lo t o f study goes in to the science its e lf o f running 
ships."
Decisions in fact tended to be based more on the analysis of the characteristics or the ship to be 
acquired than on the expected market characteristics. In the detailed discussion which took place in 
some of the companies, on specific investment decisions actually made, several instances were round or 
ships being acquired to suit some kind or implicitly derined 'fleet concept', without any detailed plans 
being made ror their use. In one such case some $40T1 was invested because financing conditions were 
excellent and the ships were or the right type, but no clear idea or their utilisation existed at the time 
or the order. However the company had carried out an extremely rigorous analysis or its area or 
operations, and had established a fleet concept which was basically ror handy sized bulk carriers, or a 
shallow draft, approximately 40,000 dwt capacity, and with sophisticated gear on deck. The logic or 
this approach was based upon the idea that in the geographical area in which the company operated there 
were a considerable number or ports with poor loading and berthing racilities, which were likely to 
become rather more important in years to come. Shallow drart vessels with seir discharging gear 
would enable most or these ports to be utilised by the ships or this company. The capacity or 40.000 
dwt was the largest vessel consistent with the above characteristics, thus enabling economies or scale 
to be achieved with regard to trade through these ports.
An approach or this type, while common, would appear to be a necessary but not sufficient part 
or the analysis. An uncritical commitment to the industry, with limited runds ror diverstrication into 
other areas, is likely to lead to a rail back to this kind or thinking.
The idea or a fleet concept also led to a constant desire to upgrade the fleet. In practice this 
meant constantly trying to obtain a younger, and presumably more erficient, fleet. This pre-conditioned 
most investment decisions, and led to an investment approach such as the following:
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The way that people like  us would build up our fle e t would be to s e ll a tw enty 
year old ship, and hope to buy one say, eight years old. This is  how you gradually 
build  your fle e t up again. There s no other way, because your resources a fte r a long 
recession like  th is  are ju s t gone. You've used your cash to keep your ships running."
A small number of companies made comments about the advantages, in terms of both operations and
maintenance, of operating the same kind of ships under some kind of fleet concept. A similar number
pointed out the importance of getting the best deal possible on acquiring ships, since most owners in this
category were likely to be operating ships of the same characteristics, with the same kind of cost
structure. Lower acquisition costs were seen as providing a good competitive advantage.
2.5 Flexibility/Opportunism
Following on from the earlier sections on philosophy, it  should be clear that companies in this 
category did not have the kind of flexibility found in category 1 companies. Various arguments and 
positions were put forward however, which were supportive of the position that flexibility is a 
desirable characteristic. For companies of this size flexibility was generally confined to market and 
operational flexibility, with little  strategic flexibility really existing. Various comments were also 
made implying a desire for financial flexibility, but the recent recession had taken much or this 
flexibility away.
For most of the bulk carrier companies flexibility was sought by concentration on handy sized 
bulk carriers. e.g.
1Ye have tended to take a po licy decision to go fo r the handy size, because o f 
th e ir fle x ib ility  ... and the handy size keeps increasing ... now its  around 30,000 
tons. “
"We tend to go fo r the most flexib le  animal, so we know its  going to be coal, 
grain, steel, that kind o f trade. We haven i  o f la te trie d  to fix  ships from  delivery. ’
In the liner trades various changes were taking place to preserve flexibility. In one case the changes
related to the commitment implicit in ship ownership, e.g.
I t  is  our view that because o f the surplus tonnage that is  cu rre n tly  on the 
market, and studies have shown that th is  is  lik e ly  to increase over the next s ix  or
seven years, we believe that i t  is  going to be cheaper to charter in  on the market
than to actually own ships. Apart from  anything else you have fle x ib ility  and ... a 
wide range o f s tu ff available, and these ships can be crewed by foreign crews -  
cheap crews. I f  you go out and buy your own ship firs t, you've got to make a long
term  decision about the need fo r that ship in  the future. Secondly you've got to buy
it  a t todays costs and todays exchange rates. You've got so many variables that its  
almost impossible to get it  rig h t. A part from  anything else, the trade that you're 
buying it  fo r may not develop as you think. It's  our view that the business o f ship
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owning and management and so on could very w ell become d iffe ren t from  the business 
o f actually trading and marketing. "
In other cases changes in ship design, or container design, such as the sea shed being developed by 
Farrell Lines, helped with regard to market and operational flexibility.
2.6 Miscellaneous, ideas on Philosophy/Strategy
In spite of the earlier comments about the move towards greater involvement in the sale and 
purchase market, the majority of investments were still intended to be long term. Thirteen of the 18 
companies specified an expected period for holding vessels. The shortest period was six to eight years. 
Of the five which were not prepared to specify a period of this sort, one was simply not buying at 
present, while the other four made comments which implicitly made it  clear that the expected period of 
holding was medium to long term, but that market conditions might change this. An illustrative 
supportive comment on the expected period of holding is given below:
'We're not in  business to  make a k illin g  tomorrow. We're there fo r the long 
haul ... The company has always bought ships to operate and then has generally 
scrapped the ships ... Generally most o f the ships that have been bought have been 
bought, rebu ilt, operated. ’
The intention of holding assets for a long time is not necessarily inconsistent with greater use of 
the sale and purchase market. Nor should greater use of the sale and purchase market be presumed to 
mean that companies in this category were becoming speculative in their investments in the sense of 
acquiring ships with a view to selling them later at a capital profit. No company invested in vessels for 
speculative purposes, though increasing numbers were being forced to invest in ships without any 
guarantees of employment. One company, in discussing its considerable interest in the sale and 
purchase market, explained that it would only acquire vessels at low prices, with a view to ensuring 
that it could always provide cheap rates. A second company expanded its ideas on speculation as 
follows:
"There are occasions when we w ill buy a unit, not having a charter fixed. We 
do that from  tim e to  time. In the lin e r service, where the lin e r service is  like  a bus 
service, you have an idea o f what's required in  that service -  its  quite a d iffe ren t 
investment decision. I f  you 're building a d rillin g  rig  o r a bulk ca rrie r w ithout having 
a charter then it  is  speculative from  that point o f view: But c le a rly  the Board took a 
view on how we see the d rillin g  market, and the bulk c a rrie r market, in  the years 
ahead. ’
In fact attitudes towards investments were generally conservative, and. while many of the
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decisions made in recent years now appear unfortunate, there is little  doubt that managers simply did 
not correctly guage the risks actually involved. For example, detailed discussions of a project which
caused major problems for one company elicited the following comment:
"We d id not produce conservative projections. We tended to fee! that the 
projections that we were producing were on the conservative side ... That did not 
turn out to be true, but that's one o f the d iffic u ltie s  o f forecasting, that re a lly  the 
fluctuations, a t least recently, have been so huge that you would be considered 
insane to  p red ict fluctuations like  th a t."
Another company, which had invested substantial sums of money in vessels not backed by 
charters, made it  quite clear that they had considered carefully the risks involved, and were of the 
opinion that the company could "stand the commercial ris k  " . However this investment had in 
turn changed attitudes towards further investments.
"Within that context our c rite ria  is  quite simple. We w ill not put (fu rth e r)
capita! a t ris k . We w ill only enter in to  a U.S. flag  domestic venture ... that gave us 
essentia lly a back to  back fu ll payout deal, fhe reason we have th is  c rite rio n  is  that 
we have ju s t invested / ... M in  ... new ships that are free, and we have said that 
that 's enough o f a ris k  fo r us a t th is  tim e, that we have spent that money in  
consideration o f a m arket which is  protected by law. and law  can be changed."
Other topics for discussion which arose in the areas of philosophies and strategies covered the 
following:
(i) Taxation aspects -  emphasised as a major component of the decision in two companies, but of 
some importance elsewhere. Under more profitable economic circumstances it  seems likely that tax 
considerations would be given more weight than currently. At present a substantial supply exists of 
capital allowances and losses to be carried forward.
(ii) In one company synergies existed between ship owning and operations, and ship management and 
training, clearly influencing certain decisions.
(iii) Market share was considered to be important, though secondary to profits, in one of the 
specialist companies, and in some of the liner companies. In most other companies particularly in the 
bulk markets, market share seemed almost completely irrelevant.
(iv) One company had established a particular trade, supported by long term contracts, and was now 
in the business of operating the necessary ships in that trade. No strategic decisions appear to have 
been made or considered in recent years.
(v) One company ran a shipping subsidiary, on a limited route, with the principal aim of ensuring 
transportation for its own products.
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(vi) In one company, which had gone through a somewhat traumatic period, discussions identified 
certain problems caused by being too rich and too successful, with the result that planning and control 
systems were somewhat lax. and decisions had been reached on a re-active, rather than a pro-active 
basis. Current market conditions had necessitated major changes to this approach.
3. Corporate Planning
3.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings
This section is concerned with the identification of the nature, form and content of corporate
planning systems for category 2 companies. Overall, it  is dear that few companies in this category
have either formal or sophisticated planning systems, although evidence does exist to show that in 
these few companies a high degree of sophistication can be found. Clear reasons were given in other 
complies for not having planning systems. These broadly covered resource issues, forecasting 
difficulties, inflexible business strategies leading to few options, and the need to survive in the short 
term.
3.2 Corporate. PJanoing. Systems
Of the 18 companies in this category 14 had no formal systems of corporate planning, or indeed of 
any planning systems, other than one year budgets. The latter were almost universally found, although 
one company admitted that even this was a recent introduction.
Of the four companies with formal planning systems, three covered periods of five years ahead, 
and one of three years ahead. In one of these cases the planning was restricted to members of the 
family, and subsequent comments by non-family managers tended to imply that planning was of a fa irly 
general nature. i.e.
" It’s something which is  very much developed and kept by the fam ily, but I  am 
not p riv y  to it ,  other than in  the broadest sense ...Our Chairman has from  tim e to  
tim e shown great in te rest in  a il so rts o f erudite forecasts, and trie d  to get me to do 
i t  fo r him. but it  's always failed, because one doesn 't have the tim e o r expertise 
necessary to do it  in te lligen tly , and there's such a mass o f conflicting data published 
every day o f the week by a ll those so-called learned people from  H.P. D rew ry 
downwards and upwards."
278
In the other three cases, planning was fa irly sophisticated. These were the only companies in 
this category where plans even approached comparability with those of category 1 companies in terms 
of their degree of sophistication. They were among the largest and most respected companies in 
category 2. The most sophisticated approach (which did compare very favourably with that of category 
1 companies) included the following elements:
(i) A survey of the business environment -  covering five years.
(ii) Projections of relevant supply and demand for particular transportation services.
(iii) Analysis of GNP/lndustrial production/growth.
(iv) An assessment of political factors.
(v) A detailed cost analysis.
(vi) A detailed financing analysis.
(vii) A detailed analysis of business cycles.
A specially designed computer programme enabled planners to devise plans under various scenarios, 
with the option of considerable sensitivity analysis being available. Results were then followed through 
in terms of the potential effect on the three financial statements.
The other two companies with what might be termed well developed planning systems did not 
have the same amount of information provided by planning staff. The analysis of the business 
environment and market analysis was thus generally less wide ranging. and forecasts tended to relate 
more to specific trade routes and/or products, and to supply and demand relationships on particular 
trade routes. More emphasis was placed on agency reports for market forecasts . The three/five year 
plans were thus regarded as more of a guesstimate than in the case referred to above, though detailed 
operating, staff and equipment budgets followed from them. Plans were followed through into the three 
main financial statements and carefully monitored. Given the lower degree of confidence in the 
forecasts produced, a considerable amount of time was spent on discussion of the assumptions 
underlying the plans.
Of the remaining 14 companies, four had undertaken significant one-off strategic analyses in 
recent years, in all cases prior to major investment or disinvestment decisions. These analyses 
typically covered many of the ideas included in the previous paragraph, albeit on a less regular and 
more ad hoc basis. In the other ten companies corporate planning systems were almost non-existent, 
beyond the annual budget. However, particular issues were raised in a number of companies, as being
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issues which would be thought through in some detail by senior managers, again usually, though not 
always, prior to investment or disinvestment decisions. These included the following:
(i) Type of fleet or ships.
(ii) Market trends.
(iii) Chartering policy.
(iv) Financial factors -  particularly the ability to service debt.
These issues were not raised in all companies, and were typically dealt with in a somewhat ad hoc way. 
They w ill be dealt with in more detail in the section on appraisal methods.
It has already been pointed out that the initial emphasis of this study was on an assessment of 
finance theory, hence detailed questions were asked about appraisal methods, and these are dealt with 
in section 4.2. However, the importance of other factors, such as corporate planning systems, and 
macro-economic indicators and similar variables, became clear at an early stage, if  the forecasts 
needed for the appraisal methods were to be put in perspective. The questioning referred to above 
relates to the use of formal planning systems. More detailed questions were also asked about 
macro-economic indicators and similar variables, in relation to their assessment and significance for 
decision making. The overall findings of this line of questioning were as follows:
(i) Three companies had specialist staff who looked at macro-economic and related figures in some
detail, and incorporated them formally into the planning process.
(ii) Seven companies looked at some macro indicators in some detail, as one of the factors likely to
influence particular decisions. Commonly referred to indicators were as follows:
(a) GNP, industrial production and related economic trends
(b) Estimates of trade flows on particular trade routes
(c) Trade flows and the potential for containerisation
(d) Global supply/demand relationship for particular types or sizes of vessels
(e) Inflation, wages, cost escalation, currency changes
(iii) One company relied on consortia for its information on macro-indicators likely to affect its 
shipping activities, all of which were within consortia.
(iv) Seven companies did not do any sort of analysis of this type, other than keep a general eye on 
trade and related press articles.
Emphasis depended on a variety of factors, the most important of which w ill be picked up later. The
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type of trade in which the company was operating was probably the single most important factor.
3.3 Reasons given for the absence of Planning Systems
Clear reasons were not always given for the absence of planning systems. However, three 
reasons recurred frequently.
The firs t of these concerns the question of resources. It was pointed out that few companies in 
this category could actually afford the resources considered necessary to do the planning. Very few 
raised the opposite, but equally valid question of whether they could afford not to.
The second reason, and undoubtedly the most widely held, was that forecasting was so difficult 
that plans were unlikely to be achieved. Problems of forecasting were highlighted for the industry as a 
whole, for particular periods, and for particular types of trade, in statements such as the following:
7 think unless you have fixed  contracts fo r five  years ahead you're kidding 
youse lf on. Sure you can have a p lay a t it, but /  don’t  think you'd get very fa r.'
7 think 1980 was the year when everybody got i t  wrong, Governments as well.
We made a lo t o f bad decisions on chartering. The whole tramp market went 
bananas.'
"But given facto rs that you know, you can get fa ir ly  close, but its  s t ill a b it o f
a gamble i f  you p ro je c t anything ... to take it  fo r another five  years is  v irtu a lly
impossible, w ith shipping affected by p o litics , the middle east wars, a ll th is  so rt o f
thing comes in to  it. There are too many imponderables a t the moment.'
A third reason given reflects an extension or continuation of some of the ideas included in the 
section on philosophies and strategies. A number of companies clearly considered themselves to be 
locked into, or to have a commitment to. the industry, or to particular sectors of it. Such companies 
saw little  point in the type of planning referred to earlier, since they had little  room for manoeuvre. 
For example, two of the American Liner companies in this category were involved in particular trade 
routes, for which they received operating differential subsidy. The impossibility of obtaining such a 
subsidy on alternative routes was recognised, so alternative trade routes (and associated economic and 
other macro-data) were simply not looked at. Where this kind of situation exists and the scope for 
different courses of action is limited, the perceived most relevant questions concern the suitability and 
comparative cost effectiveness of the vessels being used, and relatively short term financial factors. 
The emphasis is thus tactical, operational, or financial, but seldom strategic.
■ Closely associated with this is the question of survival, previously identified as a cause for
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concern for some companies, in the section on philosophies and strategies. Such companies are 
concerned to see how long they can survive under certain assumptions, and the effect that these 
assumptions would have on their sale, purchase, and chartering decisions. In fact the fourth company 
referred to in section 3.2 with a formal planning system had done just that. A five year forecast of 
earnings under different assumptions had been projected, with the purpose of showing how long the 
company could survive under these assumptions. This approach has led to the sale of one ship. Since 
the emphasis is on survival under differing assumptions, less emphasis is given to forecasting per se. 
and more to identifying potential liquidity implications.
Finally, it  perhaps needs to be noted that some individuals clearly felt that the absence of 
planning systems did not imply an absence of planning or forethought, and comments such as the 
following were made:
"Your plans are always there, but they depend e n tire ly  upon the amount o f 
fre ig h t that you collect, and the prospects fo r the future, and the prospects a t the 
moment are anything but brigh t. /  happen to believe that in  id  months time, provided 
nobody s ta rts  flooding the w orld w ith new ships ... a situation w ill a rrive  when we 
again w ill be able to  make su ffic ien t p ro fit (a ) to cover [ourJ running costs, but also
(b) to leave something le ft over towards replacement. You see you’re  continually 
planning ways and means o f economising in  every department you can on a ship, it  
isn ’t  something you sim ply allow  to d r ift away... It's  a da ily discussion on how you 
can cut on th is. ’
I ts  an industry where you can only s ta rt to  plan when you can see ahead 
prosperity fo r a number o f yea rs."
"But ce rta in ly  i f  we found business where we could get a guarantee that the 
ship would be taken back on charter fo r ten years, we would, even today, consider 
it .  But these are the so rt o f things we’re  enquiring in to  a ll the tim e. But it's  a very 
d iffic u lt w orld we're operating in, and your great thing is  you live  from  day to day 
and hope you can survive u n til tom orrow ."
How much of the above is wishful thinking, or merely a defensive reaction, is unclear.
4. Project Appraisal
4 .1 Introduction and Summary of Findings
Given that one of the purposes of this thesis was an assessment of the extent to which various 
methods of appraisal were used, a number of specific questions were asked about the forecasting of
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various figures and the use of Payback. Accounting Rate of Return. Net Present Value, and Internal Rate 
of Return. In general It was found that forecasts of operating costs occurred more frequently than 
forecasts of operating revenues, and typically for longer periods. However, there were few cases 
where any degree of confidence attached to revenue forecasts. With regard to the use of the traditional 
appraisal methods. It became clear that they had a relatively small role to play in investment decision 
making. An attempt was then made to analyse the criteria and appraisal methods actually used in 
practice, and to summarise this into a likely behaviour pattern. Given the significant differences which 
exist between companies operating in the bulk, liner and specialist trades, this part of the analysis is 
broken down into these three groups. Investment decision making was found to be based upon a variety 
of factors, the most Important of which were market analysis, ship characteristics, liquidity and 
profitability considerations. The final decision usually reflected a compromise on these, together with 
elements of experience or Intuition.
4.2 Appraisal Methods used
As with category 1 companies, detailed questions were asked about the nature and period of 
forecasts prepared, and about particular appraisal methods used. However, as has already been noted, 
specific questions do not always lead to specific answers. Detailed questioning sometimes led to initial 
responses being revised In the light of new information.
Questions on forecasts of operating costs and revenues were asked in some detail, being 
necessary ingredients to most of the traditional assessment methods. The responses indicated that such 
forecasts occurred less than might have been expected, with operating costs being forecast more often 
than operating revenues. A summary of the responses is given in table 17.
Period Ahead in years None 1 - 2 3 - 5 5 - 1 0 1 0 * Unspecified
Operating costs - 5 (8) 3 3 3 (4) 4 (0 )
Operating revenues 1 (6 ) 3 2 2 CO 2 (3) 8 C3)
Table 17 Forecasts of costs/revenues -  category 2 companies
The firs t figure in each column represents the initial response to the question. The figure in brackets 
represents modifications which seemed appropriate after further detailed questioning on actual case
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histories.
In interpreting the above table the following observations are likely to be helpful. In several 
companies which forecast operating costs for 1-2 years ahead, the idea was simply to ascertain a 
break-even or hurdle rate for revenues. In one of the cases where revenues and costs were forecast 
for a period of over ten years, a policy of not building ships without a charter had been adopted. In this 
case there were clear revenues to match against costs. Of the four companies which did not specify a 
period for the forecasting of operating costs, one was in fact fulfilling contracts and charters made 
some years ago. and was not actively looking for investments. It dearly had a very good idea of what 
its costs and revenues were likely to be for the remainder of the contractual periods. A second 
company was not prepared to acquire vessels, and had made a decision to charter. However, given that 
this company had a detailed budgeting system in operation, it  is clear that costs were known in detail 
for at least the next year. The other two 'unspecified' were in fa irly specific trades and knew their 
costs in some detail. Three of the four companies in the "unspecified" column for forecasts of operating 
costs could thus reasonably be Incorporated Into the 1-2 year column, with the fourth being 
incorporated in the 10+ column. The bracketed figures show these revisions. With regard to operating 
revenues the following factors are relevant. In one of the cases where revenues were allegedly 
forecast for 5-10 years, further questioning revealed that in fact the projects being analysed were 
cost-savings projects, so detailed knowledge of revenues was not needed (or actually forecast). Of the 
eight "unspecified" cases further questioning made it  apparent that revenue forecasts were not done in 
four cases. Of the other four, forecasts existed in three cases for certain types of project, but not for 
others, while the fourth company had revenues from long term charters, making a shift to the 10+ 
column appropriate. As with operating costs, the revisions for operating revenues are shown in 
brackets.
The final factor with regard to forecasts concerned estimates of disposal value. Only one of the 
18 companies initially said that such estimates were made, but even then a healthy scepticism existed, 
as is indicated by the following statement:
The big unknown in  ship calculations is  the value o f the ship a fte r five  years 
o r a fte r ten years ... You can struggle on year a fte r year not re a lly  making very 
much and then when you s e ll the ship it  a ll comes rig h t -  o r the other way around.'
In fact this company used different assumptions about disposal values in an attempt to establish the
sensitivity of projects to changes therein, rather than attempt to estimate disposal value per se.
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Questions were then asked about the extent to which Inflation was built into forecasts. Two 
companies dealt with inflation on the basis of broad global assessments. Three companies escalated 
costs in a broadly based manner. Only four companies adjusted costs and revenues on a specific basis, 
while nine companies either used current costs and revenues in their calculations, or ignored inflation 
completely. One company specifically identified a move away from adjustments for inflation. i.e.
/  think we're going away from  that (i.e. in flation adjustments) a little  b it, in 
that we, provided we can get the relationship between costs and revenues righ t, 
don't fee! we have to bother too much ... Hie probably ju s t run that rig h t through fo r 
10 years, ra the r than th is so rt o f a rtific ia l business o f increasing the running costs 
by some so rt o f percentage every ye a r."
Following on from these details, it  is not surprising that the formal appraisal techniques based 
upon forecasts were found to have little role to play in project appraisal In category 2 companies. Of 
the 18 companies interviewed, all but one answered questions concerning the use of Payback. 
Accounting rate of return. Net present value, and internal rate of return. These results are 
summarised in table 18.




One method 1 1 2
Two methods 1 1 1 1 2
Three methods 2 2 2 3 3
Four methods 1 1 1 1 1
4 4 5 6 17
V , , , , ....................... .......................
Table 18 Appraisal methods used *  category 2 companies
It perhaps needs pointing out that the "Total* column refers to the number of companies actually 
using the methods referred to, whereas the total row relates to usage of particular methods. In other 
words the use of the above appraisal methods (19 in total) was confined to eight companies, with none 
of the above methods being used in nine of the companies, in fact subsequent discussions suggested that 
two of the companies which stated that they used three methods (ARR. NPV, IRR and PB. NPV. IRR), 
were not likely to use these techniques very often, and certainly not as a matter of routine. In the firs t 
of these cases it  became clear that discounting techniques would only be used to determine the most
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appropriate financing method, while in the second case the quotation given below certainly suggests that 
discounting techniques are given less weight than implied by the original answers. i.e.
“We use the d c f thing ... but ... /  think the payback is  the more im portant. But 
we do norm ally evaluate i t  under a number o r alternatives. "
This still leaves 3 or A companies supposedly using discounting techniques. The earlier reference to the 
fact that only one company appeared to make any estimate of disposal values casts some doubt even on 
these claims, or at least on the validity of the figures actually calculated, unless vessels were 
chartered in, rather than purchased.
Interestingly, where discounting techniques were used, the basis of the calculation was always 
cash flows including debt service commitments. e.g.
"We'd have the cost o f the ship, the loan received, loan repaid, capita! and 
in terest, running costs, income, ... the value a t the end, the cash How. and the d c f 
re tu rn  (over JO ye a rs )."
"One would have to  take the to ta l cost o f the decision. I t  would re a lly  be the 
case that the financing is  p a rt o f the price. I t  would be p a rt o f the deal
The theoretical implications of this were seldom recognised. The discount factor or hurdle rate of
return would need to be related to the cost of equity (almost always tor highly geared projects) for the
above approach to be valid. Given the high risk involved this cost would be high. No company in this
category made any attempt to relate these two aspects of project appraisal. As with category 1
companies further questions were asked of companies which said they used discounting techniques, in
order to clarify what was actually done. They were asked to specify the rate of discount they used.
and to explain its rationale. Answers indicated a considerable degree of confusion, and differences of
opinion. For example, in the company to which the second quotation above relates, the discount factor
was based upon the desire to achieve a real rate of return of 3-4%. A second company said that the
discount rate would depend upon the cost of money, clearly implying a discount rate equivalent to the
current cost of borrowing. One of the companies using the yield method compared returns with market
returns, but again made clear that this was a comparison with the current rate of interest. Two
companies based rates on the cost of money (i.e. current interest rates) plus a risk premium. In one
case this resulted in a target return of 20-258. In the other the risk premium was likely to be around
58. Interestingly in this case the idea of opportunity cost was discussed and discarded. It was pointed
out that it was all very well talking about alternative uses to which funds could be put, but shipowners
were in shipping, not in alternative investments. The 58 premium was thus something of an ad hoc
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figure. One company used the internal rate of return, but did not have a single figure criterion. The 
final company which had said that it  used discounting techniques did not provide a clear cut answer to 
this section, and the general tenor of the discussions suggested that discounting methods were not 
routinely used.
Three further companies passed comment on this question, even though they did not typically use 
discounting. One said that the discount rate 'should obviously be based on the weighted 
average cost o f capita! One considered a target of 6-7% net appropriate. The third, while 
pointing out that it  was an hypothetical question, said that if  it  were currently investing, it would be 
aiming for 10-15% after tax. This was based on an appropriate rate for a high risk, cyclical industry 
with high inflation.
These results suggest some clear misunderstandings about discounting methods. Errors are being 
made in their application in three cases, and in the others the approach was somewhat hit or miss. 
Given the earlier comments on problems of forecasting the doubts about the usefulness of discounting 
techniques may be valid. If such techniques are used however, care must be taken to ensure that an 
appropriate discount or hurdle rate is chosen.
Clearly the above results indicate that the traditional appraisal methods set out in most Finance 
texts are not a significant part of decision making in category 2 companies. This raises the question as 
to the alternative approaches which are used. In practice some consistency of approach was found, and 
the results led to a concentration of the analysis into the following areas:
(i) Analysis of the sector in which the company operated
(iU Fleet or systems concepts as opposed to individual vessel appraisal
(iii) Emphasis on the 'right** ship
(iv) Analyses of costs/revenues
(v) Liquidity aspects
(V I) Overall group or corporate aspects
A broad indication of findings is given in table 19. The basis of this table w ill be explained below, and 
the results w ill be discussed in more detail in later sections. As can be seen from the table, significant 
differences in approach and emphasis were found between the bulk trades, the liner trades, and the 
specialist trades. These are thus examined separately in the following sections. The total of 18 in fact 
represents 17 companies for which detailed answers were obtained, one of which had substantial liner
ADd bulk interests.
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--------- Companies w ith  substantial in te res ts  in
Appraisal c r ite r io n Bulk Liner S pecia lis t Total
General analysis o f sector 9 4 1 14
Emphasis on "rig h t"  ship 7 1 0 8
Appraised as p art o f a "system " 0 5 1 6
Appraised individually 1 1 1 0 12
B reak-even  ra tes  calculated 8 0 0 8
Emphasis on liquidity 8 4 1 13
Emphasis on o v e ra ll resu lts 4 1 1 6
Total 11 6 1 t 8
Table 19 Appraisal criteria -  category 2 companies
4.3 The Bulk Trades
Table 19 indicates that no company in this category acquiring ships for the bulk trades appraised 
them other than on an individual basis, although three companies had a fairly clear ’ fleet* concept 
underlying their individual appraisals. By and large this is because the bulk trades operate in a world 
wide market, with relatively low barriers to entry.
This latter fact also influences the kind of background or macro-analysis that goes on. At least 
nine of the eleven companies with interests in the bulk trades kept a general eye on economic conditions, 
mainly through the reading of Journals and various reports. In fact It was difficult to quantify or 
evaluate precisely how much of this sort of background analysis went on. and it  is likely that some sort 
of minimum level occurred in all companies. However, in no case was the analysis comparable to that 
of category 1 companies, or some of the liner companies In category 2. Particular attention was 
devoted to supply/demand relationships for those types of vessel in which the company might be 
interested. Given the almost perfect nature of competition in this area this analysis almost always 
related to global figures. In no case was any individual competitor analysis done, or any formal attempt 
made to evaluate political risk.
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The analysis or overall supply/demand relationships" with regard to particular categories or ship 
also led in a significant number of cases (seven of the nine) to a search for the “right* ship. In general 
the “right" ship was one of:
(i) a type of ship in short supply, relative to current or anticipated demands
(ii) a type of ship which was suitable for a variety of trade, routes or berths
(iii) a type of ship (often with modifications of some sort) which would give the owners a competitive 
advantage, often, though not always, by giving the lowest operating costs.
The kind of thinking found is illustrated by the following quotations.
'(The next stage) goes in to  specific alternatives that were available to us, ... 
pricing, delivery, characteristics o f the ship, lim itin g  characteristics, and in fact 
what we wound up doing was taking a sm aller tanker which was a standard design 
from  a shipyard, and saying, 'A lrigh t in  principle. Let's keep the engine room, and
le t 's blow out the cargo section u n til we can get the ra te  down to a point that makes
sense'. And in  blowing out the cargo section we had to do certa in things. We had to  
say, OK, ... , we don't want to  go beyond that. We don't want to  go beyond 40 ' 
d ra ft, because o f the characteristics o f our ports', so we actually came up w ith th is  
magic 50,000 ton num ber."
"We/i. whenever there 's a cargo in  the market, because these are targe modern 
ships w ith re la tiv e ly  low  operating costs, compared w ith a typ ica l steamship in the 
American f/ee t, ... we can take it . "
The analyses of costs and revenue relationships for companies in this category involved in the 
bulk trades also displayed considerable consistency, with break-even rates being calculated explicitly in 
eight of the eleven companies included. As has already been indicated, confidence in being able to 
predict revenues accurately was low, and the emphasis was thus placed upon estimating costs in some 
detail. (In practice these were known with a high degree of accuracy), converting them into a 
break-even freight rate (or time charter rate), and then making Judgements as to the likelihood of this 
rate actually being achieved. e.g.
"We wouid do a p ro file  o f its  costs, and re la te  it  to its  m arket potential, on the 
tim e charter o r voyage charter ra te . O f course invariably you're doing i t  against 
the current market. ’
‘You 'd do it  (forecast operating costs) fo r 4  o r 5  years, being p re tty  certain  
that you were going to  be wrong, i f  things were so stable that there wouldn't be 
fluctuations o r imponderables i t  could w e ll be that it  would take you through the 4  or 
5  years w ith some accuracy, but too many imponderables come along. Operating 
revenues are a com pletely d iffe ren t proposition. Your running costs ... haven't 
varied much, very litt le  in  fact, but what has varied tremendously is  your revenue 
side ... We know what every ships break-even is, and /  always keep a lis t on my 
desk ... and when /  see a da ily fre ig h t ra te  that exceeds it  /  fee l like  celebrating. 
But /  haven t  fe lt like  celebrating fo r a couple o f years /  shou/dn t  th in k ."
Interestingly, every company that calculated such rates appeared to base such rates on a cash flow
289
break-even rate. In other words the break-even rates calculated included operating and financing costs. 
Financing costs /  debt service included both interest and capital repayments. This reflects the 
importance of the liquidity concerns referred to below.
For the three companies which did not fijm lK iily calculate break-even freight rates, procedures 
were broadly as follows. One made estimates of costs and revenues for ten years plus, and emphasised 
the expected relationship between the two, and also expected utilisation rates. This was seen as 
“very im p o rta n t". Such an approach is similar in concept to the idea of break-even rates. In the 
second case the company had a policy of not ordering ships without charters, in which case revenues 
and costs could be ascertained accurately, and a profit per vessel calculated. This enabled the company 
to:
"... workout a ra te  o f re tu rn, and ... also took a t when we can pay Pack the 
equity. That becomes a key element w ith us ... We're very conservative. We couid 
go ahead i f  we befieve we couid pay back the debt, then the equity, and go ro r p ro fit 
fu rth e r down the lin e .'
Whether such a policy with regard to chartering w ill continue to be realistic remains to be seen. The 
third company actually used all four standard appraisal methods in certain circumstances, and 
break-even rates, or some analysis of the revenues/costs relationship, were implicit in much of the 
analysis. It was specifically pointed out that, in the absence of charters, current revenue and costs 
levels would provide the basis for the figures used.
The third area of considerable consistency concerned attitudes towards liquidity, and the 
importance of liquidity considerations in the decision making process. Nine of the eleven companies 
highlighted liquidity analysis as being an important part of the process. In fact the majority of 
companies prepared forecasts of debt service over some period in the future, typically five years, 
sometimes for the life of vessels. These forecasts, while incorporating debt service obligations for 
individual vessels, were basically done to arrive at a clear estimate of debt service obligations 
(including leasing) for the corporation or group as a whole. In two of the nine cases the forecasts were 
of group debt service commitments. In four other cases these were done and then incorporated into 
formal corporate cash flow forecasts. In one case forecasts consisted of the estimated cash flow 
obligations, covering both operating and debt service commitments, for the period for which loans were 
outstanding, both on an individual ship and a shipping division basis. One company emphasised its 
concerns with survival in such a way as to make it clear that liquidity concerns were paramount. Only
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one company did not emphasise the importance of debt service on a corporate or group basis, and this 
was explained by reference to the type of company it was and to the fact that projects were financed 
from different sources, i.e.
'Each p ro je ct o f ours stands on its  own tegs. It's  not ca rried  by another 
pro ject. And that's because a lo t o f our p ro jects are financed by d iffe ren t 
individuals, and therefore it  isn 't the norm al type o f corporate en tity . “
In spite of this, the company still shared the liquidity concerns with other companies in this category,
pointing out that:
"We have only ordered vessels where there were charters, and therefore 
during the term  o f the charter ... we have su ffic ien t cash flo w  to meet the capita! 
and debt. Our problem would re a lly  arise where we don't have a charter equivalent 
to  the vessels life . ’
Such circumstances may well arise in the future, in spite of the tremendous drive and personality of the 
Company President, with the potential result that practice would tend towards that of the other 
companies in this category.
Two companies did not explicitly emphasise liquidity concerns in their discussions of the 
appraisal process. In one case a whole range of methods were used, and further questioning on liquidity 
elicited the following comments:
'Sure, we don't do anything w ithout knowing what our cash flow  is  going to be. 
P ro fits  are very fine  fo r people to look at. maybe shareholders, but speaking 
personally, and speaking as fa r as m y Board is  concerned, they are w e ll educated 
in to  the cash flo w  method o f accounting, as i t  w ere."
In the second case a detailed planning system was in operation, so divisional and group forecasts of 
cash flow were actually made. The lack of emphasis on liquidity in investment decisions reflected the 
richness and strength through diversification of this particular company.
Four of the eleven companies involved in the bulk trades specifically prepared assessments of the 
impact of individual projects on corporate profit and loss statements and Balance Sheets, though the 
emphasis on corporate profitability was lower than that on corporate liquidity.
Illustrative quotations on views on liquidity and profitability are given below:
"Yes, P ro fit and Loss, but Cash Flow pa rticu la rly . That's what i t  's a ll about. 
It's  the most im portant statement. P ro fit is, in  my view, notional to some extent, 
because it  depends upon your depreciation charge."
"We do a calculation fo r the ship its e lf, and we also do calculations buifding the 
ship in to  the company, i  think the second in  some ways may be more im portant than 
the fir s t ... The three b its  o f paper we look a t are the Balance Sheet and the cash 
flow  (and the P ro fit and Loss). The cash flow  is  ce rta in ly the most im portant one. 
and the P ro fit and Loss is  probably the least im portant one. That's possibly because
291
we are a fam ily  company. I  should imagine fo r a public company the P ro fit and Loss 
would be o f great im portance."
A final factor which seemed of significance in investment decisions was what might be termed
the "experience factor", or the " intuition factor". Clearly many decisions had a strong element of
"feeling right" about them. Sometimes these feelings were justified. Increasingly, as the bulk shipping
market changes rapidly, they were not. That they are a significant, if  informal (and certainly
non-quantifiable), element in decision making, is apparent from the following comments:
"We tend to  re ly  very much on our experience ... /  think in  the past some o f the 
evaluations were p re tty  optim istic. in tu ition  is  s t ill considered very highly in  
shipping, and it's  usually w rong."
"You're not ju s t cranking out numbers. You Ye got to have some so rt o f
in tu itive  feeling that th is  is  the tim e to  do it .  I f  your planning process said you're 
a ll wrong, you would probably change your way o f thinking, but i f  your planning 
process gives you a reasonable degree o f support, i t  re inforces your in tu itive  
thinking more than anything e lse ."
In summarising this section, the following points would appear to be a reasonable statement of the likely 
behaviour pattern of companies in this category, operating in the bulk trades.
(i) Projects are likely to be analysed individually, although some companies are likely to have some 
sort of "fleet concept", usually related to the purchase of handy sized or flexible ships.
(ii) The analysis of demand/supply relationships is likely to be broadly based, probably confined to 
broad impressions obtained from the specialist press, in terms of world trade, 6NP, and other 
macro-economic indicators, but fa irly specific in terms of the relationships between supply and demand 
for particular types of ship. Competitor analysis and/or the analysis of specific political risk is 
unlikely to occur. Increasingly an awareness of the trends in the sale and purchase market is likely to 
be found.
(iii) Considerable emphasis is likely to be placed upon obtaining the "right" ship. Often this is a vessel 
which gives considerable flexibility.
(iv) Little attempt is likely to be made to estimate revenues for vessels being considered. The 
analysis is likely to concentrate on the identification of costs, and from this the break-even freight 
rate. A judgement can then be made as to the chances of such a rate being achieved. The costs included 
in the calculation of break-even rates usually includes debt-service committments, both interest and 
principal, so the break-even freight rate is a cash flow break-even rate.
(v) Considerable emphasis is likely to be placed on a liquidity analysis of a project, particularly debt
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service commitments. It is likely that the analysis w ill cover specifically the effect of an individual 
project on corporate cash flows. Some companies are likely to calculate the impact of projects on 
corporate profit and loss and Balance Sheet figures, but this is far from universal.
The above factors were found in a substantial number of the eleven companies in category 2 
involved in the bulk trades. The actual weighting given to each varied somewhat from one case to 
another. The following quotations illustrate the approach found in two companies, and provide some 
overall perspective on the investment decision making process in these companies.
The firs t relates to one of the wealthier companies in the sector, with its bulk shipping activities 
being one part of its overall portfolio. It relates to a decision to acquire new tankers.
" If we go onto the ... new ships there were some ra th e r subjective crite rio n  
applied, and those subjective c rite ria  were, as t  understand i t  .... the company took a 
took a t its  geographically removed shipping operations ... and looked back over 
fo rty -o d d  years and said, H y God, that company's been damned profitab le , and not 
too cyc lica l e ither, because o f the nature o f the business we d id .' And they said. 
Well, weVe got money. Should we put more in  the re? ' And in  looking a t the way the 
company h is to rica lly  d id  business ...the  only alternative was new construction ... 
The company as a group d id  not have to  say, 'Before we invest th is  we want to see a 
positive  cash flow , a secure charter, and so on.' Rather the company said. We can 
stand the commercial r is k .' O don't think anyone assessed the Governmental ris k ). 
But in  tha t process i  am certa in that, ce rta in ly  the equity portion o f the investment 
had to  compete w ith demands (from  the other areas o f business, w ith in the group) ... 
To what extent there were quantitative requirem ents thrown against the plan, in  
term s o f re tu rn  on equity and so on, /  don t  think there were any. P rojections were 
made, and there was a desire to stay in  the business, in  the long term , and th is  
seemed to  be a good way o f doing i t . "
The second relates to a company entirely devoted to the bulk trades at the time of the interview.
The atmosphere was very conducive to a c tiv ity  and /  think that we were very 
concerned ... about building a basis fo r the fu tu re  ... and so we considered a number 
o f things ...
■We came to  the conclusion that i f  we were to  order new vessels we should look 
in to  the sm aller tanker sector, because the sm aller tanker sector had, fir s t o f a ll, 
the best balance in  the tanker industry. Secondly, i t  had the oldest flee t, and 
th ird ly , while i t  had a lo t o f ships on order they represented a sm all proportion o f 
the fle e t ... So we decided that we should go sm all tanker ...
There was an atmosphere o f concern amongst some people about what the 
fundamentals o f the m arket were like . We were a b it a fra id  that ... the m arket m ight 
be over, tha t we were heading in to  a recession ... and that th is  was perhaps the tim e 
to m aintain our liq u id ity , but ... the strong pressure w ithin the Board was to  have 
something fo r the future, and the expectation that ... things never get cheaper, and 
therefore you have to go in  and grasp the opportunities when they're there because 
they don't get cheaper ...
"And then there was a tendency towards wanting to do a new vessel, because 
the argument was, i f  the recession was coming ... we wouldn't get the vessels fo r a 
couple o f years, and then the recession would be over when we were taking delivery 
o f the vessels in  a recovering m arket ...
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The fir s t thing that we would do would be to say OK, today the ra te  fo r th is  
vessel is  so and so. I f  we were to earn a t th is  level, annually, and turn that ra te  in to  
an annual p ro fita b ility , and p ro ject that fo r the life  o f the vessel, what kind o f 
re tu rn  would i t  be? Would i t  be a positive re tu rn ? ' Then we would put the vessel 
in to  our cash flow  to see its  impact on the company over the next five  years, based 
on ra te  projections o f today ... Then we would judge re a lly  whether we had the 
capacity to undertake the p ro ject -  in  liq u id ity  term s...
The cash flo w  was pure liq u id ity . I t  was pure ly to see that our liq u id ity  was 
maintained a t reasonable levels fo r a reasonable period o f tim e ... /  would say a
reasonable period o f tim e would be to see your liq u id ity  in  hand fo r the five  years 
period. Maybe perhaps depleting, but ce rta in ly  not being extinguished w ithin the five  
year period ...
'We did not go to a consultant to do a detailed study o f the potentia l use o f ... 
tonners ... We d id  i t  in  a s lig h tly  d iffe ren t way. In ... we were thinking along the
lines o f th is  class o f ship, and /  spent about three weeks in  the US visiting  our
clien ts there, and ta lking about th is  class o f ship, which gave me a p re tty  good idea 
about whose programmes it  was a vessel i t  was suitable fo r, and talking to brokers 
generally about the class and type o f vessel. But we didn't do e ither any in te rna l 
studies o r re ta in  outside consultants to do any study o f the class o f ship. /  had read 
studies done by people like  D rew ry who had ... done pa rticu la r studies on tankers, 
and had pinpointed weft in  advance o f the recovery, the strong market recovery 
which was expected in  the sm all tanker sector. '
On being asked whether, with hindsight, the decision to go ahead with the purchase of new vessels had 
been correct, the following response was given.
The game is n 't over yet, so it's  s t ill too ea rly  to te ll. What /  can say
absolutely is  that /  could have done substantia lly better. /  couid have bought the
vessel fo r substantia lly less money, on substantia lly be tte r terms, and i  could have 
kept substantial amounts o f money in  m y Balance Sheet and earned substantial 
in te rest while i  was waiting, it's  the best vessel to have ordered a t that time, and 
it's  the best vessel to  order today. Whether f t  was ... a good decision to order 
anything a t a ll is  another m a tte r."
4.4 The Liner Trades
Table 19 indicates that five of the six liner companies very clearly appraised projects as part of 
a system, with only one apparently viewing projects on an individual basis. This company was confined 
to one trade route, on which Operating Differential Subsidy was paid. Investment decisions were thus 
confined to replacement decisions or to moderate increases in capacity. Where the decision was 
essentially one of replacement, the core of the analysis was on establishing comparative figures on a 
cost per ton basis, for the exising vessel/s and its potential replacement/s i.e.
" if we're going to  be in  the same business w ith the same requirement were 
looking a t the best p ro fit we can generate w ith the pa rticu la r sh ip ."
If the capacity of the replacement was going to represent a significant increase in tonnage on the liner
route, market studies and market share analyses would be carried out. In practice quite significant
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changes in the type of vessel used had occurred, with new vessels having the capacity of between two 
and three of the vessels replaced. While strictly such decisions could be viewed as 'individual', a clear 
awareness existed of their role in the liner system in which they were to operate.
Of the other five companies, two made it  clear that the appraisal was related to its liner fleet, or 
particular trade route on which it  operated a liner service, as follows:
In  the fine r trade i t  (the appraise!) would be p a rt o f the fine r flee t, as to what 
its  prospects are, and how i t  would f it  in to  our flee t. Bulk ca rrie rs  and rig s  tend to  
be looked a t as p ro jects in  th e ir own rig h t."
7 suppose in  e ffe c t we would do i t  fo r the trade route and realise that we had 
two o r three ships assigned to the trade route. "
One company emphasised the importance of membership of consortia for all but the largest liner 
companies. It went on to indicate that in project appraisal it  is membership of a particular consortium 
which is the project. i.e.
*... you know, you can't look a t the ship by its e lf, ft's  the decision to  trade on 
that route. Because fu rth e r down the 'pike you can make a decision to charter in, o r 
to purchase, o r to  do whatever, but its  the in itia l decision to  trade on that route 
which provides you w ith  so many obligations, to  the market, to  customers, to  
employees, and so on, and that's the re a lly  big decision."
The other two companies were committed to single liner routes to parts of the world which could 
be regarded as less stable. In both cases decisions made were made in the context of that trade and its 
peculiarities. For example, one of the trade routes was to the Middle East, and it  was found to be 
“very hard" to forecast what was likely to happen. Part of this was due to political uncertainty, part 
to currency fluctuations, and part related to uncertainties about the level of governmental and/or 
m ilitary cargo to the region. The company attempted to build more flexibility into its activities by 
taking more charters on its ships, rather than dedicating the whole ship to the liner route. Its major 
concern was to ensure that it  introduced such modifications as were needed to " handle the changing 
m arket place ’ . All decisions were thus made in the context of an assessment of where the market is 
going, what part of it  is containerisable. and what market share cm be obtained. The fifth  company had 
bought vessels for a particular trade, clearly knowing what they could do with them, and how they 
would f it  into that trade.
As with the companies involved in the bulk trades, a certain minimum level of market analysis 
seemed to exist. However, the analysis for the liner companies generally covered such things as 
economic forecasts, currency forecasts, and historical and expected trade flows for particular routes.
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The weighting given to different aspects varied from company to company, but the following quotation 
Is Illustrative of a typical approach.
"This is what wa do routinely, with reference to our marketing. We are at 
ways looking at the economic forecasts, the value o f the dollar, the opportunity o f 
particular countries to buy American goods and vice-versa. “
With consortia the same kind of analysis also seemed to go on, although the consortia often did the 
analysis, rather than the company Itself. e.g.
"The censortfurn, when ft's large, tends to have Its  own specialist s ta ff ... and 
they are working from published government statistics in the various countries that 
the trade serves, and [looking atJ the correlation between those statistics and total 
volume carried by both conventional and container shipping, assumptions about the 
penetration o f container shipping Into the total shipping market, i.e. how quickly is 
the conventional shipping being moved over, etc. So it's a very composite thing.m
No liner company In this category did an analysis of the world supply/demand relationship for 
ships of a particular type. Indeed, in only one of the six liner companies In category 2 was emphasis 
specifically placed on the "right” ship. This is not to say that detailed quality and design aspects of the 
ship were not important, but that the emphasis was firs t on the liner service or trade route, and 
secondly the ship. In fact in discussing decisions it  became clear that the identification of certain 
desirable ship characteristics was an important part of the analysis, particularly those relating to fuel 
efficiency, maintenance costs, and flexibility. Reference was again made to the need for ships to be 
cost effective, since it  was clear at the Ume of the interviews that it  was only the least cost carriers 
that were making any money. That position is unlikely to have changed since.
The Sea Shed, being developed by MARAO and Farrell Lines, provides evidence of the search for 
greater flexibility of operations. One liner company, as mentioned earlier, was attempting to mix a 
liner service and charters, again with the objective of achieving greater flexibility. One company had a 
policy of having the "best ships in the trade", though it  was not clear in precisely which area ( i* . 
running costs/maintenance costs/flexibility, etc.) the ships were the best. It is thus clear from the 
subsequent questioning that while the search for the "right ship" was not given the emphasis in the liner 
companies that it  was in the bulk companies, considerable time was nevertheless devoted to ship design.
Studies of competition and capacity data were generally restricted to the particular trade routes 
concerned, and were far less detailed and rigorous than those done by category 1 liner companies. In 
two cases these studies were done by the consortia, to which the companies belonged. Nevertheless, 
these studies of competition and capacity data, when coupled with further analysis of vessel costs.
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often provided the real basis for decision making in category 2 liner companies. For example, one 
company carried out its analysis of entry into a consortium broadly as follows:
(i) Estimates of potential trade flows on the liner route were obtained from the consortium.
(ii) Estimates were then made of the trade share likely to be obtained or negotiated. This could then 
be converted into a figure for the volume of containers. When coupled with a figure for the expected 
freight rate (obtained from the consortium), broad estimates of revenues couid be made.
(iii) The next stage consisted of the identification of costs, broken down into variable costs and ship 
costs. Variable costs were identified as including port dues, costs of loading/unloading containers, 
inland costs, agency costs. A final figure was then expressed in terms of variable cost per container. 
Ship costs were then identified in terms of ’slot costs’  or feeder costs.
(iv) A comparison of costs and revenues was then made to work out whether or not the trade share 
negotiated was profitable. If conditions were favourable the project would almost certainly be 
profitable. If conditions were unfavourable all members of this particular consortium would run at a 
loss.
(v) In this particular company projects such as this were assessed over 7-10 years, occasionally 
longer. An NPV was calculated on the basis of the above.
(vi) Cash profiles of the project were then carefully examined, particularly with regard to their 
impact on the company overall. Membership of a consortium provides obligations, and these were 
carefully ,ascertained in cash flow terms.
Few other companies carried out such complete analyses, but the firs t few points provide the basis for 
most decisions. More typically, estimates of revenues and costs were based upon current figures, 
which could then be converted into equivalent profitability estimates. Judgements could then be made 
as to likely changes in trade flows, market shares, and hence profitability, and a decision reached 
accordingly.
The different nature of liner shipping to bulk shipping probably accounted for the fact that no liner 
company in category 2 calculated break-even freight rates. The equivalent concept would probably be 
break-even utilisation rates. Certainly concerns with trade levels and expected changes therein were 
important, as was seen in the last paragraph. However, there was no evidence found that this was 
converted into break-even utilisation rates, or that these rates were an important part of the 
investment decision making process.
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Concerns with liquidity were specifically identified in four of the six liner companies, and 
survival policies in a fifth company ensured careful consideration of all liquidity issues. In the sixth 
company it  became apparent that the purse strings were held centrally by the owners, and managers in 
the shipping subsidiary were not aware of the liquidity position overall.
In the four cases referred to above the concerns were with the overall efTect on corporate 
liquidity. Cash flow profiles were identified in one case as being of potential significance, as follows:
“We'd obviously have to look a t the cash How p ro file  ... f f  i t  had very large 
outlays in  the ea rly  years and a ll the benefits came late, that would have 
im plications fo r the degree o f ris k  that was inherent in  it .  “
This same company also took the view that in the liner trades part of the necessary investment on 
certain routes was the “funding o f e a rly  losses “. Only one of the six companies routinely worked 
through the effect of investment decisions into corporate profit and loss statements and Balance Sheets.
Overall rather less consistency existed with regard to project appraisal by this group, than for 
the companies in the bulk trades. For example, three of the companies stated that they would use NPV 
(amongst other things) as one of their appraisal methods. A fourth stated that none of the traditional 
appraisal methods had been used in the past but they probably would be for new investments. 
Discounting techniques were emphasised in this discussion. By comparison, the remaining two 
companies made It dear that none of these techniques were used. Indeed, in one of the companies the 
response was very dismissive of these techniques, as follows:
“Were not re a lly  Interested in  anything like  that, that's sp littin g  hairs, it  
must be a good opportunity. “
Nevertheless, some summary can be made, which at the very least indicates the major areas of 
investigation and methods of analysis found in the liner companies, and provides an interesting 
comparison with the bulk companies.
(i) Projects are likely to be assessed in relation to complete liner routes, or even membership of 
consortia, rather than single vessels.
(ii) A certain amount of market analysis is likely to take place. This is likely to relate to such things 
as economic forecasts, trade volumes on particular routes, the potential for containerisation, and 
expected market shares. These aspects are likely to be covered in far more detail in the liner trades 
than the bulk trades. The study of supply/demand relationships for particular types of ship are not 
likely to be an important part of the analysis. (In certain cases, depending upon the trade routes under
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consideration, it is likely that political considerations w ill be given some weight.)
(iii) The emphasis on finding the "right ship" is likely to be less in the liner trades than the bulk 
trades. Nevertheless, the identification of important ship characteristics is still likely to be an 
important, though secondary part of the analysis. It is likely that the more important characteristics 
w ill relate to cost effectiveness and potential flexibility, with the latter generally being less important 
than the former. This is because liner ships are usually dedicated to a particular trade, and must be 
amongst the cheapest to operate in that trade. Flexibility is more likely to be sought for less stable 
trade routes.
(iv) Competition and capacity data for the particular liner routes on which the companies operate are 
likely to be available in some detail, typically through membership of consortia and conferences. Little 
formal analysis is likely to occur in this area for category 2 companies.
(v) Considerable attention is likely to be devoted to the assessment of the impact of investment 
decisions on corporate cash flows.
4.5 The. Specialist Companies
While two companies in category 2 were involved in specialist trades, only one provided detailed 
information on investment appraisal. In fact the cost of the specialist trades is so high that few private
companies are likely to be able to afford to enter them. Most specialist companies are thus likely to be
in category 1. In fact the company referred to above was one of the most sophisticated in category 2 
and acted in many ways as a category 1 company. The main difference was in the degree of 
diversification achievable, which was somewhat less than category 1 companies. With regard to its 
planning and appraisal systems this company was undoubtedly the most sophisticated in its category. 
The essential parts of its planning system have already been described in section 32 . Project appraisal 
was clearly set in this planning context, and was based upon the following points:
(i) An identification of the strategic importance of the project
(ii) Project description
(iii) Project Financing
(iv) An analysis of the Business Cycle
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(v) Financial results for one ship -  i.e. cash flow and profit and loss forecasts for three years, on 
both a standard and a pessimistic basis
(vi) Such addendum or exhibits as are considered necessary
Subsequent discussions made it  clear that discounting techniques were used as pad of the 
appraisal process. These calculations were based upon cash flows after financing for eight years, in 
fact the IRR calculations were based upon savings in operating costs, with a calculation then being made 
of the benefits (in NPV terms) of any subsidised finance available. Nevertheless, in spite of the 
reference to financial results for gap ship in (v) above, it  was clear that:
"... the appraisal was the class .... then the number o r ships, then the question 
o f what does the financia l structure  amount to ."
This was reinforced in subsequent discussions on the cost-effectiveness of certain ships, as follows:
"Having a collection o f single ships ... it's  d iffic u lt fo r maintenance, look a t 
your spare pa rts  problem. W eii have certa in classes o f ships w ill predominate on 
certa in trade routes, and i f  you've got s ix  ships o f a class you know then that every 
other voyage is  going to be an identica l ship. So you can plan ahead, and your 
customer can plan ahead. You know that three months down the line  you can ca rry  
your cargo because the system is  coming along th a t'll do the same th ing ."
‘One o f the things on ju s tify in g  these new ships -  they're cheaper to operate, 
in  other words, the point that we were try in g  to  make ... was that given the same 
environment tha t you're going to  be in, whether it's  a more p ro fitab le  environment 
o r a loss environment, the ships themselves, on a transportation cost per ton, were 
cheaper, even though they cost more, ... than some o f the older ships... "
Clearly this particular company analysed its projects, and planned its future in a very 
comprehensive way. with the analysis covering a whole range of factors. Interestingly, the experience 
or intuition factor mentioned earlier was also mentioned in this company, as follows:
"Gut feeling has a lo t to do w ith things, but it's  not a gut feeling that doesn’t  
have a lo t o f study and analysis going on behind i t . "
5. Risk tn In vestm en t D ecisions
5.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings
This section is concerned with identifying the ways in which companies in this category dealt 
with risk in the investment decision. Little new information was obtained as a result of further 
questions being asked specifically on risk. Risk appeared to be dealt with in a very general way. 
through broad policies concerned with the maintenance of a spread of interests/ activities, such things
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as the acquisition of general purpose vessels, and conservative attitudes towards liquidity. Formalised 
systems for dealing with risk were almost non-existent for category 2 companies, as was the use of 
analytical methods for dealing with risk, other than sensitivity analysis.
5.2 General Approaches to Risk
Few companies in this category dealt with risk systematically. However, the section on 
philosophies and strategies should have made it  apparent that some of the policies chosen were intended 
to reduce risk in some way or another. Particular areas of concern which were highlighted in that 
section, and which recurred in discussions on risk were:
(i) The degree of exposure to a particular industry or sector of the industry in which the company 
was operating
(ii) The risk associated with the purchase of particular ships
(iii) Liquidity risk
As was pointed out in the section on philosophies and strategies, six of the 18 companies had a
variety of interests, and clearly saw diversifications as an essential element of risk reduction. In two
cases specific reference was also made to questions about whether the overall group could stand the
risk associated with further investment into certain sectors of shipping. In both cases the answer was
that it  could, but there was a clear implication that there was a level of commitment beyond which they
wouldn't go. since the risks to the entire group would become too great.
Other companies, even when confined to particular sectors of the market, attempted to reduce
risk by careful balancing of such things as time charter periods. Most companies in the bulk sector
would clearly have liked to obtain what one company described as V  be tte r balanced p o rtfo lio  o f
usage \  with rather more ships on longer term contracts and charters. Certainly there appears to be
little  doubt that historically risk has been systematically reduced by this method, with charter periods
of five, ten or even 15 years not being unusual. The current market situation is very different, and
while the balancing of charters is still an option, its effectiveness at present is somewhat more limited.
Both the intent and the current limitations are captured in the following comment:
" What you tr y  and do ... you want a t least seven o r eight ships to  operate. and 
you try  to  se t o ff one type o f charter to  another. You look a t the tim e charter ra tes  
and you think, now, what can we a ffo rd  to  do. W ell put two ships on 12-18 months 
charter, running costs are covered and i t ’s  making a p ro fit. T h a ill be our so rt o f
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bread and bu tte r fo r the next two years. And then you feet w ith the re s t o f the ships 
tha t you can p lay the spot market, s titt looking fo r chances to cover yourself. *
A t least two companies were actively looking for further diversification out of shipping to compensate
for this reduced ability to balance out risk within the sector in which it  was operating.
A decision to actually acquire vessels itself incurs certain risks. These risks increase as the 
degree of specialism of the vessels increase, since the selling price of a vessel w ill reflect its potential. 
A high cost specialist investment in shipping, which subsequently goes wrong, is likely to lead to a 
substantial loss in terms of both operating losses and capital losses. A more generally useful vessel, 
particularly one of a size which permits it  to operate in a variety of geographical areas, and/or with 
self discharging gear for use in less developed parts, is far less likely to involve its owners in a 
substantial capital loss, even if  operating losses are incurred. For category 2 companies, particularly 
those in the bulk trades, risk reduction by the purchase of handy sized, flexible ships, with low 
operating costs, was a common solution to a difficult problem. For the bulk trades this may be a 
reasonable approach. In the liner trades there is likely to be some conflict between being low cost and 
also having the minimum risk. Only one of the liner companies had given considerable thought to risk 
reduction in this area. It had decided that under current market conditions the risks involved with the 
acquisition of vessels were too great, and a decision to charter in needed tonnage had been made. This 
policy had been applied to other factors as well, as can be seen from the following:
7 think we would do everything we could to  m inim ise ris k  while a t the same 
tim e try in g  to  be a tow cost ca rrie r, and that has tended to mean that we are buying 
in  many more supplies from  the outside market, because one can then vary the 
volume o f those supplies more easily than i f  you have set up s e lf supply.m
Under certain circumstances, notably where there was a commitment to provide tonnage under a
succesful consortium agreement, this company might s till consider acquisition of vessels. However, as
is evidenced by the following comment, the degree of risk associated with such a venture is s till
perceived to be high.
“ Where i t  becomes dea r that a pa rticu la r ship size is  appropriate ... then it  
m ight be rig h t. But then again, when one looks a t ... what has been recently done, 
ordering ships o f 4,000 TEU capacity, one has to constantly ask oneself whether the 
accepted economic relationships that exist today, about the size o f the ship, and the 
cost per TEU o f tha t ship, w ill be appropriate in  the future. We've seen that i f  you 
have a 4,000 TEU ship, purchased in  todays m arket, w ith todays low  stee l prices, 
todays overcapacity in  shipyards, w ith todays cheap containers, which are h a lf the 
price  o f what a container would have cost 10 years ago, that someone can provide a 
container s lo t a t a fraction  o f the capita! cost that was provided a few  years ago."
The concerns with liquidity have been identified earlier, with the result that more emphasis is
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being placed on liquidity in appraisal and planning. Having said that, few companies seemed to have any 
policies for incorporating liquidity aspects into either the measurement of risk or its reduction. Only 
three companies seemed to have specific liquidity risk criteria in their appraisals, or to have changed 
their policies to reflect changed concerns with liquidity risk. In one case specific cash ratios and levels 
were required at all times, and these were incorporated into the analysis. In a second cash flow 
profiles were examined in terms of their implications for risk, in the third case repayments had been 
changed to an annuity basis, and more was being borrowed on new assets than was really needed. The 
idea was to leave the company's own cash for other things, in effect, to create a greater cushion in the 
event of liquidity problems. A small number of other companies made subjective judgements about the 
degree of liquidity risk involved, and whether they could stand it.
At least seven of the 18 companies appear not to have formally considered any aspect of risk in 
their investment decisions. However, in at least four of these cases the companies considered that they 
were conservative in attitude anyway, so their decisions were based upon the pessimistic side, rather 
than the optimistic side, in other words, risks were sometimes simply not perceived as real at the 
outset of a project. Subsequent experience has indicated that this was an error of judgement. What is 
less clear is whether or not attitudes have been changed by such experiences. The following 
observation from a senior official in one company indicates the tremendous practical difficulties with 
regard to ex ante assessments of the degree of risk inherent in a project.
*Our cash Hows, even though we make them representative or what we expect 
the m arket to  do, invariab ly are representations o f the current environment. 
Because when you’re  in  a bad m arket and you say. Well, id  be tte r be a litt le  b it 
optim istic', what you consider op tim istic is  ju s t peanuts compared in  fa c t to  what 
it's  going to  be, and equaliy, in  a good m arket when you say y o u ii be pessim istic, 
it's  ju s t peanuts in  re la tion  to what i t  ends up being, i t  is  extrem ely hard to  accept 
the tremendous v o la tility  that e x is ts .“
The final area, and one of the few in which some consistency did arise, was the area of currency 
risk. All eight British companies were extremely conscious of currency risk, and avoided it  where 
possible. In general the attitude was that the currency market was not for "playing* in. since the 
companies involved did not have currency "experts". (The fact that several companies commented that 
currency exchange losses are not allowable, whereas exchange rate gains were, suggests that this 
might also have been a factor.) British companies tried to “balance th e ir books'  in currency 
terms. Wherever possible cirrency risk was eliminated by hedging, or refinancing in US dollars (the 
currency in which most revenues were earned -  even by British companies). In most, but unfortunately
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not all, cases, yen loans were re-financed in sterling or US dollars.
The American companies did not see currency fluctuations as quite such a problem, since, as was 
mentioned above, US dollars are the main currency in which shipping business is transacted, in five 
cases currency risk was not perceived as a relevant problem, though in one of these the point was made 
that currency risk simply would not be taken. The other five companies all expressed some concern 
with currency risk, although the degree of concern was variable. Two companies incorporated some 
sort of analysis of potential currency fluctuations in their investment appraisals, although in one of 
these there was no attempt to actually forecast likely movements, but rather to assess the sensitivity 
of projects to changes in certain exchange rates. Three companies had hedged, particularly when 
purchasing ships in yen. One company saw currency fluctuations as a ’big concern' ,  but s till did not 
hedge, adopting a ’w in some, fose some ’  philosophy.
5.3 Analytical, approaches lo.mk.
The only analytical approach to risk which was used by companies in category 2 was sensitivity 
analysis. However, even this technique was only used in six companies, with sensitivities being 
calculated for:
(i) Trade volumes (1 company)
(ii) Freight rates (1 company)
(iii) Cost escalation/inflation rates (3 companies)
(iv) Residual values (1 company)
(v) Exchange rates (2 companies)
6 Financing A spects o f Investm ent Decisions
6.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings
Of the 18 companies in this category, only 17 answered questions on financing aspects of 
decisions. In a small number of cases it  was clear that the staff discussing the decisions were more 
concerned with the investment aspects of the decision than the financing aspects. This is particularly 
true of the sections on capital structure. Attention w ill be drawn to the reduction in the sample where
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appropriate.
In general, it  was found that the financing decision was an important part of the overall decision. 
In a significant number of cases the investment and financing decisions were seen as being integrated 
parts of the overall decision. Financial arrangements clearly influenced the choice of shipbuilders in a 
majority of cases.
Questions on methods of finance revealed a heavy reliance on loan finance, with substantially 
longer periods of loan being available in the United States under Title XI finance. (20-25 years as 
compared with 8-12 with yard credit or bank loans.) Security required followed fairly consistent 
patterns.
Questions on capital structure revealed that it was regarded more as a figure resulting from 
other decisions than as something which could or should be optimised per se. Only one company had a 
target debt/equity ratio. Several others either saw some kind of self imposed lim it to debt, or a 
practical limitation related to security and the satisfying of bank covenants, as being more appropriate. 
Concerns did exist with regard to overall levels of debt, but these related more to problems of debt 
service and related liquidity issues.
L I Relationship between the Investment and Financing Decisions
It has already been pointed out that under a fa irly restrictive set of assumptions finance theory 
suggests that investment decisions should be made prior to. and separate from, financing decisions. It 
has further been pointed out that a departure from such assumptions w ill lead to adjustments to the 
above idea becoming necessary. (e.g. where benefits arise from subsidised credit). Some doubts also 
exist about the general acceptability of the ideas on separation.
Given the fact that shareholders’ wealth maximisation is a more difficult problem for private 
companies, and that these make up the majority of companies in category 2. plus the fact that asset 
specific finance is relatively easily available (at least for new ships), the question of the relationship 
between the investment and financing aspects of decisions appears valid. Certainly the method of 
incorporating the benefits of subsidised credit into investment decisions requires clarification.
A specific question was thus asked, as follows: Are decisions to acquire vessels made prior to 
consideration of how the vessels are to be financed? Sixteen of the 18 companies in category 2
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provided answers. However, as with many of the previous questions answers were often not clear cut 
yes/no answers. Eight of the 16 companies could be said to have answered yes. implying a separation 
of investment and financing. However, of these eight, five had made a clear presumption that Title XI 
finance was available, at a rate which was competitive at the time the loan was taken out. and for a 
long period, typically 20-25 years. Two of the other companies kept the investment decision separate, 
and considered it  firs t, on the grounds that they could always finance a project. The final company of 
the eight made it  dear that while the investment decision was paramount, they would have a very clear 
idea where the cash was coming from, and would be running a study on the best financing method in 
parallel with the study of the investment decision. Further discussion with the companies relying on 
Title XI made it  clear that the availability of this finance was crucial to the final decisions to invest in 
new vessels. It is only because of the high degree of confidence these companies have that finance w ill 
be available under favourable conditions that the financing aspects of the decision are given such low 
priority. Of the other eight companies responding to this question, six regarded the investment and 
financing aspects as being integrated parts of the decision. In two of these cases however, an 
investment analysis was done prior to combining the two aspects. In one of these the decision on 
acquisition came firs t, followed by decisions on the timing of the project, and how it  was to be funded, 
with an overall decision resulting. In the other, initial calculations on the investment, based upon 
expected charter revenues, would be calculated before integration with the figures reflecting the 
different financing possibilities. In the remaining two of the 16 companies the investment and financing 
aspects, if  not formally integrated, were certainly seen as being closely linked. In one case the 
financing conditions available resulted in a substantial investment actually being made, with very little  
clear idea existing of the exact use to which the vessels purchased would be put.
Overall, a substantial proportion of the companies in this category regarded the financing 
decision as an important part of project appraisal. Certainly if  the companies relying on Title XI 
finance were forced to go elsewhere in the market, only two or three of the 16 companies answering 
questions in this area were likely to actually make investment decisions without serious consideration 
of the necessary financing. As w ill be seen later finance tends to be raised in asset related "chunks’ , 
which tends to reinforce the importance of financing as part of project analysis. This is not to say that
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an overall approach to financing is not also taken, merely to point out that in fact the investment and 
financing decisions are by no means completely separate.
In the course of the Interviews a specific question was asked as to whether the choice of 
shipbuilder had been influenced by the financial arrangements. Answers were obtained in 14 cases. 
Nine of these answered yes, although emphasis was effectively given to the word “influenced". In only 
one of these cases was a decision basically made because of the financial arrangements. In all of the 
others the financial arrangements influenced the choice of shipbuilder, but as part of a range of 
considerations. These generally included ship specification, quality/reputation of the yard, price, 
financial conditions, and credit available. One company pointed out that the financial arrangements, 
while influencing the country in which the ship was to be built, would not influence the choice of specific 
yard, since credit terms were often standard across the country of building. Five companies considered 
that the financial arrangements did not influence the choice of shipbuilder. In three of these cases this 
was because Title XI finance was available anyway. In the other two companies the critical features 
were size and quality of ship, delivery date, and price.
6.3 Methods of Finance
Seventeen of the 18 companies in category 2 answered questions on this area. In only three of 
these cases was additional equity (excluding increases in retentions) put into the company to assist in 
financing projects. In one of these cases (a public company) a rights issue was made, while in the other 
two some equity (though in relatively small amounts) was put in by new partners in individual projects. 
For example, one company had sold an 8/64 share in one of the vessels it acquired to what was 
described as >  frie n d " . not currently involved in shipping. Such amounts, while not insignificant 
sums on a vessel costing $20M. are still relatively trivial with regard to the industry needs overall. In 
fact, the raising of new equity was not perceived as a realistic option by many companies, since they 
could not offer sufficiently high profits to compensate for the perceived risks in an industry with the 
volatility that shipping has. Only two other companies had even considered the possibility of further 
equity. In one of these cases this remains a possibility, in the other it  has been shelved for the moment 
because of poor results, but might be considered again in the future, possibly as an issue on the Unlisted
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Securities Market. Very few of the private companies were in a position to obtain substantial sums of 
new equity without going public and hence potentially changing the controlling group, in only one of the 
private companies in this category was this mentioned as a possibility.
The net result of this is that the equity contribution to project financing was generally confined 
to retentions. However, as is evident from subsequent discussions, the amount of this contribution was 
relatively small.
In fact, the majority of funding for new projects came from loan finance, with the typical 
proportion funded in this manner being 60-90X for new vessels. Nine of the companies had funded 
projects using loans linked to shipbuilding contracts. Five others had used Title XI and/or capital 
construction fund finance. Another had used a long term financial lease, providing 100% financing, 
principally because of cumulative losses, after a lease/buy analysis had been done. One company which 
had used yard credit later also used financial leases, since the 30% equity contribution implicit in 
Japanese yard credit at that time, was s till too much for the company to put in. One of the companies 
which had used yard credit made it  clear that It was more usual to use commercial bank credit. Five 
companies using yard credit or Title XI finance obtained further top-up funds from commercial banks, 
thus enabling them to fund projects up to between 90% and 100% from the two sources of debt finance. 
Two companies adopted a flexible approach, and had used a variety of sources of finance, depending 
upon the current financial position of the company, and the currency in which business was to be 
transacted.
It is clear from these results that a very heavy reliance is placed upon debt finance. In only one 
case was it  made clear that debt finance was used only because of the subsidy available. This company, 
which was extremely rich, had actually paid cash for investments up to 1970. Since then it  had used 
subsidised credit "sim ply because o r the cost'. The emphasis on debt finance in the others goes 
some way towards explaining the perceived link between the investment and financing decisions 
discussed in the previous section.
Questions were also asked about alternative sources of finance which had been, or might be. 
considered. Only two alternatives were of significance, namely chartering and leasing. The chartering 
in of vessels was seen as a way of obtaining the use of vessels for a certain period, for a prescribed 
cost. Under present market conditions the emphasis tends to be on short and medium term periods. 
Financial leasing generally relates to longer term periods, usually close to the physical or economic life
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of the asset being funded. Twelve of the 17 companies in the sample had seriously considered the use of 
chartering or leasing, although only two had actually used it. Eight of these 12 cited tax as one of the 
major reasons for considering leasing. Four companies made reference to the length of time for which 
funding could effectively be obtained. In general, leasing periods were longer than those achievable with 
shipyard credit and commercial bank credit. Only with Title XI was this not the case. Leasing was thus 
more likely to be used by a British company than an American one. since it  was a way of bringing the 
period of funding more in line with the period of expected use for a vessel. Other reasons put forward 
for the use of leasing related to cash flow profiles and the current financial position of the company 
(though this latter point is clearly closely related to the tax position referred to earlier).
By contrast, five companies expressed strong views against the use of leasing, with phrases 
being used such as “it's  ju s t not done", It's  not re a lly  our business" and "leasing is  a 
heavy load, were not happy w ith i t ". Subsequent discussion made it  clear that the main 
objection was the loss of flexibility that resulted in terms of disposal of the asssets. The conditions 
associated with getting out of a lease were generally onerous. For a company wishing to utilise the sale 
and purchase market at opportune moments such conditions are undesirable. In such cases leasing is 
likely to be seen as imposing significant constraints on a company's freedom of action, and is likely to 
be rejected in favour of other forms of funding. At least two of the 12 companies which had considered 
leasing, rejected it  for the above reason.
Specific questions were then asked about the period for which loans were normally obtained, and 
whether or not companies would normally take up the maximum possible under the loan agreement. 
Eleven of the 17 companies stated that they would take up the maximum loan possible for the purchase 
of new vessels. (So few companies in this category purchased second hand vessels that analysis with 
regard to such vessels was relatively meaningless.) It is perhaps worth noting that one of the 
companies qualified its answer by saying that it  would normally Include a provision in its loan 
contracts, permitting early repayment without penalty. One company leased assets, obtaining 100% 
funding over a longer period than would have been possible using debt finance. Responses from the other 
five companies, while all negative, were generally qualified in some way. In three cases the decision as 
to the proportion of funds to be provided from loan depended on a variety of things, such as the 
currency of the loan, current and anticipated interest rates, current financial resources of the 
company, etc. In the remaining two cases a conservative attitude towards borrowing appeared to
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exist, with one company saying that it  would not borrow to fund new assets if  it  had the money to pay 
for them outright. However, in practice in all five cases where companies said that they would not 
normally borrow the maximum amounts possible to fund new assets, substantial amounts had actually 
been borrowed.
The period of loans varied somewhat. Yard credit was typically available, usually at a subsidised 
interest rate, for periods from 7-10 years, with 12-15 years being obtained in a small number of 
cases. Commercial bank loans, which were not subsidised, were typically available for maximum 
periods of 8-10 years. Title XI finance, at US government rates of interest, was usually obtained for 
20-25 years.
The proportion of cost for which loans could typically be obtained was 60-90% yard credit 
(occasionally 100%), 75-87.5% for Title XI finance, and 50-70% for commercial bank loans. These 
figures could often be extended by the use of 'top-up* and/or 'stretch* facilities from the commercial 
banks. Horatorla on early year payments and/or the use of balloons at the end of the loan period could 
often be obtained.
6.4 Sfirurity
An extremely high degree of consistency was found across the companies in this category with 
regard to security given for loans. Almost all companies had firs t mortgages on vessels, and a number 
of restrictive covenants of the type set out in chapter 6 on banks. A commonly required covenant was 
one relating the current market value to debt outstanding, with minimum figures of 120% to 150% 
being quoted as required. Parent or group guarantees were also frequently given, although some 
companies attempted to resist these. Cross collateral was often given from other unencumbered 
vessels in the fleet.
6.5 Capital Structure
Two separate questions were asked in an attempt to establish views on the extent to which debt 
finance couid be used overall, rather than simply in relation to individual projects. Companies were 
thus asked:
(i) Is there a lim it to the total amount of debt taken up?
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(ii) Do you work towards the achievement of a particular long run capital structure which is broadly 
adhered to over time?
If specific limits or targets did exist, companies were asked to state what they were, and to give a 
rationale for their choice. Answers were obtained from 16 companies.
Five of the 16 companies stated that there was a lim it to the total amount of debt taken up. In 
one case debt was actually limited by the articles to twice capital plus reserves. Steps were being 
taken to move this up to three times. Subsequent discussions with this company made it  dear that the 
company was less concerned with gearing than with its ability to pay debts. It clearly also regarded 
"snapshot" pictures as very misleading, with the long term picture being much more important. 
Nevertheless, it  ‘ge t(s) w orried i f  the gearing is  too high" principally because of concerns 
about the interest rate risk, particularly when loans were LIBOR related. A second company also 
referred to interest rate risk as the main reason for limiting debt, but also pointed to the problem of 
providing adequate additional security if  debt became too high. The three other companies which stated 
that a lim it existed all gave a debt/equity lim it of 1:1 (or SOX assuming debt/debt + equity). In the 
firs t of these it  was pointed out that gearing was “not an issue" A 50X figure was a probable 
maximum, but the current figure was only 25X. and that was the highest ever. The debt/equity ratio 
was ju s t a figu re  that turns u p There clearly was no target, and the lim it was somewhat 
hypothetical. In one case a 1:1 ratio was “about rig h t, as a m atter o f judgement". In the final 
case, while the company would react to changes in its financial position, it  would not wish debt to 
exceed equity.
Subsequent discussions made it apparent that practical limitations existed with regard to 
borrowing, irrespective of any self-imposed limits. Adequate security needs to be available before 
further loans w ill be made available. Three companies pointed out that covenants in loan agreements 
effectively set upper limits to the amount of debt, and that this was a significant factor in resultant 
debt/equity ratios. The main covenant cited in this context related the current market value of assets 
to debt outstanding, with figures of 120-150X being common. The current market values of assets 
(which in turn are closely related to earnings potential) represents the firs t line of security in many 
cases, so levels of debt are likely to be constrained by these values. This was implicit in most
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discussions, even if  not formally specified as in tne three cases above.
With regard to the second question, concerning target capita) structures, only two companies had 
particular target figures in mind. In one case this target rate was 50% (based upon debt/debt + 
equity), though in fact new buildings were pushing this figure higher than the company considered 
desirable, since the company was currently taking out maximum loans for safety (in liquidity terms). 
In the other case an objective of equity being twice the debt existed, but in reality the actual level of 
debt exceeded that desired. In the remaining 14 companies no target capital structure existed. Actual 
debt/equity ratios could only be calculated for seven of the companies in category 2. These are given m 
table 20.
Company 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1981 1 9 8 2
Ellerm an 3655 3753 3693 2793 2553
Lyle 3293 1753 793 24S3 4553
Hogarth 2553 4753
W aterm an 8893 9553
LOF 4553 3553 2753 2553 2353
Reardon Sm ith 7393 6053 5553 4953
Irish Shipping 5353 4493 3593 2753 3593
>
Table 20 Debt equity ratios -  category 2 companies
These figures, while not giving away very much information, do display considerably more changes 
over time than found in category 1 companies, and provide reinforcement to the above findings. By 
1984 the ratios for both Lyle and Irtsh shipping were very much higher than those shown in 1982 (98% 
and 87% respectively). Rearden Smith has ceased trading.
This is not to say that no concerns existed with regard to capital structure or overall levels of 
debt. In fact only one of the 16 companies was not concerned in some way with overall levels of debt. 
This particular company, which has already been referred to as an exception in earlier sections, did not 
see its overall Balance Sheet as the basis for borrowing. Because individual vessels were treated as 
separate companies, concerns with debt on individual vessels was seen as the relevant cause for 
concern. In practice, capital structure per se was seldom an issue. Most companies were more
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concerned with their ability to service debt, than the level of debt as such. This in turn is affected by 
market conditions, covering such things as general economic conditions, the state of world trade, the 
supply of and demand for shipping services, the nature of the shipping/business cycle, and current and 
expected interest rates. It should be noted that shipping is perceived as a somewhat volatile industry, 
with relatively low quality earnings. Several companies followed this thinking through into very 
conservative attitudes towards debt/equity ratios, principally because of this inherent volatility in the 
industry. One company had. until very recently, no debt at all. and regarded this as one of the reasons 
for its past success. A significant factor in discussions on capital structure, closely related to the 
above, was the nature of the earnings expected. Earnings related to a long term charter or contract of 
affreightment are thus far more supportive of high debt than those expected from a bulk carrier trading 
on the spot market.
In most companies the actual capital structure was the result of a balanced approach to issues 
such as those given above. In other words, particular capital structures were not an end in themselves. 
They were basically the end product after consideration of factors such as those referred to above. 
For example, one company, having said that its debt/equity ratio would tend to be about 50%. went on 
to point out that this was not really a target or a maximum figure. It was something looked at by the 
Board from time to time. It was certainly not an inhibiting factor, it  was rather something you keep in 
mind, something you live with. 50% was not a bad yardstick. However, if  the company were buying a 
fair number of large vessels with long term contracts there would be no problem in raising the 
debt/equity ratio.
In considering views on capital structure the earlier comments on liquidity need to be borne in 
mind. Of the 16 companies answering questions on this section. 13 conducted thorough analyses of the 
liquidity aspects of their plans. As a minimum these analyses identified debt service commitments for 
some time ahead. The calculation of break-even rates in most of the companies involved in the bulk 
trades further emphasises the importance given to an ability to service debt (particularly if  one 
remembers that break-even rates were usually cash flow rates, covering debt service and operating 
costs).
Given this perceived link between capital structure and ability to service debt, questions were 
asked as to whether any other accounting oriented ratios were calculated and kept at certain minimum 
levels. Particular questions were asked about interest coverage and cash adequacy, and companies
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were asked to identify any other ratios considered particularly important. In the majority of cases 
(nine from 16) no further formal analysis or ratio requirements were found, with the previous 
emphasis on cash flows and ability to service debt being pointed to. Where such ratios were calculated 
they indicated, as had been expected, concerns with cash adequacy and interest coverage. Four 
companies paid considerable attention to interest coverage, although in one of these cases concerns 
were wider, and covered fixed charges in a broader sense. In one of these, this idea was extended into 
a ratio of operating flows (net profit + depreciation) to debt service, to ensure that the former is likely 
to exceed the latter. Five companies made supportive calculations and comments concerning cash 
adequacy. These ranged from estimates of the minimum working capital needed at all times to keep a 
fleet of five or six ships in operation, to more global estimates of the amount needed to see the company 
through the low cycle associated with building and implementation of a new programme. Several 
companies kept a close watch on the relationship between the current market value of assets and debt, 
though in most of these cases the reason was partly attributable to the existence of a covenant 
regarding this in the loan agreement, referred to above.
In considering the overall level of debt, due consideration needs to be given to the previous 
discussions, in the section on philosophies and strategies, about the commitment of most category 2 
companies to the industry, or to sections of it. A commitment to an industry of this type requires 
periodic major investments. The costs of these in shipping are so enormous that few companies could 
afford them without recourse to borrowing. There is thus a clear need to borrow, which has to be 
balanced against the risks associated with borrowing, which in turn translates into ensuring an ability 
to service debt in a volatile industry. High borrowing on individual projects is. of course, perfectly 
consistent with lower overall gearing levels, given the naturally self liquidating nature of most shipping 
loans.
An interesting by product of the discussions on capital structure concerns the cost of debt. In the 
course of the discussions it became clear that the cost of debt bore little  relationship to the amount 
borrowed, a point which has been made already in the chapter on banks. With yard credit or Title XI 
finance very high proportions could be borrowed at relatively low rates. Spreads on bank loans were 
low. and did not appear to vary much with the amount of finance raised. "Top up* finance was generally 
more expensive than yard credit or Title XI finance, so some slight increase in the cost of borrowing 
occured at higher levels of gearing for companies using such a facility. However, this appeared to
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reflect the difference between subsidised and commercial rates, rather than a risk premium. 
Interestingly the interest part of the costs of leasing, which was effectively 100% financing, was no 
higher than that associated with lower levels of debt. The overall conclusions of this must therefore be 
that the cost of debt does not rise significantly, if  at all. as the level of debt increases. However, given 
the earlier comments on practical limitations imposed by the need for adequate security, it  is likely that 
difficulties would arise with regard to actually obtaining the debt needed to push up gearing to 
extremely high levels.
The final question asked in this area related to the impact of gearing on share price. Seventeen of 
the 18 companies provided answers to the question: “In considering the level of debt, do you attempt to 
assess the impact of changes therein on the value of ordinary shares -  in general terms -  or in a 
quantified way?" One answered "Yes'  -  in general terms, and went on to explain this by reference to 
the amount of time the Board spent on discussions of dividend policy. Interestingly, this company was 
not a public company. No other company made any attempt to relate levels of debt to share price.
&£ Financing -  an illustration
The following summarised comments, relating to one specific company in the study, are included 
to illustrate the kind of thinking which goes on with regard to the financing of projects. Some comments 
on the individual project appraisal are incorporated to clarify the link between investment and financing.
On individual project appraisal, figures would be calculated relating to break-even freight rates 
and accounting rates of return. The implications of the project would then be built into cash flow 
forecasts for the company, covering the next five years. This last process was considered to be 
cruciai. Following this, the Balance Sheet and cash flow implications of the project would be worked 
through. In particular this would include the calculation of future ratios for such things as fixed charge 
coverage, debt/equity ratios, debt coverage (i.e. current market value of the fleet/debt) and similar 
ratios. Calculations of this sort were considered to be "the key to su rviva l" . The most important 
ratios were probably:
(i) debt as a percentage of current market value of the assets
(ii) cash as a percentage of debt, and
(iii) a cash coverage of fixed charges ratio, namely the number of years of interest and principal
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repayments that the cash represents.
No hard and fast rules could be laid down for these ratios, indeed, the company pointed out that we are 
now seeing “very conservative ratios 18 months ago are proving to bo hideousiy 
overextended today* However, the company would usually like to have sufficient cash (or
equivalents) to cover two years debt and interest payments (in a moderate market situation). The more 
volatile market which existed in shipping today had led to a much more conservative approach than had 
been taken in the past.
In reaching an investment decision the company would have a fairly clear idea how the acquisition 
was to be financed, because sufficient cash would not usually be available to finance the entire 
acquisition. Hence, while the investment and financing decisions are strictly separate, there is a very 
close link between them, of a rather stronger nature than one might expect in manufacturing Industries.
Typically vessels would be financed from shipyard or export credit to the maximum amount 
possible. The proportion varied according to market conditions but was normally 60-80% of cost. The 
balance of the cost was usually funded internally. The currency of the loan, and its relative strength or 
weakness, would also be carefully considered. US dollars was the preferred currency to buy in. 
because the majority of earnings are in this currency, and exchange risk would be virtually eliminated. 
The proportion of debt taken up on new vessels was usually high. However, the final decision as to the 
amount of loan taken up. and hence on overall capital structure, depended upon the circumstances 
prevailing at the time, with detailed consideration being given to both liquidity considerations, and to 
the ratios, referred to above. Criteria were laid down for all of these ratios, which had to be met, but 
generally liquidity considerations were given more weight than anything else. It was pointed out that a 
new vessel would be carrying a higher proportion of debt than existing vessels, earnings from which 
also provide support for the debt. While legally the debt may relate to one ship, it would be taken 
because there were other vessels which were unencumbered or encumbered rather lightly. It was clear 
from the financial accounts that no target debt/equity ratio existed as regards the historic cost 
accounts. Even using debt/current market value of assets, no particular targets were set. but broad 
guidelines are borne in mind. 6fven the volatility of the industry this ratio should not prudently be more 
than 60% in a low market coming down to something like 30% in a high market. Reservations existed
with regard to giving such "off the cuff" figures, since, for example:
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"60S leverage on a VLCC w ith zero prospect o f trading fo r the next three or
fou r years is  very d iffe ren t from  30JS leverage on a products c a rrie r o f 30,000 
tons ... You're not dealing w ith ju s t ra tios. You've got to look a t the to ta l p icture o f 
what you're dealing w ith ."
The period of loan taken out was normally 8-10 years, for new vessels, with second hand 
vessels being slightly shorter. The decision as to where to go for a new vessel depended on the 
specification of the ship, the standards of the builders, the price, the financial conditions, and the credit 
available. For example, for ships ordered in Japan all the constructional finance is usually included in 
the price, while for those ordered in many other countries the finance during construction is an 
additional cost. "AH these things must be taken in to  consideration when evaluating 
d iffe ren t p ro je c ts ."
The use of leasing as an alternative to loans had been considered. The view was held within the 
company that this could be a valuable vehicle for a British Company, since it  was perceived as a way of 
adding to the term of the debt, or of increasing overall debt capacity. The company, which was fairly 
conservative, has never really wanted these advantages, and has not actually financed vessels by 
leasing. The main problem however, relates to the constraints on disposal typically built into leasing 
contracts. Given the earlier comments about the need to respond to the market, including trading in 
ships, such restrictions were not considered acceptable, because of their effect on the company's 
freedom of action.
Father equity other than through retentions, had not been seriously considered. This was 
because shipping companies cannot provide good profit forecasts, thus making market issues extremely 
difficult. Equity partnerships were fe lt to provide more trouble than they are worth, unless they bring 
in more expertise. Hence new vessels were financed almost entirely from loan and retentions.
Approximately 50% of cost was normally available secured on a firs t mortgage of the vessel. 
Additional amounts would normally be secured either by a bank guarantee (which in turn could be 
secured by other collateral), or by mortgages on other ships. Export credit agencies generally required 




Small and "Entrepreneurial* Companies
L . Introduction to the Category
Category 3 consists of a number of companies, which did not f it  either of the other two 
categories, either because of size, behaviour, or nationality, it was intended to include a selection of 
smaller companies involved in shipping (accepting that the sheer cost of individual vessels means that a 
"small" company is s till likely to control assets running into the equivalent of several million pounds). 
Equally important, however, in establishing the need for a further category, was the fact that certain 
companies displayed quite different behavioural characteristics, behaving in what category 1 and 2 
companies often described as an "entrepreneurial" manner. A common belief was that this behaviour 
was typified by the Greeks in the industry. Subsequent discussions made it dear that a number of 
British and American companies operated along broadly similar lines. As a result the sample includes 
15 companies, of which five were British, four were London 6reeks, two were American, three were 
New York 6reeks, and one was the American agent for a Panamanian Company. All but one of these 
companies were private companies.
As was pointed out in the pilot study, discussions with these companies (with some notable 
exceptions) tended to be rather more broadly based than those with companies in the other two 
categories. There was a tendency for questions to be answered with broad generalisations, about what 
for example, the typical Greek or entrepreneurial owner did. rather than with specific answers about 
exactly what a particular company did. This was further complicated by the fact that a number of the 
companies with which discussions were held were in fact, agency companies, in strict legal terms.
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Published information with regard to these companies was also extremely limited, with financial 
accounts only being obtained in two cases. In general, companies were simply not prepared to disclose 
as much detail as companies in other categories. This is not intended to imply any kind of criticism. 
Rather it  reflects the fact that almost all of the companies were closely held, often by families, and 
owners, not unreasonably, did not wish too much Intrusion into their private affairs. Interviews were 
thus approached by the companies with more caution. Having said that, very few companies refused 
totally to discuss things, and all those who did participate were very helpful, if  sometimes discreet.
The overall effect of these points is inevitably that conclusions reached are more tentative than 
those for the other two categories. However, as a counterweight to this, the approach to decision 
making was generally less sophisticated (though not necessarily less effective), and certainly less 
complicated.
Z. Aims and Objectives
2J, Introduction and Summary of Findings
The pilot study had suggested that objectives bo do with wealth maximisation and fleet
maintenance and expansion were more important than other objectives. Thirteen of the 15 companies
discussed their objectives in some detail, though, as with the other categories, they were not always
clear. The fact that most companies in this category were controlled by families or even individuals
posed a particular problem, since it  tended to result in objectives being implicit, and somewhat
personal. In at least six of the companies in this category decisions were made by one or two
individuals, and their thinking was not always clear to others in the company. For example, the Chief
Accountant in one company made the following observation on the owner:
7/7 his m ind he knows where the company wants to go, but /  don t  know what h is 
mind is . '
Under these circumstances it  was not possible to identify the nature of personal objectives with regard 
to companies in this category. It needs to be recognised however, that these kinds of objectives have 
considerable potential for influencing corporate objectives for category 3 companies.
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For purposes of consistency with other categories, questions were asked about objectives to do 
with share price maximisation, and dividends. Responses with regards to dividends enabled no 
conclusions to be drawn, other than that category 3 companies apparently did not see dividends as a 
major constraint or objective. With regard to share price maximisation a clear view did emerge. 
Share price maximisation was explicitly rejected as an objective in 12 of the 13 companies, with the 
thirteenth substituting the objective "a broad consideration o f wealth * Answers on this point 
were so emphatic that there seemed to be no point in having a separate section specifically discussing 
this further.
In spite of these caveats and difficulties, objectives were found to exist in a significant number 
of companies, in two main areas, even if  in a relatively informal or implicit way.
(i) objectives related to profitability and/or wealth
(ii) objectives related to continuing in business.
These objectives follow fa irly closely those identified in the pilot study. However, inevitably 
differences of emphasis were found, and these are discussed in more detail below.
2JL Objectives toito with Profitability
Not altogether suprisingly. objectives to do with profitability were found to be important. Eight 
of the 13 companies specifically emphasised such objectives, though only one specified profit 
maximisation as an objective. Subsequent discussions with this company made it  clear that profit was a 
long term concept, and the emphasis was on maximising profit (as an increase in wealth) over time, 
rather than with maximising it for particular periods. In the other seven companies concerns with 
profitability were expressed in different ways, ranging from general comments such as:
"We try  to  do the best we can. '
*We try  to  be as pro fitab ie  as we can." 
to rather more specific comments about required profit levels. One company specified an objective of a 
208 return and a 20% growth rate for the broking part of its business, which was now becoming much
more significant, given the volatility and problems associated with the shipping industry per se.
Another tried to keep an overall annual return of 15-20%. However, it  emphasised that this return
should be viewed as a long term average, rather than a required return for individual years. Two of the
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remaining companies in the eight made general comments about the search for profits. The final 
company, having made the point that there were profitability objectives, then went on to discuss their 
approach in more detail. This particular company, in common with a number of others, as w ill be 
discussed later, considered that more money could be made by buying and selling ships than by trading 
with them. They therefore had the aim of operating without making a loss, but then making as much 
profit as possible through buying and selling, when the market was right.
The fact that five companies did not emphasise profits in discussing their objectives should not be 
taken to mean that profit was unimportant. For example, in one company the point was made that no 
profit or growth targets were formalised, with the result that such things as return on capital weren’t 
ever discussed. In fact, this particular company was extremely profitable, but other factors were 
given more weight in discussions, with an implicit assumption that these other factors have some 
degree of correlation with profitability. In another the comment was made that we are happy 
w ith what we g e t", reflecting a feeling that while profitability is important in the long term, 
market conditions in shipping are such that profits In the short term may not be too wonderful.
2Jl Objectives to do w ith  C ontinuity
The second objective (or set of related objectives) that was found to be common, was based upon 
a desire to actually continue in business, often in the same business. In some cases this idea of 
continuity was expansion oriented, while in others it related more to maintenance or replacement. In 
almost all of the companies in this category, owners (whether individual or family) had been in the 
business for a long time, and wished to continue in it. Five of the 13 companies specifically identified a 
desire to continue in the business, with comments such as:
"Requirement number one is  to exist and maintain youseif. To expand is  an 
option."
A further three made statements implying the same kind of commitment to remain in the 
business, but specifically said that they were aiming for growth, a point which w ill be returned to in 
section 3.4. Two more companies make observations about commitments to replace existing vessels, in 
such a way as to imply a fairly strong desire to continue in their existing businesses.
The desire to continue in business, particularly when that business is shipping, is in some senses 
in conflict with profitability objectives. As w ill be seen, most companies in this category did not feel
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able to influence the market in any significant way. and were thus at its mercy. Clearly, profits w ill be 
made whenever possible, but there may be substantial periods of time when returns are poor or 
non-existent. This may explain the ambivalence which seemed to exist with regard to profitability 
objectives.
7 A Othftr nhjfirtivfts
While only one of the companies specifically identified concerns with owners' wealth in the
discussions on objectives, further discussion of philosophy and strategy with regard to investment
decisions did suggest that considerable agreement would have existed with an objective couched in
terms of at least maintaining owners' wealth, while remaining in an interesting business which provides
periodic opportunities for substantial increases in that wealth. Such an implicit objective is consistent
with the discussions in approximately two thirds of the companies in this category.
Apart from the broad objectives discussed above, a number of particular objectives were
discussed in certain individual companies, mostly reflecting the personality of the individual or group
making the more important decisions. For example, the chairman of one company commented that he
had thoroughly enjoyed his time in the City, that the business provided the family with as much income
as they wanted, and that he thus wanted to ensure that the same opportunity should be available to
someone else. Considerable emphasis was thus placed on ensuring that the business continued. In fact
this company was currently growing, but further concerns were expressed about too rapid growth.
"We wish to  grow  as big as we can w ithout changing the nature o f the company. 
Getting too big resu lts in  a change in  the character o f the company."
The objectives in this case might include:
(i) enjoyment ( "amusement" was the word used)
(ii) an adequate income
(iii) the maintenance of a business with certain perceived desirable characteristics
This latter point can also be related to earlier comments on continuation, expansion and 
replacement. In the course of the discussions it  became clear that approximately half of the businesses 
did not envisage growing beyond a certain size, because to do so would change the way they did 
business. This was seen as important. For example, one company discussed its desire to maintain its 
present "sty/e and tra d itio n " , feeling that it  had "a reputation fo r being quite good
322
c h a p s It wanted 'to  be as good as i t  can be in  term s o f m oral s ta tu r e This translated 
into concerns with consolidating its reputation, and with specific safety and crew policies.
Overall, while the objectives were generally ill-defined, they followed the above broad patterns. 
Given the nature of the companies, and the close involvement of owners in decision making, this lack of 
definition is not surprising. In these circumstances, the need for clearly defined objectives is less than 
in companies in the other two categories. Nevertheless, when linked with the philosophies and 
strategies adopted, the approach becomes much clearer and more consistent.
JL Philosophies and Strategies
_2J_ InimdiiRiinn nnri Summary nf Finriiims
The philosophies, strategies and activities of the companies in category 3 displayed considerable 
consistency, and also tended to be inter-related to a much greater extent than those found in the other 
two categories. The same broad headings are used, as far as is possible, as for the other two 
categories, but it  perhaps needs to be emphasised that such a subdivision has an element of artificia lity 
about it.
in the main, the strategies adopted tend to follow from the line of business in which most 
category 3 companies operated. The more important philosophies, strategies and activities found were 
as follows:
(i) Limited diversification had taken place, with the majority of companies having substantial 
interests in the bulk trades.
(ii) This fact, when coupled with current market conditions, caused considerable emphasis to be
placed on the sale and purchase of vessels at the right time.
(iii) Most companies in this category wished to stay in the business.
(iv) The sale and purchase markets were used to maintain, replace, and expand the interests in
shipping.
(v) The need to use the sale and purchase markets at opportune moments emphasised the advantage 
of having ships which would retain a good second hand value.
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(vi) Attitudes towards liquidity and debt were somewhat conservative.
A variety of miscellaneous strategies were also found.
3.2 Areas of Business/Approach to diversification
Not surprisingly, most companies in this category were involved in a relatively restricted range
of activities, with only four companies having significant activities outside of shipping. Even in these
four cases, the shipping activities had either provided the base for the other activities, or were by far
the largest of the activities. In three of these four cases there appears to have been a positive decision
to diversify, although in two of them the policy was very clearly one of limited diversification. Only
one of these four companies was involved in more than two completely unrelated areas of business.
This particular company had four areas of business, all of which were quite different. Interestingly, in
discussing this, it was pointed out that such an approach was:
"... not typ ica l fo r 6reok owners, the m a jo rity  o f whom are s t ilt  in  shipping, 
although more are now moving in to  such things as re a l estate, precious metals, 
etc.*
In each of the other three cases only one further area of activity (other than shipping) was 
identified. Interestingly, interests in Real Estate were found in two of the four companies. The reason 
appears to be the similarities between ships and property in terms of their revenue earning and 
transferability characteristics. Overall, there is no doubt that for category 3 companies, 
diversification out of shipping was unlikely to be significant.
Even within shipping the degree of diversification was limited. Of the 13 companies still 
operating ships:
(i) Seven were exclusively engaged in bulk shipping.
(ii) Four (referred to in the last paragraph) had some diversification out of shipping. Within shipping
three were involved exclusively in the bulk trades, while the fourth had interests in a regular trade to a 
certain part of the world, for which subsidies/rebates were available (the ships were nonetheless 
essentially bulk carriers).
(iii) Two were involved in both bulk shipping and other areas of shipping. One had further interests in 
supply boats and ship management. The other had liners and cruise ships besides substantial interests in 
the bulk trades.
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Of these 13 companies, 12 had interests in dry bulk, with six having interest in tankers. One of 
the companies which was not in tankers made the point that this was a conscious decision, since the 
company felt that the days of the independent tanker owner were coming to a dose. One of the 
companies which was involved with the tanker trades made the point that 'most Greeks are a fra id  
o f the tanker m arket. We are n o t." This statement is not completely supported by the evidence 
collected in this study. Of the seven Greek companies interviewed six were involved in dry bulk, and 
four in the tanker trades. However, what did become clear was that the tanker trades require a 
different expertise in some respects to dry bulk shipping, and that tankers are more expensive to 
acquire. These facts, when coupled with the current excess supply with regard to tanker tonnage, 
undoubtedly make tanker activities appear to be a more risky venture than dry bulk shipping. The latter 
was perceived (at the time of the interviews) to have fewer problems (although overtonnaging is an 
increasing problem) and to be the easiest area of shipping to enter or leave.
In the course of the discussions on activities/trades the point was made directly in two 
companies, and Implicitly In several others, that various trades were effectively closed to them, or 
that they simply could not compete with companies such as those of category 1. In particular, several 
had tried to get into the liner trades in the early days but found this to be impossible, because of the 
strength of existing conference or consortia arrangements. The liner trades thus tended to be regarded 
as a ‘closed shop" by companies in this category. Cruising was another activity perceived as likely to 
be reduced or stopped, because of the fact that this business was now ‘extremely competitive’ , as well 
as being very expensive to enter.
The end result of all this was an effective limitation of the shipping activities of category 3 
companies to:
(i) the bulk trades
(ii) smaller specialist areas of activity
with the former generally representing the most important part of the companies activities. Very little  
scope for other shipping activities exists, and this needs to be remembered in subsequent discussions, 
which are largely influenced by the particular characteristics of the bulk shipping markets.
325
3JS Philosophy with regard to earnings
A striking feature of companies in this category, which reflects their dependence on the bulk 
shipping market, was their attitude towards trade in ships, as compared with trade by using ships. Ten 
of the 13 companies currently operating ships emphasised strongly that trade in ships was an essential 
part of their strategy. Indeed five of these argued that profits on the disposal of vessels were more 
lucrative than profits from using the same vessels. e.g.
"We believe even more in  making money out o f sa/es (o f ships) because p ro fits  
m aterialise fa s te r and more pos itive ly  than from  trade. "
"Buying and selling ships is  probably more im portant than trading, though there 
is  a great deal o f sentim enta lity."
The reasons for this approach were based upon two premises. First, the market for bulk shipping 
was large and competitive, so individual companies could do little  to influence the market and associated 
returns. Second, this market is volatile, with a consequent effect on both freight rates and disposal 
value of ships. In fact most owners saw a strong element of cyclicality to the markets, although the 
"down* cycle was now perceived as being much longer than the "up" cycle. When the market was 
"down" or low. returns from using ships were likely to be low. Hence, if  much money was to be made it  
would need to be made by buying and selling at the right time. Even if  a vessel was built to operate, 
buying it  at the right time. i.e. when the price was low. would help keep capital costs down, an 
important factor in a competitive market.
Certainly, it  is not difficult to find evidence of substantial sums of money being made by 
companies adopting this view towards ships. For example. Graig Shipping pic sold a vessel, the Garth 
Newydd. in the financial year 1981/82. for in excess of £9M. (giving a pre-tax profit in excess of 
£5M). The proceeds were held on to for some time, and in the Annual Report for 1981/82 the Chairman 
made the following comments, after referring to the sale of the Garth Newydd.
"On the shipping side we continue to trade our t l/V  Graigwen. but due to the 
present appalling state o f the fre ig h t m arket we are unable to  make a p ro fit w ith the 
vessel. A t the moment ships are la id  up a il over the w orld and those that are 
trading in  some cases are taking staggering losses in  order to  do so. Bearing in  m ind 
the large volume o f tonnage presently on order and due to be delivered w ithin the 
next s ix  months, i t  is  our view that conditions in  w orld shipping w ill continue to 
deteriorate a t least u n til the end o f the year.
"However, we have every intention o f remaining in shipping and w ith th is  end in  
view, we are keeping a very active in te rest in  both the new building and the second 
hand m arket in  order that we can replace our tonnage when a suitable opportunity 
a rise s." (Graig Shipping pic -  Annual Report 1981/82 P6.)
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Some time later, in early 1983. Graig acquired the Ben Wyvis. a ship of similar age to that disposed of. 
but of almost twice the tonnage, for approximately $4M. By holding on to the proceeds from the sale of 
the Garth Newydd in US dollars the company was also able to report a £ 1.43M exchange rate gain in the 
period to 31st March 1982.
Before leaving this section, it should be remembered that three companies did not emphasise the 
buying and selling of vessels as significant. Two of these operated in the short sea and coastal trades, 
with significant parts of their work being covered by contracts. Both acquired ships when they were 
needed, and intended to keep them for some time. Little thought was given to the sale and purchase 
market in the interim. The third company was involved in the Jones Act tanker trades, and the ships 
had been built to use. not to sell. When built they had charters, and a lot of trade existed. They were 
subsequently upgraded, but since then the market had gone down dramatically.
When acquiring ships the existence of charters was undoubtedly preferred. Five companies 
stated that they would not normally acquire vessels without charters, though the problems of obtaining 
reasonable charters was resulting in changes in attitude. For example, one company looked for charters 
of three years or more. One aimed to get 70% of its vessels on 2-5 year cover, with the rest being on 
the spot market. Even these limited ambitions were not proving achievable at the time of the interview, 
and all the vessels owned by the second of these companies were operating on the spot market. It would 
thus appear that relatively conservative attitudes were being outweighed by other factors, not least
the desire to stay in the business, a point which w ill be discussed in the next section.
3 4 Types nf acquisition and Approaches tn acquisition
A number of companies in the survey provided further examples of another strategy, closely 
related to the buying and selling of ships. In the section on objectives, attention was given to various 
objectives to do with continuing in business, or to replacement and/or expansion of assets. Careful use 
of the sale and purchase markets was identified as an important part of achieving replacement or 
expansion objectives in seven of the 13 shipowning companies. One of these made the point that
expansion could in fact be achieved in three ways:
(i) growth in the number of ships owned or used
(ii) growth through the use of larger ships
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(iil) growth through improved quality of tonnage.
The view was expressed that 'A ll Greeks took fo r one o f these, probably in  th is  o rd e r' 
The third point was often related to the age of the ships, and the sale and purchase markets were used 
to overcome what was referred to by one company as the 'age problem '  of its ships. This 
particular company consciously sought to get the age of its ships down. They always watched the 
markets very carefully, selling when the market was high, buying when it  was at the bottom. They felt 
that they could often get three times the number of ships they originally had by the end of a particular 
cycle, or equivalent improvements in the quality or age of their ships. This policy had enabled them to 
bring down the average age of their ships from the upper teens to about ten. Variations on this theme 
could be found in all seven companies referred to above.
As with the category 2 bulk carrier companies, emphasis was given to acquiring flexible, handy 
sized vessels. Such vessels, besides keeping more revenue earning options open, also generally had 
good second hand values. An alternative approach was what might be termed the 'balanced fle e t'  
concept. This approach was based upon the idea of keeping a balance within the fleet, of vessels of 
different sizes and capabilities, on the pounds that the markets for different ships are not uniform, so 
some measure of risk reduction is achieved. Five of the 13 companies currently operating vessels gave 
one or other of these approaches considerable emphasis.
5 5 Flm tihility/nppnrtiinism
It is probably the importance placed on the sale and purchase markets which leads many 
observers in the industry, not least among category 1 companies, to describe the behaviour of category 
3 companies as opportunistic or entrepreneurial. Certainly such behaviour does require a rapid 
response when a bargain or opportunity is seen. Whether the implication that such behaviour is risky is 
justified is another matter altogether, as w ill be seen from the following discussion.
Certainly there is little  doubt that companies in this category did not perceive themselves as 
being particularly risk taking. Given the nature of the business, with long periods of recession being 
followed by short periods of boom, during which profits could be made, category 3 companies often 
developed an approach of keeping losses to a minimum in periods of recession (and preferably avoiding 
them altogether), while ensuring that the company is in a position to make substantial profits when the
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upturn comes. By buying when the market was low. particularly if  debt raised on the ships was low. 
capital and financing costs could be kept to a minimum, thus making it more likely that the ship could 
trade at close to break-even, or better, even in the recession. Careful choice of vessel in terms of its 
disposability would then allow profits to be made when the market turned up. This emphasis on 
disposability tends to result in companies not acquiring ships which are purpose built for a particular 
trade, but general purpose ships, with good fuel economy. Two companies also made reference to the 
importance attached to where the vessels had actually been built, since this significantly affected the 
perceived quality and hence second hand price.
Linked to this strategy (indeed, underpinning it) was an overall concern with cash flow. It would 
probably be more correct to say that the concern with avoiding losses in periods of recession, referred 
to above, was in fact a concern with avoiding cash flow deficits in periods of recession. This point w ill 
be returned to in the section on capital structure.
One company likened this approach to that of acquiring an house. The vessel acquisition was 
perceived as a long term venture, with the major concern being the ability to “survive’ the cash 
outflows associated with buying and running the vessel over 5-10 years. At the end of that time the 
vessel was then owned, so the company was constantly building up its capital base. Return on equity as 
such was not perceived as important. Such an approach, especially if  coupled with conservative 
borrowing, also puts companies in an extremely strong position In terms of survival.
Z Jl Miscellaneous points nn Philosophy and Strategy
Another feature found in a small number of the companies related to the total size of the 
commitment to the industry, usually expressed in terms of the number of ships. Three of the companies 
identified their optimal fleet size as being between 6 and 10 ships, and in several other cases similar 
impressions were obtained. The logic of this seemed to be based upon two facts. Firstly, becoming too 
large might result in a loss of control of the organisation. Secondly, the management structure of the 
companies, together with the associated support services, was set up for. and could cope with, this 
sort of number of ships. Any increase was likely to lead to significant changes in the management style 
and structure of the company. Given the personal or family nature of the management of certain 
companies, this later step was viewed with misgivings.
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Inevitably a number of strategies and approaches were found which were rather more 
individualistic than those described above. One company typically acquired ships by the use of long 
term charters with an option to buy them. A small number of companies chartered in vessels to satisfy 
short term excess demand, whereas the more typical approach was to look for employment for the 
vessels owned. One company had developed an effective policy of making money by using and scrapping 
old vessels, with the view that "scrapping generates do lfa rs", This company therefore adopted a 
very short term view of decisions, with a consequently different perspective on risk analysis. 
Basically this company bought ships at (or close to) scrap value, and then got a few more years work 
out of them. It was not expected that vessels of this type would be kept for more than 4-5 years, so 
the emphasis was on payback. A cargo to a part of the world where the vessel could be scrapped at a 
good price was likely to be the final trigger to scrapping.
±  Corporate Planning
4 J . Introduction and summary of findings
This section is concerned with identifying the extent to which formal corporate planning systems 
exist in category 3 companies, and their impact on investment and financing decisions. Very few 
companies had such systems, and their impact on investment decisions was slight.
± 2 Corporate Planning Systems
Of the 15 companies interviewed only two had anything approaching a formal corporate plan. In 
one of these plans were done periodically for 3-5 years, principally with the aim of relating the 
company's shipping activities to the business cycle. In the second company the planning was largely 
concerned with target setting for both geographical areas and commodities, and ensuring appropriate 
tonnage was available.
In two other companies no formalised corporate plan existed, but informal processes took place 
which were similar in some respects to those found in more formal systems. In one of these annual
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budgets were prepared, together with cash flow projections 2 1/2 years forward (beyond that was 
considered to be a waste of time). In addition the directors met regularly, if informally, and were very 
aware of where the company was, and of the overall state of the market. Significant market studies 
were carried out for the non bulk shipping areas of the company, covering shipping needs for the sector, 
market shares, and type of vessel. This particular area of activity was considered to be capable of 
assessment five years on. Similar activities did not occur with the bulk shipping activities, but the 
proportion of time spent on strategic thinking in this area was nonetheless high. The emphasis of the 
other company referred to above was on planning the structure of debt, identifying cycles, and 
supply/demand relationships.
In the remaining companies little  was done in the way of formal planning or detailed consideration 
of economic data, .other than overall supply/demand relationships for bulk shipping. This was generally 
using figures and other data collected from the specialist press and brokers, and w ill be dealt with in 
more detail in the next section. In addition to the four companies referred to in the firs t two 
paragraphs of this section, a further four clearly kept a fa irly close eye on the supply/demand 
relationships. However, such an approach is quite dissimilar to the formal planning systems found in 
category 1 and some category 2 companies. Indeed, in some senses it  is not really planning at all. but a 
necessary pre-requisite to the ‘opportunistic" approach to the sale and purchase market identified in 
the earlier section on philosophies and strategies. This approach did. of course, require an ability to 
survive in cash flow terms for quite long periods, and concerns with cash flow were either explicit or 
implicit in almost all companies in this category.
Consideration of the summary of responses of one company w ill provide an example of the 
approach described in the previous paragraph. This particular company had no action plans as such, and 
no targets were set. Instead, it  was standing back and waiting for the market to pick up. However, it 
did keep a general eye on the state of the world economy, and a more detailed eye on the supply/demand 
side of bulk shipping, in an attempt to identify opportunities in terms of both type and timing. A two 
year budget was prepared (somewhat unusually), but this was strictly “loss" and “cash flow" oriented, 
rather than operational.
One company comissioned detailed outside studies as needed, covering such things as the charter 
markets, the Alaskan oil fields, etc.
331
± 2 . Reasons given for, the absence of Planning Systems
Few clear reasons were given for the relative lack of planning systems. Given the nature of the 
activities of most companies in this category, namely bulk shipping, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that difficulty of forecasting, as identified in certain category 2 companies, was a significant factor. 
The size of the companies, particularly given the importance of families and/or individuals, was also of 
undoubted significance. A further factor, which may be related to this last point, relates to what might 
be described as 'the way of doing business'. Four companies (three of which were Greek), specifically 
made comments along the lines that corporate planning, and the associated study of such things as 
macro-economic indicators, was not the way it  was done. e.g.
The p riva te  shipowner doesn't go about h is business that way. '
"Generally Sreek owners don't think th is  w ay."
The philosophies and strategies identified earlier are clearly related to this view.
5. Project Appraisal
5 J . Introduction and summary of Findings
This section attempts to assess the importance of traditional methods of investment appraisal, 
and to identify appraisal methods actually in use in category 3 companies. Little detailed work appeared 
to have taken place with regard to macro-economic indicators and other figures related to world trade. 
The emphasis tended to be on a more detailed study of the market with a view to identifying opportune 
moments for buying and selling ships, and with identifying potential shortages in the market. Relatively 
little  attempt was thus made to forecast revenues for any length of time ahead. Operating costs were 
generally known in a fa ir amount of detail, but again a substantial proportion of companies did not 
attempt to forecast very far in advance, initial responses to questions on the use of the traditional 
appraisal methods suggested more use of these methods than might have been expected, although only 
508 of the companies said they used discounting methods. Further discussions however, revealed 
inconsistencies in statements made, and also led many companies to play down the importance of the
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traditional appraisal methods in reaching a final decision. Such calculations as were made tended to 
concentrate on the identification of break-even freight rates, and the clear identification of cash flow 
obligations for some time ahead. These obligations typically covered both operating and financing 
costs.
5.2 Appraisal Methods used
Useful and usable responses were obtained from 12 of the 13 companies currently operating 
ships. It is apparent from the Corporate Planning Section that very little  was done by companies in this 
category in the way of forecasts of macro-economic and trade related figures as such. Eight of the 
companies kept a close eye on supply and demand relationships as a matter of course, with a ninth 
commissioning studies as needed. There is little  doubt that the others had a broad overview of general 
market conditions, or consulted agents and brokers whenever an important investment/disinvestment 
decision was to be made. Agents and brokers typically have a variety of market information at hand 
which can be used to update shipowners as needed. Interestingly, one of the companies interviewed, 
which was principally an agency company, commented in detail on the kind of information it  was asked 
for, or could provide if  asked for, for shipowners or other interested parties. This included such things 
as the volume of commerce; the direction of trade movement; costs of transporting goods to ports, as 
well as costs for the sea-leg; prices and competitiveness; political factors; market shares; competitor 
costs; and the effect of other trades on the proposed activity.
In spite of the availability of a considerable amount of information, there is little  doubt that 
detailed market forecasts were extremely rare in this category. Even forecasts of costs and revenues 
were far from universal. While all companies which responded to questions on this area clearly knew 
their costs in some detail, only seven attempted to project them forwards. Only four companies 
attempted to forecast revenues. A summary of the results on operating flow forecasts is shown in 
table 21.
r
Period  Ahead in yea rs None 1 -2 3 - 5 5 - 1 0 10+ Unspecified
Operating costs 5 - 2 1 2 2
Operating revenues 7 - 1 2 - 1
Table 2 1 Forecasts of costs/revenues -  category 3 companies
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Inflation adjustments were incorporated in four cases. It should be noted that where charters 
exist, revenue forecasts become much easier. Attempts to forecast disposal values were only made in 
three cases, and in one of these ships were only purchased at figures close to scrap value. Given the 
earlier comments, in the philosophies and strategies section, on opportunistic sales, this result is a 
little  surprising. It reinforces the points made then, however, about the importance of having vessels 
capable of being resold when a good market opportunity arises. The emphasis is placed on being in a 
good position to take an opportunity, rather than attempting to quantify the result of taking an 
hypothetical opportunity.
Questions concerning the use of the four standard appraisal methods were asked, with the 
following initial results.
Number o f Methods Payback ARR NPV IRR T o ta l
No methods 3
One method 2 1 3
Two methods 1 1 1 1 2
Three methods 1 1 1 1
Four methods 3 3 3 3 3
7 5 4 6 12
a
Table 22 Appraisal methods used -  category 3 companies
These results suggest that a reasonable use is made of the traditional methods, and could be taken 
to imply that they are an important part of the decision making process. Such an implication would be 
misleading, since subsequent discussions and questions made it apparent that in reality these techniques 
were of relatively minor importance.
A moments reflection w ill make it  clear that these traditional appraisal methods require certain 
figures to be assumed with regard to operating costs and revenues. Table 21 indicated that only five 
companies specified that they forecast operating costs for periods in excess of three years, with only 
three forecasting revenues. Only three companies (possibly plus one which failed to specify its position 
with regard to revenue forecasts) £Quld therefore effectively appraise projects using these techniques 
based upon forecasts. Clearly they could be used by assuming other figures, such as current revenues,
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but only one such example was cited, in which discounting techniques were used under specified 
assumptions. Inconsistencies in statements made about the use of appraisal methods were found in a 
number of cases, casting serious doubts on the figure shown in Table 22. These inconsistencies were 
particularly apparent in the area of discounting techniques. The reason for this is not clear. It may be 
due to the fact that discounting techniques may well be used only occasionally rather than routinely. It 
may be that the systems were not properly understood. Certainly an element of defensiveness was 
detected in some cases, as if  companies felt that they ought to be using these methods. It may simply 
be that these methods are not considered useful. Whatever the reasons, a number of companies which 
had described their strategies in detail, became very vague when discussing discounting and the other 
appraisal methods. These doubts referred to above were heightened by responses to questions 
concerning the choice of a discount or hurdle rate, where discounting techniques were said to be used. 
Two of the companies which said that they used both NPV and IRR calculations appeared not to have any 
clear ideas on appropriate rates, and certainly failed to Identify either a rate or a rationale for it. One 
company said that the rate varied, but 16% was "typical". No rationale for this figure was given. One 
company which said that it  did both NPV and IRR calculations used market rates, by implication for loan 
finance, even though cash flows included debt raised and repaid. One company calculated IRR only, and 
had no specified rate required. The final company used 25% and made it  clear that this was considered 
to be an appropriate return on equity. 6iven that the cash flows included debt raised and repaid such an 
approach seems eminently reasonable. The implication of this analysis is that only a maximum of three 
companies were using discounting techniques in anything approaching a systematic way. which in turn 
reinforces the impression given earlier that Table 22 significantly exaggerates the effective use of 
discounting techniques, especially the use of NPV. given that only one of the three companies using 
discounting systematically, was using NPV.
Similar doubts exist with regard to the effective use of payback and ARR, given the lack of 
detailed forecasts. In reality it  seems more likely that payback would be linked to the concerns with 
liquidity identified earlier, while ARR is more likely to be related to the company as a whole.
Clearly this area is one of the least satisfactory in terms of precision of answers. Overall these 
traditional appraisal methods appeared to be far less important than might have been expected from 
Table 22. However, in order to ascertain more precisely their use. it  is necessary to look carefully at 
the systems actually used, in the following paragraphs the systems of the six companies which said
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that they use discounting techniques w ill be considered, to provide insights into both the general 
approach and the use of the traditional appraisal methods.
Three companies either stated or clearly implied that all four methods would be used. The firs t 
of these stated that their ranking or use would 1depend on circum stances’  However, they then 
went on to describe their approach to investment. Their md riH m was basically as follows.
(i) investigate chartering needs
(ii) look at supply/demand/orders/scrapping -  find the type of vessel needed most
(iii) consider the proposed vessel type by comparisons with existing ships, in such things as 
increased cargo capacity, speed, fuel consumption, flag and insurance costs
(iv) calculate daily cost (with an adjustment for inflation) and calculate the obligations and expected 
income.
The principal concern was with ensuring that obligations were clearly known, and that the company
could cope with them. The implication was made that the four appraisal methods would then be used.
though the precise weighting given to these methods was unclear. Given the explicit emphasis on
’obligations’  it is unlikely that the traditional appraisal methods were of paramount importance.
The second company which said that it  used all four methods described its approach as follows:
"We say, OK, we're going to buy th is  ship fo r $JM, and were going to am ortise 
i t  a t / 3000 a day, and that gives us a five  year payout. And it  costs $3000 a day 
fo r crew, etc.. so th is  ship has to  earn $6000 a day in  order to live  up to its  
projection. So we've got to  take a cargo o f ... tonnes, which translates in to a net 
charter ra te  o f S6000 a day. But i f  you're running ten ships, and one's a $1000 a 
day behind, and one's a /1000  ahead, that's OK."
Judgements would then be made about the chances of these rates being achieved. A break-even rate
would be calculated. ARR and discounting techniques would also be used but these were "not too
sophisticated" . Subsequent comments made it  clear that they were not an integral part of the
decision making process, but a means of helping raise finance: i.e.
7 think they're very cosmetic. My opinion is  once you've obtained the ioan and 
the financing you can throw  them away. '
The third company supposedly using all four appraisal methods, having described an appraisal
system in which forecasts of operating costs and revenues as such were made, then went on to say that
1someone'  would work out the figures by the traditional methods, but “these were not o f prim e
importance ’.
Besides the three companies just referred to. three other companies said that they used
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discounting techniques, in one case the company used a computer package to help evaluate projects, and 
both NPV and IRR were said to be calculated in the package. However, the company did not look at any 
of the standard methods very carefully. They were concerned with absolute figures, particularly cash 
flows over five, eight and ten years. In the second case the company certainly projected operating 
flows out for in excess of five years, and calculated an IRR. as well as using payback and ARR. The 
discounting techniques were clearly not a significant part of the process, as is evidenced by the fact 
that the observation was made that 'we do dcf, but we don 't fin d  it  useful. '  In the third case 
an internal rate of return was calculated based upon estimates of time charter rates for the next three 
years, followed by a 12 year plateau and a disposal value. IRR was used to avoid the problem of choice 
of discount rate. The calculations were made on the basis of both operating and financing flows, so the 
IRR represented a return on equity. The return normally required was 25%. There was little  doubt 
that these calculations were a significant element in the decision process in this company, together with 
concerns with the cash flow and fleet balance.
These descriptions of the approaches actually used reinforce the earlier comments about the 
relative unimportance of the traditional techniques in project appraisal in most companies in category 3. 
A description of the methods used in the remaining companies in the category would tend to re-inforce 
this further, since few of these included any of the standard appraisal methods in their system. One 
used Payback and ARR. two used payback, and the remaining three used none of the methods. This still 
leaves unanswered the question of what companies actually did to appraise projects, in a sense the 
strategies adopted almost resulted in decisions being made without the use of formal appraisal 
techniques, since the emphasis was an action when the market was right. However, specific 
calculations were usually made to ensure that cash flow problems would not arise, or would be kept to 
manageable levels. The calculation of break-even freight rates is one aspect of this. Cash flow analysis 
of some sort is another.
Seven of the 12 companies providing usable responses to this area calculated break-even freight 
rates, or something closely related to them. In six companies the calculations were straight forward 
break-even calculations, usually covering debt service commitments as well as operating costs. In the 
seventh company costs were estimated and compared with current revenues, and those expected for a 
"good* market and a "bad" market. Cost escalation was also incorporated into these comparisons. 
While not precisely the same as the calculation of a break-even rate the aim of this procedure was
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broadly similar.
Nine of the 12 stressed the importance of cash flow analysis in some form or another. In three 
cases the emphasis was on individual vessels. In six cases it  was on the corporate entity. In almost all 
cases the objective was to identify the cash flow obligations associated with both operating and funding 
vessels, so as to enable a judgement to be made on the likelihood of these obligations being covered 
under different market conditions. The conversion of these obligations into break-even rates was part 
of this process. One company indicated that individual cash flow calculations would only be made for 
certain ships, namely expensive ships or those with high debt.
Three companies did not explicitly identify cash flows as a major part of their appraisal. In one 
of these cases no new investment was envisaged in the foreseeable future. Previous investment 
decisions had been made either with charters, in which case cash flow risk was minimal, or at a time 
when the market appeared good, and substantial cash reserves existed. Cash flow reports were 
identified as an important part of the monitoring and control process, and it  is likely that cash flow 
analysis would form an important part of any future investment appraisal. At present however, such a 
situation was viewed as purely hypothetical. In the other two cases the market analysis was thorough, 
and both companies also had substantial cash reserves. Liquidity considerations were not ignored, they 
were simply less pressing, so the need for detailed cash flow analysis was reduced.
By way of illustration, a broad description of the approach used in one of these companies is 
given below. This company examined the supply side of the industry carefully, and were thus able to 
identify the sort of ship needed most. Costs were known “in  d e ta il'. Current revenues were known, 
and break-even rates were calculated. Residual values were looked at to see what they would need to 
be to cover trading losses. A view could then be taken on the likelihood of such values being achievable. 
Scrap value could be a consideration for older ships. Inflation adjustments were incorporated in 
detail , as was “some so rt o f margin to be safe. “ Concerns appeared to be with downside risk, 
which was the main reason for the cash flow analysis done in the other companies.
The above represent the main components of appraisal methods for category 3 companies. 
Several companies referred to other features set out below, but no consistency existed with any other 
methods.
(i) One company looked at absolute figures for profit and cash, rather than return on investment.
(ii) One company stated that it  would not normally take on a new vessel unless it contributed to
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profits immediately.
(iii) One company stated that it  would take a loss in the firs t year to make profits later.
(iv) One company attempted to identify the time at which the vessel would be "se lf supporting
i.e. debt service would be covered in almost any market.
£. Risk In Investment Decisions
f i j .  Introduction and summary of findings
This section is concerned with identifying ways in which companies in this category deal with 
risk in the investment decision. As with category 2 companies, very little  new information was 
obtained as a result of further questions being specifically asked about risk. Real concern exists with 
"downside risk*, but this was dealt with in the general way covered in the sections on philosophies and 
strategies, and project appraisal. Analytical techniques were used in only five companies, and then 
infrequently. Nine companies made reference to currency risk, but not all of these avoided it. Twelve 
usable responses were received for this section.
§l2  General Approaches to Risk
The approach to risk of most category 3 companies can be found in sections 3 and S. covering 
philosophies and strategies and appraisal methods used. In summary these comprise:
(i) a policy of buying at the bottom of the market and selling at the top. Ships acquired at the bottom 
of the market w ill have lower capital costs than other ships;
(ii) the acquisition of general purpose ships likely to hold their values well (especially when coupled 
with (I));
(iii) careful appraisal of the commitments of the company in terms of cash flow, both operating and 
financing. In some cases this is reinforced by conservative attitudes to debt, a point dealt with more 
fully in section 7.
The only other area of general concern was that of currency risk. Three companies were 
confined to domestic trades, with both income and expenditure in sterling or dollars. These companies
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were clearly not concerned with currency risk. However, all of the other nine companies expressed 
some concern with currency fluctuations, but this did not result in the avoidance of currency risk in all 
cases possible. Certain currencies were carefully avoided, whereas risks were taken with others. In 
some cases the size of the risk was a factor. All nine companies had either hedged, taken out 
multi-currency loans, (or restricted themselves to dollar or sterling loans), or covered ahead in 
certain circumstances. Four companies had taken currency risk.
Analytical approaches to Risk
Questions on the use of sensitivity analysis and other techniques for dealing with risk elicited 
only five positive responses. Of these only one used sensitivity analysis "a to t", mainly to deal with 
different assumptions about financing costs, the loan period, and revenues, (though not costs as these 
were considered to be known fa irly accurately). A second company always took "an extrema case 
m arket' ,  and allowed for a period of at least 1-2 years of zero trading profit. If the deficit could not 
be covered from other sources, then the project would be rejected as being "not a good r is k ". In 
the other three cases sensitivities were "played around w ith ", although nothing in particular was 
mentioned. In short, this area of risk analysis was underutilised, even although the strategies are 
perfectly consistent with an extensive use of sensitivity analysis.
2. Financing Aspects of Investment Decisions
7.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings
Twelve usable responses were obtained from category 3 companies for this section. In general it  
was found that the financing decision was a fairly important part of the overall decision, particularly 
for new vessels, and had some influence on where vessels were built. The importance of financing was 
less for second hand vessels. Finance for new vessels was mainly yard credit or bank finance, with 
some coming from retentions. Second hand finance was typically from retentions and bank loans. Loan 
periods and maximum amounts available followed standard conditions fairly closely, as did security 
requirements, though some slight differences in emphasis were found. Maximum borrowings usually
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occurred for new vessels, sometimes solely because of the subsidy. The proportion borrowed was 
much smaller for second hand vessels.
Questions on capital structure made it clear that capital structure as such was of little 
significance. The critical questions concerned ability to service debt, often through periods of 
recession. Approximately two thirds of the companies took conservative attitudes towards debt. The 
remainder took on larger amounts of debt, but spent a considerable time on cash flow analysis. 
Nevertheless the exposure to risk of these latter companies was considerably greater than that of those 
with low debt.
2 2  Relationship between the Investment and Financing Decisions
Of the twelve usable answers which were obtained to a question about this relationship between 
the investment and financing decisions, seven indicated that the two were closely linked. A further two 
companies saw no problems in raising finance, so were able to concentrate on the investment decision. 
Another said that the investment decision was probably made before the financing, but the financing 
would always be in the back of their mind. One felt the two aspects were "separable but both 
im portant'  The final company kept the two separate, but felt that it did not give financing as much 
consideration as it  should.
Ten responses were received with regard to the question about the influence of financial 
arrangements on the choice of shipbuilder. Several companies were excluded simply because they did 
not buy new vessels.
In five cases financial considerations did not appear to have been a significant explicit 
consideration in the decision. However, in at least four of these the availability of yard credit or 
government backing (SJ1FC or Title XI) had been established. By implication the use of such credit 
established which country the vessels would be built in. even if some choice with regard to the 
individual shipyard remained. In the fifth case the company used builders that it knew.
In the other five cases the financial arrangements were an explicit consideration in reaching a 
decision, though in two cases price was established as the first consideration. Overall the final decision 
seemed to be a balance between cost, quality, delivery time, currency and financial arrangements.
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U l Methods nf Finance
All 12 companies responding to questions on methods of finance used either yard credit or bank 
loans, or both, to cover part of the cost. Ten companies used yard credit, and nine bank loans. Only 
two had actually used lease finance, though a further four companies had considered it. These 
companies had rejected leasing either for tax reasons, or because it  took away their flexibility to 
dispose of assets at appropriate but unforeseeable times. Similar reasons for not even considering 
leasing, were given in almost all the other cases, although one company pointed out that lease finance 
was not generally available for second hand ships anyway. One company, while not prepared to 
consider leasing, was prepared to consider a charter with an option to buy. No significant inputs of new 
equity were found in these companies, though clearly retentions played an important part in funding 
investments. The main reason for this was essentially that of control. The period of loans, and the 
proportion borrowed, were influenced, if  not determined, by the age of the vessels being purchased. 
For new vessels standard yard credit was available, usually 60-90% of cost, spread over 7-12 years. 
For second hand vessels 50-60% was a more normal proportion available, usually for periods of 3-6 
years. These proportions were not necessarily taken up by companies. Specific questions were asked 
about both the periods for which loans were taken out, and whether companies would normally take up 
the maximum amount available. Six of the 12 respondents made it  dear that they would opt 
necessarily, or even normally, take out the maximum loans obtainable, with comments such as:
"We would taka the maximum wo requ ired . not necessarily the maximum we 
coutd. "
"We borrow  what we can read iiy  repay.."
Two of these six companies made the point that they would probably take up maximum (or close to 
maximum) loans on nayst ships, simply because of the subsidy. This was definitely not the case with 
second hand vessels. The other six companies said that they would take up the maximum amount of 
loan. In two of these cases this appeared to be largely because of the subsidy, and also second hand 
vessels did not represent other than a minor part of their acquisitions. One company borrowed high 
proportions on individual vessels, but had very low debt overall, implying borrowing for convenience 
rather than need. Only three of the 12 respondents appeared to take high debt on individual vessels and 
to show little concern with overall levels of gearing.
Apart from one case, where 20 year loans were obtained using Title XI finance, loan periods
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actually obtained for new vessels varied from 5-12 years, with eight years being typical. Yard credit 
facilities were effectively the same for category 3 companies as for those of the other categories. 
Proportions actually borrowed on new ships tended to reflect this. For second hand ships loan periods 
ranged from six months to eight years, with 3-5 years being typical. In only one case was more than 
70% of the cost of a second hand ship taken up as a loan, and this was for a ship acquired at close to 
scrap value, with the intention of it being used only for a short period, so the loan was capable of being 
viewed as of a short term, self-liquidating type. Substantial additional security was given. Other than 
this, actual proportions borrowed ranged from zero through to 70%. Small or cheap ships were often 
purchased for cash. Other examples could be found of substantial sums, running into several millions of 
dollars, being paid in cash. More typically sums borrowed on second hand tonnage were in the 30-60% 
range, with 50% a frequently quoted figure. Precise answers were not usually obtained to these 
questions, because so much was seen to depend upon circumstances, but a considerable degree of 
consistency was found in the ranges being discussed.
2A Security
Few differences were found between security requirements of category 3 and category 2 
companies. Requirements were fairly standard, as set out in the chapter on banks. Slight differences in 
emphasis were given by companies in this category, as compared with those of category 2, particularly 
in the areas of second mortgages, and parent company (or personal) guarantees. More emphasis 
appears to be given to second mortgages. Guarantees were disliked and resisted where possible.
Z £  Capitol Structure
As with the other categories, two separate questions were asked in an attempt to establish
views on the extent to which debt finance could be used overall, rather than simply in relation to
individual projects. Companies were thus asked:
(i) is there a limit to the total amount of debt taken up?
(ii) Do you work towards the achievement of a particular long run capital structure which is broadly 
adhered to over time?
If specific limits or targets did exist, companies were asked to state what they were, and to give a
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rationale for their choice. Answers were obtained from 12 companies.
Only one of the 12 companies reponded that there was no limit to the total debt. The debt level 
was “as high as we can get Two companies did not appear to be unduly constrained by concerns 
about overall debt limits. In one of them the overall level of debt was said to be “not forem ost in  
the companys th inking“. The other company, with very high gearing (described as" fiendish “ ), 
pointed out that without high gearing the kind of expansion which it had gone through would simply not 
have been possible. Great care was nonetheless taken with clearly identifying the commitments 
associated with this high level of debt. In both of these cases concerns were with ensuring that cash 
flow commitments were planned, understood, and covered, rather than with levels of debt overall.
Of the remaining nine companies, seven had a fairly clear view of the maximum debt they would 
be prepared to have outstanding. In three cases specific maximum debt/equity figures were given. In 
two cases these came out at 33% (based upon the ratio long term debt/(!ong term debt + equity)). 
Comments made included:
“We are very conservative. Our po licy is  not to owe a lo t, but to  be our own
man. “
’We are very wary o f being overgeared."
The third company referred to always ensured that total debt was “..w ith in  40-50X o f the low  
m arket value o f the sh ips.“ In three other cases ratios were conservative, with comments being 
made such as:
“We're always conservative, and tower than most others. “
“We need to re s tric t debt according to our capability to service it. “ 
in only one of the seven companies specifying a limit on debt was the limit effectively externally 
imposed. This company would not borrow more than 100% of the cost of assets and this represented a 
theoretical limit. For practical purposes such a limitation is no limitation, and this company ought to be 
added to the "no limit” companies. In the two remaining companies, answers indicated clearly that the 
question of a debt limit was somewhat hypothetical, since debt levels were low.
“We don t  go beyond our means. We have to be in  a position to repay loans out 
o f our own assets. “
"Our debt is  so tow that we don t  re a lly  have to w orry. “
Discussion on target capital structure revealed that nine companies very clearly had no targets 
for this area. A tenth company distinguished carefully between good and bad markets, as ship values
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vary dramatically. Hence debt/equity ratios in good markets would be much more conservative than 
those in poor markets. Nonetheless no specific targets appeared to exist. Of the remaining two 
companies, one refused to disclose its views on targets (or whether it had any), and one, mentioned 
above, always kept debt within 40-50% of the current market value of its ships. Target capital 
structures would thus not appear to be of significance to category 3 companies.
However, as was pointed out in the section on philosophies and strategies, clear views were 
found to exist with regard to liquidity and the ability to service debt, and capital structure has an effect 
on this. Capital structure ratios are thus really only a surrogate for this, and a somewhat imperfect 
one at that. In the discussions on limits to total debt it became clear that eight companies had fairly 
conservative limits to the amount of overall debt taken up. In three of the others detailed corporate 
cash flow forecasts were made for several years ahead, while in the fourth it was evident that 
sufficient liquidity existed to see the company through a long period of adverse trading. This implies 
that the capital structure debate with regard to category 3 companies is something of a red herring. 
Concerns appear to be twofold, namely:
(i) the ability to service debt through periods of adverse trading as well as good trading:
(ii) the degree of security to cover debts outstanding that actually exists at any particular time.
Approximately two thirds of the companies in category 3 considered that they had conservative debt 
ratios, but these appear to be geared to debt service ability, rather than because of any idea of market 
optimum. Certainly no company attempted, in any way. to relate share values to capital structure. 
There is little doubt that further debt could be raised in these companies, for additional security, but to 
do so would increase the risks of being unable to service debt in a time of depression. Those companies 
which have higher debt appear to spend a considerable amount of time on cash flow planning, with the 
emphasis again being on debt service. In a sense it  could be said that only three of the twelve companies 
were taking high risks associated with their debt levels, and there is no doubt that the companies 
recognised this.
The second point referred to above relates to the ratio of debt to current market value of 
vessels. 6iven the nature of covenants required, this particular ratio was more often thought of than 
the traditional debt/equity ratios, calculated on an historical cost basis. A conservative approach to 
such ratios ensures that no problems arise with banks or other lenders, with regard to defaults on 
covenants. Such a result would lead to additional security being required by lenders, with a consequent
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adverse effect on the ability of companies to behave in a rapid and opportunistic manner whenever the 
market was in an appropriate state.
iL An Example
& 1 Introduction
it  is apparent that the overall approach to investment decision making for category 3 companies 
is much more general than that of the other categories. The breaking down of the complete process into 
its various constituent parts is thus much more artificial for this category, and undoubtedly accounts 
for the lower level of detailed analysis. In an attempt to link the various elements together, to convey 
a better impression of the overall approach, this section summarises the more important comments and 
responses of one of the companies interviewed. This company is fairly typical, and representative of 
the approach found in the majority of companies in this category. The details given below include 
references to the family, to philosophy and strategies, to past experiences, appraisal methods, and 
financing. While some points are clearly peculiar to this particular company, they provide useful 
insights into the complex and often implicit decision making process.
8.2 Nature of Business and Objectives
"We have always been a tramp shipping company ... we've always owned d ry  
cargo vessels ... so we've been always employed in  the carriage o f bulk commodities 
since our foundation."
"... we have consciously decided that we can't to ta lly  re ly  on the shipping 
m arkets to  give us our income over the next five  o r ten years, so we have made a 
decision to d ive rs ify . but in  a modest way. We're ce rta in ly  not going to put huge 
amounts out o f our assets in to  a d iversification, because that can be ju s t as 
disastrous as buying another ship, p a rticu la rly  i f  you don't know anything about the 
business."
“We don't go out fo r more capita l ... because it  would destroy the fam ily  
co n tro l."
7 think one o f the main reasons fo r shipping being in  the hands o f fam ily people 
is  that you do have to make instant and quick decisions, and sometimes you have to 
make such a re a lly  quick decision that a corporate structure  would be unable to come 
to a decision quickly in  order to  capture a bargain which is  on o ffe r, rhat's why you 
get a lo t o f Greek fam ilies and Far Eastern fam ilies able to  suddenly emerge w ith an
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enormous number o f ships, because they've been able to fin d  the bargain and buy it  
before anyone else realises it, and before a corporate structure  can make a 
decision. “
*Our objective is  to make a p ro fit, and in  order to make a p ro fit you've got to  
read your m arkets correctly . We haven't absolutely got set objectives that we must 
stay w ithin the bulk c a rrie r m arket. I f  we fe lt that any other shipping market was 
going to give us a p ro fit, and we could see a reasonable trade, o r reasonable 
prospects, we would buy o r bu ild  that type o f ship, because we're shipowners, not 
b u lk -ca rrie rs ."
8.3 Philosophies and Strategies
"Now when we look a t a decision to buy o r s e ll ships, it  isn 't dictated by the 
financia l structure  .... its  always dictated by m arket forces. Shipping is  a very 
simple industry as regards economics ... because i f  there are too many ships, then 
the m arket is  low, and i f  there are too few  ships then the fre ig h t m arket is  high.
And we've always worked on the basis that when the fre ig h t m arkets are very high,
even though you can see reasonable rewards from  trading your ships, that is  the tim e 
to  think o f selling your older units and modernising. We ve done th is  over the la st 25  
years, and you can c a ll i t  i f  you like  trading in  ships, because that is  exactly what it  
is. So although we're shipowners we do consider that we trade in  ships ... you make 
fa r more money from  trading the ship than you do by trading your ships in  the 
m arket."
The best way to finance ships is  to  buy and s e ll proper/y. Because its  very 
unwise to have even 80X o f your ships running on borrowed money. Its  a stra in  on 
your cash flow , when the m arkets get down, which can be so intolerable that you 
actually go out o f business ... One o f the main decisions in  our company is  that we 
w ill always try  to fin d  the tops and the bottoms o f the m arket. Now that's easy to  
say. but i f  you're in  the m arket place you have a reasonable idea when these are 
coming about. Only the fools h it the top and only the foo/s h it the bottom, but 
somewhere around the top o f the m arket we would always s e ll our older units, and 
when the m arket's running a t the bottom we would buy back in, again ... The h is to ry
o f the company shows that that is  how we've actually traded ... "
8.4 Planning and Market Analysis
The fir s t issue that you look a t is  how many ships are being b u ilt, o r what the 
capacity and the new building programme is  in  the world, and there are a number o f 
people today who have th e ir own s ta tis tic a l departments. You can rin g  up any 
number o f leading brokers, who you know, because they're always talking to you, 
try in g  to in te rest you in  doing pa rticu la r deals, buying ships, that so rt o f thing, and 
you can say, What's your la test record o f how many ships o f a pa rticu la r type are 
on the stocks?' They m ight not be absolutely precise, but they can give you a 
reasonable enough figure. You can then pick out an area o f the m arket that you m ight
think is  undertonnaged ... You re a lly  haven't got a plan in  shipping. Opportunistic,
that's what you have to be. You have to  tru ly  be an entrepreneur in  shipping."
"Every day you get perhaps 20 o r 30 telexes in. pure ly on the sale and
purchase market. So you know the new ships that are coming on the m arket. You
know the price a t which ships are being sold ... so you know whether the m arket is  
moving up o r down ... and you get th is  on an instant basis, so you don't have to go 
in to reams and reams o f research, because it's  being provided every day from
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organisations in  London. ~
"Because we're to ta lly  involved w ith our business, we would norm ally say that, 
out o f our experience, we would be able to say what type o f ship we would want to
bu ild  o r buy, because we fo llow  the trends in  the market, and we fo llow  the size o f 
ship .... improvement in  po rts  ... We watch a ll these so rts o f things, and when it  
comes to buying we norm ally have done our own litt le  m arket research beforehand ... 
by follow ing the trends that have taken place w ithin the in d u stry ."
Very clearly a lot of technical and design specifications are looked at routinely, with attention
being devoted to the relationship between technical merit and price.
"You cant plan five  years ahead in  shipping ... i t ’s not a business where you
can s it down and set your corporate plan working fo r a two, three, five  o r ten year 
period, because events change more o r less on a da ily basis, so you're a ltering your 
figures, re -s truc tu ring  your strategy, certa in ty on a weekly o r m onthly basis. "
'We're always very aware o f keeping our costs down, which is  the main thing in  
shipping, but as fa r as making p ro fit forecasts, e ither pub lic ly o r w ithin the 
company, we do not do that, because we fee ! that that is  very dangerous in  shipping."
*So i f  you're coming to  the questions. Vo we look a t the p ro fit forecast and 
then make our investment decisions?', the answer is. Mo, most categorically, no. ' 
We make our investment decfsions in  re la tion  to what we have in  the k itty , and how 
we fee ! the m arket is  going to  progress, that is  the safe and purchase m arket and the 
fre ig h t market, two separate m arkets."
JL5 Appraisal Method
In discussing a recent investment the following comments were made.
"... i t  was a ship o f which there are very few  trading in  the world, so we fe /t
that when the m arket revived, i t  woufd be a good money earner fo r the company. We
could a ffo rd  to pay cash fo r the ship ... i t  looked as though the m arket had reached 
the bottom and was turning s lig h tly , i t  was a good replacement fo r a ship that had 
been sold ..."
"We worked out how much we fe lt we could run the ship fo r, and we also looked 
a t trades where the ship would be employed. We worked out our own estim ates as to 
what re tu rn  we would make on those trades, and how much we would need 
in  order to break even on the venture ... The m arket was such that i t  was fe lt to be 
a break even venture w ith the prospect o f the m arket getting a litt le  be tte r ..."
Break even rates were calculated for any routes that the ship could operate on, with up to 50 
being calculated.
"By buying the ship we were not going to be losing much on trading her, and the 
prospect o f making good money on her in  the next two years are quite reasonable. 
Also we looked a t the fa c t that the ship was worth w ell over /... fo r scrap ... and 
has a life  o f another s ix  o r seven years ... A ll our ris k  capita! was m inim ai ..."
Additional comments made it clear that the ship was in good condition, and required little in the
way of alterations to design or accommodation. When all these factors were put together it was decided
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to make a bid.
&& Financing
"Now when it  comes to  making decisions about financing a ship, the fir s t thing 
we would actually want to  do is  to see whether we could finance it  out o f our own 
resources. "
In discussing new buildings, and the availability of yard or governmental credit, the following 
comment was made.
"We did take up term s like  that in  19.., from  the Japanese Government, and the 
one hiccup we've had in  our company since the war occurred because we took that 
type o f credit, and also we took i t  in  the loca l currency, .. So we got h it on the ... 
revaluation o f the yen, plus the fa c t that the fre igh t m arket didn't expand as rap id ly  
as we'd hoped. So we did have cash flow  d ifficu ltie s  when the ships were due fo r 
delivery ... and that was so le ly attrfbutable to the fa c t that we had taken up, not 
ju s t the yen credit, but the whole 80% c re d it."
mWe don't have a set view in  the company that we wouldn't borrow  up to the 
maximum, but t  think that we have a view that we would not extend ourselves to the 
extent that when you look a t your cash flow  projections on a borrow ing o f 80% o r 
more, you fin d  that you have to  have an enormously good fre ig h t m arket in  order ju s t 
to  pay your way. ’
"We would p re fe r to fund from  our own reserves, but we would take up to  50%. 
I f  we could borrow  a t much low er than we could lend out our own money, then we 
would do that, but we would always have the background o f having our own money in  
case things went wrong, to  pay o ff the loan.'
hie would ce rta in ly  be very w ary o f being overgeared, because that's where 
a ll the shipping companies that are in  trouble have gone wrong. There's no way o f 
making up overindebtedness i f  the m arket is  against you. And here again we wouldn 't 
like  to see a ra tio  o f -  an absolute maximum o f -  50%."
This ratio was calculated on the basis of debt/equity, giving a ratio of 33X using long term debt/Oong 
term debt + equity).
"Shipping companies should always have a reasonable amount o f cash. /  would 
have thought that i t  depends on the number o f ships you own, and on your debt ... 
You've always got to  have something fo r a ra in y  day in  shipping, and ... J would think 
you must have a substantial amount o f cash available in  the company to pay fo r those 
m aritim e contingencies that may occur. Most ... Greeks have always got ... 
substantial cash balances."
Leasing was discussed and rejected, since:
"... up u n til very recently some o f the leasing deals were very re s tric tive . 
You couldnt buy and se ll, w ith in the term s o f the lease, and that's exactly what our 
business is. We would want to  buy and s e ll when the m arkets are r ig h t."
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Chapter 11
Summary of Findings 
_L Introduction and Aims of Chapter
This chapter aims to summarise the preceeding three chapters, so as to provide a basis for 
assessing the relevance of the theory of finance, and its associated criticisms, outlined in chapter 3, 
for decisions on investment and financing within firms; for identifying potential links with theories of 
corporate planning and strategy outlined in Chapter 5; and for developing a descriptive model of 
investment and financing decisions in shipping.
The summary given below will follow a similar approach to that used in the earlier chapters, and 
will thus focus on similarities and differences in the following areas;
(i) Objectives
(ii) Philosophies and Strategies
(iii) Areas of Activity
(iv) Corporate Planning
(v) Project Appraisal
(vi) The approach to risk in investment decisions
(vii) Financing aspects of investment decisions
In considering this chapter it  should be noted that it is concentrating on points of principle, rather 
than detailing exceptional cases. The latter can be identified within each of the three previous chapters.
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Z  Summary of Findings
2 .1  O b je c tiv e s
In the sections on objectives in the preceeding three chapters no clear cut picture emerged with 
regard to objectives. However, the more important aspects of these discussions are summarised in 
Table 23.
Objectives Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Share price maximisation Few None None
Other shareholder concerns Considerable Few Almost non-existent
Concern with share price 
(usually for purposes of 
takeover or defence 
from takeover)
Several None None
Concern with regularity 
o f dividends
Virtually all Only public Few
Concern with quality of 
earnings
Virtually all Vould like to be Few
Concern with profitability 
in general terms
All All All
Concern with wealth but 
not regularity of earnings
Virtually none Changing more to 
this
Most
Personal/family objectives Very few Reasonable number Most
*
Table 23 Objectives -  by category
The main points of similarity between the three categories appear bo be as follows:
(i) Virtually no reference was made to any formally written down objectives, within any of the 
three categories. This could be attributable to one of three factors. Either no written down objectives 
existed (as was almost certainly the case in the vast majority of the companies), or executives were 
unaware of such objectives, or they simply did not regard the objectives set as operational. Whichever 
of these is the case, there seems little doubt that decisions were being taken without reference to. or 
apparent need for, a set of specific, dear cut objectives.
(ii) Share price maximisation was not seen as an operational objective in any company.
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(iii) Virtually all companies had some kind of profitability objective, frequently implicit, frequently 
couched in very general terms.
(Iv) Companies in all categories highlighted the problems of forecasting in volatile markets such as 
shipping, and the difficulties of setting precise objectives or targets.
The main Points of Difference appeared to be:
(i) Share price and shareholder concerns (but not share price maximisation) were found in a 
considerable number of category 1 companies, and some of the category 2 public companies. The main 
reasons for this appear to be related to takeovers, in terms of both minimising threats and maximising 
opportunities, and in maintaining good shareholder and institutional relations, so as to facilitate further 
fund raising. Share price and shareholder concerns were almost non-existent in those companies which 
were not public.
(ii) The category 1 public companies were virtually all extremely concerned about the quality of 
their earnings, to such an extent that the maintenance of high quality earnings could perhaps be 
identified as the principal objective. Implicitly, the maintenance of high quality earnings was seen as 
ensuring an appropriate and acceptable share price, and continued good shareholder relations. Many of 
the category 2 companies, especially the long established or public companies, had taken a similar view 
on the desirability of high quality earnings in the past. Most still wanted business of this sort. Most 
were finding it difficult to achieve, with a resultant change in attitude. Some of the private companies 
in category 2. and most of those in category 3. were concerned with wealth accretion in general terms, 
but not with quality of earnings per se.
(iii) Category 1 companies generally translated their profitability objectives into return on capital 
figures, typically return on shareholders equity. An objective of this sort was considered to be both 
appropriate and operational. While some companies in the other two categories took the same approach, 
many did not. The principal reasons for this appear to be related to the ideas set out in the proceeding 
paragraph, on quality of earnings. For category 2 and 3 companies profitability objectives were often 
long term, with an acceptance that short run fluctuations in profits would occur.
(iv) Virtually all category 1 companies had adopted an approach to dividend policy which was stable. 
Whether this policy was seen as an objective or as a constraint was unclear, although discussions 
tended to imply the latter. This view is reinforced by the relatively low payout ratios found in many 
companies. In general only the public companies in category 2 had the same desire, though lower quality
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earnings were leading to less regular dividends. Very few of the remaining category 2 or 3 companies 
had any clear cut views on dividend policy, and many appeared to pay no dividends at all.
(v) Many of the category 2. and most of the category 3. companies were Influenced (or capable of 
being influenced) by personal or family objectives. The exact nature and influence of such objectives 
could not be established, but their potential influence was generally acknowledged to be significant. For 
example, many category 2 companies, and virtually all category 3 companies, expressed the desire to 
continue in their existing lines of business, often to continue a family tradition. Retention of family 
control was important in many private corporations. Personal or family tax considerations frequently 
determined the business approach. Even in category 1 a small number of instances were found of this 
kind of influence. In general, however, the scope for a substantial influence of this type appeared much 
less for category 1 companies, as the level of corporate bureaucracy and the size of the companies 
increased.
(vf) Host category 1 companies appeared to have some kind of objective related to growth (which 
tended to reinforce the concerns with share price and shareholder or financial market relationships). 
Some category 2 and 3 companies had objectives of this type. Some were currently more concerned 
with survival. Some saw growth from a particular viewpoint in terms of improvements in the number, 
size and quality of ships, up to a maximum point, beyond which it was not possible to go, while still 
preserving the existing nature of the business.
2.2 Philosophies and Strategies
Finance theory says little about the philosophies underlying most business decisions, or the 
strategies used to achieve a desired position. In the course of this study a number of philosophies and 
strategies were identified early on, and followed up by consistent questioning. These provide useful 
insights into the way in which different companies approach their investment and financing decisions. 
The more important of these are summarised in table 24.
This table highlights a number of interesting differences between the three categories. At first 
sight there appears to be little similarity between them. However, running through all three, and 
overlapping to some extent with objectives, was the idea of flexibility. Interestingly, approaches found 
were often similar in essence to the ideas set out by Donaldson in 1969. referred to on pages 69/70. 
This point will be returned to in the next chapter. Certainly very few companies in the study did not
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Philosophy /S tra te g y Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Speculation on purchase 
of assets or businesses
Virtually none Little Most
Opportunism Some Some Most
Use of High Technology or 
Specialist (expensive) ships
Virtually all Few Virtually none
Use of general purpose or 
handy size ships
Virtually none Most Virtually All
Use of strategic positioning 
through diversification
Virtually all Few Virtually none
Degree of diversification Typically 3 - 8  
different areas 
of business 







Market flexibility Most Some Few
Operating flexibility Some Most Most
Financial strength & 
flexibility
All Most -  but 
getting more 
difficult
Most -  but 
conservative
fable 24 Philosophies and strategies -  summary
Strategic positioning related to the maintenance of a well balanced set of business activities. Concerns 
such as these tended to be major concerns arising on a periodic basis, subject to regular review. 
Market flexibility related to the maintenance of a flexible approach to markets, and was achieved 
through such things as efficient facilities, flexible operations, multi-purpose facilities or vessels, 
efficient data bases and agency systems, a balanced approach to chartering, a balanced fleet, a low cost 
fleet, high market share, and a high quality service. Operating flexibility related to an approach to 
operations which permitted alternative methods of operation as conditions and circumstances changed.
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Possible means of achieving it included such things as efficient facilities, flexible or multi-purpose 
ships, a balanced fleet, and equipment ownership. Considerable overlap existed between strategies to 
achieve both market and operating flexibility, and a division between the two is inevitably a little 
artificial. Financial flexibility generally related to the maintenance of adequate financial resources, or 
at least access to them, at all times. This was for both safety reasons and opportunistic reasons. In 
passing it  is worth noting that the ideas of "Action Range" and "Endurance", developed by Derkinderen 
and Crum, appear to have much in common with these ideas on financial flexibility. Methods of 
achieving financial flexibility included such things as adequate financial resources, lines of credit, good 
quality earnings and good cash flow, conservative debt levels, and well financed assets.
In practice the extent to which flexibility existed, or was sought, and the areas of greatest 
emphasis, depended on the size and nature of the company, and its lines of business. Company size and 
wealth provided greater opportunities for Category 1 companies, in terms of the range of business 
activities in which they could engage. It enabled such companies to engage in strategic positioning 
through diversification, and to acquire high technology or other expensive or specialist lines of 
business. The first of these was seen as reducing corporate risk, irrespective of anything which might 
be said in finance theory about the lack of benefit (to shareholders) of diversification, and hence leading 
to higher quality earnings. The second provided a kind of barrier to entry to other firms, which in turn 
also helped in the maintenance of high quality earnings. Clearly smaller companies in the other two 
categories were generally unable to afford this luxury. Indeed, many Category 2 and most Category 3. 
companies had very limited diversification of interests outside of the bulk trades. The different degree 
of diversification found in the three categories had a considerable effect on ideas on flexibility. The 
diversified conglomerates were typically found to have considerable strategic and market flexibility. In 
many such companies, particularly where trades were more specialised, operating flexibility was more 
limited. Many of the Category 2 and 3 companies, typically involved largely in the bulk trades, had 
little strategic or market flexibility, but achieved considerable operating flexibility through the use or 
handy size general purpose ships. Such ships also gave flexibility with regard to the sale and purchase 
markets, since a large market for such ships existed, and they could typically be sold easily and 
quickly. Against this, it must be recognised that general purpose ships were seldom the lowest cost 
ships for particular services or routes. The concentration of many Category 2 and 3 companies on a 
small number of activities, especially when coupled with current market conditions, had caused many
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such companies to move away from a reliance on operating profits, and to emphasise the sale and 
purchase of vessels at the right time, with resulting capital profits. Such profits clearly occurred on a 
less regular basis than the high quality earnings of category 1 companies. The sale and purchase 
markets were also used by these companies to maintain, replace and expand their shipping interests. 
Much more similarity of approach was found with regard to ideas on financial strength and financial 
flexibility. Almost all companies paid considerable attention to the preservation of adequate financial 
strength, so as to be able to survive unexpected shocks, or to take opportunities that came along. This 
point will be dealt with in more detail in later sections.
The emphasis of Category 1 companies on quality earnings was also found to influence other 
philosophies and strategies. Category 1 companies tended not to purchase assets on a speculative basis, 
but to acquire them for long term use. Indeed, Category 1 investment decisions tended to be based on 
some kind of fleet concept, rather than on individual projects. By comparison Category 3 companies 
appeared far more likely to acquire individual assets on a speculative basis, with the aim of making 
substantial profits on a subsequent sale of that asset. The whole approach of Category 3 companies was 
found to be more opportunistic than that of the other two categories. This should not be taken to imply 
that Category 1 and 2 companies did not behave in an opportunistic way, but that their philosophy was 
likely to be more concerned with operating profits, rather than capital profits.
The relationship between quality of earnings and the type of business engaged in was another area 
in which the three categories behaved differently. For category 1 companies the quality of earnings 
appeared paramount. Such companies typically would only engage in lines of business with high quality 
earnings, if the quality of earnings dropped to an unacceptable level the category 1 company was likely 
to drop that particular line of business. Given the earlier comments about strategic flexibility it was 
not surprising to find that potential problems were identified quite early, and alternative lines of 
business were examined on a regular basis. Category 2 and 3 companies were generally more 
restricted to a smaller range of current and potential activities, and typically had to accept lower 
quality earnings. This difference is fundamental, and needs to be clearly recognised in considering 
attitudes and approaches to investment decisions.
2 .3  A re a s  o f  A c t iv i t y  w ith in  Shipping
The major areas of activity within shipping, sub-divided by category, are shown in table 25.
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This table reinforces many of the comments made in the previous section. Only the largest companies 
were able to undertake the massive investment needed for the major liner trades. This was also 
generally true of the specialist trades, with a small number of notable exceptions. Problems of ease of 
entry and overtonnaging had caused many category 1 companies to withdraw from the bulk trades, 
since the quality of earnings was thus perceived to be low. Interestingly, the trend in UK category 1 
companies suggests further reductions in the proportion of their activities which are shipping oriented, 
for much the same reasons. The recent spate of spin-offs In the USA reflects similar attitudes, but a 
different approach.
A rea o f  A c t iv i ty  
w ith in  Shipping
Category 1 C ategory 2 C ategory 3
Liner Trades Substantial number Reasonable number 
but smaller scale
Very few
Bulk Trades Very few Majority Almost all
Specialist Trades Reasonable number Very few None
>
Table 25 Areas of activity -  by category
2.4 C o rp o ra te  P lann ing
The nature and content of the Corporate Planning Systems found in the study reflected the 
philosophies, strategies and areas of activity. A summary of the approach is shown in table 26.
Corporate Planning Category 1 Category 2 Category 3








Virtually all Some Very few
Analysis of applications 
to shipping
Virtually all Some Some
Supply side analysis Only bulk companies Most Virtually all
Competitor analysis Virtually all 
(except bulk)
Very few 
(only those not 
in bulk trades)
Virtually none
Analysis of own company data Some Virtually none Virtually none
Table 26 Corporate planning and related analysis
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For category 1 companies it  is clear that greater complexity of the business activities, together 
with a desire for high quality earnings, caused such companies to develop fairly sophisticated planning 
systems, typically covering periods of five years or so. Plans were usually based around the three 
main financial statements. They almost invariably included cash flow or debt service figures. A five 
year planning period was generally considered to be long enough to cover most important strategic, 
market and operational issues, yet not so long as to unduly reduce confidence in the figures being used. 
While the planning process was undoubtedly a positive process, searching out regular earnings, 
considerable emphasis was also placed on the negative aspects, namely the early identification of 
potential problems, and concern with downside risk and the avoidance of shocks. These category 1 
planning systems generally included detailed analysis of macro-economic factors, applications of 
economic trends and figures to the shipping industry (basically demand analysis), supply side analysis, 
competitor analysis, and an analysis of past and present in-company data. Figure 26 is slightly 
misleading with regard to supply side analysis for category 1 companies. Virtually all bulk operators 
in category 1 did a detailed supply side analysis, on a global basis, for particular types of ships (or 
substitutes). For the liner companies and specialist companies the emphasis moved to a detailed 
competitor analysis. However, implicit in such an analysis were supply considerations. Overall, it  is 
clear that, for category 1 companies the Corporate Planning Systems provided a firm basis for all 
strategic decisions, and for subsequent project or individual decisions. Projects were considered in an 
overall strategic context very early on in the planning stage. Precisely when decisions to invest were 
made was thus difficult to ascertain. Subsequent project analysis in later stages may merely confirm 
or rubber stamp earlier "in principle" decisions which had been made along strategic lines.
Few formal or sophisticated planning systems were found to exist in companies in categories 2 or 
3. Only three of the category 2 companies had formalised systems, although another four had conducted 
significant one-off strategic analyses in recent years, prior to major investment or disinvestment 
decisions. Two category 3 companies had something approaching a formal plan, while another two 
adopted informal systems along similar lines. The range of strategies and activities open to category 2 
and 3 companies was generally much smaller than that of category 1 companies, and the need for 
planning was perceived to be rather less. Current difficulties in the shipping markets were causing 
some companies to concentrate more on short term considerations to do with survival than with longer
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term planning. A significant number of companies, particularly in category 3, also expressed the view 
that formal planning was not consistent with their way of doing business, i.e. careful use of the sale and 
purchase markets. In general the reasons for the difference in approach to planning systems between 
category 1 and the other two categories could be attributable to resources, forecasting difficulties, the 
type of business activity in which the companies engage, and differences in philosophy with regard to 
the way of carrying out their business.
For most category 2 and 3 companies detailed economic analysis was thus rare, although 
attempts to ascertain likely demand levels for shipping services, particularly relating to different 
types of vessel, were more common. Detailed supply side analysis, on the other hand, was common, 
and often formed one of the most important aspects of the decision. Competitor analysis was very 
rare. The main reason for this was that most such companies were involved in the bulk trades, where
global figures for demand and supply were seen as the most important factors, since virtually all bulk
operators were seen as potential competitors, and market entry and exit was relatively easy. This 
must be compared with the rather more oligopolistic nature of the liner industry and other specialist 
trades. It also needs to be recognised that since few category 2 or 3 companies chose to afford large 
planning departments, reliance for obtaining market information was placed on such things as press 
articles, brokers reports, and related information.
The absence of formal planning systems for most category 2 and 3 companies should not be seen 
as an indication of a lack of awareness about the market in which owners were operating. In general it 
must be said that most companies kept reasonably well aware of market conditions, or any other 
factors which might affect their current or potential activities. They were thus usually fairly well 
informed on such things as:
(i) market trends in terms of freight rates, demand levels, charter prices
(ii) supply available and on order
(iii) political factors relating to particular trades
In addition, a considerable amount of detailed thinking appeared to go on, albeit on an informal (or even 
implicit) basis, with regard to such things as the type of vessels to be used, chartering policy, and 
financial policy, particularly the ability to service debt. Hence, while the degree of “planning” was 
somewhat limited for category 2 and 3 companies, a fairly high degree of market awareness was found 
to exist, together with a certain amount of strategic thinking. This will be discussed in more detail in
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the next section.
2 .5  P r o te c t  A p p ra is a l
This study had, as one of its aims, the ascertainment of the extent and nature of use of the 
various appraisal methods put forward in finance theory. While the detailed questioning on appraisal 
methods revealed a substantial use of these techniques, the study revealed that the investment and 
financing 'decision” was in reality a multi-stage decision process, in which the traditional techniques 
played a relatively minor role. These findings are consistent with the work of writers such as King 
(1975) and Pinches (1982), referred to earlier on page 71.
The major findings of the study with regard to project appraisal are summarised in table 27.
Project Appraisal Category 1 Catagory 2
" " 1 > 
Catagory 3
Analysis o f system or fleet
Analysis of individual vessels
Project appraisal techniques
-  Payback
- Accounting rate of return
for individual projects
- Accounting rate of return
effect on overall rate
-  Net present value
-  Internal rate of return
-  Break-even freight rates
Analysis of effect of project 
on overall results'
Analysis of effect on overall 
liquidity
Clear understanding of 
debt service committments
Virtually all 
with exception of 
bulk companies








































Table 27 Project appraisal methods -  by category
This table highlights a number of important points, which will be dealt with below or in later 
sections. The most important factors were as follows:
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(i) In a substantial number of companies "projects'* related to some kind of system or fleet concept, 
rather than to individual vessels.
(ii) The traditional appraisal techniques appeared not to be used consistently or uniformly.
(iii) Substantial differences in approach arose between:
(a) large and small companies
(b) companies involved in the liner trades and the bulk trade.
(iv) The analysis of the effect of individual projects on corporate figures was an important part of 
the appraisal.
(v) The appraisal techniques used were set in the context of a background philosophy or approach to 
business, and frequently, a detailed set of supporting information and planning.
Most larger companies and virtually all companies involved in the liner trades, (i.e. category 1
and some category 2 companies), adopted a "system* or "fleet" approach to investment. Sometimes
such things as entry into a consortium might be regarded as a project. Where a fleet or system concept 
was in use it was clear that the strategic considerations had usually been taken into account at the 
planning stage, and decisions taken accordingly, on an overall basis. At some stage detailed project 
figures would typically be run through, but the major decision to commit resources to a particular fleet 
concept had already been made, after due consideration of ail the strategic factors, at the planning 
stage. Where comprehensive planning systems were found to be in operation, most new ventures could 
be seen to have "grown out" of the plan. Occasionally single projects, or other opportunities, arose 
which had not been identified within the normal planning system. The analysis of projects of this type 
was inevitably more ad hoc in nature, but strategic factors were given considerable attention, at the 
same time as individual project figures were being calculated. Clearly then, at whatever stage projects 
were introduced in these large or liner companies, strategic considerations were given considerable 
attention. For projects dealt with within the normal planning systems, detailed project analysis 
frequently took place after the broad strategic considerations had been discussed and established. 
Under such circumstances it becomes relatively easy to attach greater importance to this latter phase 
than is actually justified.
Virtually all of the smaller companies, and companies operating in the bulk trades (i.e. mostly 
category 2 and 3, and a small number of category I companies) appraised projects on an individual 
basis. Once again, however, a certain amount of strategic analysis went on either prior to. or during.
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the decision making process. As was pointed out in the preceedmg section, most category 2 and 3 
companies analysed their markets In some degree, although the level of sophistication was generally 
less than that of the category 1 companies. Undoubtedly most of these companies had a clear view of 
the current and anticipated supply/demand relationship for particular types of vessel, together with 
freight rates and operating costs. As has already been pointed out, however, virtually no competitor 
analysis was carried out, principally because of the nature of the bulk markets. The emphasis was 
generally on obtaining ships which would provide some kind of competitive advantage, through such 
things as being in short supply, lower cost, flexible operations, etc. Indeed, a significant part of the 
analysis for most category 2 companies in the bulk trades related to ship characteristics, and the 
search for the “right" ship. For category 3 bulk companies the analysis concentrated on a detailed 
study of the market with a view to identifying opportune moments for buying and selling ships and with 
identifying potential shortages in the market.
The use of the traditional appraisal techniques varied across categories. Detailed forecasts of 
costs and revenues, a necessary part of the appraisal process for most of the techniques, occurred 
unevenly, as is evidenced by Table 28. This table shows the number of companies making forecasts of 
costs, revenues and disposal values, and the period for which forecasts of costs were made.






Period of forecast Costs Revenues Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
None 0 1 0 6 0 7
1 -  2 years 0 0 8 3 0 0
3 - 5  years 2 1 3 2 2 1
5 - 1 0  years 1 1 3 1 2 2
Over 10 years 14 14 4 3 1 0
Unspecified 1 1 0 3 2 1
Other -  Various to life 1 1 0 0 0 0
Current figures known but 0 0 0 0 5 1
no forecasts done
Disposal values 9 1 3 V
Table 28. Project figures forecast
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it is clear from this table that category 1 companies appeared to consistently adopt processes 
which would permit the use of the traditional techniques. The position with regard to the other two 
categories is less encouraging. Rather more than half of the category 2 and 3 companies would have 
found it difficult to use the traditional appraisal techniques, even had they wanted to, without 
reasonable cash flow forecasts.









No. 93 No. 93 No. 95 No. 93
Payback 11 58 4 24 7 58 22 46
ARR for individual 
projects
7 37 4 24 5 42 16 33
NPV 9 47 5 29 3 25 17 35
IRR 14 74 6 35 3 25 23 48
Use of at least one 
discounting method
16 84 7 41 3 25 26 54
Table 29 Use of specific techniques
Table 29 summarises the use of specific techniques across the categories. It indicates the 
number of companies in each category using the traditional methods, together with the percentage for 
each category. As has already been implied, these results do not suggest that the traditional techniques 
form a particularly important part of the decision process, other than possibly in category I . The 
proportion of category 1 companies using at least one of the discounting methods was high, at 84X. As 
can be seen from the table. IRR was found to be the more popular of the two discounting methods, 
principally because of problems of choosing an appropriate discount rate. The use of discounting 
techniques was low in both category 2 and 3. In passing it should be noted that the figures included 
above for category 3 discounting techniques were lowered from the original answers received, after 
subsequent questioning displayed either inconsistency, or that the techniques were not used regularly. 
Indeed, considerable confusion was revealed in many companies in the study, not merely category 3 
companies, over the choice of an appropriate discount rate. This point will be picked up in more detail in 
the next section.
The use of multiple methods of appraisal was fairly common, as can be seen from table 30.
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No. Cum S3 No. Cum 95 No. Cum S3 No. CumS3
Four methods 2 10 1 6 3 25 6 13
Three methods 7 47 3 24 1 33 11 35
Two methods 4 63 2 35 2 50 8 52
One method 4 89 2 47 3 75 9 71
None of the traditional 
methods
1 9 3 13
Unclear 1 1
Table 30 Multiple use of appraisal techniques
This table reinforces the view that individual appraisal techniques were given relatively limited 
weight, but that decision making was a multi-stage, multi-criteria, process. The table also indicates 
the relative extent to which the traditional techniques were used in the category 1 companies, as 
compared with the other two categories.
Where discounting techniques were used it is interesting to note that the figures used often 
included financing aspects of the decision. Table 31 sets out the basis of the discounting process used 
across the categories. In passing, it  is worth noting that in a number of cases where payback was used, 
the figures used in the calculation were also inclusive of debt finance.
Basis of discounting Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Total
Operating flows only 8 0 1 9
Operating flows and 
financing flows
6 7 2 15
Both calculations 2 0 0 2
Total 16 7 3 26
A
Table 31 Basis of discounting -  by category
A further appraisal method used fairly extensively was the calculation of break even rates. A 
total of 19 companies calculated break even rates for new ventures, 4 from category 1. 8 from 
category 2. and 7 from category 3. Of this number, all but one were involved in the bulk trades. One 
liner company emphasised the importance of knowledge of break-even utilisation rates. Three other
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category 1 companies emphasised careful examination of the cost/revenue relationships as an 
important criterion for the appraisal of new projects. These latter figures were surprisingly low. and 
are almost certainly misleading. As will be seen from the next section, considerable use was made of 
sensitivity analysis by the category 1 companies. The use of such techniques enable a better picture of 
project risk to be built up than a single break-even figure, and give an indication of earnings at different 
freight or utilisation rates. Implicit in such an approach is a clear understanding of break-even levels, 
and cost/revenue relationships at different levels of utilisation. Overall an examination of the 
cost/revenue relationship under differing assumptions appears to be an important part of the appraisal 
process. Other than the use of required freight rates, very little use appeared to be made of the 
industry specific techniques, such as the minimum average annual cost method and others outlined in 
chapter 3.
A further important part of the appraisal process relates to the impact of projects on overall 
corporate figures. Virtually all category 1 companies had formal corporate planning systems, so that 
new projects were automatically fed into the corporate figures, and their impact assessed. A 
philosophy of searching for high quality earnings meant that any project with a significant unfavourable 
impact on corporate earnings quality was likely to be rejected. Hence, while only a small number of 
category 1 companies specifically identified the examination of project earnings profiles as an 
important part of the appraisal process, there is little doubt that the impact on corporate figures was 
an important part of the appraisal process.
Fewer of the category 2 and 3 companies placed as much emphasis on the analysis of the effect of 
individual projects on corporate figures. This was partly attributable to lower concerns with the 
quality of earnings, partly to the greater emphasis on individual projects. However, considerable 
importance was attached to the analysis of liquidity risk. Thirteen of the category 2 companies and nine 
of the category 3 companies analysed debt service commitments and potential liquidity problems for 
several years ahead. In most cases this analysis was corporate, rather than project oriented. The 
main aim of the analysis was to ensure that adequate liquidity would exist to see the companies through 
a period of lean years. Indeed, in the relatively few cases where detailed liquidity analyses did not take 
place the reason was typically either that new ventures were secure and self liquidating (i.e. backed by 
secure charters), or considerable liquid reserves were already available.
Overall, consideration of the above comments, and those of the previous section on corporate
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planning, make it dear that the traditional techniques do not play a major role in decision making. For 
category 1 companies they appear to representa small, but necessary, stage in the analysis. For the 
other companies the evidence suggests that their role is minor, with decisions frequently being made 
without the use of any of the standard techniques. The importance of the philosophies behind the 
business, the lines of business, the nature and detail of the planning systems (or associated economic 
and market analysis) all provide inputs to the decision making process. The traditional appraisal 
techniques may. indeed, do in many companies, form part of the overall analysis, but the over-riding 
importance of the other factors needs to be recognised. Equally important, and in many cases more 
important, were the overall implications of projects on corporate figures, especially liquidity, and a 
clear understanding of cost/revenue relationships.
2 .6  R isk
Questions on attitudes to risk and methods of dealing with it  yielded fairly dear answers, with 
substantial differences being found across the three categories. Table 32 summarises the main features 
identified.
Risk in Investment Decisions Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Analysis of Corporate risk Virtually all Few Few
Very broad consideration of risk Few Most Reasonable
number
Analysis of detailed project risk Some Few Virtually none
Analysis of liquidity risk Virtually all 
as part of 
corporate plan
Virtually all Virtually all
Use of sensitivity analysis Most Some Some
Use of other analytical approaches 
to risk
Few Virtually none Virtually none
Avoidance of currency risk Most Virtually all 
UK companies
Some
Table 32. Risk in Investment Decisions
The first, and perhaps most important, point to note is that, in general, risk analysis tended to 
relate more to corporate risk than to project risk. For category 1 companies this analysis tended to 
cover two areas:
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(I) Business risk -  relating to a search for a balanced diversity of interests, and the maintenance of 
high quality earnings.
(ii) Corporate financial risk -  relating to the ability to service debt, raise further debt, and cover 
operating costs.
A regular review and analysis of business risk, in terms of continued high quality earnings, was 
found to occur in virtually all category 1 companies. This was manifested in the search for a balanced 
set of diversified activities, with a fairly continuous process of eliminating areas of business with 
potential problems, and introducing further areas of business with the potential of high quality earnings 
for some time. Category 1 companies did not like shocks, and this overall approach to business risk is 
completely consistent with the earlier sections on philosophies and strategies, and areas of activity. 
Few category 2 or 3 companies were able to take the same approach, since their ability to diversify 
was much less. They were inevitably much more locked into particular industries. Their approach to 
risk was somewhat more philosophical, and was generally restricted to broad considerations in terms 
of markets, politics and related shipping activities.
Much more commonality of approach was found with regard to the analysis of corporate financial 
risk. Virtually all companies in the study analysed liquidity and potential liquidity problems in detail. 
Category 1 companies typically did this as part of their corporate planning system. Host of the other 
companies undertook fairly detailed analyses of liquidity either on a regular basis, or whenever a 
substantial Investment decision was being considered. It Is of interest to note that no cases were found 
of any attempts to estimate costs of a possible bankruptcy. Rather the approach was one of attempting 
to ensure that the liquidity position was strong enough to carry the companies through a series of 
adverse events. If liquidity was not considered high enough, investments were typically not proceeded 
with. Overall the aim of this kind of corporate risk analysis appears to have been the identification of 
the kind of circumstances which might pose problems for the company over the next few years or so, in 
terms of markets, profitability and liquidity. For category 1 companies risk analysis was an essential 
and integrated part of the corporate planning system. For category 2 and 3 companies greater emphasis 
was typically placed on the use of risk reduction techniques with regard to their business activities 
(e.g. purchase of general purpose ships, purchase at bottom of market etc.). and detailed analyses of the 
corporate financial risk.
The results of this study with regard to the analysis of individual project risk are perhaps more
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surprising. A small number of companies, mainly in category 1, made attempts to evaluate project 
risk. Elsewhere, detailed project risk evaluation was extremely rare. Quantitative and analytical 
approaches to risk (other than sensitivity analysis) were seldom identified. Clear reasons for the lack 
of such analysis were seldom given, but general comments suggested that difficulties of forecasting, 
and the danger of a kind of pseudo-accuracy being attached to such calculations, were the two most 
important factors. For the smaller companies lack of resources and differing levels of expertise were 
also important. Clearly reasons such as these have some validity. Nevertheless, it is surprising, and 
not a little disconcerting, to find that well documented techniques of project risk analysis appear to play 
little part in the overall analysis. Even if the argument is accepted that risk relates principally to the 
corporation, it  would still appear useful to also evaluate project risk. This lack of emphasis could well 
mean that quite risky projects are accepted because they have no significant risk for the corporation 
overall. Such an approach is quite valid, j f  the risk of the project is actually recognised, and 
appropriate returns are forthcoming. The impression gained from most interviews is that this latter 
point was not actually recognised. It would seem appropriate for a corporation to analyse in some detail 
both corporate and project risk, even if the former is the more important.
As has already been indicated, the only technique for analysing risk which was used widely, was 
sensitivity analysis. The greatest use of this technique was undoubtedly found in the category 1 
companies (17), but approximately one third of the companies in the other two categories (6 in 
category 2. 5 in category 3) also used it. albeit typically less formally, and covering a much smaller 
number of variables. The major advantages of sensitivity analysis over other techniques of risk 
analysis were seen as twofold:
(i) it  enabled problem situations to be clearly identified, with the result that judgements could be 
made about their likelihood, and/or preventive action (if possible) could be taken at an early stage:
(ii) it  did not require a precise judgement to be made of the likelihood of single eventualities, a factor 
which was seen as being important in a volatile market.
The most comon factors analysed were changes in utilisation rates, freight rates, operating costs, and 
interest rates. Other fairly commmon factors analysed were exchange rates, growth rates, and 
disposal values.
One final point with regard to risk which emerged was that most companies, certainly across 
category 1 and 2. preferred to avoid currency risk if  possible. Few U.S. companies identified currency
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risk as a problem. Some category 3 companies perferred to avoid it. while others had a more open 
mind.
2 .7  F inancing and C a p ita l S tru c tu re
Detailed questioning on financing and capital structure revealed the broad trends set out in table
33.
Financing Aspects Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Investment & Financing separate 
Method of Finance
Approx. half Approx. half Relatively few
-  yard credit Most Most Most of those buying new ships
-  bank loans Most Most Virtually all
-  corporate loans Reasonable
number
Very few Virtually none
-  leasing Reasonable
number
Very few Virtually none
- new equity (.other than retentions) Few Virtually none Virtually none
Financial arrangements influencing 
choice of yard
Most Most Most -  where 
new building
Maximum amount borrowed Approx. 2 /3 Majority Some
Period of loans
- over 10 years Virtually all Some Very few
- 5 -  10 years Few Most Most
- under 5 years Virtually none Very few Few
Limit to total amount of debt 
taken up
Most Minority Majority
Target debt/equity ratio Very few Very few Virtually none
Table 33 Financing aspects of investment decisions
Interestingly, the separation of the investment and financing aspects of capital acquisitions was 
not found to be as clear cut in practice as it  is in theory, even for category 1 companies. In practice 
much closer links were found to exist between the two, with financing being seen as an important part 
of the decision whether or not to invest. Even where separation of the two existed, the main reasons 
for the separation often appeared to be bureaucratic.
Considerable confusion was identified with regard to this debate and the choice of discount rate, 
and in a surprisingly large number of cases clear misunderstandings were found to exist. Perhaps the .
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most common was the discounting of cash flows including the raising and servicing of debt by a discount 
rate reflecting the cost of borrowing. This will be examined in more detail in section 2A of the next 
chapter.
Concerns with financing generally related to all or some of the following:
(i) the availability of finance for new projects
(ii) whether the use of subsidised finance could lead to larger gains
(iii) whether the decision would be.different under alternative financing packages
(iv) whether the project would pose any problems in terms of bond rating, share price, liquidity or
long term survival.
Substantial differences were found to exist across the three categories with regard to the 
finance actually used for vessel acquisition. Yard credit was used wherever possible, but few category 
3 companies were in the business of acquiring new vessels, so the relative importance of yard credit 
was less for category 3 companies. Dank loans were used by most companies, but category 1 
companies typically used such loans for top up finance, or to stretch terms obtained from yards. By 
comparison category 3 companies used bank loans as their major source of borrowings, and financed 
much of the cost of second hand vessels from this source. Corporate loans were confined almost 
completely to category 1 companies, as were leases and new equity issues. Leasing was not generally 
used by category 2 or 3 companies principally because of the loss of flexibility which ensued. New 
equity issues were not particularly important even in category 1. and were not favoured with the other 
two categories because of the potential loss of control of the company. Most companies making 
decisions about new buildings were influenced in the choice of shipyard by the financial arrangements on 
offer.
Periods of finance were generally longer for category 1 companies, with most being able to 
obtain bank finance for periods in excess of ten years. By comparison, few category 3 companies were 
able to obtain funds for this period, with terms of 5 -  8 years being much more typical.
Another area in which differences existed between the categories was with regard to limits to 
the amount of debt taken up. Given the nature of most category 1 companies, it  was not unduly 
surprising to find that most such companies did have limits to the total amount of debt taken up. Few 
such companies had debt equity ratios (using debt/(debt + equity})in excess of 50%. and approximately 
40% of them had debt equity ratios of less than 40% in recent years. What was perhaps more
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surprising was that most category 3 companies had self imposed limits on the amount of debt taken up. 
Furthermore, while actual debt equity ratios were seldom obtained for category 3 companies, the 
responses indicated that a very conservative approach was adopted in most such companies. The main 
rationale for this again relates to the philosophies and strategies identified earlier, especially that of 
buying vessels at the bottom of the market and selling them at or near the top. Such a policy may well 
commit a company to a long period of operations with low or negative profits and unfavourable cash 
flow patterns. A sound financial basis and relatively low debt burdens were seen as essential parts of 
such a strategy. A minority of category 2 companies envisaged actual or potential limits to the total 
amount of debt taken up. This may reflect the dilemma in which many such companies found 
themselves, in trying to emulate performance of the category 1 companies, with a much lower capital 
base.
Virtually no companies in the study had any clear target debt/equity ratios. Indeed, for many 
category 2 and 3 companies it was clear that debt equity ratios had changed quite significantly from 
year to year, as the result of different investment decisions and changing market conditions. Overall, 
capital structure appeared to be the result of a variety of factors, rather than a positive decision 
variable. The most important factors in determining or influencing capital structure appeared to be the 
following:
(i) For public companies, the perceived effect of capital structure, and changes therein, on share 
price. Nevertheless, it is clear that most companies felt that provided they operated within broadly 
acceptable bands, that particular capital structures, or changes therein, had little impact on share 
price.
(ii) The relationship between new investment opportunities and the availability of internal funds. For 
category 1 companies, particularly the larger companies, self financing ratios were high, earnings 
quality was high, and dividend payout ratios tended to be relatively low. enabling the overall levels of 
debt to be kept under control. For category 2 and 3 companies, particularly those engaged mainly in 
shipping, poor quality earnings and substantial re-investment costs tended to impose greater debt 
burdens. Few category 1 companies needed to borrow for other than expansionary projects. Companies 
in the other two categories were frequently forced to gear-up simply to replace existing assets.
(ill) The perceived effect of capital structure on bond ratings, and on the ability to finance further 
assets (or re-finance existing assets). This appeared to be more of an influence for the larger
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companies, which tended to go to the market generally for funds. For the remaining companies, capital 
structure per se did not appear to be a particularly significant factor In terms or raising farther 
finance. The availability of finance was seen to depend upon the quality of future earnings and the 
adequacy of the security which could be given to lenders.
Civ> The relationship between profitability and debt service requirements, with interest cover 
sometimes being used as an Imperfect surrogate (at least in category 1 companies). Considerable 
emphasis was placed on this particular aspect, particularly for companies with large investments in 
shipping, where debt service requirements are often substantial. For companies which were better 
diversified, and which had higher quality earnings, the concerns were generally less pressing. For 
category 2 and 3, which were typically more Involved In shipping activities, the concerns were more 
with the relationship between profitability and related cash flow, together with liquid reserves, and 
debt service requirements. In considering appropriate levels of debt, ft became dear that, beside the 
level of debt itself, the repayment profile of debt, and the ability to re-finance debt, were undoubtedly 
Important. Precise data were seldom obtained on repayment profiles from any companies other than 
those of category 1. However, where such profiles were obtained, it became clear that considerable 
variations existed, with companies with extensive shipping interests generally having less favourable 
profiles than oil majors or diversified conglomerates. The debt service commitments associated with 
relatively short term repayment profiles were greater than those with longer term profiles. This In 
turn imposed greater pressure on the relationship between profitability and debt service ability, and 
makes clear that repayment profiles and ability to re-flnance debt are also Important aspects of the 
capital structure decisions.
(v) The nature of the assets being funded. The point has already been made that loans were only 
made if adequate security existed. Security rests partly in good cash flow patterns, but ultimately, in 
the event of a default, on the current market value of the corporate assets, either on a secured or a 
general basis. Certain assets, such as ships, are fairly easy to sell, whereas others, e.g. production 
equipment/facilities, are not. Inevitably, therefore, assets such as shipping and property are likely to 
sustain higher levels of gearing than many other types of asset, though clear limits exist to the amount 
of effective security provided even by such assets.
(vi) Market fashion and changing economic conditions. Several category 1 companies implied that the 
financial markets now had different attitudes towards gearing levels to those which existed several
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years ago. Certainly there appeared to exist in some of these companies a belief that the market is now 
much less happy with high gearing levels than it once was. Whether this perceived change is the result 
of changes in market fashion, or simply a response to more volatile and difficult economic conditions, is 
unclear. The possibility of distinct changes in market perceptions is nevertheless a factor to which 
most category 1 companies needed to pay attention. Indeed, the possibility of changing economic 
conditions affecting desired capital structure clearly existed for all such companies, not simply those of 
category 1. Nevertheless, the high quality earnings associated with category 1 companies appeared 
generally to lead to more stable capital structures over time. For companies in category 2 and 3. far 
greater volatility appeared to exist, since the range of business activities was much smaller. Capital 
structure ratios which might have been perfectly sustainable for a shipping company in the 1960s and 
much of the 1970s are now likely to leave such a company in an extremely difficult position. The more 
exposed a company is to single lines of business the greater the variation is likely to be in capital 
structure ratios, as economic conditions change.
2 3  Overall Summary
The results of this study indicate that, within the shipping industry, the investment and financing 
decision is the result of a complex process. Decisions appear to have been reached as a result of a 
multi-stage, multi-criteria evaluation process, with particular decisions reflecting the emphasis within 
particular companies. Nevertheless, broadly similar patterns of behaviour were identified for certain 
groups or categories of company, reflecting such things as size and the nature of activities in which 
these companies were involved. Considerable differences in approach were found across the different 
categories, as has already been pointed out. but the following, factors appear to have influenced the 
investment/and financing behaviour of most companies in the study.
(i) Broad objectives to do with profitability generally existed with substantial differences being 
found in attitudes towards earnings quality and dividends across the different categories. Share price 
concerns, but not share price maximisation, existed to some extent, across most public companies. In 
certain categories personal or family objectives were important. Certain companies had a short term 
objective of survival, because of particular current difficulties.
(ii) A number of underlying philosophies were found, with considerable differences being found 
across the three categories. The most important of these related to quality of earnings, and the range
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and type of activities engaged in. Considerable emphasis was placed on the preservation of flexibility, 
again with differences being found in the implementation of this idea across the categories.
(iii) The process of data collection and analysis was generally complex, with considerable emphasis 
being placed on:
(a) the collection and analysis of economic and market data, though the amounts of 
information, and its emphasis, varied considerably by category and type of activity. Information of 
this type was typically associated with a considerable amount of strategic evaluation or re-evaluation 
of the types and range of activities to be pursued in the future;
(b) a certain amount of detailed forecasting of costs, revenues and associated cash nows. 
Again considerable differences in the extent to which forecasts were made, and the confidence with 
which they were viewed, were found across the categories;
(c) a certain amount of use of the traditional techniques of appraisal. Again, differences in 
use arose across the categories. In general, however, the importance attached to such techniques was 
low, and they represented only a small part of the total decision making process;
(d) a certain amount of use of other techniques of appraisal, notably techniques such as break 
even analysis, sensitivity analysis, and others concerned with the cost/revenue relationship;
(e) the evaluation or the impact of individual projects on corporate figures. Again, a certain
amount of variation by category was found, but concerns with corporate liquidity and debt service were 
almost universal;
(f) a certain amount of risk evaluation, generally related to diversity of interests and/or
flexibility of operations, and corporate liquidity risk. Little project risk analysis was undertaken.
(iv) Considerable concerns existed with regard to the funding of investments. The separation of the 
investment and financing decisions was seldom clear cut. Concern with capital structure targets per se 
was virtually nil. although limits to the amount of debt were common. Capital structure was seen as 
being dependent on the following factors.
(a) the perceived effect of capital structure on share price
(b) the relationship between investment opportunities and availability of internal funds
(c) the perceived effect of capital structure on bond ratings
(d) the relationship between profitability and debt service
(e) the nature of the assets being funded
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(f) market fashion and changing economic conditions.
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Chapter 12
Theoretical Implications of the Study 
_L In tro d u c tio n  and A im s  o f th e  C h a p te r
This chapter aims to relate the findings of this study to the literature reviews of Chapters 3 and 
A. In particular it aims to:
(i) assess the implications of this study for the theory of finance, and its associated criticisms, 
outlined in Chapter 3;
tii) suggest the importance of establishing links between the theory of finance and that relating to 
corporate strategy, and to identify areas of linkage and overlap between these two areas;
(iii) outline a descriptive model of the way in which investment and financing decisions are made in 
the shipping industry, with different approaches being identified for different categories of company or 
types of activity.
The chapter will conclude with the identification of a number of limitations of this study, and 
suggestions for future research. Where appropriate, comparisons will be made throughout the chapter 
of the findings of this study and other empirical studies in this area, previously summarised in Chapters 
3 and A.
Perhaps the most important limitation of this study, which needs to be recognised in order to put 
the assessment of finance theory into a proper context, is that this work concentrates on investment 
and financing decisions by managers and owners working within a business organisation, with an 
emphasis on investment in real assets. The financial markets and asociated securities (other than 
banks) were not included specifically within the study, and the behaviour of investors, whether on a 
positive or a normative basis, was not examined. The emphasis is thus on managerial aspects of 
investment and financing decisions within firms. Even here, further limitations must be recognised. 
The approach to questioning used emphasised the rational aspects of planning and finance. No systematic
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attempt was made to incorporate motivational, behavioural or political aspects of decision making in the 
survey, though in some cases information on these aspects emerged from the discussions. Given the 
criticisms of rational planning which were identified in chapter A, this omission could be seen as a 
serious limitation of the study. However, the study does enable us to identify the kinds of approach 
used in practice, the processes gone through by managers in reaching decisions, the range of economic 
and financial inputs into the decision making process and the evaluation methods of most significance in 
making decisions. Clearly the decision making process is set in the context of world wide markets for 
both the services supplied and demanded, and the finance available. As such it should reflect the 
influence of investors. An approach along these lines enables us to establish the perceived relevance of 
finance theory in the situations described, and to identify alternative priorities and approaches adopted 
by managers. If the perceived relevance is small, then serious questions need to be asked either about 
the continued emphasis of this approach in the teaching of, and literature on. the subject, or about the 
education and training given to most managers. If the perceived relevance is of some substance, this 
study will have served to provide some empirical support for the theory, at least in relation to a 
specific industry. In fact it is the former which appears to be true. This has a number of potential 
implications, and suggests the need for some changes of emphasis within the area of finance; greater 
integration of ideas from other theories and from practice; the development of appropriate alternative 
theories or models of behaviour; and further research. These implications are explored further in 
this chapter.
Z  Assessment o f Finance T h eo ry  
2J. Objectives
Finance theory is based on an assumed objective of share price maximisation. This has the 
considerable advantage of providing a unique theoretical objective, against which all finance decisions 
can be analysed in a systematic way. Whether this happens is more doubtful. Detailed questions were 
thus asked of all companies in the study about the extent to which the objective of share price 
maximisation existed. The findings are clear. In the public companies, concerns with share price or
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shareholder relations were real, particularly with regard to share price as an offensive or defensive 
factor in takeovers. It might, therefore, be argued that share price concerns act as a constraint on 
decisions. While this may be true, very few examples were found of situations where such 
considerations had seriously affected a decision. Share price maximisation did not appear to be viewed 
by managers as an operational objective. As indicated in chapter 11, concerns with share price were 
generally dealt with by a concentration on high quality earnings and the achievement of a balanced 
diversity of interests. Findings such as this are consistent with both the American studies referred to 
in chapter 3 (Page 73) and other approaches e.g. the stakeholder approach, referred to in chapter 4, 
namely, that managers have multiple goals and that share price maximisation is frequently considered 
to be less important than other goals. Possible reasons for this appear to relate principally to 
problems of application, in that decision makers were clearly not confident either of their ability to 
forecast correctly in a volatile market, or that the market would actually convert the available 
information into an appropriate share price. A great deal of uncertainty and cynicism existed with 
regard to the actual process of share price determination. Much of this cynicism echoed the kind of 
criticisms made by writers such as Franke (1981), and Derkinderen and Crum (1981), summarised on 
pages 59 and 60. Under such conditions the concentration on quality earnings could enable managers to 
be philosophical about the share price, which could then be assumed to take care of itself. In fact, as 
has been seen, other strategic and financing considerations were also seen as being relevant, but share 
price remains the result, rather than the target. The situation in the private companies was even 
clearer than for the public companies, with share price concerns, let alone ideas on share price 
maximisation, being almost non-existent.
Whether decision makers should take such an approach is a different issue. Supporters of finance 
theory would no doubt argue that the objective of share price maximisation should be pursued since only 
in this way can decisions be made which reflect the optimal use of economic resources. The fact 
remains, however, that share price maximisation was not found to be an appropriate or operational 
objective in this study. In passing, it is worth noting that a number of examples were found where the 
size and bureaucracy of some of the category 1 companies posed effective barriers, to the 
implementation of traditional theory, even had such companies wished to adopt the traditional approach, 
(e.g. the use of divisionally set targets).
Reference has already been made to the work of Quinn (1977), and Carter (1981), on reasons
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why managers do not use the theoretical models, or formally set and announce objectives or targets. 
Some support for these views was found in this study, in that many companies were found to have 
strong reservations about the use of such objectives and targets. The main reasons were related to the 
volatility of the industry, and its associated forecasting difficulties, which made forecasts and targets 
rather risky ventures, since they were almost certain to be wrong. Confidentiality of decision making 
also tended to mitigate against the use of detailed and formal targets. Having said this, it must be 
emphasised that the above reservations tended to "emerge" from the discussions with a number of 
companies, and were not the result of formal or structured questioning. Nonetheless, it is interesting 
to note that the reasons given above are consistent with those provided by Quinn and Carter. Further 
research on this particular area appears to be potentially useful.
The findings of this study are also consistent with many of the other criticisms of finance made 
in Chapter 3. Perhaps the most notable in the area of objectives are the works of Cordon (1981), 
Spronk (1981), Zeleny (1981) and Schmidt (1981). Cordons views on the importance of objectives to 
do with profitability and security, and the consequent effect on strategies, particularly diversification, 
were found to have considerable empirical support. Nevertheless, the concerns with security which 
were identified were not all related to capital structure per se. implying an even broader set of 
objectives than was suggested by Cordon. The works of Zeleny and Spronk placed considerable 
emphasis on multiple goals and multiple criteria. The evidence provided by this study is strongly 
supportive or this emphasis, although both goals and criteria were frequently implicit. Whether the use 
of interactive multiple goal programming, suggested by Spronk, is appropriate, is far less clear. No 
evidence was found of the actual use of such an approach. Indeed, the evidence on the complexity of 
decision making in a volatile environment suggests that the information requirements of such an 
approach are too great for it to be practical. Nevertheless, greater emphasis on modelling would 
probably enable more criteria to be formally incorporated into the decision making process. Zeleny also 
discussed the concepts of "bounded ra tio n a lity "  and "bounded optim ality". No direct 
assessment of these was undertaken. Nevertheless, the findings on philosophies and strategies, 
discussed in more detail below, suggest that some kind of parameters or bounds do frequently exist, 
providing a framework within which decisions can be made. The views of Schmidt, on the need to 
recognise flexibility of objectives, were also found to have some measure of support in this study, 
principally in terms of certain companies being forced to take a short run approach to problems, with
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associated short run objectives such as survival. However, too much should not be made or this. In 
many cases, while multiple objectives were found, a fairly high degree of continuity of such objectives 
appeared to exist over time. Indeed, while the ideas of Schmidt have much in common with the findings 
of this study, they appear to be more important in the area of philosophies and strategies than in the 
area of objectives.
Chapter 3 identified a number of criticisms of finance made by Donaldson (1963: 1969: 1985) 
and Hull (1982). This study provides implicit support for many of the ideas expressed by these writers 
on the differing goals of shareholders and managers. Particular differences supported by this study 
include: the desire (particularly strong in the smaller companies) to continue with the existing business 
and to expand if  possible; concern with the company's total risk, and not merely systematic risk 
(exemplified by such things as the concern with diversification and acquisitions displayed by the 
category 1 companies); and the aversion to downside risk (which was displayed fairly consistently 
throughout the study). Donaldson also developed ideas on flexibility and financial mobility, based on 
managers desire for self-sufficiency. These ideas also have much in common with the findings of this 
particular study, and will be discussed in more detail in later sections.
Overall, it is clear that a single objective of share price maximisation does not provide a 
realistic base for a descriptive theory or model of investment and financing decisions in the shipping 
industry. This is not to deny the validity of such an objective for a normative theory based upon an 
assumed efficient market. Indeed, it is interesting to note that concerns with share 
price/shareholders, high quality earnings and regular dividends, were strongest in the category 1 
companies. It may reasonably be inferred from this that such companies do give broad consideration to 
the logic of the financial markets, so as to ensure the maintenance of an appropriate relationship with 
these markets. Provided that the relationship is satisfactory, share price concerns will be small, and 
their operational significance will be low. In the final analysis, however, a reasonably efficient capital 
market will establish some kind of norm for the relationship between risk and return. The extent to 
which companies need to concern themselves with this will depend on the extent to which they need to 
go to the market for funds. However, even if  little use is made of the financial markets a clear 
understanding of risk-return relationships should be useful in reaching decisions, since it provides a 
guide to the returns generally available for various categories of risk. This will be dealt with in more 
detail later, but the evidence of this study suggests a lack of awareness of alternative returns
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available. The normative theory of finance has been developed from a financial markets perspective, 
and assumes economic rationality. While actual behaviour may depart from this, an understanding of 
the implications of the normative theory would appear to be a necessary element in an effective 
decision making process.
7 7 Philosophies and Strategies
The findings of this study included the identification of a number of philosophies and strategies 
which appear to be important ingredients of the overall investment decision making process. These are 
very similar in nature to the 'ideologies" discussed by Brunsson (1982). referred to in Chapter A. 
Little attention has been given to such ideas in either the literature on finance theory or that on 
corporate strategy, in spite of the fact that their importance in the overall approach to decision making 
appears to be considerable.
Brunsson perceived an ideology as some knowledge, perspective and/or attitude which persists 
over time, generally shared by individuals within an organisation. The summary on philosophies and 
strategies included in Chapter 11 makes it clear that companies surveyed did consistently adopt some 
kind of automatic or implicit filtering process in terms of project acceptability. For example, a 
philosophy of investing only in projects with potentially high quality earnings has meant that few 
category 1 companies have given any serious consideration to investments in the bulk markets. Indeed, 
these companies seem unlikely to give serious consideration to any investment which is not perceived 
as capable of giving some kind of competitive advantage which can be preserved or protected for 
several years ahead. Clearly in such companies certain types of activity were effectively eliminated 
on the basis of this broad philosphy. Further examples were found of other areas of activity which 
were effectively excluded from consideration, while in some cases investments were only considered if  
they were in specific areas, or had particular characteristics. It is clear, however, from the summary 
set out in Chapter 11. that while a number of philosophies and strategies were identified, significant 
differences existed between the three categories. These differences need to be recognised in any 
consideration of the actual process of decision making.
Overall the philosophies and strategies adopted by particular companies appeared to be applied 
consistently over quite long periods, with changes only occurring infrequently, usually as a result of
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some fairly traumatic learning experience. This was particularly true of some of the category 2 
companies, and a small number of the category 1 companies, notably where changes in their traditional 
markets had led to a dramatic decline in profitability. This is consistent with the arguments of 
Brunsson, that the dominant ideology is likely to be strong under normal conditions, and to be questioned 
only during crises. It implies that the analysis and identification of past and present perceived 
philosophies and strategies is likely to provide a very good guide to future philosophies and strategies, 
other than in times of crisis. Such an analysis effectively provides a clear set of parameters for future 
projects, and effectively limits the kind of projects which will be considered. Even if  the development 
of philosophies and strategies is implicit, their importance in overall decision making is considerable. 
Finance theory, however, has virtually nothing to say on this area.
When considering the actual philosophies and strategies identified in this study several points of 
interest in relation to finance theory were identified. These related to the search for high quality 
earnings, diversification, flexibility, and the differences identified across the three categories.
Corporate mangers in category 1 companies (and certain other companies) appeared to see 
diversification as an important part of maintaining high quality earnings and reducing corporate risk. 
This is inconsistent with a CAPM approach to finance theory, which suggests that diversification is best 
left to the investor, and provides empirical support for the views of writers such as Gordon (1901). 
Donaldson (1985) and Haddams (1982). Clear limits to diversification were found to exist, however, 
principally for reasons to do with managerial control, compatability of the lines of business, business 
philosphy, and related issues.
The emphasis given to flexibility, by companies throughout the study, also poses problems for 
finance theory. Much of the theory of finance is based upon optimisation, or on achieving an appropriate 
risk/return trade-off. Typically even this trade off is seen as being the result of some kind of 
quantitative analysis. By comparison, companies in this study were much more concerned with 
managing risk in a broader and non-quantified way. with considerable emphasis being placed on the 
reduction or virtual elimination of downside risk, on keeping options open for as long as possible, and on 
developing a flexible approach to business, so as to be able to deal with problems as they arise. These 
findings are consistent with certain of the views expressed in chapter 3. dealing with criticisms of 
finance. For example, the work of Schmidt (1981) emphasised the importance of flexibility throughout 
the decision making process, while that of Derkinderen and Crum (1979) provided useful insights into
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certain aspects, particularly those relating to financial strength and flexibility, and opportunities. 
Particularly interesting is the similarity in the findings of this study with those of Donaldson (1969), 
referred to in Chapter 3 (P 69/70). Donaldson argued that the challenge to management is provided by 
substantial unexpected changes which affect operations. For these to be successfully handled there 
must be an understanding of what is happening and how to adapt, time to act, and capacity to act. In 
developing the concept of financial mobility Donaldson was effectively concentrating on the last of 
these. This concept was seen as having a number of basic elements, some of which have much in 
common with the ideas on flexibility developed in this study. Perhaps the most important aspects of 
financial mobility identified by Donaldson were the preservation of funds flow equilibrium under various 
conditions; the identification of key policies for debt and dividends; and the identification of the 
resources which might be needed if an unexpected event arose. In the current study the importance of 
financial flexibility was also widely recognised and frequently achieved. Methods of achievement 
included such things as: adequate financial resources; lines of credit; good quality earnings and good 
cash flow; conservative debt levels; well financed assets; and relatively low dividends. The similarity 
of emphasis and approach is clear. In a sense, however, this study can be seen as extending the ideas of 
Donaldson by showing how the methods of achieving financial flexibility vary across the three 
categories of company depending upon the size, philosophy and nature of the activities of the companies. 
For example. Donaldson's ideas on funds flow equilibrium appear to be implemented by many category 3 
companies by buying at the bottom of the market, borrowing conservatively, and ensuring adequate 
cash resources to survive a long period of recession. For category 1 companies a concentration on the 
achievement of high quality earnings was the preferred method. Such an option was not perceived as 
being open to many category 3 companies.
In establishing a strategy for financial mobility Donaldson also included a search process to 
identify hitherto unexpected events as soon as possible, and the development of strategies for dealing 
with unexpected events. This study suggests that companies regarded such an approach as unrealistic, 
given todays conditions of environmental complexity, and that a better approach was to develop 
strategies which are themselves flexible, so as to enable unanticipated events to be successfully dealt 
with. The concept of flexibility developed in this study, with its four constituent parts related to 
strategy, markets, operations and finance provides a somewhat broader approach than that of 
Donaldson. Approaches to financial flexibility are thus likely to be conditioned by the flexibility which
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exists with regard to strategies, markets and operations. j
In a later study (1965) Donaldson further emphasised ideas on financial self-sufficiency, with an 
emphasis on internal funding, and trade-offs being made between growth and risk. The findings of this 
study provide reinforcement for these ideas, especially for category 1 companies. Table 14 (P 251) 
shows that internal financing ratios for these companies were generally high. Table 5 (P 191) shows 
that dividends paid out typically represent a fairly low proportion of earnings (e.g. the average dividend 
payout ratio for 1981 was 34%). Donaldson also saw diversification as being consistent with the 
desire for self sufficiency. Interestingly, the highest dividend payout ratios for category 1 companies 
over the period 1978 -1982 were in two widely held companies with a major commitment to shipping, 
namely P & 0 and Ocean. Doth have since diversified to a much greater extent, with substantial 
improvements in earnings quality being achieved, and a corresponding reduction in the dividend payout 
ratios.
Chapter 3 also contained a number of criticisms or finance theory which were based upon the 
perceived increases in environmental complexity. For example. Derkinderen and Crum (1981) called 
for ‘greater consideration o f  environmentsI fee to rs ’  and pointed out that todays managers 
faced ’increased situational f lu id ity  and a multitude o f  complexities ’ . They particularly 
identified difficulties of obtaining reliable Information and making cash flow projections as problems, 
together with the identification of the potential adverse effect on the firm of bad decisions. Dertoneche 
(1981) also identified a number of areas of increased complexity. Undoubtedly this study provides 
considerable support for these views, albeit in the context of one particular industry. Particular areas 
of increased complexity which were identified were: Increased competition; governmental/political 
influences; and decreased predictability of future markets and associated cash flows. Problems such as 
these provide further impetus to the ideas of flexibility discussed above. Overall, this study suggests 
that greater consideration ought to be given in finance theory to ideas on flexibility, with the concept of 
risk being extended. While it  may be argued that financial decisions should be the result of a careful 
balancing of the risk-retum trade-off. such an approach excludes a number of the considerations of 
flexibility identified above.
One final comment is appropriate on the importance of the findings on philosophies and strategies 
for finance theory. While substantial differences were found across the three categories, considerable 
consistency of approach was identified within categories. Given the orientation of finance theory to the
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security and financial markets, it might be argued that finance theory only relates to category 1 
companies (the large public companies), plus a few category 2 companies (smaller public companies or 
large private companies). Little recognition appears to have been given in finance theory to the fairly 
fundamental differences in the approach and attitudes of the remaining companies.
2 .5  C o rp o ra te  P lann ing  S y s te m s  and S tra te g y
The discussions in this area indicated that detailed planning systems were common in the 
category 1 companies and some of the category 2 companies. For such companies the decision making 
process was long and complex, with a variety of factors being necessary parts of the process. Regular 
re-evaluation of plans appeared to be a necessary part of most systems. The precise weighting given to 
each part of the analysis was not clear, nor was the exact time at which decisions were effectively 
made. However, the weighting given, in finance theory, to the calculation of an appropriate NPVor IRR, 
does not appear to be reflected in fact.
For the remaining category 2 and category 3 companies planning systems were generally much 
less detailed, sometimes non-existent. However, even in the absence of planning systems a certain 
amount of economic and market analysis was typically undertaken, and this was generally an important 
part of the overall decision process. In practice this analysis was the first part of the project analysis, 
and tended to merge with ideas of the next section.
These findings are also consistent with many of the criticisms of finance theory made in Chapter 
3. For example, both King (1975) and Pinches (1982) saw capital budgeting theory as representing only 
a relatively small part of the decision making process. Various other criticisms of finance theory were 
identified in Chapter 3 (section 3.5) relating to the need for closer links with corporate strategy. There 
is little doubt that many of these criticisms are valid in the context of the shipping industry. 6iven the 
importance of this particular area, section 3 of this chapter deals specifically with links between 
finance and strategy. At this stage it is perhaps sufficient to note that the decision making processes 
found in practice were longer and more involved than those implied by finance theory. As such the 
theory of finance does not provide an appropriate or adequate base for understanding how the decision 
making process actually functions.
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2.4 Protect Analysis
In the findings on project analysis, several ideas stand out as having most significance for 
finance theory.
(i) The use of discounting techniques or other appraisal techniques was seen as being unlikely to 
assist in the identification of projects which were consistent with the chosen philosophy or strategy 
(e.g. the search by category 1 companies for high quality earnings over time). This is not to deny their 
role in the evaluation process, but this role represents only a small part of the process.
(ii) The emphasis on 'project analysis' found in the literature was generally misleading. "Projects" 
ranged from whole lines of business, fleet concepts, membership of consortia, single ships, or 
combinations of these. The first three were found to be particularly important for category 1 
companies. Larger projects such as these seemed generally to be likely to involve decisions being made 
on rather imprecise or uncertain quantitative information, with the result that non-quantifiable factors 
were given much greater weight than might have been expected. The strategic implications of projects 
such as these were usually paramount. The fact that projects were frequently analysed as part of a 
system, which was in turn seen as part of a diversified range of activities, provides support for 
Derkinderen and Crum (1981), in their argument (see P 60) that projects in a portfolio are not 
economically independent in the way that securities in a portfolio are. and that the traditional approach 
to securities is not necessarily valid for the corporate resource allocation decision.
(iii) The use of the traditional techniques was low. particularly outside of the category 1 companies. 
Undoubtedly some of this was due to a misunderstanding of the techniques themselves, with a 
surprisingly large number of examples being found of confused and inappropriate use of discounting 
techniques. However, the main reason for the relative lack of importance appeared to be the difficulty 
of forecasting with any degree of confidence. It might have been expected that the careful use of 
statistical techniques, and other techniques such as sensitivity analysis, would make the traditional 
techniques more useful. In fact, as has already been shown, little use was made of quantitative 
techniques for dealing with risk. Sensitivity analysis was used to identify critical points and problem 
areas, but it was also found to be a way of avoiding specific forecasts’. In many cases forecasting was 
so difficult that the emphasis was placed on the identification of critical points (e.g. break-even freight 
rates), with judgements then being made on the likelihood of such events occurring. On balance It would 
appear that the traditional appraisal techniques are viewed as being of relatively little use in dealing
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with projects or industries with forecasting difficulties. In such cases their role is likely to be small. 
This is consistent with the findings of Bertoneche (1981), referred to in Chapter 3.
(iv) Where discounting techniques were used, the internal rate of return (IRR) was generally found to 
be more popular than NPV. This is consistent with the findings of Petty and Scott (1981) (see page 75). 
It should be noted, however, that in a large proportion of cases where discounting techniques were 
used, both approaches were used. Table 29 (P 362) shows that of the 17 companies using NPV. 14 also 
used IRR, with a further 9 companies using IRR as their only discounting approach. The precise reasons 
for the preference for IRR were not clear, but the fact that it does not require the identification of a 
particular rate of discount was undoubtedly important. The considerable confusion which was found to 
exist with regard to the choice of discount rate would appear to support this reasoning. It is, of 
course, recognised that whichever method is used, a choice of hurdle rate nonetheless needs to be made. 
However, where uncertainty about the rate exists, the use of IRR is easier than the use of NPV, since a 
single calculation can be made, followed by a judgement on the acceptability of the return calculated. 
While the use of alternative discount rates in an NPV calculation should lead to the same kind of 
understanding of the implications of the project flows, the fact remains that such calculations are a 
little more involved. This does not in any sense reduce the theoretical superiority of the NPV method, 
but it does help provide some explanation as to practical reasons for the preference given to IRR. A 
second reason may be related to the fact that profitability objectives for category 1 companies (the 
largest user of discounting techniques) were often couched in terms of return on capital targets. Where 
this occurs the calculation of an IRR may well be perceived as a more appropriate way of presenting 
project returns than NPV. It is also worth noting that the circumstances in which NPV is clearly 
theoretically superior to IRR, namely, where mutually exclusive projects are being considered, where 
cash flows are non-conventional, or where capital rationing exists, do not appear to be likely to pose 
major problems for the shipping industry. Expected cash flows are unlikely to be non-conventional. The 
attitude of banks and other suppliers of finance is such that rationing is likely to be self-imposed, rather 
than market imposed. The problem of mutually exclusive projects remains, though the range of 
alternative is likely to be low, with the consequent effect that potential problems with the use of the 
IRR are likely to be recognised. The assessment of the impact of project flows on corporate figures, 
while not being theoretically as efficient as the use of NPV. seems likely to eliminate most of the 
potential problems of mutually exclusive projects.
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(v) A frequently found consideration in decisions to do with investments, was the impact of 
individual projects on corporate figures, especially those relating to debt service and liquidity. In many 
cases the effect on overall results was a more important factor in decision making than individual 
project figures. More recognition of this could be made within finance theory.
In considering the role and importance of the traditional appraisal methods a number of other 
factors need to be borne In mind. The first of these Is that clear evidence could be found of considerable 
misunderstanding and confusion over the correct use of the techniques themselves. As has already been 
pointed out. the choice of discount rate posed particular problems, since the type of cash flows included 
in the calculation has a significant bearing on the rate which is appropriate. Traditional finance theory 
suggests that financing flows should be excluded, with an assumption of 100% equity funding being 
made. Using such flows, an appropriate discount rate is argued to be the weighted average cost of 
capital. Even this Is only correct ir new projects are in the same risk category as existing projects, 
and are funded broadly in line with current capital structure proportions. In fact only a minority of 
companies in this study (9 of the 26 using discounting techniques) excluded financing flows from their 
calculations. (See Table 31 Page 363). All but one of these was in category 1. Only five used weighted 
average cost of capital as the basis of the discount rate. Four used discount rates based in some way on 
the cost of borrowing. In two of these cases a substantial risk premium was added to give a rate more 
appropriate to the risk Inherent In the business. In the other two cases the discount rate reflected the 
cost of borrowing. Such a practice is contrary to the theory of finance, and clearly gives no extra 
return to equity holders for their risk capital on new projects. More disconcerting than this however, 
is the fact that a total of 15 of the 26 companies using discounting techniques based their calculations 
solely on cash flows including financing flows. This is not wrong per se. However, It needs to be 
recognised that calculations of this sort should be based upon an appropriate return to equity, not on the 
weighted average cost of capital, or the cost of borrowing. This seldom happened. Of the category I 
companies, two used rates very close to the borrowing rate. Two used the borrowing rate adjusted by 
a risk premium, but did not specifically Identify these as attempts to calculate an appropriate return In 
equity. One used a figure of 20%, on the basis that this 1seemed about r ig h t  One used a variety 
of rates, depending upon circumstances. Two did not specify the rate used. For category 2 and 3 
companies the answers received were even more confused, with the following bases being used:
(i) the cost of borrowing (3 companies);
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(ii) the cost of borrowing adjusted by a risk premium (2 companies);
(iii) the return needed to achieve a real return of 3 -  4% (1 company);
(iv) specific rates -  one company stated that rates were variable, but 16% was typical. One used
25% as an appropriate return on equity.
Given that virtually all category 2 and 3 companies used cash flows including financing flows, it is clear 
that the potential for misuse of the discounting techniques is considerable.
Several possible implications might be drawn from these conclusions. The first is that i f  the 
correct procedures were important to business survival they would have been identified as such and be 
in use. Misunderstandings of the type referred to above therefore could be taken as further evidence of 
the low weight given to discounting, and their relative unimportance in the identification of effective 
strategies. A second implication is that evaluation errors are occurring and that the theory in this area 
needs to be re-emphasised. The likely position seems to be somewhere between the two. The 
overriding importance attached to strategies which are seen as giving both some kind of competitive 
advantage and a degree of flexibility has already been noted. The role of evaluation techniques is low. 
However, problems can, and probably have, arisen in the industry which may be related to the misuse 
of evaluation techniques, which in turn may impact on the success of the strategies chosen.
A particular concern in this area relates to the raising of further equity finance. Overall it is
clear that very few companies were making serious attempts to evaluate such things as the appropriate 
rate of return on equity for a venture in a risky line of activity such as bulk shipping, funded say 80% 
by debt. The use of CAPM, or something similar, to make estimates of a reasonable return, would 
provide useful insights into the kind of returns needed to ensure continued funding from the financial 
markets. The perceived shortage of equity capital in the shipping industry may well be the result of 
completely inappropriate returns being available on equity capital in shipping. Certainly the evidence 
that was collected suggested that very few companies appreciated the implications of the theory of 
finance in this area. In many cases required rates of return were too low to continue to obtain equity 
capital from an efficient capital market. This may well result in increased reliance on debt finance and 
consequent increases in the risk of bankruptcy. It would thus appear that useful insights can be obtained 
by the correct use of the evaluation and related techniques. One such example is the concept of 
Ad justed Net Present Value, discussed on page 51, which offers potential advantages for international 
projects funded with subsidised loans. No use was found anywhere in this study of this technique. Some
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re-emphasis of the theory in these areas would appear useful.
A second factor of note in considering the role and importance of traditional appraisal methods is 
that none of the additional methods of appraisal need be seen as being mutually exclusive with the 
traditional methods. These latter methods have not been invalidated. They have simply been put in 
context, as one part of a broader appraisal. They have a role in many companies, but its precise nature 
depends upon the type of company, the nature of its activities, and the current position of the company 
and economy. The 'broader context'  sought by writers such as Derkinderen and Crum (1981), and 
the recognition of the need for a multi-stage, multi-criteria, approach to investment and financing 
decisions, appear to be essential stages in the development of a more practically useful theory of 
finance.
A third factor of undoubted importance relates to the question of environmental complexity. 
Various criticisms of finance theory were identified in Chapter 3 (P 56/59) which relate specifically to 
the difficulties caused by complexity and increased environmental turbulence. Overall, there is little 
doubt that the dramatically increased complexity and volatility of the shipping industry has changed the 
emphasis of the investment decision making process, both in terms of the approach to planning systems 
(or the collection of economic and market data), and the appraisal methods used. For example, 
relatively little emphasis was now given to the forecasting of project figures. Where such forecasts 
were made (i.e. the category 1 companies) they were frequently used in conjunction with techniques 
such as sensitivity analysis, so as to build up a better overall picture of the implications of different 
outcomes in an uncertain world. Rather more emphasis was given to consideration of current and 
potential market and environmental factors, to cost/revenue relationships and likely changes therein, 
and to the identification of areas of flexibility associated with particular strategies or investments. 
The work of the writers identified in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 appears to be generally supported by the 
findings of this study, although variations arose due to the peculiarities of the shipping industry, and 
within companies.
Finally, it is worth re-considering the approaches and attitudes of banks and other lenders, 
identified in Chapter 6. and their implications for project analysis. The point was made in that chapter 
that few banks required detailed forecasts, and that where these were required they tended to cover 
costs over the relatively short term. Expectations with regard to both revenue forecasts and the use 
of formal appraisal techniques was low. The emphasis was placed on track record, an analysis of the
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underlying project assumptions, debt service ability, and security. Any company which wishes to 
obtain debt funding for a project will need to give careful consideration to these aspects. Given the 
importance of debt finance to the shipping industry these aspects are thus likely to impact on a 
company's internal project appraisal, with a possible consequent playing down of the traditional 
techniques. This in turn helps to explain the concern found within companies with downside risk, since 
poor results may be viewed as a "black mark" on a track record, and with the impact of a project on 
corporate results, which may affect perceptions of both debt service ability and security.
2 .5  Risk
This study provides a number of interesting insights into the analysis of risk by decision makers, 
which have implications for the theory of finance. Some of these have already been introduced. 
Probably the single most important factor, already identified under philosophies and strategies, relates 
to the ideas on flexibility. Virtually all of the category 1 companies actively sought a diversified range 
of activities, to maintain high quality earnings and to preserve strategic flexibility. Finance theory 
suggests that shareholders should be left to carry out their own diversification, through the holding of 
a portfolio of securities. The theory of finance in this area must therefore be seen as normative, 
rather than positive, providing little guidance to actual behaviour within companies.
The ideas on flexibility were seen to pervade the actions of all companies at some stage. While 
few category 2 and 3 companies were able to engage in substantial diversification of the type found in 
category I companies, considerable emphasis was nevertheless placed on market or operational 
flexibility. Such an approach, as with that of category 1 companies, suggests an overriding concern 
with risk at the overall corporate level. Finance theory says little about this, other than in the area of 
capital structure, but rather more about risk associated with individual projects. In passing, it should 
be noted that the behaviour of soma category 2 companies, and most category 3 companies, in this 
study, provides some measure of support for the ideas of Norman (1981 Xsee page 81). on the 
possibility of risk reduction through optimal policies on chartering and sale and purchase of vessels.
A particular facet of the flexibility approach which was consistently found within the study, 
were concerns with regard to financial strength and flexibility. While the emphasis was rather 
different across the three categories, the careful preservation of an adequate financial base, in terms 
of liquid funds or access to them, and the analysis of the potential impact of projects on the corporate
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financial position, were generally important parts of the appraisal process. Finance theory tends to 
focus on questions of capital structure, with the final structure being the result of a balancing process 
between the advantages of debt and considerations of financial distress and bankruptcy. However, in 
this study rather more factors appeared to be important in achieving a strong and flexible financial 
position, with capital structure being essentially a residual. Certainly no cases were found in which 
estimates of bankruptcy costs were made. If projects were seen to have any real potential for 
bankruptcy, they were generally rejected.
Another interesting factor which was found In this study was the relative unimportance and lack 
of use of the various techniques for dealing with project risk. The implication of this study is fairly 
clear, namely that corporate risk Is more important than Individual project assessment. The rationale 
for this appeared to be that companies were prepared to carry a certain degree of risk in relation to 
individual projects, even if  this was not clearly assessed, provided that the overall level of corporate 
risk was acceptable. Nevertheless, consideration of corporate risk need not exclude consideration of 
project risk. The two are not mutually exclusive, and there seems little doubt that greater use could 
reasonably be made of the existing techniques. Practice could no doubt be improved by further study of 
the theory in this area. Having said this, some note needs to be taken of the real problems of 
forecasting in this particular industry, and the considerable use made of sensitivity analysis. Many of 
the traditional approaches require some assessment of probability distributions for project flows. Very 
few managers actually did anything like this, and few had any real confidence in the forecasts which 
were prepared. The use of sensitivity analysis, especially when related to corporate financial models, 
enabled a profile of risk to be built up, without committing managers to individual forecasts. While, at 
the end of the day, judgements still needed to be made about the critical points identified, managers 
were not in the position of having to defend particular forecasts. Clearly the behavioural implications 
or the various techniques are not identical. Further consideration of this aspect should prove 
interesting. The findings of this study with regard to the use of sensitivity analysis, and the relative 
lack of use of other techniques for dealing with project risk are broadly similar to the findings of Pike 
(1982XP78).
2.6 Financing and Capital Structure
This study provides empirical evidence on a number of aspects of the theory of finance relating
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to financing and capital structure. The first concerns the separation of the investment and financing 
decisions. As has already been indicated in Chapter 11 on the Summary of Findings (Section 2.7) 
considerable concerns existed with regard to financing, most especially for the smaller companies of 
category 2 and 3. but even for category 1 companies. The four concerns which were identified in 
Section 2.7 of Chapter 11 suggest very strongly that the separation of the two aspects of the decision 
is not realistic, certainly in the context of the shipping industry.
The second area deserving further comment is that of capital structure. The theory on this area 
is itself somewhat confusing, with traditional theories being contrasted with those of Modigliani and 
Miller, which in turn have been modified to include potential bankruptcy costs. Both the traditional 
theory, and that of Modigliani and Miller when modified to incorporate taxes and potential bankruptcy 
costs, imply that an optimal capital structure can exist. Very little empirical testing has occurred in 
recent years. In fact empirical testing of the theory cannot be achieved by asking decision makers 
within firms for their views on capital structure. It is the market collectively which determines 
whether such a structure exists. Nevertheless, this study does provide some useful insights into the 
theory, since it  includes the views of bankers, and those of managers, on the importance of capital 
structure and the extent to which It is an internal decision variable.
In fact, the study is quite clear in this area. Very few companies considered the impact of capital 
structure on share price, other than In the most general terms. Virtually no company had any clear 
target debt/equity ratio. However, a substantial number of companies, particularly in categories 1 and 
3, did have limits to the amount of debt they would wish to take up, and concerns with debt levels 
undoubtedly existed. Those concerns were not generally with capital structure per se. but to do with 
financial prudence and flexibility. The capital structure in existence at any particular time appeared to 
be the result of a balancing of a variety of factors, the most important of which were outlined in section
2.7 of chapter 11, as follows:
(i) the perceived effect of capital structure on share price.
(ii) the relationship between investment opportunities and availability of internal funds.
(iii) the perceived effect of capital structure on bond ratings
(iv) the relationship between profitability and debt service.
(v) the nature of the assets being funded.
(vi) market fashion and changing economic conditions.
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As can be seen from that section, some differences were found in the behaviour across the 
categories, but considerable consistency of approach was nevertheless found. Particularly important 
influences were the rate and quality of earnings, the relationship between these earnings and debt 
service commitments, the ability to finance new ventures internally, and economic conditions. For 
category 1 companies, bond ratings and. to a much more limited extent, share price considerations, 
also provided a broad backcloth to decisions. For some category 2 companies commitment to the 
industry inevitably led to substantial borrowings to support new investment, since no alternative 
existed. For category 3 companies, conservative debt ratios were frequently the result of an 
overriding concern with the ability to service debt over periods of adverse trading.
These findings have much in common with the work of Gandemo (1981), referred to in Chapter 3 
(P 57/58). Gandemo was concerned with the influence of Increased environmental turbulence on 
corporate investment and financial planning. The choice of an optimal capital structure was seen as a 
particularly difficult problem when conditions are changing. Gandemo felt that existing theories did not 
include all the relevant variables, and identified other potentially significant variables, including the 
risk of being taken over, the risk of being unable to cover fixed financial obligations, and the potential 
impact of a long period of recession. While not being of uniform importance across the three categories 
of company, these variables were nonetheless frequently found ingredients of the decision making 
process.
Some similarities exist between the findings of this study and Myers (1984) ideas on a 
1modified pecking o rd e r '  approach to capital structure, described on page 50. This approach 
implies that a reluctance to Issue new equity exists. New investments will be funded Hrstly from 
internal funds, then from debt. Dividend payout ratios are likely to be low, thus facilitating the 
financing from Internal funds of a *normaf ” amount of new investment. Remaining investment will 
probably be funded from debt, rather than new equity. As investment opportunities and profitability 
fluctuate so the debt equity ratio changes. In this study dividend payout ratios were generally low. For 
category I companies earnings quality was high, thus assuring a substantial internal funding capability. 
Even so, examples can be found (see Table 11- page 248) of a number of instances where the use of 
debt to fund new investment resulted in sizeable changes (5% or more) in debt-equity ratios from one 
year to another. For category 2 companies, with much lower quality earnings, rather larger
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differences in debt-equity ratios from one year to another were identified. Both of these provide 
support to the pecking order approach. As it stands, however, the pecking order approach tends to play 
down, if not ignore altogether, the importance of the preservation of a reasonably strong financial 
position. It implies that all profitable new ventures will be funded. This study suggests that the 
preservation of a flexible and strong financial position will be an important factor in determining the 
level of new investment actually undertaken. For category t companies high quality earnings generally 
mean that such a position can be easily maintained, and most profitable investments can proceed. For 
category 2 companies the desire to stay in the business may well conflict with the achievement of a 
good financial position, and some compromise may need to be worked out. Certainly for category 3 
companies financial prudence was generally likely to mean that some investment opportunities may need 
to be foregone.
In passing, it is worth noting that companies in this study almost invariably included lease 
commitments as part of the overall debt service commitments, when considering their attitude towards 
debt levels. A similar view was expressed by virtually all of the banks in assessing requests for 
finance. The question of whether lease financing can be seen as off balance sheet financing, and a way 
of increasing debt capacity, would thus seem to be relatively unimportant. Any increase in debt 
capacity associated with leasing was almost certainly due to the fact that lease periods may be longer 
than loan periods, and debt service therefore somewhat easier, and not to the fact that it is off balance 
sheet financing. A further point worth emphasising is that debt was effectively limited by the security 
which could be offered to lenders. For many firms, and certainly most of the category 2 and 3 
companies, this meant that levels of debt were effectively limited by the current market value of its 
assets. Indeed, where debt/equity ratios were referred to in category 2 and 3 companies, the rate was 
usually based on current market values.
As has already been pointed out, the fact that decision makers do not have target capital 
structures in mind does not invalidate the idea of optimal capital structures in a market sense. It has 
clear implications for the usefulness of the theory in a positive sense, but it may nevertheless be true 
that optimal capital structures do exist. However, the fact remains that for category 1 companies, 
weighted average cost of capital was used in only 5 of the 16 companies which utilised discounting 
techniques. Even in these cases it needs to be recognised that the use of such a figure can only be 
theoretically correct if the risk of the new venture is the same as that currently being faced, and if  the
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new venture is to be financed in the same proportions as existing business. Furthermore, It will only 
lead to an optimal result if capital structure is at an optimal position.
In the course of this study a certain amount of evidence was collected with regard to changes in 
the cost of debt or equity as levels of gearing change. As has been made clear earlier, most finance for 
new vessels came from either yard credit or the banks. Most of the borrowed funds for second hand 
vessels came from the banks. Yet terms for yard credit followed a very standard pattern, with 
60-80% of the cost of new vessels generally being available at quite low interest rates (frequently 8 
1/2%), over periods of 7-12 years. Security was typically related to the individual asset being 
purchased. Very little difference appeared to exist in the conditions for category 1, 2 or 3 companies. 
As far as bank credit is concerned, the point has already been made in chapter 6. that the banks 
generally considered their spreads to be narrow. Competitive pressures were such that interest 
charges could not be raised very much, even if  the perceived risk associated with a loan was 
significantly higher than normal. Certainly no evidence was found of any formal attempts to relate the 
size of spread to the amount of risk involved. In general, the banks appeared to take the view that they 
were only interested in certain kinds of business, and would simply not lend if  the risks became too 
high. The dearth of equity finance from the banks is supportive of this view. Where leasing was used, 
and this was only effectively available to a restricted number of companies, no evidence was found of 
the interest portion of the cost being any more expensive than borrowing, even with 100% finance 
being available.
The implications of this for the debate on optimal capital structures would appear to be that the 
cost of debt changes very little as the debt/equity ratio rises, but a point is eventually reached at 
which debt becomes extremely difficult to raise, almost irrespective or price. This cut-off point is 
likely to be somewhat below a debt/equity ratio (using debt/debt + equity) of 70%-80% since the 
security covenants are likely to come into play at this point. Certain banks adopt rather more 
conservative attitudes to overall debt levels than this, implying that the above figure should be seen as 
a maximum figure. Clearly a small number of companies have higher debt/equity ratios. Detailed 
evidence on bank attitudes to these companies was not collected, and probably would not have been made 
available anyway. It would seem reasonable, however, to hypothesize that such companies experience 
much greater day to day pressure from the banks, and only obtain additional funds if  there is a 
reasonable chance that such funds could be used to retrieve the current difficult situation.
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With regard to estimates of the cost of equity, considerable confusion was found within 
companies as to the appropriate discount rate to use, and these have been detailed earlier (Section 2.4). 
As has already been pointed out, a substantial number of cases were found in which returns were 
calculated on the equity portion of new ventures, but then related (in terms of adequacy) to the cost of 
borrowing. Even where the nature of the return was correctly recognised, little evidence was found of 
significant changes in the returns required for different debt/equity levels, at least within categories. 
Overall, there was very little evidence of a real understanding of the implications of CAPM for the cost 
of equity.
Several limitations need to be recognised with regard to these comments on the cost of equity. 
Firstly, It must be remembered that questions were asked of decision makers within companies, and 
decision makers were not necessarily owners or shareholders, actually putting up finance. Secondly, 
most of the category 1 companies, as was shown in Table 11 (P248) had, in recent years, gearing 
positions which were broadly consistent over time, even though substantial differences existed between 
companies within the category. In reality, therefore, even if  the actual costs of debt and equity were 
capable of being plotted for an individual company, at different gearing levels, a very limited graph 
would result. Thirdly, for many category 2 and 3 companies, no estimates of cost of equity could be 
made, since such funds were not raised on the financial markets anyway, but reflected the particular 
views, interests and aspirations of the owners. Required rates of return for such owners were in many 
cases merely one part of an overall set of objectives, and were not subject to market forces in quite 
the same way as the large public companies of category 1. Having said this, it  was quite clear from the 
discussions that many such owners did not appreciate the implications of CAPM, to the extent that they 
frequently appeared to accept, and expect, returns, often from highly geared ventures, which were 
considerably lower than those which would be required from a category 1 company. The implication of 
this is interesting, if apparently illogical, namely that certain individuals will provide funds for a 
private business which yields lower returns than those obtainable from a public company in a 
comparable, or lower, risk category. For this to be the case, factors other than economic ones must be 
given a weighting not normally associated with the security markets.
Clearly no formal assessment of market views of capital structures is possible on the basis of 
the above evidence. Nor was this the aim of this study. What is clear is that the search for an optimal 
capital structure is not a major part of the internal analysis of investment and financing decisions by
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companies in this study. However, the evidence collected suggests that the cost of debt will not rise 
significantly as gearing rises. Nor was any evidence found to suggest that substantial increases in 
required equity returns would occur automatically as gearing increases, though little detailed 
information was obtained on companies with high gearing levels. This suggests some advantages to the 
use of debt. However companies limited debt for reasons of financial prudence and flexibility, 
irrespective of any financial market views.
2.7 Conclusions on Finance Theory
The findings of this study suggest that relatively little overlap exists between finance theory 
and actual behaviour within organisations, and that finance theory does not adequately reflect the 
complexity of the internal investment and financing decision making process. The practical difficulties 
of implementing the theory are also significant. A more complex theory or model is needed if  these 
complexities and practical difficulties are to be effectively encapsulated.
This is not to say that the theory has no relevance with regard to securities and the financial 
markets. No evidence was collected on this particular aspect, but the evidence on market efficiency 
collected in past research is generally supportive of much of the theory, particularly that relating to 
risk/return trade offs and portfolio theory. Interestingly, even in this area increasing doubts have 
been raised (see P 46/7). The evidence collected in this particular study suggests that a certain 
amount of confusion exists with regard to this part of the theory, and that the market relationship 
between risk and return is not always recognised, and certainly not translated into equivalent rates of 
return for internal purposes. Even if  an alternative descriptive theory or model of internal investment 
decision making is devised, managers must be aware of the market implications of their actions. This 
will almost certainly require the recognition and inclusion of parts of the existing theory within any 
internal processes.
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IL The Links between Corporate Strategy and Finance
5.1 An overview of the findinos on corporate planning and strategy
While it is not the aim of this thesis to provide a detailed assessment of the theories relating to 
corporate planning and strategy, or of the supporting techniques, this study does permit a number of 
broad observations to be made on corporate planning and strategy in the shipping industry, which help 
achieve the project aims in this area, namely the identification of areas of overlap and linkage between 
finance and strategy, in the consideration of investment and financing decisions.
Perhaps the most significant point is the fact that for category 1 companies corporate planning 
systems were found to be well developed. If the four stage evolution model of Gluck. Kaufman and 
Walleck (see P 87) is taken as the base, it is clear that most category 1 companies are on either phase 
3 or phase A. Planning was undoubtedly well beyond the phase of basic financial planning, or even 
forecast based planning. The problems of forecasting which were identified by Gluck et al were 
undoubtedly found to exist in the shipping industry. Phase III. externally oriented planning, suggests the 
need for planning to respond to external market pressures. The ideas of strategic positioning, 
particularly with regard to diversification, together with the careful elimination of certain 
unfavourable areas of activity, were very much in line with this phase. Phase IV. "strategic 
management", attempts to go further than this, by emphasising the importance of a corporate, values 
system and a planning process that stimulates entrepreneurial thinking. The findings of this study do 
not provide clear evidence that such systems were in operation. Nevertheless, a great deal of 
similarity was found between practice and the ideas described by Ansoff as 'entrepreneurial 
planning “ . which in turn appears to be broadly similar in concept to strategic management. Particular 
features found in category 1 companies included the following:
(i) the taking of a broader perspective on the environment. The range of background information 
obtained, normally as part of the planning process, has already been discussed. In most cases a 
substantial amount of background information was seen as being available as a matter of routine, being 
absorbed and used as appropriate in reaching decisions;
(ii) the identification of areas with potential problems, notably in terms of supply/demand 
relationships and the level and quality of earnings;
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(iii) toe continuous search for new opportunities, so as to ensure a steady flow of areas of business 
with the potential for high quality earnings;
(iv) the importance attached to maintaining a position which was both strong and flexible, in terms or 
strategies, markets, operations and finance. The importance of positioning and flexibility for the choice 
of strategies was considerable. Indeed, it could be seen as the factor from which most systems and 
strategies followed. The development of flexible strategies requires a different approach to that 
implied by finance theory, with its emphasis on optimisation. Some of the implications of this were 
discussed in the preceding section. Further discussion will be found later in this section.
In passing it is perhaps worth noting that the emphasis on flexibility found in this study is 
consistent with many of the ideas of futures research which were identified in section 3.7 of Chapter A. 
Particularly important was the use of sensitivity analysis. As used, sensitivity analysis seemed to be 
closely related to scenario planning. These techniques were generally seen as being more appropriate 
than detailed forecasting when markets are volatile, and as a means of identifying potential problem 
areas early.
For category 2 and 3 companies the evidence is less clear. Relatively few such companies 
prepared detailed forecasts, environmental analysis was much less detailed, and the analysis of 
expected financial performance tended to concentrate on liquidity and (to a more limited extent) long 
term profitability. Phase I and phase II of the corporate planning evolution appeared to be largely 
omitted. However, considerable emphasis was given to the preservation of flexibility, the holding of 
adequate financial resources to see a company through adverse events, and to an opportunistic approach 
to the markets. In some senses this latter philosophy has much in common with that implied by 
strategic management. This apparent inconsistency is probably partly attributable to the differences in 
the type of business carried out by companies in the various categories. Further research into the 
differences in approach between large and small firms with regard to planning and strategy would seem 
useful.
Of the literature which relates specifically to shipping, the MARAD study (1982Xsee page 12A) 
is perhaps the most developed. The MARAD study is limited to the US liner trades, and differences have 
already been established to exist in the decision making processes appropriate to the various trades. 
Nevertheless, considerable similarity was found to exist between the approach suggested in the MARAD 
study, and the behaviour patterns identified in certain companies in this particular study. The most
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important areas of similarity between the two studies are as follows:
(i) Both emphasise pursuing opportunities and avoiding threats.
(ii) Both emphasise the preservation of flexibility, so as to be able to deal with the unforeseen.
(iii) The environmental analysis suggested in the MARAD study, covering industry, company, 
markets, competition, and other environmental factors, has much in common with the approach used 
within the liner trades in this study.
(iv) The evaluation process suggested in the MARAD study has some similarities with the finding of
this study, but a number of differences were also found. The MARAD study suggests the use of
computer simulations as a means of evaluation, with concentration on income statements, cash flow 
statements, utilisation tables, and market share tables. Both IRR and the impact of project flows on 
corporate figures are regarded as important. These techniques were not universally found In the liner 
companies, but a high degree of usage was nevertheless found in the larger companies.
Overall, the approach suggested in the MARAD study appears to be rather more reliant on forecasts and 
formal analytical techniques than the approach found in practice. It accords more closely with the 
current theoretical models than do actual behaviour patterns. Nonetheless, it is clear that many of the 
ideas included are actually followed by large liner companies.
Very little evidence was found in this study of the use of the specific techniques identified in 
Chapter 4 as being supportive of corporate planning and strategy. Some of this may be due to the fact 
that, given the financial emphasis of this thesis, questioning In this area was fairly general, whereas 
that relating to the use of financial techniques was specific. Some may be due to the fact that in the 
early interviews the questioning on strategy was less rigorous, developing as the study progressed. A 
further problem is that some of the techniques, e.g. business portfolio matrices, seem more likely to be 
of use in the Head Office of a diversified company, rather than in its shipping subsidiary, but interviews 
were often held in the latter, since the emphasis was on shipping. What was clear, however, is that in 
many cases, particularly category 1 companies, the analysis which was carried out had many 
similarities with the ideas underlying particular techniques, even if  the techniques themselves were not 
specifically identified. For example, the processes carried out by most category 1 companies involved 
in the liner trades typically included considerations of market share, competitive position (including a 
detailed competitor analysis), and a variety of economic analyses aimed at identifying future prospects 
and problems. Reference has already been made to the concept of distinctive competence (see P 94),
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and to the identtfication of potential areas of business which appear likely to encounter difficulties. The 
overlap between these ideas and supporting techniques such as SWOT analysis and business portfolio 
matrices is dear. Yet few companies specifically identified the use of SWOT analysis, and none 
identified the use of any specific business portfolio matrix. Overall, the analyses actually undertaken 
by the category 1 companies support the same kind of thinking about strategy as is implicit in these 
techniques, without resorting to the somewhat simplistic approach implied by the techniques 
themselves. By way of example, the identification of the bulk markets, and particularly the tanker 
markets, as potential problem areas and hence as areas for divestment, appears similar in essence to 
the identification of "dogs' by the use of the share-growth matrix. Reasons given for such decisions 
were generally related to the inability to obtain any kind of competitive advantage in these areas, which 
was in turn partly due to low market share, low growth prospects, and low prospects of profitability. 
For companies in category 2 and 3 the none-use of portfolio matrices may well be due simply to the fact 
that few such companies could afford any significant diversification.
Closely linked to ideas on portfolio matrices and SWOT analysis is the idea of the experience 
curve. In this study the dangers of applying the experience curve to the shipping industry could be seen. 
In particular, it is clear that the search for increased market shares in the liner industry has led to a 
situation of overcapacity and decreased profitability, which has impacted on most liner companies. 
Other problems with applying the experience curve to the shipping industry relate to the use of 
conferences and consortia, subsidies and low cost inputs (e.g. flag of convenience ships), and the 
inability to obtain significant economies of scale beyond a certain point.
Chapter A referred to the development of ideas related to contingency theory. This study 
provides evidence of the need to recognise that in developing appropriate systems and strategies, due 
consideration needs to be given to the overall characteristics of the company concerned, its markets, 
and its environment. This is not to say that strategy is entirely dependent upon environment. Firms 
may be pro-active, rather than reactive. However, it is important in considering the strategic options 
open to say, a category 3 company, to recognise the serious constraints under which such a company 
operates. These constraints are in turn likely to lead to somewhat different approaches to planning and 
investment decision making, and to involvement in different areas of business, to those found in other 
categories. In devising a descriptive theory or model of decision making these differences must be 
recognised.
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This sub-division of companies into categories facilitated the identification of analytical 
processes, philosophies and strategies used by companies in this study. Some similarities were noted 
with other empirical work on corporate planning and strategy, identified in section 5 of Chapter A. For 
category 1 companies the processes carried out generally had the aim of providing a background against 
which strategic decisions could be made, so as to assist in the identification of activities which should 
be pursued, and of problem areas which should be eliminated. The collection of a broad set of 
environmental/economic data, and its detailed analysis, must, therefore, be seen as an important part 
of the decision making process of such companies. Activities to be developed require high quality 
earnings for some time ahead, which in turn requires strategies which give some kind of competitive 
edge which could be sustained for some time. The holding of an appropriate market share was 
undoubtedly regarded as an important aspect within the liner trades of category 1 companies. Another 
common strategy, again of significant importance in the liner trades, was the achievement of the lowest 
cost position in the particular trade or route concerned. The provision of high quality service was a 
further method used to obtain a competitive edge. In general, category 1 companies concentrated on the 
high technology, high cost end of the shipping markets, an approach similar in essence to the concept of 
’distinctive competence'  referred to earlier. In a complex and volatile world the search for 
strategies which would provide this competence needs to be conditioned by considerations of 
uncertainty and adaptability. The strategies developed must therefore permit the company to adapt to 
unexpected events as they arise.
For companies in categories 2 and 3 much less scope existed with regard to areas of activity and 
potential strategies. Planning systems were less developed but the aim was nonetheless the 
identification of appropriate areas of activity and associated strategies. Given an inability to compete 
effectively in certain markets, these companies were forced to concentrate on markets where the 
degree of distinctive competence which could be brought to bear was low. Under such circumstances 
the emphasis shifted to identifying markets where projected supply was insufficient to meet projected 
demand, or ships could be acquired at a price likely to give a capital cost advantage, with the possibility 
of future capital gains. As with category 1 companies, the ability to adapt and respond to the 
unexpected was an important consideration. A particularly important feature of this was financial 
strength and flexibility.
Overall, while differences of detail and emphasis were found, a considerable degree of overlap
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appears to exist between the ideas and approaches underlying investment decisions which were 
identified in this study, and those set out in the first three sections of Chapter 4. The need to link these 
ideas with finance theory is clear, if a descriptive theory or model of investment decision making is to 
be developed.
3 ? Areas nf linkage and overlap between corporate strategy and finance
In considering areas of linkage and overlap it is usful to consider the problem from both strategic 
and financial perspectives. Financial perspectives are provided by Chapter 11. section 2 of this 
chapter, which assesses the implications of this study for finance theory, and section 3.5 of Chapter 3. 
which identifies a range of criticisms of finance theory specifically relating to aspects of corporate 
strategy. Corporate strategy perspectives are provided by Chapter 11 and section 3.1 of this chapter.
Perhaps the most important of the financial perspectives provided by Chapter 11 and section 2 of 
this chapter are as follows:
(i) Finance theory does not adequately reflect the complexity of the decision making process within 
companies. In general, a considerable amount of background information was collected and anlaysed. 
often as part of a formal corporate planning system. Its importance in the decision making process is 
considerable. By comparison, the use of the traditional financial evaluation techniques was low, and 
they were seen as offering little help in identifying strategies which give a competitive advantage.
(ii) Finance theory largely ignores the role of philosophies and related strategies. In particular, the 
importance of positioning and flexibility does not appear to be adequately recognised. This is 
particularly important given the current complexity and volatility of the markets. The implications of 
this for risk assessment are considerable. In practice risk assessment was seen as part of the 
positioning/flexibility debate, and project risk analysis was given correspondingly lower weight.
The criticisms of finance theory relating to aspects of corporate strategy which were identified 
in section 3.5 of Chapter 3 offer similar perspectives. For example, Derkinderen and Crum (1981) 
pointed to the need for a systems approach, so as to conduct capital budgeting activities explicitly 
within the context of the corporate strategy. Coda and Dematte (1981) criticised the adequacy of the 
traditional financial concepts and techniques in their handling of strategic decisions. They argued that 
there is a multi-level decision system, with a different approach being used for the higher level
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(strategic) decisions. Bertoneche (1981 pointed out that the underlying assumption of the traditional 
techniques is that the fundamental strategic decisions have been made. He suggested that more 
attention should be given to the integration of the traditional capital-budgeting framework into the 
overall resource allocation process. Crum and Derkinderen suggested (1981 Xsee P 66) five distinct 
classes of criteria, covering the various aspects of the decision process, namely: prescreening or 
filter variables; measures of aggregate performance over time; criteria that ensure corporate stability 
and harmony; strategic positioning in terms of maximising favourable options; and strategic positioning 
in terms of minimising the possibility of unfavourable outcomes.
While it was not the purpose of this study to test empirically any of these particular criticisms, 
it is worth noting in passing that this study nonetheless provides a great deal of support for ideas of 
this type. There is little doubt that in practice considerable attention was paid to the strategic aspects 
of decision making, often to the detriment of the traditional project appraisal techniques. The various 
criteria suggested by Crum and Derkinderen also have counterparts in the findings of Chapter 11. The 
prescreening variables could be related to the overall philosophies and strategies adopted by the various 
categories, eliminating many lines of business virtually automatically. A certain amount of use of the 
traditional measures of performance were found. Considerable emphasis was certainly placed on 
criteria related to corporate stability and security. The ideas of strategic positioning were found to be 
particularly important for category 1 companies, while general ideas on flexibility were found in other 
categories. Overall there is little doubt that the kind of criticisms made under this heading are relevant 
to the shipping industry. A blending of the traditional project analysis with ideas on corporate strategy 
is essential if  an effective decision making process is to be developed.
The perspectives provided on corporate strategy have many similarities with those outlined 
above. Particularly important are:
(i) the need to take a broader view of the environment, so as to ensure a clear understanding of 
current and potential markets, to provide a framework for decision making;
(ii) the preservation of a strong and flexible position, with emphasis being placed on the search for 
new opportunities (especially in category 1 companies), and the identification of potential problem 
areas;
(iii) the search for strategies with some kind of competitive advantage;
(iv) the need to recognise that different analytical processes, philosophies and strategies exist for
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different types of company.
None of these are inconsistent with the findings of this study, or the perspectives outlined 
earlier. Indeed, the extent of overlap of the differing perspectives is considerable. This suggests that 
a framework for decision making could be established which enables due consideration to be given to 
inputs from both strategy and finance. Given the findings of this study, with its recognition that the 
preservation of financial strength and flexibility is an important part of corporate strategy, it  may be 
argued that finance and strategy are inextricably linked. In practice, however, it  seems likely that 
strategy specialists will provide inputs relating to the identification of market opportunities, while 
finance specialists will concentrate more on financial strength and flexibility.
Section 2 of this chapter includes much related to the area of financial strength and flexibility. 
Further insights into the importance of this with regard to overall strategy can be provided by 
consideration of the approach referred to as PARE analysis, in the light of the findings of this study. 
PARE analysis, devised by Derkinderen and Crum (1979) (see P 119), aims to link together strategic 
management and finance. The main thrust of this approach is that the concepts of “potentia l“ and 
“resilience ' have more to offer in explaining investment and financing behaviour than those of 
“return ’ and “r is k ' . The resulting emphasis is on strategic positioning, rather than on a search for 
a single optimal position. The further sub-division of “potentia l" into “opportunities' and “action 
range" is consistent with the behaviour of many companies in this study, and represents a useful 
breakdown of the overall approach to investment. A positive search for opportunities was a feature of 
virtually all of the companies in this study. However, the actual following up of these opportunities 
depended upon the philosophy towards quality of earnings, and also on the overall ability to do so, in 
terms of financial ability, managerial or technical ability, market knowledge and expertise (including 
agency services), and the ability to acquire appropriate assets within a reasonable time. For example, 
clear evidence was found of the difficulties of breaking into the liner trades, which were very 
expensive, required a considerable infrastructure, needed a sophisticated agency network, and were 
frequently already organised under consortia or conference systems. Under such circumstances it is 
easy to see why relativley few category 2 and 3 companies were involved in such trades. By 
comparison, the problems of entering the bulk trades were small. In fact, the findings of this study 
suggest that category 1 companies are concerned to ensure that action range is seldom limited, at least 
in terms of availability of finance, since concern with bond ratings and share price should mean that
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further funds can be raised if  the proposed project justifies it. The search for expensive or specialist 
ventures with high barriers to entry, would also suggest that greater action range is perceived to be 
associated with higher quality earnings. For category 2 or 3 companies action range was clearly less, 
with a consequent reduction in the options which could be pursued. For such companies consideration of 
the action range was thus likely to be an important, if  implicit, facet of every major decision.
The concept of "resilience" , which is further sub-divided into “ris k  ’  and "endurance'  , also 
appears to have some empirical support from this study. The impact of individual projects on corporate 
financial profiles, which was carried out in virtually all companies, was one part of the risk assessment 
process. Another part, particularly (but not exclusively) for category 1 companies, was an 
assessment of the sensitivity of corporate cash flows to different variables. The concept of endurance 
appears to be of more variable importance. This is not to say that firms did not wish to endure, but 
simply that the overall approach to the financial markets, and the concentration of high quality 
earnings, found in most category 1 and the larger category 2 companies, meant that powers of 
endurance were likely to be high for such companies. Under such circumstances the concept of 
endurance seems likely to have little operational significance. For the remaining companies this is less 
likely to be true. Indeed, it  is clear that the assessment of ability to survive long periods of recession 
was an important part of the overall appraisal process for many category 3 companies.
Overall. PARE analysis appears to be an interesting approach which provides useful insights into 
the decision making process, and a useful framework for analysis. The findings of this study provide 
some empirical support for it in the following ways:
(i) The importance of the concept of strategic positioning is demonstrated
(ii) Considerable emphasis was placed on being in a position to deal with the unexpected
(iii) Several of the facets of the appraisal process which were given considerable attention in 
practice are very similar in concept to the four strategic elements. The usefulness of concepts such as 
action range and endurance, in terms of their impact on strategic decisions, is particularly apparent.
3 3 Conclusion on the links between finance and strategy
The need to put financial aspects of investment and financing decisions into a corporate strategy 
framework is clear, as is the fact that many companies are already doing so. Particularly important
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factors are the broader environmental perspectives being taken by many companies, notably those of 
category 1, the early identification of problem areas, the continuous search for new opportunities, and 
the emphasis on positioning and flexibility. The maintenance of financial strength and flexibility 
represents a significant part of the positioning process. In this study the importance of criteria to do 
with stability and security were noted, as were ideas to do with action range and endurance. Overall, 
the importance of financial factors in decision making is undoubted, as is the need for an appropriate 
theory or model of finance to support decision making. However, decision making is seen to occur in a 
complex and uncertain environment, with decisions being made against a broad backcloth of economic 
and other environmental information, with the aim of obtaining, and retaining, some kind of position of 
relative competitive advantage. The importance of this background information depends upon the nature 
of the company and its activities. The emphasis on obtaining a competitive edge, coupled with a 
perceived need for the preservation or a flexible and adaptable approach, results in less emphasis being 
given to detailed forecasting, and more to an understanding of the markets themselves, and the impact 
of changes in these markets, whether foreseen or not. Such an approach places far less emphasis on 
optimisation than is implied by the normative theory of finance.
Until finance theory is set more firmly in a strategic context, and due recognition is given to the 
importance of flexibility in strategy development, the differences between finance theory and 
management practice will continue. While greater recognition of some of the practical implications of 
the theory of finance are undoubtedly called for. the findings of this study generally suggest that 
Donaldson's conclusion of 1963 remains essentially valid, namely that it would be finance theory and 
not management practice that would have to change, if  the two were to continue to have a valid 
relationship with each other.
±  A Descriptive Model of Investment and Financing Decisions 
in the Shipping Industry
± 1  Introduction
Chapter 11 summarised the findings of this study, with regard to actual behaviour patterns in
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companies in the shipping industry, in the area of investment and financing decisions. The preceeding 
sections of this chapter examined the implications of chapter 11 for the relevant parts of the theory of 
finance, and for related criticisms and potential links with the literature on corporate planning and 
strategy. In general, actual behaviour was found to be rather different from that which might have 
been expected if finance theory were correctly applied. Indeed, the ideas found in finance theory were 
seen to represent a relatively small part of the total decision making process. Furthermore, the earlier 
sections of this chapter reveal the considerable influence of ideas on corporate planning and strategic 
management, and of the validity of many of the criticisms made of finance theory, at least in terms of 
actual behaviour.
Given the above facts, it is clear that a need exists for a more comprehensive theory (or set of 
theories) to be developed. The findings of this study provide a detailed analysis of the way in which 
investment and financing decisions are made in the shipping industry. By changing the perspective on 
these findings, and making the assumption that the approaches identified will continue to be used in the 
future, it is possible to take some steps towards the development of a more comprehensive theory or 
set of theories. In doing this it should be noted that while considerable differences in behaviour were 
found to exist between individual companies in this study, a high degree of consistency was found within 
the categories, and for companies involved in similar trades. This suggests that the use of appropriate 
groupings would assist in the development of a more comprehensive theory or model. The remainder of 
this section therefore attempts to convert the findings of previous chapters into a broadly based 
descriptive model of behaviour in the area of investment and financing decisions in shipping, with 
different approaches being identified for different groups of companies. The two most important 
groupings relate to size and type of business, corresponding broadly with the three categories used 
within the study, and type of activity, namely bulk or liner operations. The model identified is positive, 
in that it is based upon actual behaviour patterns identified in this study. It is presented in such a way 
as to provide broad guidance on how firms are likely to approach actual investment and financing 
decisions in the shipping industry. However, in places actual behaviour appears to fall some way short 
of what might be considered desirable. In such places normative additions to the model have been made.
The model is developed in the form of a series of propositions relating to various aspects of the 
investment and financing decision. Some of these propositions are sufficiently general to apply to all 
companies. In other cases differences arise depending upon the groupings. i.e. category and/or type of
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activity. In these cases the differences will be identified, usually in the form of a table showing the 
different behaviour patterns associated with the different groupings. In places it is possible to slot in 
various aspects of finance theory virtually as they stand. These places will be clearly identified. In 
some places the current state of the markets is causing certain attitudes which may not be permanent, 
making the assumption of continued behaviour along similar lines rather more questionable. In such 
cases supporting comments are made at the end of the relevant proposition. The propositions developed 
are clearly grounded in fact, and reflect an attempt to generalise the findings of the previous five 
chapters into a broad descriptive model of investment and financing decisions within companies involved 
in the shipping industry. The following through of each proposition as it relates to a particular 
company, category of company, and/or area of activity will permit the development of a set of models 
of behaviour, such that guidance to likely behaviour patterns can be obtained for different companies. 
The logic behind the various propositions, and the reasons for the likelihood of certain behaviour 
patterns, have already been identified in preceeding chapters.
Overall, this section aims to summarise the findings of the study in such a way as to provide an 
integrated framework for the consideration of Investment and financing decisions, albeit in one 
particular industry. This framework is seen as drawing on issues relating to both corporate strategy 
and finance, and as putting financial considerations more clearly Into a strategic framework. As such, 
it should provide a more relevant set of guidelines on actual behaviour In the area than would be 
obtained from the theory of finance. Further research into the approach used in other industries, when 
put alongside this framework, may well lead to the development of a more complex theory or model of 
decision making in the area of investment and financing. The framework identified below is seen as a 
step in.that direction.
±2  A Descriptive Model
Objectives 
Proposition 1
Multiple objectives exist within organisations, and decisions will reflect a balance between them. 
Proposition 2




All companies w ill search for reasonable levels of p ro fitab ility , but considerable differences of 
emphasis exist w ith regard to the need for this pro fitab ility  to be regular.
P roposition 4
Objectives w ill va ry  according to the category of the company but are likely to include the objectives 





i)  Achievement o f reasonable
pro fitab ility
-  emphasis on high quality
earnings
-  emphasis on increases in
w ealth over tim e





iv )  Maintenance o f a regular 
or increasing dividend
v )  Remaining in existing lines 
of business
v i) Per sonal/fam ily  objectives
IC a te g o ry T Category 2 
public
[Categories 2/ z \
iii) Maintenance o f good [Category 1| Category 2  
public
Category 2
shareholder /m a rk e t relations priva te
[Categories 2 /3 |
[Categories 2 /5 |  
ICateqory 1[
[Categories 2 / 3 [
ICateqory 3[





fable 34 . Objectives and their relative importance
P-llllQSQDhies and Strategies 
Proposition  5
The difference in emphasis w ith regard to earnings quality and the regularity  of profits w ill have a 
significant effect on the lines of business in which companies w ill engage, and on the attitudes and
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approaches to these d ifferent activities. Likely lines of business, and associated attitudes and 
approaches, are shown in Table 35 .
Philosophy/Strategy Relative importance 
^High Medium L o v .





ii )  Acquisition o f assets fo r
long te rm  use
ii i)  Use o f hiqh technoloqu or 
specialist (expensive) ships
iv )  Use o f general purpose or
handy size ships
v )  Speculation on purchase of
assets or businesses 
(ie  purchase in hope of 
capital gain)
ICateqory l| ICateqory 2 1 ICateqory 3|
(Category 3 | (Category 1|
(Category 2 |
ICateqory 11 Cateooru 2 | (Category 3|
7
ICateqory 1| ICateqory 2 |  ICategory 3 |
ICategory 1| ICategory 2| ICategory 3|
11
ICategory 3| ICategory 2 | ICategory l |
ICategory 3 | ICategory 2| iCateaoru i l
Table 35 . Lines of business and related attitudes 
Proposition fi
Considerable emphasis w ill be placed on the establishment of a strategic position which provides a 
degree of flexib ility, together w ith the capability to respond to opportunities and threats, as yet 
unseen, in a timely and effective way.
Proposition 1
The establishment of an appropriate strategic position can be broken down into four constituent 
elements.
( I)  Strategic positioning -  the maintenance of a well balanced set of business activities, typically  
through diversification.
( ii)  Market flexib ility  -  the maintenance or a flexible approach to m arkets, through such things as 
efficient facilities, flexible operations, multi-purpose facilities, efficient data bases, a balanced fleet, a 
balanced approach to chartering, a low cost fleet, high m arket share and a high quality service.
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( iii)  Operating flexibility -  an approach to operations which permits alternative methods of operations 
as conditions and circumstances change, typically achieved through such things as efficient facilities, 
multi-purpose assets, a balanced fleet, and equipment ownership.
(iv ) Financial strength and flexibility -  the maintenance of adequate financial resources, or access to 
them, at all times.
The actual extent to which all these elements w ill occur w ill depend largely on the size and nature 
of the company, since clear constraints exist in the various types of company. The likely importance 
attached to the various elements is shown in Table 36.
Elements of Strategic 
Positioning
Relative importance 
.High Medium Lov >
i)  S tra teg ic  positioning
ii)  M arket fle x ib ility
i i i )  Operating fle x ib ility
iv )  Financial strength &
flex ib ility
ICategory 1| ICategory 2 |  ICategory 3|
ICateqory 1| *  ICategory 2 |* | Cateqory 3|
ICateqory 2 l (Category 1| 
ICategory 3 |  ;
ICategory 1|
Category 2 | 
ICategory 3 |
Table 3 6 . Relative importance of Elements of Strategic Positioning
•Though the use of the sale and purchase markets to move out of certain markets could be 
perceived as m arket flexib ility.
Proposition 2
Even where strategic positioning through diversification is given a high p rio rity , lim its to the process 
w ill generally be found. For US companies the areas of activ ity w ill tend to be more closely 
inter-re la ted  than those of UK companies.
Planning. Systems and Associated Environmental and Economic Analysis 
Proposition 2
Underlying all investment and financing decisions w ill be a degree of environmental and economic
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analysis, sometimes set within a corporate planning fram ework, sometimes done on an ad hoc basis. 
This w ill provide a strategic framework for decision making, and w ill enable companies to make broad 
judgements on the most favourable areas for investment. This analysis w ill thus form an important 
stage in the decision making process.
Proposition IQ
The nature of the environmental and economic analysis, and the importance of the various aspects of 
this analysis, w ill vary according to the size and type of company and the nature of its activities. 
Likely aspects and their relative importance are shown in Table 37 .
Area of Analysis Relative importance 
.High Medium Lov .
i)  Macro-econom ic factors
ii)  Applications to shipping
ii i)  Supply side analysis (global)
iv )  Com petitor analysis
v )  Analysis encapsulated 
w ith in  form al corporate  
planning fram ew ork




(Bulk companies! • [Liner companies]
| Specialist cos.|
Category 1 
L in er/spec ia lis t
Category 2 ICategory 3 |
L,ner |Cat 1 / 2  bulk]
ICategory 1] ICategory 2 | ICategory 3 |
— i -  ------------------------- -
Table 3 7 . Nature of Analysis
Project Appraisal 
Proposition 11
The appraisal of projects is a m ulti-stage, m u lti-c riteria  process. Typically the following areas are 
likely to be considered in the process.
(i) The strategic implications o f the project.
Cii) The project figures themselves
(iii)  The impact of the project on corporate figures.
(iv) Funding and liquidity considerations.
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Proposition 12
Many projects w ill tend to "grow out" of the corporate planning fram ework, so that the strategic  
implications w ill be considered automatically in the planning process. Where projects arise on an ad hoc 
basis, or a formal planning process does not exist, the f irs t  stage of any analysis is likely to include 
certain of the analytical stages identified in proposition 10.
Ecflpositipn 12
Considerable differences and difficulties w ill arise with regard to p ro ject definition. Only in the bulk 
trades are new ships likely to be regarded as separate or independent projects, and even then the idea 
of a balanced fleet is likely to be an important consideration. For the liner and specialised trades it is 
far more likely that new ships, or increases in capacity, w ill be regarded as part of a system or fleet, 
and analysed accordingly, using incremental analysis. The weighting given to the strategic aspects of 
the decision in such cases is likely to be considerable.
Proposition 1A
A variety  of individual project appraisal techniques w ill be used, reflecting a m u lti-c riteria  approach to 
decision making. Methods and likely relative importance are shown in Table 38 . Many of these methods 
can be drawn d irectly  from finance theory.
Appraisal Method Relative importance 
.High Medium Lov ^
i )  Payback
ii)  Accounting ra te  of re tu rn
for individual p ro jects
i i i )  Net present value
iv )  Internal ra te  o f re tu rn
v )  B reak-even  fre ig h t rates
ICategory 11 ICategory
i l£ j
ICategory 11 : 
ICategory 1| |Cat




ICateqory 2 / 3 |
tegory 2 / 3  |
(Bulk companies] : liner /sp ec ia lis t 
companies
Table 38 . Appraisal methods and their relative importance
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Proposition 15
For many projects the degree of confidence in an ability to forecast future cash flows, particularly 
revenues, will be low.* Where a lack of confidence of this type exists little emphasis is likely to be 
placed on the use of discounting techniques. Discounting is likely to be of most significance where 
revenues are backed by charters, or in choosing between alternative methods of financing. 
•A t present confidence in forecasting shipping related flows is low. and likely to remain that 
way. Confidence is likely to be greater where formal planning systems are in operation. 
Proposition 15
Where discounting is used more reliance will be placed on the use of Internal Rate of Return, which 
avoids the choice of a specific discount rate, than on Net Present Value.
Normative Proposition i£a
In deciding on an appropriate hurdle rate, careful consideration should be given as to the cash flows 
which are to be included (i.e. assuming 100E equity funding, or including financing flows), and the rates 
of return being obtained elsewhere for projects of similar risk. This requires more care in project cash 
flow identification and a greater awareness of the implications of the CAPM in terms of required rates 
of return.
Poposttion- 12
Where payback is used it is likely to be calculated on a cash flow basis, including debt service 
commitments.
Proposition 12
Considerable attention is likely to be placed on an evaluation of the cost/revenue relationship at 
different levels of utilisation (liner trades) or freight rate (bulk trades). For companies in the bulk 
trades break-even freight rates will be a significant figure in such an analysis.
Proposition 12
Where companies have a strong commitment to high quality earnings, an important part of the analysis 
relating to a project will be an assessment of the impact of the project on corporate figures. In such 
cases projects with an unfavourable impact on corporate figures, are likely to be rejected. An 
important part of this corporate analysis is likely to be a detailed analysis of the effect of the project
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on overall corporate liquidity.
Proposition. 2Q
The analysis of the effect of projects on corporate figures will be less important in companies which 
are structured on a “single ship company" basis, or which have substantial cash reserves, or which 
have conservative gearing ratios.
Proposition 21
The assessment of all major projects will involve the clear identification of the debt service 
commitments associated with the funding of the project, and the likely relationship of that commitment 
with potential revenues.
Ecoposilion. 22
Projects with any perceived potential for causing bankruptcy will be rejected.
Risk
P ro p o s it io n  23
Risk analysis will generally relate more to corporate risk than to project risk. Corporate risk analysis 
is likely to cover both business risk and financial risk.
Proposition 24
Business risk will be reduced by diversification, in the larger companies. Elsewhere this will prove 
difficult, and risk analysis will be confined to broad considerations in terms of markets, politics, and 
related shipping activities. Strategies such as the use of general purpose ships, the purchase of ships at 
the bottom of the market, etc. may result.
P ro p o s itio n  2 3
The assessment of financial risk is likely to concentrate on a detailed analysis of liquidity and potential 
liquidity problems. Considerable emphasis will be found in the private companies of category 2 and the 
category 3 companies, on being sure that the liquidity position is strong enough to carry through a 
series of adverse events. For category 1 companies the analysis of financial risk will be an integral 
part of the corporate planning system.
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Proposition 28
Relatively limited use is likely to be made of techniques for dealing with project risk, especially those 
requiring some kind of assessment of probability of certain occurrences.
Ngpnatiyfi. proposition 26a
Greater attention should be paid to the assessment of project risk, through the use of a variety of 
techniques, so as to build up a better picture of the degree of risk inherent in the project.
It should be noted that many techniques already in existence offer useful insights into this area, More 
use should be made of them.
Proposition 22
The most likely technique to be found for assessing risk is that of sensitivity analysis. This technique is 
more likely to be used in conjunction with the assessment of the impact of individual projects on 
corporate figures.
Proposition, 28
Attitudes to currency risk will vary. British companies and most other large companies are likely to 




Only in the largest companies will a clear separation of the investment and financing decisions be found. 
Concern with funding is likely to reflect all or some of the factors shown in Table 39.
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Financing Concerns R e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  
^  High Medium  Lov >
i)  A vailab ility  o f finance fo r  
new pro jects
n ) E ffect o f subsidised finance
ii i )  Effect of a lte rn a tiv e
financial packages
iv )  W hether the p ro jec t would 
pose any problems in term s of
-  share price
-  bond ra ting
- liquidity
- s u rv iv a l
ICategory 2| ICategory 3| ; ICategory 1|
ICategory 2 1 ICategory 11* | Category 3|
ICateqories 2 / 3  [Category 1 |*
(Category 1|
: ICateqories 2 /3 |  
ICateqory 1|
: (Categories 2 /3 |
(Categories 2 / 3 |  [Category 1|
ICategory 2 | ICateqories 1 /3 |
Table 39 . Financing concerns
* There is a clanger that these aspects w ill be largely ignored by some category 1 companies.
Proposition 20
Investments in vessels and other fixed assets are likely to be financed as shown in Table 40 .
Method of f in a n c in g
High
R e la t iv e  im p o rta n c e  
M edium Lov
i)  Yard c red it on new ships 
n ) Bank loans
ii i)  Leasing
iv )  Corporate loans
v) New equity
(o ther than re ten tio ns)
v i)  Retentions
[Categories 1 ?2\




ICategory I I * *  
ICateqories 2 /3 ] » » *  
|Category~2]
[Category 3] 
ICategory 1j [Categories 2 /3 |
Categciries 1 /3 | ICategory 2
Table 40 . Financing methods
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*  The relative importance of yard credit for new ships for category 3 companies is shown at this 
level since re latively few new ships w ill be bought, and some w ill be partly  paid for in cash. 
* *T h e  relative importance of bank loans overall for category 1 and 2 companies is likely to be 
lower than for category 3, but significant use is likely to be made of top ups and wraparound and 
stretching facilities.
* * * Leasing w ill not be favoured by many category 2 and 3 companies because of the loss of 
flexib ility which results w ith regard to asset use and disposal.
Prppfl5itipn 2 1
For new buildings the choice of yard is likely to be considerably influenced by the financial 
arrangements.
Prpppsitipn 32
Differences in the effective period for which loans w ill be able to be raised are likely to arise, as 
indicated in Table 41 .
P erio d  of Loan P r o b a b i l i t y  of o b ta in in g  th is  period  
^ H ig h  M edium  l o v .
Loans -  over 10 years
-  5  -  10 years
-  under 5  years
Long te rm  financial leases 
( 1 0 - 1 5  y e a rs )
:
ICategory 1| ICategory 2| ICategory 3|
[Category 11 [Categories 2/31
I All categories |
ICategory 1| [Categories 2 /3 |
Table 4 1 . Loan periods obtained
Proposition 55
Differences in attitudes to the amount of debt taken up are likely to be found, as shown in Table 42 .
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B o r r o v in g  P o lic y L ikelihood of o ccu rren ce  
High M edium  L o v .
i) B orrow  m axim um  amount 
possible on an Individual 
pro jec t
n ) Set an o vera ll lim it to debt
ii i)  C onservative  debt/equ ity  
position





-  1 :
ICategory 2 |
iSome category 3 | USome cateaoru 3l
Table 4 2 . Attitudes to debt 
P roposition  2 4
V ery few  companies w ill set target capital structures. Capital structure per se is unlikely to be a 
decision variable. Attention is likely to be concentrated on the analysis of the factors shown in Table 
43.
In f lu e n ce  on Copitol  
S t r u c t u r e
R e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  
.H ig h  M edium  L o v .
i)  Perceived e ffec t of capital 
s tru c tu re  on share price
ii) Perceived  e ffe c t o f capital 
struc tu re  on bond ratings and 
ab ility  to obtain fu rth e r funds
ii i)  The relationship between  
financial re s e rv e s , p ro fitab ility  
and debt serv ice  requirem ents
ICategory 1 |*
ICategory 2 p rivate l





[Categories 2 /3 | ICategory 1 | * * |
Table 4 3 . Influences on capital structure
*F o r category 1 companies, relative importance is likely to be fa ir ly  low, as long as debt/equity 
ratios are below an acceptable level (say 4 0 -5 0 8 ) .
* * F o r  category 1 companies concern w ith interest cover is a likely surrogate. Again this
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relationship is likely to be the subject of careful scrutiny at the corporate planning stage. 
Proposition £5
Other factors which will considerably affect the capital structure, and which will influence the financing 
decision, are:
(i) the relationship between new investment opportunities and the availability of internal funds, 
flany category 1 companies, with their high quality earnings, are likely to have fairly high 
self-financing ratios. In the other categories this ratio is likely to be much more variable;
(ii) the nature of the assets being funded. Debt will be effectively limited by the amount of security 
which can be provided, which in turn is determined by the current market value of the assets. If the 
ratio of current market value of assets/debt falls below a certain ratio (125-150%) restrictive 
covenants are likely to be applied by lenders, an eventuality which will be avoided by all companies if  
possible;
(iii) the effect of market fashion and changing economic conditions.
5 . Conclusions. L im ita tio n s  of the Study and D ire c tio n  of 
Future Research
The set of propositions outlined above provides a guide to likely behaviour in the area of 
investment and financing decisions within the shipping industry. Attention is also drawn, through the 
two normative propositions, to areas where actual behaviour could be improved by the use of certain 
techniques and concepts outlined in finance theory. In general, however, the relative lack of importance 
of finance theory in actual investment decisions is apparent. Overall, the model developed is one of a 
more complex approach to decision making than is generally assumed, which should provide a useful 
framework for making actual decisions, and for future research.
Inevitably; given the broad based approach used in this study, a number of limitations exist.
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although many of these can be seen as pointers to further research. The more important of these 
limitations are given below:
(i) This emphasis on a specific industry, namely shipping, means that the summary and conclusions 
drawn are clearly based upon discussions with companies and organisations with substantial interests in 
shipping. The view may well be taken that any conclusions drawn must be restricted to that industry, 
which undoubtedly has some interesting and somewhat peculiar features, as well as some very 
interesting and individual characters. Such an approach must necessarily be the one taken here, since 
the evidence collected clearly comes principally from this industry. Nevertheless, the comments 
already made with regard to category 1 companies make it clear that few such companies were 
involved exclusively, or even principally, in shipping. It would thus appear reasonable to hypothesize 
that the behaviour of the category 1 companies in this survey would be consistent with other 
diversified conglomerates, albeit in different industries. If this were true the conclusions of this study, 
at least with regard to category 1 type companies, would become generally applicable to diversified 
conglomerates. The results for category 2 and 3 companies seem more likely to reflect the 
peculiarities of the shipping industry. Nevertheless, it would be very surprising if further studies of 
the behaviour of small or medium firms, in other industries, did not display some of the characteristics 
found in this study. The results found in this study are thus seen as providing a useful base for further 
research in different industries.
(ii) Section A of Chapter A outlines a variety of criticisms and limitations of rational planning 
systems. There is little doubt that the points discussed in this section pose potentially serious problems 
for both finance theory and the theory relating to corporate strategy. No systematic attempt was made 
in this study to consider issues relating to organisational structures, political behaviour, inter-personal 
or group behaviour, or motivational aspects of decision making, though in some instances discussion of 
these issues “emerged" as interviews progressed. Undoubtedly this means that the decision making 
process is even more complex than is suggested by this study. More extreme critics of rational 
planning systems may well argue that omissions of this type make it  virtually impossible to establish 
how decisions are made. This latter view is not accepted. It should be remembered that the model set 
out in section A of this chapter has been derived from individual perceptions of the decision making
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process, and as such is likely to reflect actual behaviour, at least in the areas for which detailed 
questions were asked. The model developed is not claimed to be an all embracing theory of decision 
making, but is seen as providing a basic framework for approaching economic and financial aspects of 
decision making, and ensuring that these are set clearly in a strategic context. This does not deny the 
impact of other factors on the process, and further research in this area would be useful. It is 
nonetheless interesting to note that the theory developed remains rooted in rationality, although the 
rationality is that of managers working in a complex and volatile world, being concerned with the 
survival and continued profitability of their organisations. However, given the intensely competitive 
nature of shipping, it may be that the market forces a degree of rationality on the decision making 
process which may not exist in other industries.
(iii) It may be argued that one of the more important variables in the development of a theory or 
model is the effect of current economic and market conditions. Undoubtedly the conditions within the 
shipping industry in recent years have had an effect on attitudes, decision processes and related 
strategies, perhaps most noticeably for category 2 companies. Changes in such conditions could change 
any of these. At present there is little evidence to suggest that any further dramatic changes are 
imminent, but the possibility remains. Research into different industries would identify patterns 
peculiar to the shipping industry. However, given the spread of interests of most category 1 companies 
it seems unlikely that changing economic and market conditions would lead to significant changes in the 
propositions listed above, as they relate to such companies. Considerable changes might well result in 
lines of activity, and associated strategies, but the broad underlying principles seem likely to be 
unchanged.
(iv) No attempt has been made in this study to relate decision making processes, philosophies or 
strategies, to profitability, or to establish which were the most effective strategies. This represents a 
potentially very useful area for further research.
(v ) a number of areas within the study could usefully be developed further, now that a broad 
theoretical framework has been established. These areas are as follows:
(a) Further work on the reasons for the non-use, or non-communication, of objectives or targets, 
along the lines of that already carried out by Quinn (1977), would be useful.
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(b) Proposition 8 identified the importance of diversification to category 1 companies. Further time 
could usefully be spent on analysing the extent to which this policy is pursued, in terms of the number 
of different activities entered into, and their relationship to each other. The evidence collected 
suggests that American companies may well look for closer links between the various lines of business 
than do their UK counterparts. The reasons for this, and the relative success of the various policies 
require further clarification.
(c) The study identifies the components of the composite investment decision, and attempts to 
evaluate their relative importance. Inevitably this latter evaluation is based upon the viewpoint of 
certain executives within the firms. Further useful insights into the overall appraisal process could be 
obtained by detailed case study analyses of this area. Such studies would be particularly useful in 
clarifying the potitical and interpersonal aspects of the decision making process, which have not formed 
any part of this study. Further studies which attempted to evaluate the relative importance of the 
various components of the investment decision making process in a more objective way would also be 
useful. Particularly interesting areas for further examination are the four stage division of the ideas 
on positioning and flexibility, and the relative importance of the various influences on capital structure.
In spite of these limitations, this study nonetheless provides a number of useful insights into 
investment and financing decisions, and achieves the aims set out at the beginning. Its contribution can 
be summarised as follows:
(i) It contains a detailed appraisal of methods used to analyse and finance capital projects in the 
shipping industry. No study of this type has been related to the shipping industry. As such it  is seen as 
providing a useful addition to the industry literature, which should provide guidance to practising 
managers.
(ii) It enables a detailed assessment to be made of the practical relevance of the theory of finance to 
one particular industry. This provides support to various other studies and writings which are critical 
of finance theory. It identifies areas of overlap and of conflict between the normative theory of finance 
and actual practice, and provides clear evidence that the degree of overlap between them is limited.
(iii) It provides an indication of areas of overlap and linkage between the theory of finance and that 
relating to corporate strategy, in the context of the shipping industry. As such it is seen as providing 
further support and impetus to work which attempts to link these two areas. Relatively little work has 
been done in this area, in spite of its obvious importance, underlined by the findings of this study.
(iv) It provides a descriptive model of investment and financing decisions in the shipping industry. 
This is seen as providing a useful alternative approach to the normative theory of finance, being likely 
to conform more closely to actual practice. As such it provides an alternative framework for analysis, 
with emphasis being put on different aspects of decision making. Particularly important were the 
concerns with positioning and flexibility, and the implications of these concerns for appraisal methods 
and strategies chosen. The model outlined may also be seen as providing a step towards the 
development of a more complex general theory relating to investment and financing decisions.
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Structure of Interviews with Shipping Companies
Interviewees were encouraged to discuss their approach to investment and financing decisions in 
a broad way. Nevertheless all interviews followed the broad structure outlined below.
1. General company information
(a) Structure -  parent/subsidiary etc.
(b) Place where strategic decisions relating to shipping investments are made.
(c) Shipping activities:
-  transportation of particular products
-  world wide or restricted operations
-  liner trades
-  bulk trades
-  tramp market
-  transportation for a particular company/s
-  other
2. Objectives and targets
(a) A specific question was asked in all cases as to the extent to which share price or 
wealth maximisation were seen as objectives.
(b) Overall objectives -  including reference to any particular objectives/problems 
associated with fam ily/private companies.
. (c) The nature and extent of any financial targets set, covering such things as profits,
growth and dividends, and ways in which these have changed over time and with 
different market conditions.
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3. Corporate planning systems.
Questioning in this area developed as the thesis progressed, in the pilot study questioning 
concentrated on the identification of the main strategic issues considered in recent decisions (see 4(d) 
below), together with the identification of the kind of economic indicators or trade forecasts made or 
used. The pilot study indicated the need for further questioning in the area. Companies were thus 
asked to provide an indication of their approach to planning in terms o f :
(a) Whether a system of corporate planning was in use.
(b) If  so. the period ahead for which plans were made.
(c) The nature of the planning and review process. In particular, whether the process
occurred on a regular basis or on an ad hoc basis for new investments.
(d) Whether a system of annual budgeting existed, and the links between the budgetary and 
planning systems, and specific capital project approval.
In later interviews, and certainly in all the interviews which took place in the USA. much more 
time was devoted to questioning about the planning systems themselves, and the nature of the 
information collected for these systems. The approach identified in the U.S. Maritime Administration 
publication "A guide to strategic planning for the U.S. liner industry" was adopted as the base. This 
implies a far greater collection of background information for use in the decision making process. More 
detailed questions were thus asked about this information, as detailed in section 5(c) of this appendix.
4. Investments and their associated strategies
(a) Whether any vessels had been added to their fleets in the last five years, and if  so, the
number and type, together with details of the time of acquisition and the age of the
vessels acquired.
(b) The likely period of holding such vessels within the fleet.
(c) Whether it  was the intention to acquire any more vessels in the next five years. If  so,
an indication of age and type was requested.
(d) The main strategic issues which were considered in recent vessel acquisitions, or those 






All companies were encouraged to discuss this area widely, although consideration of 
specific acquisitions was seen as providing a focus for discussions. As interviews 
progressed discussions also focussed in more detail on issues related to strategic 
positioning, in terms of such things as the analysis of strengths and weaknesses, the 
ability to respond to opportunities and threats, and the identification of actions and 
strategies aimed at improving the strategic position.
Prqject Appraisal
(a) Whether vessels were appraised as individual projects, or as part of an overall system.
(b) The length of time for which it was expected vessels would be used.
(c) The nature of the information collected to support the investment decision. In the pilot
study questioning on background information and forecasts used in the appraisal 
process was fairly broadly based. Questions thus concentrated on identifying 
economic indicators and estimates of trade levels which were used, in the areas o f :
-  world trade
-  economic indicators
- estimates of trade for particular categories or sectors.
Companies were asked to provide details of the types of indicators used, and of 
forecasts made or used (together with the period covered), wherever possible.
Therafter. as the thesis progressed the questioning in this area became more 
detailed, as links with corporate planning systems became more apparent. Detailed 
questioning about the information used in the decision making process was thus extended
to cover the following areas:
- industry data
- company data
-  market data
-  competition/capacity data
-  other environmental data.
It should be noted that the responses were particularly variable, with whole areas being 
effectively irrelevant to many companies, depending upon their activities. In other 
cases responses in individual areas were very detailed. In such cases the detailed 
sections of the study referred to in section 3 were used as the base for extended 
questioning.
The type of specific estimates made of future events/flows which are incorporated into 
the decision making process, together with an indication of the period of time covered by 
such estimates. Specifically, whether estimates were made for the following:
-  operating costs
- operating revenues
-  disposal values
-  corporate cash flow statements
-  corporate income statements
-  corporate balance sheets
-  debt service requirements 
Methods of adjusting estimates for inflation.
Criteria used in evaluating projects, specifically :
-  payback
-  accounting rate of return
-  net present value
-  internal rate of return
-  break-even freight rates
-  others
(g) Where discounting techniques were used, the basis of the calculation:
-  assumed 10075 equity financing
- cash flows based on the equity contribution plus debt servicing
(h) Details of any sensitivity analyses run on projects, covering such things as changes in:
-  acquisition cost
-  operating costs
-  revenues
-  asset life
-  others (eg interest rates/exchange rates)
(I) Ways in which risk and uncertainty were incorporated Into the decision.
Financing Methods,
(a) The extent to which the investment and financing decisions are separate.
(b) How recent vessel acquisitions had been financed:
-  equity
-  retentions
-  independent loans
- yard credit
-  other
Companies were asked whether there was a specific policy towards borrowing or 
whether sources were used on a more ad hoc basis.
(c) The extent to which the choice of shipbuilder was influenced by the financial 
arrangements offered, together with reasons for the choice of particular yards.
(d) Whether the maximum amount of loan would normally be taken up on:
-  new vessels
- second hand vessels
together with an explanation as to the reason why (or why not).
(e) The proportion of cost likely to be funded from loans for:
-  new vessels
-  second hand vessels
(f) The normal period of loans, for both new and second hand vessels.
(g) Security given for loans.
(h) The extent to which market conditions influence financing methods.
Capital Structure
(a) A specific question was asked in all cases, as to whether there was a view on the total 
level of debt overall, and the extent to which external funds were limited.
(b) Whether there was a limit to the total amount of debt taken up, and if  so, the rationale
for this. Also whether views on such a limit had changed in recent years as markets
changed.
(c) Whether there were any accounting ratios for which minimum ratios were considered 
necessary, e.g. interest coverage, cash adequacy etc..
(d) A specific question was asked on whether the organisation worked towards the 
achievement of a particular long run capital structure, which is broadly adhered to over 
time. If so, what percentage is aimed for (using debt/tdebt + equity)).
(e) Whether views on capital structure had been affected by current market conditions.
(f) Perceptions of leasing in relation to capital structure ratios.
(g) A specific question was asked as to whether in considering the level of debt, any 
attempt was made to assess the impact of changes therein on the value of ordinary 
shares, either in general terms or in a quantified way. If so, details were requested.
(h) Whether further equity had been considered, together with reasons as to why/why not. 
If it had, were attempts made to quantify its cost?
(i) Whether other forms of finance had been considered, eg. leasing, hire purchase, 
convertibles. The rationale for the use, or rejection, of particular methods of funding, 
were also sought.
If discounting techniques were used, what rate of discount was used (as a percentage)? 
Was this rate based on :
-  an estimate of the weighted average cost of capital.
-  the interest rate on the main loan.
-  a minimum cut off rate.
-  some other rate.
The rationale was sought.
Views on currency risk and attempts to reduce it (if any).
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P a rtic ip a tin g  C om panies/Ind iv iduals
Alcoa Steamship Company. Inc. New York. ( A subsidiary of Alcoa)
American Trading Transport Co Inc. New York.
Apex Marine Corporation. Lake Success, New York.
George Bell. Dublin.
Ben Line Steamers Ltd. Edinburgh.
Bolton Steam Shipping Company Ltd. London.
Booker Line. Liverpool. (A subsidiary of Booker McConnell pic)
Burmah Oil Tankers Ltd.. London. (A subsidiary of The Burmah Oil pic)
Century Chartering Co, Inc. New York.
Chandris (England) Ltd. London.
Cunard Steamship Company pic. Hammersmith. (A subsidiary of Trafalgar House pic) 
Diamatis Pateras. London.
Denholm Group. Glasgow.
Ellerman Lines Ltd. London.
Elpidon Ltd. London.
Energy Transportation Corporation. New York.
Exxon International Company. New Jersey.
Farrell Lines Inc. New York.
Furness, Withy & Company Ltd.. London.
J. A. Gardner &. Co. Ltd.. Glasgow.
Gibson, Andrew. New York. (Ex president Delta Lines)
Golotrade Shipping and Chartering Inc.. New York.
Graig Shipping pic. London.
Gulf and Eastern Steamship and Chartering Corporation. New York.
Harrisons (Clyde) Limited. Glasgow.
Hogarth Shipping Company Limited. London.
Interport Marine Agencies Ltd. London.
Irish Shipping Ltd. Dublin.
London & Overseas Freighters pic. London.
Lyle Shipping pic. Glasgow.
Marine Transport Lines Inc. New York.
McLean Industries Inc. New York.
Moore McCormack Resources, Inc. Stamford, Connecticut.
Ocean Transport &. Trading pic. Liverpool.
Ogden Marine Inc. New York.
Overseas Container Lines Ltd. London.
Overseas Shipholding Group Inc. New York.
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. London.
Point Shipping Corporation. New York.
Prudential Lines Inc. New York.
Reardon Smith Line Ltd. Cardiff.
Scio Shipping Inc. New York.
Sea Containers Inc. New York.
Sea-Land Service Inc. New Jersey.
Southern Star Shipping Co Inc. New York.
Stephenson Clarke Shipping Ltd. London. (A subsidiary of Powell Duffryn pic) 
Stolt-Nielsen Inc. Greenwich, Connecticut.
Texaco Inc. White Plains, New York.
Universe Tankships Inc. New York.
Victory Carriers Inc. New York.
Waterman Steamship Corporation. New York.
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P a rtic ip a tin g  Banks
Bankers Trust. London.
Bankers Trust. New York.
Cayzer Irvine. London.
Chase Manhattan. New York.
Chemical. New York.
Citibank. London.
Continental Illinois. London 




Irving Trust. New York.
Kleinwort Benson. London.
Morgan Guaranty Trust. New York. 
National Westminster, USA. New York. 
Nordic. London.
Shipping Finance Corporation. Dublin.
U.S. Maritime Administration. Washington. 
Williams & Glyn. London.
